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understanding the true nature of a “culture’s legal system“ (Bohannan 1965: 41-42). 
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               Preface 
 
This book is about dynamics of identity formation and legal pluralism among the Siltie People in 
an ethnic federal state of Ethiopia. The existence of multiple ethnic groups in Ethiopia has not 
only made the country home to diverse cultures but also, an abode of competing and conflicting 
orders and juridical systems. Since 1991, the country has embarked upon a unique political 
experiment known as „ethnic federalism.“ The 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia grants specific rights to ethnic groups, which ultimately involves the 
recognition of ethnic-juridical orders. The ethno-federal system presents a rich field of 
exploration in the area of legal pluralism. The Ethiopian experience can be expressed as 
constitutionally sanctioned legal pluralism and its non-colonial history coupled with the 
introduction of developmental democratic state in the last decade has made the country’s legal 
pluralism a unique phenomenon begging for exploration.  
By examining the versatile relationship between the Ethiopian state and the Siltie people (an 
ethnic group who reside in Southern Nations, Nationalities and People's Regional State in the 
country’s current federal structure and are the subjects of the study) from the late 19th century to 
the present, this book provides an anthropological understanding of the legal dynamics of state-
society relations, focusing on Siltie people in southern Ethiopia. Previous Socio-Legal and 
Anthropological studies mostly focus on the binary nature of legal systems. The literature 
categorizes legal systems into simple, primitive, formal or informal, labeling the informal legal 
regimes as (not) norm imposing and having little legal natures (less legal status) than what they 
consider to be modern and more institutionalized legal systems (Malinowski, 1926; Radcliff-
Brown, 1942). Research done so far on legal pluralism in Ethiopia has focused on comparing the 
state system with the customary courts, and usually tend to be descriptive (e.g. Gebre et al. 2013, 
Alula and Getachew, 2008). Prior studies have also excluded the dynamics witnessing in the area 
of legal pluralism in the country. In addition, they failed to address the complexity of plural legal 
setting in the Siltie context. In an attempt to fill these gaps, the following four inter-related 
research questions are addressed: what are the legal systems the Siltie employ? How do legal 
systems interact in the area? Why and how do disputants prefer one form of conflict resolution to 
the other in the pluralistic legal setting?  
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Building on the above questions, the study focuses specifically on how actors in the religious, 
customary and state legal systems settle dispute cases, paying attention to causes of conflict, and 
the strategies mediators employ to resolve conflicts. It analyses how dispute settlers use dispute 
settlement forums not only to end conflicts but also, as an avenue to protect the custom and the 
language of the people, to attempt to preserve and promote the identity of the Siltie. The study 
also theorizes the link between dispute settlement, identity formation, and power generation of 
local dispute settlers. In this regard, the study shows that there exists some form of relationship 
between dispute resolution and identity formation. The book sheds light on the prospect of legal 
pluralism in Ethiopia as a distinct socio-cultural context. 
Using an actor-oriented analytical approach, the study examines the perceptions of dispute 
settlers and disputants toward plural legal setting, a phenomenon researchers in the field of 
socio-legal and anthropology have not yet given the attention it deserves. It also looks into the 
local communities' perceptions of plural legal settings and the dispute settlers' interactions 
among themselves and with disputants. Importantly, the study pays attention to the different 
circumstances that lead to the crisis of legitimacy of the state legal system, which in turn paves 
the ways for the re-emergence of neo-traditional power (Santos de Sousa, 2006; Klute/Embaló, 
2006; Cheeseman, 2016).  
The research data that inform this book were collected mainly through the employment of a legal 
anthropological approach, with the extended case method (Burawoy, 1998, 2009) and 
ethnography as the main research techniques employed. The book uses social constructivism 
perspective to grasp the emic point of view of Siltie about the legal realities in the area. Apart 
from the analysis of the socio-legal and cultural settings including the various legal systems 
operating in the area, 14 dispute cases were analyzed in what Geertz (1973) calls a „thick 
description“ way. The first three cases show not only the role of religious courts in dispute 
settlement, but they also reveal the involvement of state and customary legal systems into faith-
based dispute resolution processes. The cases indicate the contentious natures of intra-faith legal 
actors in the conflict resolution process. The remaining eleven cases provide an account of how 
the various legal systems interact, complement as well as compete against each other over cases. 
The cases collected from dispute settlers depict the perceptions of local legal actors about 
themselves and the various legal systems in an attempt to appeal to clients.  
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The cases indicate the oscillating tendency of power relation between legal actors on one hand 
and the state on the other. The cases demonstrate how the various local values, and norms have 
become important instruments to potentially avoid and end conflicts.  
Since I have researched the area I belong to, the issue of subjectivity will come into mind. Thus, 
in order to minimize the methodological challenges, the book explores the legal systems 
operating in Siltie area within a wider socio-cultural context on the one hand, and has 
contextualized the legal plural constellations in the frameworks of the Federalist Ethiopia and 
global developments on the other. In this regard, by tracing the genesis of legal pluralism in 
Ethiopia, the study analyzes the trajectories of legal systems historically under different 
Ethiopian regimes. This helps us to understand the changes and continuities witnessed in the area 
of legal pluralism in the country. Additionally, aiming at contributing to the existing debate on 
legal pluralism, works of socio-legal and anthropological scholars have also been consulted. The 
study discusses the genesis of legal pluralism scholarship, demonstrating how and why the 
contemporary legal landscape has diversified which has ultimately given rise to legal hybridism. 
In this regard, the book explores the socio-legal and legal anthropological literature critically 
(e.g. Griffiths 1986, 2002; Moore 1978; Merry 1988; Gunderson 1992; Benda-Beckmann et al. 
1997; Allot and Woodman 1985; Roberts 1998; Tamanaha 1993, 2001, 2008; K. von Benda-
Beckmann 1981, 1985a; Santos de Sousa, 2006; Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Keebet von 
Benda-Beckmann, 2006). It examines diachronically how the existing literature debates about 
legal pluralism. The study finds out that legal pluralism as a topic of study continues to be a 
center of contention and an agenda for academic discussion among socio-legal and anthropology 
scholars. However, taking empirical and theoretical dimensions of analysis, the study represents 
a departure from the existing literature that gives attention either to the theory or to empirical 
data as the base of analysis of the notion of legal pluralism. It thus provides a new perspective on 
legal pluralism based on a combination of theoretical and empirical understandings of the 
practices of legal systems among the Siltie and neighboring ethnic groups. 
The study finds out that there are plural legal and institutional settings in the study area. The 
legal systems found in area are discussed under two categories here: (i) state modes of dispute 
settlement, and (ii) non-state means of dispute settlements.  
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The state imposed modes of dispute resolution comprise some public institutions and associated 
rules, while the religious and customary modes of settlement of disputes comprise the respective 
norms, and belief systems of the local communities. 
One of the main findings of this study is that the relation between the various legal systems is 
characterized by dualism of cooperation and competition. The interactions of legal systems also 
display contradictory perspectives and cross into territories claimed by the other. This 
ambivalent relationship hints at the porosity of boundaries between the various systems. For 
instance, although the Ethiopian constitution is proclaimed as the supreme law of the land, and 
that serious crimes such as homicide are reserved for the formal criminal justice system alone, 
various forms of law, notably customary courts, deal with all forms of conflicts (including those 
reserved for formal law) at the grassroots level in the study area. The state legal actors rely on 
the non-state ones on dispute cases the state legal system cannot adjudicate. The empirical data 
presented in the book indicate further that some dispute cases do not end in one court, as the 
disputants often travel from one court to another. Some cases, especially marital disputes that the 
state court deliberates on, can also be taken by disputants to the customary courts and vice versa. 
The parties also travel from one customary court to another to resolve dispute cases. This 
indicates the existence of forum shopping not only between various legal systems but also, with 
in the same legal system.  
The state legal system contests for institutional legitimacy with customary legal systems since 
the non-state actors are widely chosen by the community due to the fact that the social norms 
that govern the activities of customary courts are more important for face-to-face 
interactions than the formal law (See Griffiths, 1986, 2002; Merry 1988; Benda-Beckmann et al. 
1997). Thus, the study argues that the legal systems do not only coexist in a specific socio-
cultural setting but also, they compete with each other because of a number of factors including 
legitimacy. The various cases examined and the findings presented in the book also demonstrate 
this reality. 
My data indicate also that traditional ways of conflict resolution are at a dead giving way to the 
emergence of legal hybridism. The book indicates that legal pluralism, the coexistence and 
contending interaction of legal systems is not a myth, as stated in some literature (See Teubner, 
1992; Tamanaha, 1993), but an empirical reality. Indeed, Siltie is characterized by a complex and 
hybridized legal reality that regulates the day-to-day life of Siltie people today. At the same time, 
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neo-traditional powers emerge by using conflict settlement processes in order to consolidate 
power. Local power holders among the Siltie embrace diverse legal perceptions which in turn 
boosts their legal agencies and empower their relations with state actors.  
The findings of this study also reveal that the customary and religious legal systems have got 
resurgence following the restructuring of the Ethiopian state into ethnic federalism since the 
1990s. The book further argues that the declining legitimacy of the state judiciary, which is 
precipitated partly due to political interferences and inefficient delivery of justice to the 
community, has contributed to non-state modes of dispute settlement to become popular among 
the local community. The various roles customary courts actors play in delivering justice at the 
grassroots and the agency of local actors who tended to manoeuvre the constitutional 
concessions vis a vis a strong state controls have also contributed a lot in making the customary 
courts to have more legitimacy than other state tribunals. The book thus argues that in states like 
the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (henceforth, FDRE), it is the lived realities of 
actors in the customary institutions that influence the decisions of state actors to cooperate with 
the customary court actors than the state policies. This development makes us to question the 
hypothesis put forward by Santos de Sousa, (2006) and Klute and Embalo (2006) that underlines 
neo-traditional institutions can only resurrect in a weak state, for the state's machinery will 
become ineffective to deliver services including justice to the people they are part of.  
The study argues that laws have become a weapon for the powerful, as the state officials tend to 
use law to serve their vested interests (e.g. some state official make use of law to attack those 
whom they perceive as anti-state policies). It also finds out that even if the 1995 Constitution 
sanctioned legal pluralism and has introduced a radical departure in the recognition of the 
customary and religious laws, it is the ways the religious and customary courts serve the society 
that earn them more legitimacy rather than the constitutional spaces.  
It further argues that the Ethiopian state seems to be more powerful in the political spheres than 
social and judicial areas. This state of affairs helps non-state actors to manoeuvre and appeal to 
the community that in turn helps them boost their local legal agencies and power relations with 
other actors. By examining the contested nature of law and how it exists in every semi-
autonomous social field (Moore, 1978), the findings of this study contribute new ideas to the 
existing literature on the sociological conception of the law. It also contributes to emerging legal 
spheres as perceived by scholars who are conversant with hybridized legal systems (Gluckman, 
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1956; Santos de Sousa, 2000; Lewellen; 2003; Klute and Bellagamba, 2006, Berman, 2012; 
Cheeseman, 2016). The study also contributes ideas on the choices parties make to settle their 
cases in a plural legal setting, 'Strategic Choices' (Tamanaha, 2008), ‟Forum Shopping” Benda-
Beckmann, 1971; 1986). The study demonstrates how the weak employ state law as a weapon 
for everyday resistances (e.g. the community frequently uses the constitution to ask the rights 
transgressed by local officials) and hence to coerce state officials and judges to „abide by the 
law“ and bring democracy from below (Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Keebet von Benda-
Beckmann, 2006). Thus, results of the present research do not only contribute to the Siltie 
ethnography but also, to the current debates on legal pluralism and theories of power. To this 
end, it explains the diversified and hybridized nature of legal pluralism, and the emergence of 
new forms of neo-traditional power respectively in contemporary Ethiopia, and possibly beyond. 
 In sum, the book argues that while adopting hybridized legal perceptions both the state and non-
state legal actors have developed multiple allegiances to the plural legal systems operating in the 
area. It finally argues that the recent recovery of local modes of dispute settlement has a link with 
the revitalization of ethnic sentiments and identity formation processes the Siltie people have 
been undergoing since the 1990s. 
This book is divided into ten chapters. The first chapter introduces the research problem, the 
objectives of the study and research questions, as well as the rationale for the researcher studying 
his society. The chapter also explains the field experiences and the methodological approaches 
used. This part deals with also the social scientific and legal pluralist approaches that have been 
employed to understand the state-society relations. It argues that anthropology has no longer 
become limited to foreign culture and the study of others. Although it has some assets, 
examining one's own society has its challenges. Aiming at avoiding any form of subjectivity and 
not to take things for granted, the researcher has adopted a delicate balance between being a 
stranger, and a native to look at the world based on the views of the local community.  
The second chapter deals with the study area, the various socio-economic activities and the local 
means of subsistence the people are engaging in. It also looks into the dynamics of state-society 
relations, and the religious activities as well as the kinship and social organizations of the Siltie. 
The third chapter deals with the theoretical approach and review of related literature, the genesis 
of legal pluralism study and the historical trajectories it has undergone. This chapter lays the 
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foundation for subsequent chapters by indicating how plural legal systems have become means 
for settling disputes not only in colonized world but also, in every part of the world.  
It goes further in detail to indicate how the contemporary legal systems have been characterized 
by hybridism. The fifth chapter also lays the milestone for next chapters by analyzing the legal, 
cultural and religious milieus as well as legally pluralistic socio-cultural structures and dynamics 
of plural legal settings operating in the study area. The section states how local legal actors play 
a significant role not only to maintain the social orders but also have become important social 
actors as custodian of Siltie culture as well. The sixth chapter explores the state and non-state 
modes of dispute settlement, and the various norms and values local dispute settlers and state 
actors employ to end conflicts. It also examines the interactions between state and non-state 
actors, the agency of local actors and the competitions between intra-faith, and inter-faith actors 
in the local socio-political settings. Building from the sixth chapter, chapter seven deals with the 
various types of customary modes of dispute settlement, and the interaction between local 
systems of dispute settlements. This section also discusses the initiatives from local dispute 
settlers to revive the customary system and its final failed project. Chapter seven explores the 
self-perceptions of actors and the rise of neo-traditional leadership in the study area. This chapter 
is put in conversation with the previous chapters in an attempt to show how the self-
representation and expressions of dispute settlers have become a reflection of power 
contestations between legal actors, on the one hand, and the rise of neo-traditional leadership that 
works parallel with the modern state on the other. The chapter looks intensively into dispute 
cases that have incorporated the various values and norms, which have been discussed in the 
preceding sections. Chapter eight deals with the inter-ethnic conflict between the Siltie and the 
Gurage, and processes of identity formation. Drawing ideas from the previous chapters, this part 
analyzes the relation between the revival of dispute settlement and the identity formation 
processes the Siltie have been undergoing since the 1990s. Linking with the preceding chapters, 
the ninth chapter sheds light on the prospect of plural legal systems in a developmental and 
federal state of Ethiopia. It also overviews the genesis of the legal transplantation processes and 
the local responses that finally led to the inception of legal pluralism in the Siltie area. The 
chapter hints the ways forward to the future socio-legal and anthropological studies. The tenth 
chapter recapitulates the book by stressing the main findings and arguments, the empirical and 
theoretical contributions of the book and prospects for further investigation. The chapter also 
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links together the research questions, the methodology, and the findings of the study. It likewise 
discusses and interprets the findings in relation to the theories employed. 
 
 
                          Figure 1 Map of the Study Area (Source: CSA 2007; Mo WIE and ERA, 2010; Filed 
Survey, 2016) 
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Figure 2 State and Non-State actors attended a customary court to investigate a suspect for an arson case Mamulae 
village, Werabe (January, 2017)1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 The pictures used in this dissertation have been taken by the researcher while in the field between August 2014-
Feburary, 2017. 
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                              CHAPTER ONE 
                       INTRODUCTION 
STATING THE PROBLEMS OF THE RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES 
1.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the various ideas presented in socio-legal and anthropological literature on 
legal pluralism, the areas not explored so far on the notion and empirical justifications for 
exploring legal pluralism in the ethnic federal state of Ethiopia. It argues that the constitutionally 
installed legal pluralism with its non-colonized history and the introduction of developmental 
democratic state in the last two decades has made the Ethiopian legal reality an important area of 
exploration for a comparative understanding of legal pluralism. The chapter has employed the 
diachronic and synchronic approaches to understand the genesis, operations as well as dynamics 
of plural legal settings in Ethiopia in general and among the Siltie in particular. It also 
investigates the rationale for studying one's own society. It is stated in the chapter that 
anthropology has no longer become limited to exotic society and the study of others. The chapter 
also discusses the various methodological approaches, notably extended case method and 
ethnography as crucial tools to understand the legal reality of the Siltie. An actor oriented 
approach has been mainly employed to understand the interactions of dispute settlers and 
disputants in the study area. In this regard, social constructivism perspective has been used to 
grasp the emic point of view of the Siltie and their neighbors. Finally, in the chapter I argue that 
legal hybridism becomes an emerging legal reality in the multi-ethnic states such as Ethiopia. 
1.2. Stating the Research Problem 
The intellectual genesis of the concept of legal pluralism harks back to the discovery of 
indigenous forms of law in African villages and among New Guinean tribes' men, to debates 
concerning the pluralistic law under advanced capitalism (Merry 1988: 869).  
Authors like Tamanaha (2008) push the origin of legal pluralism's scholarship back to the 1930s. 
Benda-Beckmann (2002) indicates that scholars so far could not bring a unique definition of 
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legal pluralism despite the fact that socio-legal and anthropological studies debate on legal 
pluralism for over four decades. Hence, it continues to be hotly debated among researchers. 
These discussions turn around the question „whether or not one is prepared to admit the 
theoretical possibility of more than one legal system within a given socio-political space based 
on different sources of ultimate validity and maintained by forms of organization other than the 
state“ (Benda-Beckmann 2002: 37).  
A good number of works have looked into legal pluralism since its inception as an academic 
pursuit in the 20th century. Scholars like John Griffiths (1986), Anne Griffiths (2002), Moore 
(1978), Merry (1988), Gunderson (1992), Benda-Beckmann et al. (1997), Allot and Woodman 
(1985), Roberts (1998), Tamanaha (1993, 2001, 2008), Keebet von Benda-Beckmann (1981, 
1985), Santos de Sousa (2006), and Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann (2006) 
are engaged in the debates, discussing issues of how to map out what type of complexity legal 
pluralism should address. They ask whether legal pluralism requires the existence of more than 
one legal system, or whether various „legal modes“ are sufficient to speak of legal pluralism 
within one legal system (Benda-Beckmann, 2002). As Ethiopia is one of the two African 
countries that have not been colonized, the Ethiopian case promises to be a fruitful field for this 
debate and hence for theory-building in the field.  
Recently, some scholars came up with new dimensions of legal pluralism. Santos de Sousa 
(2006), for instance, indicates that the classical differentiations of legal pluralism have been 
reshaped by the emergence of the most complex forms of legal pluralism that encompass 
customary, religious, national and also global norms that have no clear boundaries between them. 
He calls this „legal hybridization” (Santos de Sousa 2006: 39). It is important, therefore, to ask, 
if the concept of legal pluralism does suffice to encompass these changes or if we have to modify 
the concept and employ instead legal hybridization in the ongoing discussion. If yes, what are the 
manifestations of legal hybridization? Can it be found in any multinational or multiethnic state 
such as Ethiopia? Is it part of a new development within developing countries? These are the 
central questions this book explores empirically. As a consequence, the study examines legal 
developments, paying attention to the contemporary development of hybrid forms of legal 
systems. The study also gives attention to the dynamics, changes and continuities of legal 
pluralism in general and in Ethiopia in particular by carefully inspecting the Siltie experience. 
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Santos de Sousa indicates that legal hybridization characterizes the contemporary legal reality of 
Africa (Santos de Sousa, 2006).  
Due to the country's multi-ethnic features, Ethiopia's legal landscape shows aspects of pluralism. 
Very few works, however, explored legal pluralism in Ethiopia focusing on customary, religious 
and state legal systems. Works on customary, religious and public institutions of various ethnic 
groups in Ethiopia (e.g., Alula and Getachew 2008; Gebre et al. 2013) explain how legal systems 
play significant roles in resolving conflicts in the societies they are part of. These works, 
however, do not look comparatively at the interplay and interactions between the customary, the 
religious and state institutions. They do not address also the systems of dispute settlement among 
the Siltie. Research works by Mamo Hebo (2006) also explored the roles of local dispute 
settlement for land disputes and showed how plural legal systems played an important role in 
settling land related disputes among the Arsi Oromo. Meron's (2010) work also looked at the 
roles of religious figures for dispute settlement in the context of plural legal setting in Wello 
area, Northern Ethiopia. Both, works, however, are limited to particular context with specific 
cases. The southern Ethiopia in general and the Siltie in particular are not covered by the studies. 
Also scholars like Dinberu et al. (1995) and Bahru (2002) did examine the different legal 
systems operating in the Siltie area. Dinberu, for instance, described customary modes of dispute 
resolution among the Siltie, namely Ye Silti Serra, Yemelga Serra and Dambus2. While 
investigating the local governance and dispute settlement modes of the Kistane- and the Sebbat 
Bet-Gurage, Bahru also looked into local modes of dispute settlements employed by the Siltie. In 
his analysis of the respective legal institutions, Bahru tries to show the various aspects of 
customary legal systems (Bahru 2002:17). The author identified Ye Siltie Serra, Dambus, and 
Yemelga Serra as the customary modes of conflict resolution of the Siltie (Bahru 2002: 19). Both 
works neither explain the natures and procedures of customary and religious institutions of 
dispute settlement, nor do they deal with the nature of these institutions, their internal plurality or 
their relations with one another and with the state legal system.  
Since some decades, legal anthropology highlights the internal legal pluralism of any social field 
((e.g. Moore, 1978); ("pluralism of legal pluralism”, Tamanaha, 2010); ("state legal pluralism” 
Woodman, 1998)) in order to grasp the legal reality practiced in a given society. 
                                                     
2 All emic terms are explained in the glossary.  
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 Researches done so far, however, did not explore these areas deeply enough. Prior works also 
left out the idea of identifying the various sources of customary law and the roles that the value 
and belief system of the Siltie play for settling disputes.  
Alemayehu (2004) has examined legal pluralism in Ethiopia. Although he paid much attention to 
structural legal pluralism, he did neither look empirically into legal actors' and disputants' 
perception of the existence of plural legal systems in a sociological perspective (Griffiths 2002), 
nor did he deal with interactions among the state, religious and customary dispute settlements.  
Despite the fact that dispute settlers’ power relations and self-impressions have important 
implications to understand the legal realities in a given socio-legal setting, previous research 
works gave little attention to these areas. Furthermore, even if the state legal system has been 
expanded to the lowest administrative structures, the significances of customary dispute 
settlement institutions are significantly increasing (Alula and Getachew, 2008). This is also the 
case with the Siltie. It has now been observed that the customary dispute settlement modes of the 
Siltie are resuscitating since the 1990s. Studies so far did not explore the reasons and the 
theoretical assumptions behind the revival of the customary systems in the study area.  
Even though the state law is considered the dominant legal system, the state, in fact, makes 
concessions to customary as well as to religious dispute settlement institutions. Even homicide 
cases or conflicts over land, for instance, are resolved by the customary legal system, a procedure 
that is in principle not allowed by state law. The customary legal system actually addresses land 
as well as murder cases adopting thereby win-win rather than win-loss approaches like the state 
system does. This indicates that there is a contrast between political discourses on the one hand 
and local practices on the other. Recent studies also show that the customary legal systems have 
resolved many disputes at the local level (Alula and Getachew 2008: v). The works mentioned 
above, however, do hardly address the empirical reality as far legal practices are concerned.  
Even if the majority of the Siltie adheres to Islam, there are followers of Christianity who resided 
in Siltie land at least since the mid-nineteenth century. There are interfaith disputes which are 
due to several factors unique to the area.  
In this regard, it is the customary and the religious institutions that resolve such kinds of inter-
religious conflicts. The state, religious, customary, and the currently injected global laws 
(Tamanaha 2008: 410) are the different legal systems co-existing among the Siltie.  
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The growing religiosity among Siltie youths brings new norms based on a strict interpretation of 
Islamic jurisdiction in the area. This (Salafi) interpretation of Islamic law by the youth presents 
itself as a new domain of legal norms opposed to state-sponsored Shari'a courts that are formed 
from the smallest administrative Qebele3 to the highest levels. Whereas the (Salafi) interpretation 
of Islamic law does not dispose of recognized structures in the area, it nevertheless attracts the 
attention of the younger generation. These are also areas that are not explored by scholars so far. 
There are no studies which tried to compare the institutions’ processes of change within this 
particular socio-cultural setting diachronically (see also Moore 2000). Most studies fail to 
comparatively explore the natures of the various institutions of dispute resolution.  
Little attention has been given to the local communities’ perspectives on choice making between 
the existing institutions of dispute settlement (forum shopping). This holds also true with regard 
to the significance and interplay of state, religious, and customary law in the area.  
While there is a rich, largely unempirical literature about Shari’a as an idea, there are only 
relatively few empirical studies of Muslim institutionalized legal practices (Twinning 2010: 9). 
Moreover, few works deal empirically with the interface between the Western judiciary model, 
the Shari'a and the customary legal systems. By exploring the empirical legal reality, this book 
endeavors to narrow the gap between the theoretical explanations about legal pluralism and the 
empirical legal reality. To this end, the book adopts a comparative perspective. It also explores 
the features of the relationships between the various legal systems and finally, by focusing on a 
case in the constitutionally installed legal heterogeneity in contemporary Ethiopia, it will 
contribute to the growing theoretical debate on legal pluralism.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
3Qebele is the lowest form of state administrative structure in Ethiopia. 
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1.3. Objectives of the Study  
This book has assessed the interplay between different institutions of dispute settlement among 
the Siltie and aspects of change and continuity in the pluralistic legal setting of the community. 
Specifically, the study has attempted to: 
• Examine the dynamic relationship that has been existing and still exists between the 
customary, state and religious institutions of dispute settlement (to understand whether 
the three legal systems cooperate and exchange cases or contend each other or both). 
• Explore the local communities' perspectives on a preference among the various 
institutions or the choice making process of the community's views in opting for one 
institution versus the other in the plural legal setting in the study area. 
• Examine the existing concept of legal pluralism against the development of legal 
hybridization in the study area. 
•  Narrow the ethnographic gap in the literature about the Siltie people. 
1.4. Research Questions 
The book has addressed the following research questions: These are:- 
• How do the Siltie settle disputes among themselves and with others? 
• How do modes of dispute settlements interact in the Siltie socio-cultural setting? 
• What are the local communities’ perspectives on the choice making (forum shopping) or 
disputants' processes of choosing a legal system in the pluralistic legal constellation in the 
area?  
• How do actors (mediators, disputants) in the dispute settlement process express their 
mediation services? 
1.5. Significances of the Study 
This book can indicate the reasons alternative dispute settlements, such as customary and 
religious, become more efficacious than the state laws. By exploring the interaction and 
coexistence of the state, Shari'a and customary courts through expressions of actors, the study 
has shown the centrality of legal pluralism in the study area. Furthermore, the study is believed 
to contribute to the development of theories of legal pluralism by showing how different legal 
systems cooperate on some cases while contending on the others in a socio-cultural setting.  
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It will also contribute to the development of alternative dispute settlement institutions as a tool to 
resolve disputes which will also be relevant for policy makers. It will also help to have a 
comparative understanding of how different legal systems operate among the various ethnic 
groups in Africa and possibly beyond. 
1.6.  Field Work Location and Field Experiences 
The research in this book draws on data collected through intensive field work in Siltie Zone and 
its adjacent areas. My fourteen months of fieldwork amongst the Siltie was composed of two 
interrelated phases. The first, starting in late August 2014, consisted of intensive ethnographic 
research by living in the rural Siltie, while during the second, from November 2015 until March 
2016, I undertook dispute case analysis in addition to ethnographic studies. During each phase, I 
combined ethnographic research techniques with methods used by legal anthropologists. Various 
forms of data collection, including in-depth interview and observation, were adapted and 
reshaped according to the requirements of both the research objectives and the research 
participants. 
Since the objective of the research is exploring the legal practices in the context of legal 
pluralism among the Siltie, much of the data had been collected in Siltie zone areas. 
Nevertheless, for a comparative understanding of legal realities, neighboring areas such as 
Hadiyya and Gurage have occasionally been visited. My stay in the Siltie countryside was 
supplemented by several occasional visits to dispute resolution centers to gather observational 
data. Even if I am a native researcher, I had to contact Siltie zone administration to obtain 
permission to undertake field study in Siltie Zone. Since I worked as an ethnographic expert in 
the Zone for five years (2006-2010), Zonal and Wereda officials helped me in identifying key 
informants easily than a newcomer. The officials were also very collaborative to share 
information about the general status of the Siltie local system of governance, and customary and 
Shari'a courts and the role the courts played for social order in the area.  
I also made brief contacts with Qebele officials and other state agents like agriculture office 
workers at lower levels who were also collaborate with me to collect data on the customary 
system and its relation to the state and religious institutions. My previous experiences in Siltie 
Zone and my knowledge of the language of the society facilitated my easy entrance into the 
community and helped me establish a good rapport with the informants.  
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My fourteen months’ research experience has multiple stories, including reshaping my 
understanding of the Siltie. First, it helped me familiarize myself with the Siltie's day to day 
activities and local culture. Second, the new experience further played an important role in my 
understanding of the local variations in the practices of local modes of dispute settlement.  
I used field diaries that were collected before August 2014 for my former works which are 
relevant to this study. The natures of customary dispute settlement processes became one of the 
factors that compelled me not to focus on specific target Weredas. This is because some cases 
that were initiated in one district would end in another. Thus, almost all Siltie areas had been 
visited for collecting empirical data. The gathering of key informants from all Siltie areas in 
Werabe Town for Zonal meetings created good opportunity for me to collect comprehensive data 
from all areas.  
Notwithstanding, lowland areas had mainly become sources of the data for this study due to 
accessibility on one hand, and most of the dispute cases I have perused are reported from these 
areas to the state and customary courts on the other. Various Siltie Zone Towns (e.g., Dalocha, 
Werabe, Tora, Mitto, Udasa, Kutere, Kibet, and Kerate) were also important data collection 
areas. The towns host various ethnic groups (e.g., the Amhara, the Oromo, the Gurage and the 
Hadiyya) apart from the Siltie. Thus, these areas used as crucial field sites for a cross-cultural 
understanding of how legal systems work, and how disputants and dispute settlers interact. I 
understand that dispute cases that are initiated from the urban centers have complex character 
since they have inter-ethnic and inter-religious natures. The ways legal actors settled inter-faith 
and inter-ethnic disputes also helped me understand cross-cultural modes of dispute settlement.  
Nevertheless, even if I had a good experience with the field sites, my study area was not without 
challenges. The very hot weather condition of the Weredas, such as Lanfuro, and the absence of 
key informants on appointed time due to various government meetings and environmental 
conservation programs were some of the challenges I faced during the field work.  
The rural community also suspected me as an agent of the state partly due to my previous 
occupation as ethnographic and public relation expert in the zone. My new status as a student 
from abroad, Germany, has made some informants expect money in the form of per dim.  
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I also had to attend various Khat4 chewing ceremonies with notable elders. The Siltie elders love 
chewing Khat during their leisure time. They use Khat not only as a stimulant but also as a ritual. 
Before starting chewing, the elders make Du'aa (prayer). My participation with elders in this 
ritual opened the floor for discussion, and I made candid conversation with elders regarding 
topics that could otherwise not be accessed easily. These close interactions have unlocked or 
unpacked „the hidden transcripts“ (Scott, 1990) of the informants about the evolution of the 
Siltie and the state interactions.  
The Siltie elders act as interpreters of their custom. They are the custodians of the Siltie culture. 
Thus, they are the most knowledgeable persons about the nature and functions of Siltie dispute 
settlement. My points of contact were further made easy at meetings such as YeAabotweld 
Shengo, YeMula Siltie Melcho, and the Raga process (See More in Chapters Four and Five). 
Annual gatherings in Werabe town also brought key informants at the capital of Siltie Zone 
where I easily contacted the informants. In this regard, especially the annual symposium5 on 
history, culture, and language of the Siltie that was conducted on April 1st every year was an 
important time to get majority of Siltie elders in Werabe Town. At this gathering, I contacted 
respondents both from the state and non-state legal systems and conducted mixed Focus Group 
Discussion (hereafter FGD) to understand the power relations between actors of various legal 
regimes. However, since 2015 Siltie zone council has changed the date of the symposium to be 
held in the month of November every year. This gathering played a significant role to get several 
informants at the center.  
                                                     
4 Khat or Chat (Catha edulis) is an evergreen shrub native to tropical East Africa. Khat’s dark green leaves are 
chewed fresh for their stimulating effects (Aadland 2002:31). Khat is highly produced in the study area, particularly 
in Silti, Hulbareg, Alicho and Lanfuro weredas and around Werabe. Khat has now become the major cash crop in 
the study area. 
5 Siltie zone had conducted annual symposiums on April 1 in reminiscence of the historic referendum that was held 
on April 1, 2001, which separated the Siltie from neighboring areas. The symposium had been announced as an 
avenue to gather all Siltie elders and remember the struggle waged for identity. The first symposium had been 
convened in April 2008. For the Siltie patriots, the day has a historical message as it reminded them of the ten years 
identity struggle and victory on the ruling party peacefully. However, for few zonal and federal Siltie politicians 
who took part in pro-Gurage parties before, yet powerful till now, the day has a bad connotation. I also understand 
that the abandoning of the day of symposium indicates the existence of conspiracy of silence, for the ex-pro Gurage 
elites do not like the day to be remembered and have a place in the minds of the new generation. However, I believe 
that the measure can potentially divide the people and weaken their strength, for there is a large section of the 
community who did not like the measure. It will potentially also influence the mobilization of the society for local 
development and will become a source of intra-ethnic conflict in the future if the decision is not reversed in any 
way. 
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Contacts with my key informants were also made at their homesteads in the countryside. This 
helped me understand the livelihoods of the community, and how the values and norms of the 
people influence the day to day activities of the people. 
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1.7. Research Design 
Research design refers to research procedures that inform the decision-making process from 
general assumptions to specific data collection and analysis techniques (Creswell, 2009). The 
collection of data and analysis were guided by research design. Maxwell (2005) states that before 
starting a given study, a researcher should outline his/her design within which the study has to be 
determined. This will help not only in determining the appropriate research method but will also 
contribute to establishing the ontological and epistemological position of the researcher.  
The key research questions in this study require that informants recount their experiences about 
the phenomena under study as socially constructed. This calls for a research design appropriate 
for collecting data from participants who have experiences relating to the practices of legal 
systems in the study area. Qualitative research design has been employed to carry out the 
research. Qualitative research has several advantages. To begin with, qualitative research design 
helped me to search for the holistic picture of the social setting of the study site and population 
and to grasp the emic point of view of the studied group (Miles and Huberman 1994:6). It is in 
light of this advantage that a qualitative approach has been used in this book as an appropriate 
strategy „for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to the social 
or human actions“ (Creswell 2009:4). 
My selection of qualitative approach has further been informed by philosophical considerations. 
Philosophical assumptions refer to my position on epistemology, ontology, axiology, rhetoric, 
and methodology. Creswell points out that the process of conducting a qualitative research 
should start with conceptualizing philosophical assumptions and paradigms. The major 
paradigms of a qualitative research include post-positivism, social constructivism, 
advocacy/participatory and pragmatic paradigms (Creswell, 2009). My research philosophy 
incorporates both paradigms such as social constructivism and philosophical assumptions such as 
epistemology and ontology. Creswell also notes that a researcher's view of reality indicates 
his/her ontological stance whereas his/her view of how he/she acquires knowledge indicates his 
/her epistemological position.  
Bryman (2004) further notes that epistemology refers to all types of knowledge and knowing on 
quantitative-qualitative methods. He considers positivism as an epistemology of natural sciences, 
while interpretive becomes an alternative epistemology. Some of the major assumptions of 
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positivism are employing natural science methods to study the social world and conducting 
research to test theory and develop the law. Interpretive, however, assumes that the subject 
matters of social and natural sciences are quite different. So, we need to have a different logic of 
research procedure to study the social world. In this vein, Bryman underlines that social 
researchers should focus on grasping the subjective meanings of social actions (Bryman 
2004:13).  
However, recently, ontological questions are also given attention in the social science research. 
In social sciences, ontological issues are mainly concerned with two positions: objectivism and 
constructivism. Objectivism claims that social phenomena and their meanings exist independent 
of social actors; while constructivism claims the social phenomena including their meanings are 
socially constructed. Ontological assumptions influence the process of coining research 
questions and conducting research (Bryman 2004:16). Researchers who embrace the notion of 
multiple realities choose a qualitative inquiry to explore multiple realities (Creswell, 2009). In 
relation to epistemological and ontological questions, the study has embraced interpretive and 
constructivist approaches respectively. The choosing of the philosophical stand has also been 
informed by the researcher's anthropological training and experiences in qualitative research.  
From a methodological point of view, the multiple realities have been produced from participants 
through interaction between and among informants and me. This constructive approach has 
considered knowledge to be contextual and time dependent (Krauss, 2005). In the context of this 
study, the Siltie's viewpoints of the various institutions of dispute settlement, actors' views and 
actions, their beliefs and lived experiences, the interactions among themselves and their 
counterparts in the plural legal systems have been taken as the prevailing perspective. This does 
not mean that my understanding of the social reality by observation and literature review have 
not been used to explore the topic of this book. In fact, to understand whether the local people 
are acting what they are talking, and to triangulate the ethnographic data with other data 
collection instruments, understand legal realities comparatively, cross-cultural observation and 
reviewing related literature have been used.  
However, the major rationale for choosing the qualitative approach for this study is the fact that 
it seeks to understand practices of legal systems from the perspectives of the studied group. 
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This legal anthropological study explores the perspectives of actors involved in the dispute 
settlement process (mediators and disputants) and the meanings they give to their social 
experiences regarding legal pluralism among the Siltie. Therefore, for this legal anthropological 
study where obtaining culturally specific information about the values, behaviors and social 
contexts of a particular group are crucial, a qualitative approach has become an appropriate 
strategy.  
1.8. Methodological Approaches 
The research in this study employs legal-anthropological approaches as a framework to 
understand the legal realities of the Siltie. In this regard, two methodologies have been used, 
namely Extended Case Method and Ethnography. Before explaining these two methodologies, 
however, let me explain about my position in this study as a home researcher. 
1.8.1. Research at Home as an Aspect of Post-Exotic Anthropology 
“Ethnography no longer implies traveling to remote villages, and there is increased recognition 
that cultural and social phenomena are ripe for ethnographic study everywhere we find humans” 
(Murchison 2010: 9).  
Anthropological inquiry has passed through various historical episodes since its inception in the 
second half of the 19th century. The discipline has been criticized by some due to its role for 
colonialism (Lewis, 1978; Assad 1978b:15). It has initially been perceived as a subject intended 
to „study others“(Bernard 2004:4). As part of this tradition, European and American researchers 
conducted fieldwork in the so-called „remote“ and „exotic“ cultures during the late 19th and 20th 
centuries (Hayano, 1979). Nevertheless, some classical anthropologists acknowledged the 
importance of studying one's own society even during the early periods of the discipline. 
Classical anthropologists (e.g., Malinowski and Radcliff-Brown) accepted researching one's own 
society even if it is a very hard endeavor. Malinowski, for instance, noted that „if self-knowledge 
is the most difficult to gain, then 'anthropology of one's people is the most arduous, but also the 
most valuable achievement of a fieldworker“ (Malinowski 1939: xix).  
Some scholars also consider the classical anthropological inquiry of focusing on „otherness“ as 
political rather than emanating from the very interest of the subject matter of the field. According 
to Talal Assad, for instance, British functional anthropology had been based on a power 
 
 
14 
 
relationship between the West and the Third World (Assad 1978:15). Assad goes further to say 
that anthropology came into being during the colonial era as a distinctive discipline which was 
dominated by Europeans who studied other parts of the world for European audiences. If there 
were European anthropologists like Indian or African during this time, they were trained in 
European soils and „behaved and acted like Europeans“(Diamond 1980b:11-12). Thus, 
professional anthropology was characterized by „diffusion by domination“ (Peirano 1998:109). 
Taking the ethno-centric trends into consideration, some scholars like Assad (1971) and Crick 
(1976) began to encourage anthropologists to look into other cultures to develop „their traditions 
in studying their cultures rather than become a pale reflection of our interest in them“(Assad 
1978:167).  
Some refer anthropology at home as an „indigenous anthropology“ (Fahim, 1982) as a working 
concept to apply to the practice of anthropology in one's native country, society, and/or ethnic 
group. Nevertheless, others prefer to call anthropology at home as an “Insider Anthropology 
“rather than native or indigenous one since the former carried less negative connotations than, 
for instance, the name "indigenous“ or ''native“ (Madan 1982b; Peirano 1998:110).  
Since globalization accelerates the flow of ideas or technologies between peoples, and this can 
either negatively or positively affect the lives of the community, no society can be excluded from 
the other parts of the world. Moore also states that "local places cannot be studied in isolation, 
nor can the global be understood except as constituted by various locals clustered together at 
some local spot'' (Moore 1996:10). It seems that the global and local actors can interact with each 
other by sharing ideas and values that can influence their respective activities. Thus, research at 
home seems the normal conditions of the contemporary world. Moreover, Jackson (1987a) aptly 
puts that research at home is „...one of the inevitable conditions of the modern world.“ Some of 
the factors that can necessitate the emergence of insider anthropologists could become the 
existence of a political component on classical anthropological inquiry in the study of „radical 
otherness“(Fahim, 1982). This scenario has provoked the genesis of "home-grown 
anthropologists" to join the scene since the 1970s (Peirano 1998:176).  
On top of all this, we have witnessed a shift in anthropological studies in the post-Second World 
War period. Anthropology at home has thus gained popularity from the 1970s onwards.  
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Some studies (e.g. Peirano 1998) indicate that the 1970s is considered as a turning period in the 
history of anthropological inquiry as the field was divorced from the political relation and turned 
its focus to sociological analysis, and to the study of „home“ (Peirano 1998:105). Some factors 
are responsible for this change in orientations in the subject matter of the field including the flux 
of migrants to the west. However, let me shed some lights on the very idea of studying one's own 
home in anthropological studies first. 
1.8.1.1. Researching One’s Own Home in Anthropology  
Studying one's own home in anthropology at home is a contentious issue in the field of 
anthropology (cf. Greenhouse 2013). The definition covers a wider range of items from a 
territorial classification, such as a country or a region, to legal and political categories, such as 
citizenship and identity of anthropologists and the communities they work in (Mughal 
2015:122). There are many meanings to the expression „anthropology at home,“ the most 
prominent of which refers to the kind of inquiry developed to study one's own society, where 
„others“ are both ourselves and those relatively different from us, whom we see as part of the 
same collectivity. In this respect, after banning exoticism, anthropology at home was a historical 
shift for some. For others it has always been the dominant trend within a long-standing tradition; 
others still have chosen to develop their anthropological inquiries both at home and abroad 
(ibid.). Some call it „Insider Ethnography,“ a situation where in an ethnographer studies a 
cultural or social unit of which he is already a part (Murchison, 2010). Nevertheless, whenever 
observers and the observed meet, new hybrid of representations arise, which are intensified in 
comparison to the notions from which they proceed (Dumont 1994).  
In this regard, studies so far on Ethiopian societies seem to have their characteristics since they 
focus mainly on the „center rather than the periphery“ (Markakis, 2011) societies who were 
politically and socially dominant for long in the country. Even if the periphery groups have got a 
little attention by scholars, anthropologists resorted more to these areas. This may arise due to 
the classical anthropological orientations of „otherness“ as most of the anthropological works 
have focused on the southern parts of the country where more than half of the ethnic groups in 
Ethiopia live. A good instance in this regard can be the establishment of Southern Omo Research 
Center by the Institute of Ethiopian Studies (IES) and with the involvement of German 
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anthropologist Ivo Strecker in April 1992, in Jinka6 Town, Southern Ethiopia. Most of the studies 
had given little attention to more than half of the population whom they consider as „not exotic.“ 
It is partly due to the flow of anthropologists to the southern region that once the late Prime 
Minister Meles Zenawi said that „South Omo region must be developed. It should not be an 
avenue for anthropological studies“.  
Thus, from the one of the state actor's speeches one can understand that the classical 
anthropological thoughts have influenced not only the Ethiopian anthropological studies, but also 
the government rhetoric as well. The following excerpt from Clapham, who is one of the 
scholars who focused on Ethiopian studies confirms this narration. He says that ''Amharas and 
Tigrayans have their history, whereas other people have their anthropology'' (2002:40). 
Nevertheless, the need for an anthropological inquiry has got more currency in the post-1990s 
Ethiopia. The introduction of ethnic federalism that demands the knowledge of the locals about 
political organization as well as the active participation of the local community in development 
endeavors plays its share for the change in the orientation of studying one's own home. Added to 
this, Ethiopia's aggressive involvement in building big projects whose implementations among 
the local community requires the knowledge of the local people contribute also to this change.  
The ethnic federal structure has valued culture and studying own identity unprecedented before. 
Ethno writers have sprouted since then. Two factors that can contribute for increasing trends of 
studying one's own may be at work. The first one is the policy shift that favors studying own 
society as a basic issue to develop one's identity manifestation and get a fair representation and 
resources in the Federalist Ethiopia. This time has seen some movements that have aimed at „the 
right to have a right“(Smith, 2013). Second, the availability of funding for research and local 
paintings and artistic works like Music from local governments who are keen to know and let 
know others their people has also played a significant role in the expansion of research at home. 
Despite the fact that there are inherent assets one can exploit when studying his/her own society, 
there are also some challenges he/she can face in exploring his group. Malinowski (1939), for 
instance, stated that studying own society is a challenging enterprise.  
Further, studies also indicate that subjective feelings can be at work at any given moment in the 
ethnographic dialogue.  
                                                     
6 Words in italic refer to terms, names or expressions in Siltie and Amharic languages. However, if used differently, 
it will be explained in due places. 
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It is a natural outcome of the collaborative building of relationships between the researcher and 
the researched, especially when the two are part of the same cognitive world. It is important to 
recognize such subjective experiences and the feelings of counter conversion that accompany 
them as part of the practice of ethnography in one's own society. This is in line with the current 
emphasis on critical ethnography, stressing ethical considerations in fieldwork while recognizing 
and contemplating contingencies of truth claims, value-laden inquiry and local knowledge as 
substantive analytical frameworks (Denzin 2003; cf. Madison 2005:35). In addition, the various 
roles one is expected to play in his/her community could be taken as one of the challenges a 
home researcher can face. For instance, one may be expected to contribute to the development of 
his community, for he/she is part of an elite group which is supposed to do his best for the 
progress of the group. Thus, when one enters the community he/she is a part for a fieldwork, the 
researcher will be viewed in various ways (e.g. as development agent, state agent, or as a social 
worker representing one or another NGO).  
1.8.1.1.1. Researching One’s Own Home: Experience from Ethiopia 
The historical episodes Ethiopia has undergone necessitate the development of anthropology at 
home. The North-Christian hegemony or the north-south dichotomy that the Ethiopian academic 
pursued for long has given little attention to the south-eastern Ethiopians like the Siltie for an 
extended period (Braukämper, 2001). It was anthropologists like Braukämper who preserved the 
historical and cultural niches of these people. Most of the southern as well as eastern Ethiopian 
societies that can be mentioned as the periphery (Markakis, 2011) are devoid of attention by 
Ethiopian scholars. Following the installation of the federal structure in 1991, these historically 
left peoples have got access to education. Since then, studying one's own culture seems to be an 
order of the day since there is a little attempt on the part of scholars to study others. Thus, the 
period saw the sprout of elites who have begun studying their people.  
Some historians such as Lapiso7 (1999, 2000) encourage local elites to study their communities 
so that the „real image“ of the Ethiopian people can be represented in Ethiopian writings. This 
can be explained as "Nativist anthropology” (Peirano 1998:115).  
                                                     
7 Ethiopian historian Prof.Lapiso emphasized that the North-Christian dichotomy and its dominance can only be 
changed only if elites from each community breaks from the tradition and writes the ethnography of their people. He 
also stresses that the local elites should employ social science methodologies to escape from subjective writings as 
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The founding of social anthropology at Addis Ababa University in the early 1990s has also 
played a significant role for local anthropologists to study their societies. The department has 
given scholarship for students who studied their communities and produced ethnographies of the 
hitherto unexplored communities.  
We have another form of anthropology at home that Peirano calls „Nativist anthropology“ (ibid.: 
115). Nativist ethnography assumes that only natives understand natives and that the native must 
be the proper judge, and even the sensor of ethnography. Nevertheless, authors such as Kuper 
(1994) criticize this argument assuming that this way of approaching an anthropological 
understanding of the field may be prey to subjectivity (Peirano 1998:114). Various literature 
indicate that the Post-Exotic Anthropology seems to disregard the dichotomy between the 
traditional focus of anthropology's otherness (Peirano1998:112; Lewellen 2003). 
The classical analysis of political systems in anthropology has met ardent criticism by political 
anthropologists like Lewellen (2003). In this vein, the post-exotic anthropology narrowed the gap 
between the core and the periphery. Clifford (1997) noted that fieldwork had been based on a 
distinction between a home base and an exterior place of discovery. However, notions of „homes 
and abroad, community insides and outsides, fields and metropolis are increasingly challenged 
by post-exotic, decolonizing trends“ (1997:53). Fields must be negotiated, and because there is 
no narrative form or way of writing inherently suited to a politics of location, anthropological 
distance sometimes may be „challenged, blurred, relationally reconstructed“ (ibid.). 
Now let us look at how a native anthropologist like me enters the field as a researcher. The 
available published literature strongly suggests that being a native anthropologist implies a 
greater potential for value conflict (Altorki and El-Solh, 1988), a greater pressure to conform to 
local social norms, and a certain tendency towards preconceived notions (Hastrup1995:157-158). 
However, my experience in the field indicates that some of my a priori knowledge about the 
Siltie seems deconstructed and a new form of knowledge has been reconstructed. It took me a 
long time to deconstruct my preconception or „take for granted ideas“ (Murchison 2010:14) 
about the Siltie as a homogeneous entity, yet my previous works on the people also helped me 
overcome some of the challenges I could have faced as an insider anthropologist which could 
potentially have made me prone to subjectivity.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
well as criticism from nationalist writers (Phone conversation with Professor Lapiso in August 2014 and September 
2016.) 
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I had tried several times to suppress my interest not to write what is not „right“ about the people, 
especially the heterogeneity features of the Siltie in the area of modes of dispute settlement about 
which I did not have enough knowledge before. As England (1994) aptly puts, the biography of 
the researcher, which passes through our perceptions and interpretations of the fieldwork 
experience, plays a central role in the research process. Notwithstanding, this initial effort of 
establishing inter-subjectivity is complicated by the fact that anthropologists cannot always 
deliberately place themselves in a non-involved actual position without being affected by the 
taken-for-granted rules and expectations of their culture ( ibid.: 31).This seems to be especially 
problematic for native anthropologists because they are filled with the culture of their 
informants, which in turn, brings into question their ability to be ‘objective' to the individuals 
they are seeking to understand better (ibid.:31). My point is that conducting fieldwork in one's 
own society is more often affected by self-examination of one's thoughts and feelings, reflecting 
the apparent tension between the role of a supposedly neutral researcher and that of the ‘native.' 
In this sense, the researcher's reflection, intuition, and thinking can serve as ‘a springboard for 
interpretations and bring more comprehensive insight' (Finlay and Gough 2003: 9). Here, one 
may ask whether this subjectivity is a comment on the researcher's integrity or not. However, at 
this point, my position is clear -I have taken the roles of a stranger and a native. I have also taken 
the position of a student to learn from my informants8. Researchers indicate that placing oneself 
in a position of a student to investigate and question things that one has learned to take for 
granted will allow the researcher to confront own assumptions by “listening to and learning from 
the experts who are his /her informants“ (Murchison 2010:14,16 ). Thus, I have learned from my 
informants since the researcher is first and foremost a human being and his/her reactions are an 
integral part of the interview process. It is also important to explore how this subjectivity comes 
into play in the dialogical relationship between the researcher and the people being studied 
(Finlay and Gough 2003:31). Hence, I have my agency in the research work. As an Ethiopian in 
general and a Siltie researcher in particular, I can and do claim some commonality with my 
informants as far as the practices of legal realities among the local community are concerned. In 
addition to the positive effect of cultural proximity, I found myself being emotionally affected by 
my interviewee's points of commonality in relation to me.  
                                                     
8 An Informant refers to the people anthropologists learn from and study (Murchison 2010:14). 
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My informants would share the same basic understanding of the world with me. By asking me 
questions about legal practices, and then proceeding further without knowing what my position 
is, informants presume that I would have a similar opinion on this particular point especially 
considering me as an emerging Siltie elite. It also seems that in searching for a way of fitting 
elders' interest for the emergence of local power and Siltie culture as part of an identity 
formation, Siltie informants considered me and other elites as their sounding board. Putting it 
differently, elders are looking for someone who could mirror their emotions, mixed feelings and 
a quest for a new identity. It seems that local government officials are not ready to compromise 
the ruling party's interest for a revival of the Siltie culture. This does not mean that state officials 
are reluctant to revive the culture. They support allocate for protecting and developing Siltie 
cultural practices. However, they are less interested in seeing a robust elders’ power in the area. 
Sometimes, state officials tried to direct my research with the belief that the research output 
could negatively affect their „firm image in EPRDF's political group as a loyal constituency and 
land of model area“ by exposing the inefficiency of state's judiciary at the grassroots level. Some 
elites, on the other hand, urged me to write objectively and contribute to the progress of the 
Siltie's life and become an influential scholar nationally and possibly even beyond. As a person 
being educated in the west, others, especially young Muslims suspect me of working for the 
interest of Westerners whom they suspect as „anti-Muslims“.  
However, what can become impressive to me is that the majority of Silties associate my study in 
Germany with a harbinger of the onset of the age of prosperity which the Siltie are waiting for 
long. This is because one of the influential Siltie cleric, Sheik Alkesiye prophesied that Germans 
are vehicles for change and development. The Siltie said that Sheik Alkesiye predicted „there will 
be a time the Germans will come to our country and Siltie and hence they can bring wealth, and 
prosperity to Ethiopia and the Siltie“. The Sheik also said that „the Germans will also protect my 
grand mosque in Alkeso town“.  
Religious men, the youth like elite including young, educated Muslims as they call themselves as 
“Yetewhid Jemma“ or Salafists told me also that Sheik Alkesiye associated Germany and people 
who are linked with Germany as a harbinger of development to the country in general and of the 
Siltie in particular. Still, others tried to link this research with the government. This situation 
clearly indicates the existences of multiple interests and the challenges as well as role conflicts 
one will face if he/she studies own society.  
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Nevertheless, we cannot deny that there are some advantages, like entry into the field and build 
rapport with the community more easily than an outsider researcher. Additionally, the possibility 
to be influenced by thin data is also very low for the insider ethnographer. Rather, all doors will 
be opened for the home researcher to collect the data including „the hidden transcripts“ (Scott, 
1990) which further allows me to know and understand the people including the legal realities 
better than the outsider. Thus, one must understand that doing anthropology at home requires a 
similar set of protocols as does researching a country other than one's own (Mughal 2015:121). 
In contrast to this view, this study observes the classical division between mainstream 
anthropology and anthropology ‘at home,' as an inheritance from the binary segregationalism of 
colonialism is a dead-end paradigm. I argue further that the division between anthropology ‘at 
home' and ‘abroad' is coming to an end due to the nature of globalization that accelerated the 
interaction of ideas and technologies as well as breaking the boundaries of various systems 
including the nation state. 
Reasons for Selecting the Research Site 
Let me now cast a glance on some points why I selected my field site. First, though I am native 
to the area, I am an outsider to the legal practices of the Siltie. Islam's growth in the last twenty-
five years (Zerihun, 2013) and the relatively newly established ethnic based zone and the 
existence of a vibrant form of legal pluralism against the Siltie's urban nature are also factors 
behind my selection of the site. My justifications for selecting the Siltie area emanated from 
different factors. To begin with, I lived and worked among the Siltie community for six years 
(2006-2011) as a researcher and culture area expert that have given me an opportunity to know 
their socio-cultural aspects and the inspiration to do further research among the community. 
What is more, I conducted Bachelor and Master’s degree studies including annual research 
works among the people about their history, culture and local governance systems. These 
attachments also created the opportunity to understand the gaps in the literature on areas of legal 
pluralism in Siltie context in an ethnic federal state of Ethiopia. Thirdly, I published two books 
on the history, culture, language and local governance institutions of the Siltie (2012, 2013) 
which further created an opportunity to understand the intellectual void in the area of legal 
pluralism among the Siltie. I also understand that my further study will become a contribution to 
cross-cultural analysis in the area of legal pluralism in the country too. 
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The last, but not the least factor for me to choose the Siltie for this study is my knowledge of the 
Siltie language which has helped me enter the field and develop rapport better than the outsider. 
It has made communication with the local community much easier than a foreigner. I also 
wanted to work in the area of legal pluralism that is a relatively less explored topic in the 
country. Moreover, as a student of anthropology, I want to explore the Siltie's culture as an 
„outsider“ and would not overlook some of the usual things that a regular visitor or native might 
otherwise ignore. From methodological perspective, my selection of Siltie area (no particular 
area is bound/limited among the Siltie as a field site, yet), most of my data is generated from the 
lowland areas of Siltie. Nevertheless, I can say that almost all areas are covered due to the 
natures of customary dispute settlement system which demands some dispute cases that were 
initiated in the Highland area be culminated in the lowland parts.  
In addition, I moved my family from Addis Ababa to Siltie's capital (Werabe) to take part and 
live with the studied people as this is believed to be a better way “… to look at the emic 
perspectives of the studied group” (Malinowski, 1922). The location of Werabe town, i.e. the 
fact that it is found on the main road, allowed me to interact with people from other districts 
easily. Having a first-hand account of conflicts in some parts of the Siltie which involved me as 
attendant in the customary courts helped me understand the „emic view of the natives.“ The head 
of Siltie elders' court, though not officially recognized by the zone, also lives in lowland rural 
areas, and he could easily talk to me on the phone whenever a Melcho (Siltie meeting) 
summoned or cases are considered. I never disclosed the comments and remarks of one party to 
another or even to anyone within or outside the Siltie. I typically avoided inviting two opponent 
parties to a single group discussion, which could invoke serious tensions, to the detriment of my 
reputation in the community.  
Nevertheless, I sometimes invited both elders and Qadis, another time elders and state judges as 
well as Qadis and state judges in a single group discussion to see the power relations and 
understand how actors view each other. This kind of gathering helped me understand how the 
weak manipulate events or employ daily forms of resistance by changing the tone of discussion 
in the presence of the “powerful” (Scott, 1985). The Siltie elders need freedom to take part in 
various affairs of the local community.  
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They want, for instance, to form elders' council, yet the zonal officials do not want to see “a state 
within a state” and avoid possible nature of political subversive activity by elders in the future. 
The existence of robust legal pluralism seems also to be considered as politically subversive by 
politicians. Thus, I had to be cautious when contacting elders so as not to be “suspected on the 
rise of this demand.” I also had to keep it confidential whenever elders gave me an interview on 
various issues including the status of elders in the area. There seems to be a big “hope” from the 
local community, especially elders who perceived local elites like me, as appropriate persons to 
play a role in the revival of the customary system. 
Elders seem to be perplexing why some Siltie officials pay less attention to the customary law 
unlike their counter parts in the neighboring Gurage, Hadiyya, and the Sidama people. Siltie 
elders stated that the customary systems of the neighboring ethnic groups are working well as the 
state system is supporting the revival of the customary systems in various capacities. As I stated 
earlier as a native who is studying abroad, elders thought that my role in ‟protecting and 
developing” the customary system is great. Nevertheless, this cannot be easily achieved since 
developing local culture, including customary systems, involves the joint activity of stakeholders 
including the zone administration. Additionally, the presence of Islam, the state and keen interest 
to protect the local culture with local variations among the Siltie make the site interesting to 
explore the legal realities in the context of legal pluralism. Moreover, the government makes the 
Siltie not only a practical model of “success story“ to show how Ethiopian ethnic federalism 
functions but also, it considers the area as suspect number one behind the contemporary Islamic 
protest in the country.9 Thus, my presence in the field had not been without a challenge.  
Lastly, developing a rapport with transforming society like the Siltie seems the first challenge for 
an anthropologist. The Siltie are undergoing social changes and transforming very rapidly. Some 
factors are contributing to social changes and societal transformations of the Siltie. First, the 
integration of the people into the Ethiopian state since the late 19th century played a significant 
role in this regard (see more in Chapter eight). Second, the Siltie are involved in Ethiopia's 
economy from micro to macroeconomic activities in the country.  
                                                     
9. Ethiopia's former Prime Minister (PM), Ato Hailemariam Desalegn once, while comparing the number of Muslim 
population in Ethiopia vis a vis its role in recently state-religion conflict, said that “it is the relatively small Muslim 
Siltie who are more challenging and disturbing the government rather than Muslim majority Oromo population in 
orchestrating the Islamic protest that has started since 2011 in the country.“ (Taken from the PM's discussion with 
representatives of the Siltie people during Werabe hospital inauguration in December 2015 in Werabe town.) 
 
 
24 
 
They are also very open and have a receptive cultural tradition that welcomes changes and 
characterized by a high urban flux of people or "migration culture“ (Bustorf, 2009).  
Third, the expansion of education and the emergence of Siltie intelligentsia or Siltie elite, mainly 
since the overthrow of Hailesillasie I in 1974 are also behind these changes. Fourth, the various 
global factors (e.g. Islamic revivalism), and the coming into being of new ideas and norms due to 
migration are also remaking broad areas of social life among the Siltie. The last but not the least, 
the establishment of Siltie zone in 2001 and the subsequent integration of the Siltie into the 
federal Ethiopia by forming a self-administered area is also one of the reasons why the Siltie 
people have undergone social change and transformation. With these changes the area 
experiences, it requires patience and being respectful of local norms and values to look at how 
the community lives and interacts with its members and others. I used my native language skills 
and prior knowledge of the local culture of Siltie to easily integrate myself with local people. 
Thus, with these complex social realities that unfold in the area, my position is clear-I was 
simultaneously an outsider as well as an insider in the field. I was an insider because I am a Siltie 
speaker and purposefully select the Siltie identity as part of the new form of citizenship (Smith, 
2013) in contemporary Ethiopia. I am an outsider because I have entered in the field as a trained 
anthropologist to study the hitherto unexplored legal aspects of the Siltie. With this let me reflect 
on my position in this research. 
Who Am I? Self-Reflection 
A far as my position is concerned, it is important to mention my socio-cultural background at 
this point. My father is from Sodo Gurage, while my mother is from Siltie ethnic-group. Thus, I 
have got a hybrid identity. This hybrid identity helped me reduce the possibility of biases in my 
writings about the legal realities of the Siltie zone. Despite this, it is also equally important to 
explain here how I managed to control prejudices and partiality on my understandings of the 
legal systems practiced in the study area.  
I accentuate that the Siltie's notions of legal systems is not the only perspective to grasp the 
practices of plural legal constellation empirically. This is due to the fact that local notions cannot 
be the only basis of knowledge since this may lead one to partially understand social events in 
specific contexts. Local notions, however, are equally important especially for anthropological 
analysis since social activities cannot be understood without the social contexts they are a part 
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(Moore, 1978). I understood that as a home anthropologist `I was expected to play multiple roles 
in the field. To begin with, as part of the community, I share the values, expectations, rituals and 
belief systems of the Siltie community that enrich me to understand the activities of the people 
based on the world views of the local community. However, I resorted to the neighboring 
communities like Hadiyya, Gurage, Hallaba and the Sidama for comparative purposes so that 
my familiarity with the activities of the Siltie might not influence my anthropological 
understandings of the legal practices of the Siltie. These aspects of comparative analysis have 
helped me not only to reduce the inter-subjectivity of the analysis but also to understand how 
legal pluralism functions in the country as well. However, even if anthropology at home is a 
historical shift in the post-exotic anthropology (Peirano 1998: 123), I was strongly governed by 
the anthropological research ethics in collecting the data and making its findings reliable and 
valid. In addition, in order to minimize these methodological challenges, I have analyzed the 
legal systems operating in Siltie proper within a wider socio-cultural context on the one hand, 
and contextualized the legal plural constellations in the Federalist Ethiopia with regional 
connections in Africa and globally implications on the other. In this regard, by tracing the 
genesis of legal pluralism in Ethiopia, I have analyzed the trajectories of legal systems 
historically in different Ethiopian regimes. This helps me understand the change and continuities 
that have been witnessing in the area of legal pluralism in Ethiopia. Additionally, aiming at 
contributing to the existing debate on legal pluralism, I have also discussed the scholarly genesis 
of legal pluralism and tried to demonstrate how the local arena that comprises the diversified and 
hybridized legal systems has become legally plural. 
The Siltie love discussing politics, especially the identity struggle period (1991-2001). They have 
a divided mentality on the current politics. They revere the federal system as they have regained 
the independent ethnic status and self-determination after a century (see more in Chapters Three 
and Seven). On the other hand, the Siltie have developed a suspicious outlook towards the state, 
for the Ethiopian government is allegedly involved in religious affairs, especially Islam since 
2011. I maintained neutrality in every aspect the local community involved, and I explicitly told 
my informants that I am a researcher looking into legal realities and want to understand the 
socio-cultural dimensions of the Siltie rather than anything else. Thus, I also made clear from the 
beginning that I did not have an affiliation with any political party or religious group in the area. 
Therefore, I remained neutral during the discussions on both politics and religious issues.  
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This strategy helped me get good friends without any controversial stances on the issues that 
might be sensitive for some of them. It also helped me address the hidden transcripts of my 
informants (Scott, 1990), for my informants unlocked some data that are related to the newly 
emerging youths' modes of dispute settlement and shared their experiences on how the state 
officials and state court judges worked in the area, which was not in line with institutionalized 
ways. Moreover, informants demonstrated that state actors used their agency in using the local 
norms and values relevant to everyday life rather than the psychologically far away state-
imposed rules. Being fluent in native languages and aware of the social values that regulate one 
on how to behave in different situations helped me find a quicker and efficient way of ‘settling 
in' after entering the field (Bernard 2011:156). It also helped me collect valid, reliable, and 
„inside“ information about the state-society relationship. Studying abroad especially in Europe 
grants one a prestigious status among the Siltie. Germany has also got a special place among the 
Siltie, for one of the well-known Siltie Sheiks, Alkesiye, described Germany „as a land of 
prosperity and Germany or people associated with Germans are considered as sources of 
prosperity and progress for the Siltie.“ Thus, I was well received by Zonal officials or 
businesspersons in Siltie, mainly by the lowland Siltie. They gave me a warm welcome. Thus, 
with all the challenges I faced as a home researcher (e.g. role conflict), my impartiality due to 
hybridity, and easy access to the field as well as linguistic capital were assets to the better 
understanding of the legal realities in the Siltie zone. 
1.8.2. Extended Case Method 
I employed extended case method to explore the interactions of the various legal systems in the 
diachronic and synchronic approaches among the local community. The rationale for choosing 
the extended case is mainly due to its essentiality to explore the lived experiences of actors and 
to help build theory from below. It is also a research method that focuses on a detailed study of 
concrete empirical cases with a view to „extract” general principles from specific observations. 
Through extended case method, a researcher would participate in and observe a number of 
related events and actions of individuals and groups over an extended period of time. The 
researcher would then construct his or her (ethnographic) story and theorize about a social 
phenomenon, rather than starting with a theory to explain an empirical reality. 
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Scholars (e.g., Bryant, A. and K. Charmaz 2007) recommend that analyzing first a social reality 
to grasp the different dimensions of the lives of local communities from the empirical data and 
go later to theories to create a nexus or modify the existing theories is also a strategy relevant to 
understand better the social world. Bryant, A. and K. Charmaz presented their alternative ways 
of grasping the social world in what they call „Grounded Theory in Ethnography” (2007). They 
criticize researchers who go to the fieldwork packed with theories. Bryant, A. and K. Charmaz 
also underline that using theory to start field work impedes “understanding the experiences or the 
social world as the studied live it” (Bryant, A. and K. Charmaz 2007: 161).  
The extended case method also emphasizes on extensions of the local realities to forces outside a 
given area. The method also applies reflexive science to ethnography „to extract the general from 
the unique, to move from the micro to macro, to connect the present to the past in anticipation of 
the future all by building on the pre-existing theory“ (Burawoy 1998: 5, 2009: 21). 
Taking from his experiences in postcolonial Zambia as a factory worker and researcher, 
Burawoy's new version of the extended case method unbounded ethnographic method that 
limited its domain of investigation to a specified cultural group or socio-cultural setting 
(Burawoy 2009: 20). Ethnography focuses on the description of unrelated and bulky data rather 
than analyzing and extending data for theory building (Bryant, A. and K. Charmaz 2007: 160). In 
this regard, historical episodes and events that have links to a given socio-cultural phenomena 
may not be given due attention.  
Moreover, based on the tenets of ethnography, a researcher may not go beyond a specific socio-
cultural setting despite the fact that there are events that have close links with his/her area of 
investigation. The extended case method also disagrees with positivism ways of looking at the 
social world that gives little place for a researcher to get into the lives of the community „not to 
disturb the world the ethnographer studies” (2009: xii-xiii). Rather positivism insists that social 
phenomena can be explained by observing cause and effect. This is something which has been 
borrowed directly from the natural sciences (Henn M. e t al. 2006: 12). Other scholars also stress 
that a researcher should go to the field, interact with the studied group and generate empirical 
data to develop a theory. This group of scholars (e.g. Burawoy 1998; Bryant, A. and K. Charmaz 
2007) criticized both the ethnographic and positivist ways of exploring socio-cultural settings 
that focus on studying the world as it is and grasping reality without the context a researcher 
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studies (Burawoy; 1998, 2009: xii; Charmaz. and Mitchell., 2007). For them, the researcher is 
inherently part of the world he/she studies. Moreover, the researcher should extend his domain of 
exploration over time and space. Thus, these explanations have introduced the revolutionary idea 
in the methods of social sciences by breaking the barriers hitherto bounded ethnographers not to 
look beyond a given socio-cultural boundary both spatially and temporally. Extended case 
method, however, introduces the ideas of extending local realities to forces outside their borders 
and creating links between micro and macro forces. Burawoy also introduced four tenets of 
extended case method that can create ties between the past and the present, the micro and the 
macro, the researcher and researched, as well as between the pre-existing and new theories. 
These principal guiding principles comprise such four extensions as the extensions of the 
observer into the lives of participants under study, the extension of observations over time and 
space, the extension from micro processes to macro processes, and the extension of theory 
(Burawoy, 2009 xviii). Bryant, A. and K. Charmaz (2007) also recommend the interaction 
between the researcher and the researched, going to the field, and gathering empirical data that 
will move the research and the researcher towards theory development. These scholars 
recommend a bottom-up approach for a qualitative study to explore socio-cultural setting such as 
legal pluralism among the contemporary societies.  
Thus, against the backdrop of the above brief explanations, I believe that the extended case 
method has so many advantages to exploring such notions as legal pluralism that involves 
various forces or legal systems that operate even beyond a specific socio-cultural setting 
including the global norms. First, it provides me with an opportunity to extend spatially and 
temporally over time and space to explore legal pluralism in an ethnic federal state of Ethiopia 
and to reconstruct the genesis of legal pluralism, its aspects, and intra as well as inter-ethnic 
relations that the components of the notions have in the area. It also helps me explore the micro-
macro links and the theoretical debates that are unfolding in the field of legal anthropology and 
other socio-legal studies.  
I employed three of the perspectives that Burawoy put forward, namely the extension of 
observations over time and space, the extension from micro processes to macro forces, and the 
extension of theories.  
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First, the method helped me investigate the historical developments of legal pluralism, its 
changes and continuities over time among the Siltie based on my key informants' interviews. It 
also facilitated my data collection on inter-ethnic structures and functions of the various legal 
systems. The method was also helpful to understand the intra and interactions among the local 
community and with the neighboring ethnic groups. Second, the method helped me to construct a 
link between micro and macro processes. In this regard, I employed the method to extend the 
local legal realities beyond the study area. The local cannot be understood without the 
surrounding events like the national or the global forces taking the impacts of globalization into 
consideration. In this vein, the emergence of modern Ethiopian state in general and the genesis of 
legal pluralism, in particular, have gone through various stages. Historical sources (Lapiso 1984, 
1999, 2000; Bahru, 1991) explain that the creation of modern Ethiopian state had been conceived 
since the nineteenth century. Unlike most of the African countries that were colonized by 
Western powers, the introduction of legal pluralism into Ethiopia has a different story. This 
period marks not only the coming into being of modern Ethiopian state but also the 
transplantation of new state legal system and hence constellation of legal pluralism in the 
country. The Siltie were incorporated into the new Ethiopian state in the late nineteenth century 
(Bustorf 2011; Kairedin 2012). Thus, the method had been employed to explore the status of the 
customary justice system before the end of the nineteenth century, the process of legal 
implantation and the interactions among legal systems. The method had also become crucial to 
look at the competitions and complementary natures of the various legal systems and the power 
relations among legal actors in diachronic approach (Moore, 2000). The extended case method 
was also important to investigate how the contemporary ethnic federal system enriches legal 
systems in the country, solves the age-old tensions between the centripetal and the centrifugal 
forces in the country taking the Siltie experiences as a case. Third, the method had also 
effectively helped me to link national developments to the Siltie`s local experiences. Therefore, 
the method had become a necessary methodological perspective to connect the post-1991 
Ethiopia's ethnic federal experience to the global changes that has unfolded following the end of 
cold war in the 1990s. The post-cold war global changes have given rise to a new world order 
dominated by the capitalist block that unequivocally makes democracy and respect for diversity 
its priority.  
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The changes have also brought one or another form of international corporations that do not 
respect national boundaries and hence contribute to the coming into being of failed states (Santos 
de Sousa, 2006; Bellagamba/Klute, 2008; Berman, 2012). Therefore, the extended case method 
had helped me extend the local reality into the global ethnography that is also instrumental to 
understand common patterns around the world and the forces that create them (Burawoy, 
2009).Taking the existences of global legal scales that sometimes compete, and at times 
complement the customary, religious and state judicial systems into consideration and the 
existence of porosity among each other, one can say that the local reality can contribute to 
theoretical debates on legal pluralism. 
1.8.3. Ethnographic Methods: An Emic Perspective 
Ethnography is a qualitative study of cultures driven by observation and participation. Some 
written sources (e.g. C. R. Ember, M. Ember 2009; Murchison 2010) state that ethnography can 
be understood both as a process and as a product. The literature compares ethnography with 
processes in a laboratory that are important to scientists, and so is ethnography to sociologists or 
anthropologists. The sources state further that ethnography has to meet three essential 
prerequisites: „ residing for a long time among the members of the studied culture, (ii) 
proficiency in the language of the community, and (iii) the employment of participant 
observation“ (C.R.Ember, M.Ember 2009: 1, 2). The same source attests that as a product, 
ethnographic monograph must be holistic and it has to adopt the emic perspective, as opposed to 
the etic one (ibid.: 1, 2). The underlying assumption in ethnography’s commitment to being there 
is an assumption that certain types of information are only obtainable through firsthand research 
(Murchison 2010:12). Ethnography also seeks to discover and record different types of 
information that are not readily obtainable through relatively detached approaches like surveys 
and observations. For Geertz, ethnography is, a ''thick description“ (Geertz 1973: 10) intended to 
describe the field accounts that provide concrete examples of the way people settle disputes in 
real life situations. Therefore, in order to understand the legal realities and strong legal pluralism 
(Griffiths A., 2002) in its holistic picture among the Siltie, ethnography is relevant since it helped 
me grasp the people's everyday life „in its extra local and historical context“ (Burawoy 1998: 4). 
To this end, I paid much attention to the economic activities, kinship systems, marriage rules, 
customary court sessions, local assemblies, religious gatherings as well as state court sessions. 
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The social and kinship organizations mentioned above are semi-autonomous social fields 
(Moore, 1978), which the community employ in an interactive and dynamic way to regulate the 
day-to-day activities.  
On the other hand, current literature further indicates that „ethnography no longer implies 
traveling to remote villages, and there is an increased recognition that cultural and social 
phenomena are ripe for ethnographic study everywhere we find humans” (Murchison 2010: 9). 
Ethnography also allows the researcher to discover and analyze the categories and questions that 
are most relevant for the people being studied. One of the strengths of ethnography as a research 
strategy is its ability to illuminate locally important understandings and ways of operating. In 
ethnography, local modes of thought and behavior are the primary focus (ibid.: 12). Ethnography 
is particularly well suited for researching the connections and interactions between different 
elements of society and culture, such as interactions among various legal systems, culture, 
religion, and politics as they exist among the Siltie. Ethnographic accounts provide concrete 
examples of the way the Siltie organize their daily life to cope with disputes when disputes 
occur, the choices they face among plural legal systems as well as the interaction they develop 
among various legal regimes.  
In addition, studies indicate that ethnography currently „begins from a foundation that recognizes 
and foregrounds dynamic processes, variation and variability, and the need to consider the 
different perspectives and biases that may influence the research“ (Murchison 2010:11). On top 
of all this, one of the benefits of long-term ethnographic fieldwork is that informants tend to 
become more willing to share information including „the hidden transcripts“ (Scott, 1990) with 
the researcher as a result of having familiarized themselves with the researcher and his/her work. 
Thus, I employed ethnographic data collection methods which include direct observation of state 
court sessions, local dispute settlements forums, archival data, guided interviews with 
community leaders, the disputants', and dispute settlers' views.  
1.8.4. Methods of Data Collection 
1.8.4.1. Key Informant Interview 
By methods, I mean the specific techniques used to collect data on legal practices in the studied 
area. A research method employed for a certain study is dependent on the nature of the research 
problem and the research questions (Kothari, 2004). 
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Within qualitative research design, I chose key informant interview as a research strategy to 
collect data from the local community. This method of data collection has been used based on 
guideline points and unstructured questions.  
Interviewees were selected through non-random purposive sampling technique, a deliberately 
chosen group of persons, settings or events that contain certain characteristics or information that 
cannot be gained from other sources (Maxwell 1998:69). In this regard, I conducted interviews 
with 40 individuals with diverse backgrounds, including religious, state, and locals as well as 
elites to generate data for this study. The informal conversations I made with these figures 
complemented the information obtained from other sources. These conversations were often 
unstructured and informal, and they helped me to clarify and reconstruct some of the major 
events to be reported in the narrative. Smartphone S-note applications have also been used to 
write down notes from informants. The data collected during day time through field diaries and 
observation were transcribed and written during the night. This strategy helped me capture 
information in the fresh memory. Accordingly, gaps that were identified the nights before were 
filled in the days that followed. 
1.8.4.2. Focus Group Discussion  
Focus group discussion (FGD) is a method in which some people are asked to come together to 
discuss various issues for the purpose of research. I arranged nine FGDs with Gerad, Ragas, 
Moros, Qadis10, state officials and other respondents in the study area with the help of field 
assistants. Focus group discussion as a way of data collection instrument is important to get the 
collective views or group perspectives on dispute settlement institutions, their interactions, and 
power relations among different actors.  
1.8.4.3. Case Study 
According to Thomas (2011), case studies are analyses of persons, events, decisions, periods, 
policies, institutions, or other systems that are studied holistically by one or more methods. It is 
also a research strategy, an empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon within its real-life 
context. I used case study technique to explore individual's perceptions of dispute settlement 
institutions, to understand personal experiences on various dispute settlement institutions and 
                                                     
10 These individuals are the Siltie local actors who are involved in dispute settlement and local administration. 
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personal views on forum shopping that cannot otherwise be investigated by other data collection 
instruments.  
Through informal conversation with key informants, I identified individuals who have personal 
experiences with cases that have been settled through either customary, the state or religious or 
both or all legal systems. This technique also helped me to collect ethnographic data based on the 
lived stories of disputants and mediators. It also became paramount for triangulation of data 
gained from the interviews and focus group discussions. I collected and analyzed fourteen 
dispute cases to understand the local legal realities and how dispute settlers and disputants as 
well as the community interact with each other. Some of the cases also showed dispute settlers' 
self-expressions of their mediation services. 
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1.8.4.4. Participant Observation 
This technique of data collection helped me get direct information about the day to day lives of 
the subjects of the research. The method was used for observing the overall situations and the 
behavior of the local community when involved in the dispute settlement process. It also helped 
me observe real life situations of the local community, and understand whether the people act 
what they talk and triangulate the data generated from the interview, FGD and case study. It was 
also useful to have particular insight into the ceremonies, rituals and other social events taking 
place in the study area. I observed the customary, religious and state court hearing sessions, and 
the various activities of the customary authorities, Qadis, and judges during their assembly and 
dispute resolving sessions in the study area.  
Conventional anthropological methods such as participant observation that were initially tools 
for getting „insider” information are equally valid when doing anthropology at home. These 
methods are required to obtain empirical evidence to make cross-cultural comparisons by using 
the vocabulary shared across the discipline (Mogul 2015:130). I took part and observed the 
customary, religious and state dispute settlement sessions which broadened my understanding of 
how causes of some disputes are identified; the cases were initiated and how disputants choose 
between plural legal systems to make their cases done. Observation is also essential to get trust 
from the community as I attended the court hearings several times. My research experiences and 
my language competence in Siltie language also became an asset that capitalized the ability to 
establish rapport with the key informants. I also took pictures and videos of elders' gatherings, 
the customary court sessions, religious sessions and state court judges, justice office and police 
sector meetings with the consent of elders and government officials to substantiate and 
triangulate the information that had been collected through other methods. 
1.8.5. Secondary Sources  
Secondary sources of data were used to get basic information on the dynamic nature of legal 
pluralism in Ethiopia, and the geographical, historical and socio- economic background of the 
Siltie. This way of data gathering was also useful to have various researchers’ ideas and debates 
on the subject. In this regard, different research works, archival materials, figures, maps of  the 
study area and the topic had been consulted in detail to substantiate and triangulate the field data. 
I did not excessively rely on a single method to collect the data. Rather, I had been governed by 
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the principle of triangulation wherein more than one data or method or even theory are employed 
when investigating a research problem so that diverse viewpoints or standpoints can light up on a 
topic. The mixing of methods, for instance, the use of interviews together with focus group 
discussions is one form of triangulation (Olsen, 2004). 
1.9. Data Analysis and Evaluation Approaches 
1.9.1. Social Science Analytical Approaches: An Actor-Oriented Analysis 
Social scientists have been in continuous debate over how one can best comprehend the nature of 
social life and social organizations in society. These scholars are not in agreement whether 
individuals are in control of their destinies and actions or they are merely subject to particular 
social circumstances which determine their behaviors. One group of scholars who dominated 
sociological and anthropological inquiries during the late 19th and early 20th centuries argued that 
actions and organizations can mostly be shaped by the constraining forces of social structure 
rather than individuals’ actions. These social theorists suggested a vision of the world where 
powerful structures are dominant and responsible for orchestrating the conduct of human 
individuals (Durkheim, 1938[1895]; Radcliff-Brown 1952; E. Pritchard, 1940s).  
Emile Durkheim 1938[1895]:1 0), for instance, in his sociological theory suggests that 
individuals are subjected to real and external ‘social facts' that constrain and define their 
behaviors. 
 He further emphasized that a social event must be recognized by the power of external coercion 
it exercises over individuals. This theoretical perspective greatly influenced social 
anthropological studies during the first half of the 20th century, and in particular, the influence 
has been particularly evident in the ethnographic work pursued by Radcliffe-Brown, Meyer 
Fortes, and Evans-Pritchard in their analyses of small-scale societies. Thus, these scholars stress 
that individual action is dependent on a compelling social force and organization beyond human 
agency.  
Others, on the other hand, give much weight to the human agency as a decisive factor that 
influences the courses of events in the society rather than being merely orchestrated by the 
external structure. The Durkheimian perspective dominated sociological and anthropological 
inquiries since the 1960s and later replaced by the Weberian view that gives emphasis to the 
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individual actions rather than structure as an important factor in influencing actions and 
organizations in the social world. The 1960s new theoretical orientation with a grand appellation 
called Weberian view emphasizes on „human action instead of social structure as the main object 
of research, focusing on „the analysis of intimate, everyday interactions“ (Sztompka 1994:30). 
Since then, the „agency-centric“ perspective came about as a reaction to the „structural 
emphasis“ of the previously mentioned position. Placing much emphasis on the role of personal 
efficacy, the human- agency centric suggests that humans can actively decide on the courses of 
actions they wish to pursue. It is due to the place it gives to human's agency that social scientists 
became especially interested in the theoretical views of Max Weber. In his exposition of 
sociological theory and method in 'Economy and Society' (1922), Weber places the focus of 
social-scientific inquiry on the acting (and active) individual. In particular, he proposes to speak 
of ‘action’ insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to his behavior-be it 
overt or covert, omission or acquiescence. An action is „social“ insofar as its subjective meaning 
takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course (Weber 1978 
[1922]:4). In this sense, Weber suggested that sociologists should focus on the „rational, goal-
directed activities of individuals” (Gordon 1991:477). In his view, the task of the sociologist is to 
reveal the rationalizations of the person in any given situation, taking into account the 
„interpretive understanding“ (Verstehen) of social actors positioned in various contexts of action. 
Additionally, contemporary scholars also criticize structure-centric analysis of social events and 
organization. 
Norman (2001:18,19), for example, disagrees with the structure focused theories as „people-
less,“ and obsessed with the conditions, contexts, and driving of social life rather than with the 
self-organizing practices of those inhabiting, experiencing and transforming the contours and 
details of the social landscape. He emphasizes further that human agency has the knowledge and 
capability to decide on and act accordingly even in extreme preventing external environment. 
Whereas explaining their behaviour as the result of some external cause does not (von Wright, 
1993). Norman (2001) adopts a new perspective called „an actor-oriented perspective that 
explored how social actors (both ‘local' and ‘external ‘to the particular arena) are locked into a 
series of intertwined battles over resources, meanings and institutional legitimacy and control“ 
(Norman 2001: 1). An actor-oriented approach focuses on the exploration of internally generated 
strategies and processes of change b social actors themselves in their day to day lives.  
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It also elucidates the links between the world of actors at the grassroots level and the larger 
global actors and the critical roles played by diverse and often conflicting forms of human action 
and social consciousness (ibid.:16). The notion of agency attributes to the individual actors the 
capacity to process social experience and to devise ways of coping with life challenges. State 
institutions such as state courts, and community courts, religious organizations, political parties, 
non-governmental organizations and capitalist enterprises can be exemplified as social groups 
that have means of reaching and formulating decisions and of acting at least on some of them 
(ibid.:16). 
Thus, from above brief explanation, we can understand that structural analysis gives little rooms 
for local actors to articulate their views on the local situations and see variations in their 
organizations. The approach also overshadows the roles of the lived experiences of actors to 
have little impact at the grassroots level social interactions. An actor-oriented approach, on the 
other hand, provides better insights into the dynamics and complexity of power relations and 
lived experiences of the human beings. But I argue that both structure and actor oriented 
approaches are invariably important perspectives to better understand the socio-legal reality of a 
given community. It is due to this vantage point that I employed the agency-structure approach to 
asses’ actors’ interests, beliefs, and the subsequent perceptions as well as strategies dispute 
settlers have been using to settle disputes. The approach also allowed me to understand the 
contestations among actors that may arise owing to competition over resources, legitimacy or 
other factors in the study area.  
The approach further helped me to closely understand the networks of relations among social 
groups, the perceptions and actions they develop among themselves and their counterparts, and 
the interfaces they develop at the grassroots levels. The social phenomena that are made up of a 
multiplicity of constructed and new realities which actors develop can effectively be understood 
if one pays attention to both the structure and the human agency. There are growing works that 
support looking at both the agency and structure aspects of social life o better grasp the socio-
legal aspects of life.  
There are some scholars, for instance, presents their views on the structure-agency debate. These 
contemporary scholars try to reconcile the two versions by expounding that both structure and 
human agencies are very important to understand social action and organization.  
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Anthony Giddens’s (1984) work on „structuration theory“ as well as Pierre Bourdieu's 
([1972]1977) work „theory of practice“, for instance, explain that social science researchers 
should strive to understand both the structural and human agency aspects of the social life. 
Giddens, for example, said that a researcher who strives to understand the nature of social life 
should „analyse“ how the concepts of action, meaning, and subjectivity should be specified and 
how they might relate to notions of structure and constraint (Giddens 1984:2). He further 
emphasizes that one should construct a coherent framework with which „structure „and „agency“ 
can both be grasped in the account of social life and systematically analysed to have a better 
understanding of the nature of social life.  
Recent studies also underline the significances of paying attention to both the structure and the 
agency dimensions of the social life to understand the on-going socio-political dynamics of 
African societies. In this regard, Cheeseman (2016:4) insists that informal and traditional forms 
of personalized networks of leadership which he figured out as a phenomenon known as “neo-
patrimonialism“ has become important local leadership system which influences social realities 
in the contemporary Africa. This is due to, among other factors, the African states' failure "to 
maintain their sovereignty“ (Santos de Sousa 2006:36).  
Cheeseman indicates that Africa's international relationship and the engagement of external 
powers like China has demanded, on the other hand, the growing significance of "formal 
political institutions“ (Cheeseman 2016:4) to understand the social realities apart from the 
agency of Africa's people per say its local actors. Thus, giving due attention to both the structure 
and actors' agency has become an important sociological perspective to grasp the complex socio-
legal natures of African people.  
On this vantage point, let me shed some lights on how agency-structure perspective can play an 
important role for exploring legal pluralism among the Siltie people. The historical trajectories of 
legal pluralism in Ethiopia in general and the Siltie in particular indicate that the existence, 
operations, as well as functions of legal systems are closely linked with the various political 
systems the country has passed through. Studies indicate that Ethiopia's legal systems have 
greatly been influenced by the external coercive powers and social pressures as well as the 
structures that are unfolding in the country (Barnes 2001: 344; Alula and Getachew 2008: 4). 
There were and are also conflicts between the core and the periphery demanding to maintain 
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their local system of administrations (Markakis, 2011). Authors like Alula and Getachew (2008) 
and Markakis (2011) reported that the core had imposed the alien legal system over the local 
community with fierce resistance from below. In these circumstances, the local actors devise 
various strategies like abstaining from government meetings, and development campaigns to 
maintain their local power (Scott, 1985). As an indicative to the resistance to the state 
interventions, local actors tried to change the course of events and influence the intentions of the 
structure into their advantages. Actors agency has further been empowered partly due to the 
declining of the legitimacy of the state systems vis a vis local actors’ ability to appeal to the 
community as an alternative and even dominant local legal agent in delivering justice at the 
grassroots level (Alula and Getachew, 2008). They employ their lived experiences, abilities, 
social capitals, and local knowledge to mobilize the local community and generate local power.  
To recap, from the above theoretical explanations one can understand that social actions 
continuously evolve and lead to the creation of values, norms and of course various social 
institutions through the process of social changes via the interactions of structures and agency. In 
addition, both structure and human agency have been active in influencing the nature of the 
social lives of the Siltie. Therefore, the agency-structure approaches have helped me understand 
the lived experiences of the actors and explore the interactions and competitions among the legal 
systems through the perspectives of local actors and members of the institutions.  
1.9.2. Legal Pluralist Analytical Approaches 
Anthropologists used legal anthropological approaches for understanding the various legal 
systems operating in different parts of the world. As a student of anthropology, my analysis is 
mainly related to Woodman's ideas of „deep legal pluralism“ as an anthropological perspective. 
Woodman's conception of deep legal pluralism gives me an opportunity to see the world from 
the actors' perspectives (Woodman, 1996). On the other hand, a ‘’juristic view of legal 
pluralism“ or „state legal pluralism“ (Merry, 1988) has sometimes been said not to be a form of 
legal pluralism which can be of interest to social science“ (Woodman 1996:158). Griffiths Jhon 
(1986) insists further that the juristic definition of law is not comprehensive enough to show the 
dynamics of state-society relations. He further underscores that below, outside, and all around 
the state are other forms, ‘systems,' and social worlds over which the state neither exercised 
complete control nor had the ability to eradicate it.  
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Thus, legal centralist approach could not pay attention to this socio-cultural domain where the 
state has little control. Woodman's deep legal pluralism concepts, however, extend the concept of 
„law“ to include non-state modes of social ordering. Since the Siltie's plural legal setting 
embraces state, the religious and customary dispute settlement institutions that co-operate and 
contend on various cases, I adopted the legal anthropology approach to analyse the interactions 
of the legal systems among the Siltie. In addition, the legal anthropology approach also allowed 
me to understand the daily activities of the local community and their interactions with the co-
existing legal systems in the area. Nowadays, legal anthropologists have placed more emphasis 
on the process by which disputes are settled, rather than on the substance of the law that emerges 
from legal decisions.  
The studies adopt a transactional perspective looking into the strategies actors employ to manage 
disputes and the choices they make between alternative modes of dispute settlement. This has 
been referred to as „forum shopping and shopping forums“ (Keebet Von Benda-Beckman 1981, 
Merry 1979). Others further stress that social research should focus on the activities of 
individuals rather than the law (or how the courts have interpreted the law) to have a good 
understanding of a given society's internal and external social interaction. Thus, law itself may 
have little significance in the understanding of how a community resolves its disputes compared 
to the social norms or the religious values its people attach to it.  
This analysis agrees with Georg Simmel's assertion that "…society is made up of the interactions 
between and among individuals, and the sociologist should study the patterns and forms of these 
associations, rather than quest after social laws“ (Farganis 1993: 13 cited in Borszik, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the local community also employs state law to champion their rights in the various 
courts, mainly customary ones. Thus, state law has been used as a "weapon of the weak“ (Scott, 
1985), yet it remains relatively less influential over the day to day activities of the local 
community compared with social norms. In this regard, customary and faith-based courts are 
playing significant roles in dispute settlements. This is because the sheiks and elders' courts, 
among other factors, are nearer and more conversant to the grassroots rather than the state. On 
the other hand, I also employ Clifford Geertz's (1973) interpretive approaches to understand the 
roles plural legal settings play in dispute settlement in the area. As mentioned above, I employed 
an actor-oriented approach to understanding the interactions and interfaces as well as changes 
and continuities of legal pluralism among the Siltie.  
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This can be achieved through the following procedures. First, data analysis is an inductive 
process whereby the data gathered from the informants will be „analyzed inductively building 
from particulars to general themes, and the researcher making interpretations of the meaning of 
the data“ (Creswell 2009: 4).Qualitative data analysis is highly intuitive and personal activity. 
It is a process where the epistemological assumptions and standpoints of the researcher are 
revealed (Dawson, 2005; Krauss, 2005). In the whole process of analysis, I edited, classified, 
coded and tabulated the collected data so as to make sense of them and make them amenable for 
analysis.  
The types of data that have been generated in this study include field notes, recordings, and 
transcripts. In data analysis, there is a search for patterns of relationship that exist between the 
data group (Kothari, 2004). To analyze the data, as a qualitative researcher, I did not wait until 
all of the data have been collected. Analysis of the data is a process which begins as the research 
progresses and that requires refining and reorganizing the data in light of the emerging results 
(Lodico et al., 2010). The interviews have been transcribed precisely and then translated into 
English from Siltie language. Data are analyzed through the reading and reviewing of the 
collected data to (or „intending to“) identify themes and patterns that come out which then are 
coded. I have then summarized and explained the results by describing the major ideas, patterns 
or themes that emerged from the analysis (Lodico et al., 2010). Finally, I reflected on the 
analyzed data and assessed their implications for the questions in the study. 
1.10. Ethical Consideration 
An ethnographic study is about human beings by human beings. It is, therefore, important to 
consider ethical issues before launching a study. Since it involves continuous interactions with 
the studied group, qualitative study requires respecting the academic ethics more seriously than 
other studies. I, as a researcher, have a professional obligation to respect the rights, needs, 
values, and desires of the informants. Thus, I also kept the confidentiality of their information 
which is aimed only for scholarly purposes. I also articulated the research objectives verbally and 
in writing so that the informants clearly understood them. I also properly acknowledged and 
cited any information that was taken from published and unpublished sources. 
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 I count on the ethical guidelines of the American Anthropological Association, and the 
Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK and Commonwealth11. 
1.11. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, it is indicated that even if Ethiopia has become a plural legal country and has 
sanctioned legal pluralism since the 1990s, there are little research works done so far in the area. 
It has also been discussed that the days marking anthropology as a field which focuses on those 
who live in distant areas is over. Thus, the chapter argued that post-exotic anthropology has 
emerged as a new field and that ethnography is ripe in one's society like any field of study. 
Despite the fact that studying one's society has its assets, it seems, however, that studying own 
society has had its drawback for some reasons. It is because, among others, the native 
anthropologists are filled with the culture of their informants, which in turn, brings into question 
their ability to be ‘objective' to the individuals they are seeking to understand better.  
The contemporary social sciences analytical perspectives have also maintained a delicate balance 
between structure and actors' activities to understand the social settings including the legal 
realities of a given society such as the Siltie people.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
11 AAA. Code of ethics. American Anthropological Association. http://www.aaanet.org/issues/policy-
advocacy/upload/AAA-Ethics-Code-2009,and ASA. 1999. Ethical guidelines for good research practice. The 
Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK and Commonwealth. 
Http://www.theasa.org/ethics/guidelines.shtml.Pdf. Accessed on 20 March 2017. 
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                     CHAPTER TWO 
2. THE RESEARCH SETTINGS, LOCAL LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES, KINSHIP, AND 
SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the research setting, the various socio-economic and local governance 
of the Siltie people as well as the kinship and social structures of the researched people. The 
chapter also looks into the genesis of the Siltie people as an ethnic group in the context of the 
Ethiopian polity and its intra and interaction with the neighboring groups. It also explicates 
the local livelihood strategies and nature-nurture interaction as well as how land has become 
both an asset and an identity to the local community. The chapter also looks at the conception 
of territoriality among the Siltie and also sheds some lights on the concepts of family 
structures which function as semi-autonomous social fields and show how the kin and family 
groups develop their own their rules in the framework of Siltie Serra to regulate the daily 
activities of members. It also investigates the Siltie's involvement in long-distance trade and 
business activities both locally and nationally since the late 19th century. The chapter further 
looks at how this economic transaction fosters not only the economic development of the 
people and Ethiopia but has also become a channel for the flow of ideas from national to the 
local which in turn has contributed for the interaction of local and state actors. The chapter 
argues that the transfer of ideas to the local arena has become one of the factors for the 
diversification of legal and social norms in the area. It has also discussed local and national 
as well as the international migration of the Siltie which has become a culture of the local 
community. It also looks into religion as an important aspect of the everyday activity of the 
Siltie and how Islam has become quasi-identical to the Siltie identity.  
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2.2. The Research Setting: Siltie Zone 
Siltie zone is located in Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Regional State (SNNPRS) 
of Ethiopia. The majority of the Siltie people live in Siltie Zone12. Some Siltie people also live in 
the surrounding Gurage Zone, Halaba special Wereda as well as in Hadiyya Zone. The people 
are also found in significant number in various urban centers of Ethiopia.  
Siltie zone was formed in April 2001 following a referendum that separated Siltie from the 
neighbouring Gurage, Hadiyya, and Halaba communities (Zerihun, 2007, Kairedin 2012). It is 
found 132kms south of Addis Ababa on Alemgena to Jinka main asphalt road.  
The Siltie have settled in the area stretching for up to 60kms to the east and west from the main 
road. Their territory covers more than 3000km2. The zone is bordered to the north and northwest 
by Gurage Zone, to the east by the Oromia Regional State, to the southeast by Halaba Special 
Wereda, and to the south by Hadiyya Zone. Administratively, Siltie zone is structured into eight 
Weredas13 and one city administration, namely: Dalocha, Silti14 , Mirab Azernet Berbera, Misrak 
Azernet Berbera, Alicho Wuriro, Sankura, Hulbareg, Lanfuro, and Werabe Town 
Administration. An administrator presides each district and each Wereda is composed of various 
offices including the judiciary and Shari'a courts. Each wereda is sub-divided also into numerous 
lower level administrative units called Qebele. A Qebele is further sub-divided into a got that 
comprises a specific neighborhood with a limited number of households. 
According to the Central Statistical Agency (CSA) Population and Housing Census Report 
(PHCR) of 2007, the total population of the Siltie is estimated to be more than a million in 2017 
(CSA, 2009; Bustorf 2011:456-458). The same source indicates that 51% of the population is 
female. As the source further indicates, 91.5% of the people live in rural areas, while 8.5% live 
in the urban areas. The number of males is small compared with females in Highland Siltie due 
to migration either to urban areas of Ethiopia or outside. Nevertheless, it is observed nowadays 
that the lowlands and semi-highland areas are also losing their younger generation, mainly 
women, to the Gulf States in significant numbers.  
                                                     
12 Zone is the second administrative division after „Regional State” in the contemporary federal structure of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. 
13 Wereda is the fourth administrative tier in the contemporary federal structure. 
14 The generic name Siltie is a common denomination for all communities who speak Siltigna language. 
Nevertheless, the word Silti is a name for one of the five communities of the Siltie, Silti community. It is also the 
name for one of eight weredas in the study area, Silti wereda.  
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The Siltie account for 1.3% of the total population of Ethiopia.15 The largest ethnic group 
reported in Siltie zone is the Siltie people (97.35%); other ethnic groups made up 2.65% of the 
population. Siltie is spoken as a first language by 96.95% of the population, and 1.48% spoke 
Amharic; the remaining 1.57% spoke all other primary languages. Muslims account for 97.6% of 
the population, while 2.03% practiced various domains of Christianity (Ethiopian Orthodox 
Christianity takes the significant share of this) (Kairedin, 2012; Zerihun Abebe 2013:141; Siltie 
zone finance abstract, 2016/7). 
The Siltie lands have two agro-ecological zones, namely highland (Dega), and temperate 
(Weynadega), each of which covers 20.5 % and 79.5 % of the total area of the land, respectively 
(S.Z. F.E.D, 2016/7). Thus, the people have mainly settled in Highland and semi-highland areas 
of the Zone. Siltie Zone is predominantly plateau and flat plain. It also has a small, rugged 
mountainous territory. The elevation of Siltie land dwindles from west to east. The highest 
mountain in Siltie is mount Mugo that has an elevation of 3060 m.a.s.l. The average temperature 
of Siltie Zone ranges from 120c-260c, and its average annual rainfall is from 780 mm-1818mm 
(S.Z. F.E.D, 2016/7). The Siltie people are well known as merchant people in Ethiopia, 
especially in Merkato, one of the largest open markets in Africa (Bustorf 2009, 2011).  
The Siltie are also endowed with various cultural practices. Furthermore, a number of traditional 
hairstyles, the five types of traditional music, the different traditional practices such as women 
dominated religious association (Dado), traditional religious practices like Ware (See more in 
Chapter Six) can be mentioned as customary practices of the people depicting the Siltie’s 
enriched religious and cultural assets (Ferejat 2002 40-45). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
15 Cf.CIA world fact book; accessed on 2 January 2017 at 9:42 pm. 
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2.3. The People: The Silti 
 
 
Figure 3 Administrative Map of Siltie Zone (Source: Siltie Zone Finance, July 2017) 
 
 
47 
 
They live in south central Ethiopia in what is known today as Debub Kilil (South region). The 
ethnic name Siltie16 is a common appellation for various subgroups that are related to each other 
culturally, socially and religiously. The major communities subsumed under the generic name 
Siltie are the Silti17 community, the Melga (Hulbareg), Alicho Wuriro, Azernet Berbera and 
Wolena Gedebano (Dinberu et al. 1995: 56). Abzana and Zahra communities have also been 
subsumed under the Siltie ethnic group (Kairedin 2012: 35). There is a controversy on the 
etymology of the name Siltie. One version ascribes the genesis of the name Siltie with the 
alleged ancestor Gen-Silti. According to this version, the modern ethnic name Siltie was chosen 
in memory of this ancestor, while the other version points that the people have been named after 
the 13th century old Muslim Hadiyya Sultanate and as a reminiscence of this Islamic kingdom to 
which the Siltie people claim a historical relation.  
The Siltie have a strong sense of self-identity that has not been lost in the process of 
incorporation into the Ethiopian state in the last part of 19th century, in spite of the Christian-
dominated nature of that state vis-à-vis the Islamic identity of the Siltie people on one hand, and 
the urban orientation of the population on the other. Furthermore, the Siltie people have 
maintained also their customs, local beliefs, and values including the faith-based and customary 
dispute settlement systems, although there has been some erosion of traditional cultural norms 
and practises due to the influence of reformist strains of Islam imported from the Gulf region 
over the last two decades and globalization that integrated the Siltie into national and global 
markets.  
The Siltie did not have a common ethno-name for an extended period. They had been named 
differently at various times by scholars, neighboring societies, and even by themselves. They 
have been referred to as the East Gurage (Leslaw, 1992; Zerihun, 2015), Siltie beta Gurage or 
Gurage subgroup (Dinberu et al., 1995), Islam (Markakis, 1998), Siltie (Aklilu, 2002; Yalew, 
2004), Selte (Bahru, 2002), Hadiyya, Adare, Ulbareg, (Barukämper, 2003), and Salte (Bustorf, 
                                                     
16 The common name for the people under study has been mentioned differently in several kinds of literature. There 
is no great difference among these names except Siltie Beta Gurage that considers the Siltie as part of the Gurage 
than an independent ethnic group. The Siltie contested this categorization and struggled for a decade (1991-2001). I 
have used the name Siltie as a common denomination for the people under study. The primary reasons behind my 
selection are, first, the people are currently known by this name. Secondly, they are known in history by this name at 
least from the 14th century onwards (Atse Amdesion, in Braukämper, 2003; Dirk, 2011). 
17 Silti is the name for Silti sub group who trace their ancestor from Gun-Silti and is also used for one of the eight 
Weredas of Siltie Zone, Silti Wereda. Siltie is also the ethnic name of Siltie people. 
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2009: 2011). According to the respondents18, various neighboring peoples also call the Siltie in 
different names. The Arsi Oromo who borders the Siltie in east and northeast, for instance, call 
the Siltie as Adare in memory of people from Hararege in the east. The Mareqo, on the other 
hand, call the people as Gande or Genze while the Gurage name the Siltie as Hadiyya associating 
the Siltie's origin from the historic medieval Hadiyya Sultanate. The Siltie, however, address 
themselves as „Islam,” and their language as YeIslam afe or „Islamic language” to indicate their 
strong relation with Islam that shaped most of the identity manifestations of the society. They 
also call themselves Urbareg, the land of old lions. 
Additionally, it is not uncommon to hear a Siltie person when he or she describes himself or 
herself based on subgroup names such as Azernet, Silti, Alicho Wuriro, and Melga. This kind of 
circumstance is also observed whenever elders summon for dispute settlement. However, despite 
the fact that there are minor differences among sub-groups, one can easily understand a relatively 
common identity among the Siltie.  
Even if some sources (e.g. Zerihun 2015:4-9) indicate that the ethnonym Siltie and the Siltie 
ethnic group is outcome of post 1990s political development in Ethiopia, historical records 
indicate that the people were known as ‘Siltihe,' that is to say, Siltie in the 14th century Ethiopian 
King Amdesion chronicle (Atse Amdetsion chronicle Bustorf 2011:657). The ethno-name Siltie 
has also been employed as a weapon of social and political mobilization-to redress the socio-
economic imbalances of the Imperial and the Derg regimes in the country. During the 1970s, as 
respondents said19, the Siltie students at Addis Ababa University established Siltie Students' 
Association to struggle against the government's strong central policy and the subsequent socio-
economic sufferings of the rural community. Thus, the people employed the name Siltie in the 
pre-1990s period in the country.  
However, some Siltie elites indicated that the ethnic name Siltie is coined very recently 
following the emergence of Siltie movement in the 1990s. For these groups of informants20, the 
name has been conceived with the consensus of the Siltie movement leaders in the federalist 
                                                     
18 Interview with Hajji Abdurrahman Shewajjo, Hajji Hussein Hassan, and Sheik Yusuf Kemal in Dalocha, Silti, and 
Werabe. These individuals are well known key informants who are also elders who worked as judges in the 
customary dispute settlement forums and the local faith courts. They are also a member of cultural revitalization 
committee that has been formed to resurrect the traditional system of the Siltie. 
19 Interview with Ato Kairedin Azma Hussein, and Ato Jemal Ahmed on February 30, 2015.  
20 Ato Kedir Abdela, who was an active member of Siltie movement (1991-2001) and a local investor (Anonymous 
name). 
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Ethiopia partially indicating the existence of ethnic re-engineering in the contemporary Ethiopia 
(Zerihun, 2015). As mentioned above, both historical records and oral traditions indicate that the 
people employ the name Siltie at least since the mid-14th century. 
2.4. Ethno-Genesis of the Siltie 
The ethno-genesis of the Siltie has also exhibited an aspect of pluralism. There are various views 
regarding the origin of the Siltie people. One of the versions on the origin of the Siltie states that 
the Siltie came from an eastern part of the country following Imam Ahmed Gragn’s war of 
expansion during the first half of the 16th century (Label, 1974, Lapiso, 1990; Shack, 1966; 
Trimingham, 1965). Based on these sources, the Muslim communities of Siltie, namely Azernet 
Berbera, Hulbareg (Melga), Wuriro, Wolena, Gedebano, and Zeway (Zay) are identified as 
descendants of people from Harar (Trimingham 1965:188; Shack; 1966, Lapiso, 1999). 
Despite pinpointing the directions of expansion of the Siltie from the east, the above historical 
records could not identify the existence and the earliest area of the Siltie in the eastern parts of 
Ethiopia. Other sources, on the other hand, indicate the presence of the Siltie long before the 16th 
century in Ethiopia (Abraham and Habtamu 1994: 28, 31; Yalew 2004: 35; Kairedin 2013: 40). 
According to this view, the Siltie people expanded from the southern part of the Arabian 
Peninsula, settled around Lake Zeway before the war of Ahmed Gragn, and eventually dispersed 
to other areas including the present Siltie Zone areas in three different exoduses (Abraham and 
Habtamu 1994: 28, 31). Hetzron’s and Sherif’s (1985) analysis of a historical account of 
linguistic patterns even put the time for ethno genesis of the people further back to the 8th 
century (Hetzron 1976: 28-32; Sharif 1983: 3). Other sources further identified the existence of 
indigenous Siltie speaking communities such as Zhara and Abzana long before the wars of Imam 
Ahmed (Dinberu 1995:19 Aklilu 2002:42). The native peoples inhabited the area since the 
ancient time. In addition, scholars (e.g. Lapiso, 2000; Braukämper 2001; Bustorf 2009, 2011) 
further strengthen the Siltie's existence long before the 16th century. 
 According to these sources, the Siltie are one of the ancient people who had established the 
medieval Ethiopian Hadiyya Sultanate which was incorporated into the Christian highland 
Kingdom under Amdesion (r. 1314-1344) in the 14th century. This view is derived from the 
chronicle of medieval Ethiopian ruler, Amdesion and 16th-century writers such as Almada. The 
chronicle of Aste Amdesion mentions an entity allied to the Emperor by the name ‘Saltagie,' 
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‘Saltahi' which can be interpreted as the country of Siltie (Braukämper 2001: 51; Bustorf 2009: 
607). Added to this, the German anthropologist, Braukämper also identifies the Siltie as the only 
people related to the Hadiyya Sultanate who did not adopt a Cushitic language. He further noted 
that the Siltie lived in areas around the Charcher highlands in eastern Ethiopia before the 16th 
century (Braukämper 2001:55; Bustorf 2009: 607). Other scholars also mentioned the 16th and 
17th century’s population movements in south-eastern Ethiopia contributed for the inter-mixing 
of various peoples and the genesis of the Siltie in its current form. According to these sources, 
due to the wars of Imam Ahmed and the population movement of the Oromo, the ancient Islamic 
principalities including the Hadiyya Sultanate were weakened and dissolved. Such incidents led 
the ancient people including the Siltie to move from the east to the south and western parts of 
Ethiopia to the present land (Lapiso, 2000; Yalew 2004: 35; Bustorf, 2009; Bustorf, 2011). 
Therefore, the various sources mentioned above clearly indicate the existence of the Siltie long 
before the 16th century exodus. 
Oral traditions in the area relate mainly the people’s origin with the 16th century well known 
‘’Grand Fathers’’, Geradecha and Queens (Gisticha) movement. These individuals came from 
the east to the present Siltie land. However, if we carefully inspect the contents of their 
narrations, local informants do not limit the genesis of the people to the 16th century. Based on 
the primary informants21, Siltie grandfathers such as Hajji Aliye, Sheik NeserAllah, Sheik Alinur, 
Sheik Berkele, and „grandmothers” or queens such as Gistit Tahirat, Gistit Shemsiyate migrated 
from the east with a large number of people, and passed via Sharka Gadab and Wag countries 
and finally settled in the present Siltie land. These migrants intermingled with the local 
populations known among the Siltie as Zhara and Abzana which the people considered as 
Yafarsabe (indigenous people).  
Hajji Aliye especially has been considered among the Siltie as the founding father, for he played 
a significant role in integrating the new comers with the natives and establishing a new system of 
traditional administration the people employed until the late 19th century. Hajji Aliye and others 
married with the indigenous people and gave birth to many children who later became genesis 
                                                     
21 Interview with key informants Sheik Abdurrahman, Sheik Yusuf, Hajji Hussein, and Hajji Arega Nuriye. It is also 
based on FGD that was conducted in March 2012 in Werabe town with notable key informants who gathered for 
cultural reform committee meeting which is not functional this time due to the death of key elders, on one hand, and 
less interest on the part of government officials to support the initiative on the other hand. 
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for most of contemporary Siltie clans and sub-groups. According to FGD participants22, Hajji 
Aliye’s sons, namely Aleqiro, Semerdin, Dilapa, and Gun-Silti (Sultan II), and his daughter, 
Ouyeta played a great role in the origin of Siltie people in its current form. Among Hajji Aliye’s 
children, his daughter Ouyeta was given to the Kembata King as a political marriage that later 
became the base for the emergence of Ouyeta ruling dynasty among the Kembata around the 
nineteenth century (Braukämper 2001: 51).  
Also, others who came with Hajji Aliye such as Ahmed Berbera, Oucha, and Sheik Nasrallah 
were mentioned as one of Siltie ancestors who played a significant role in the ethno genesis of 
the Siltie. Hence, it is the combination of these factors that have laid a foundation for the genesis 
of the Siltie ethnic group in its present state. In fact, most of the clans and sub-clans that are 
found currently among the Siltie people trace their genealogical origin to the supposed 16th 
century ancestors. Such genealogical connection in the people's patrilineage mythological oral 
traditions also goes far beyond this period up to Sharafic lines among the Hashemite in Arab 
land. In short, the above various written and verbal traditions confirm the existence of the Siltie 
long before the advent of Hajji Aliye’s group to the area. Some sources, however, contest the 
genesis and continuation of the Siltie an autonoumus ethnic group before the 1990s period 
(Zerihun, 2015). Some sources also categorize the Siltie as part of the wider Gurage groupings 
under the generic name Eastern Gurage (Shack, 1963; Dinberu et al, 1995; Zerihun, 2015). But a 
growing number of literature indicate , however, that the Siltie are an autonoumus ethnic groups 
themselves with a notion of independent and shared origin, language, religion and territory as 
well as a common psychological makeup ( Markakis, 1998; Braukämper 2001;Abdulfeta, 2002; 
Vaughan ,2003;Bustorf, 2011; Kairedin 2012,2013; Smith, 2013). My empirical data also 
indicate further that the Siltie are one of the ancient people of the country whose ethno genesis 
goes at least back to the 9th century.  
 
 
 
                                                     
22 The above FGD participants. 
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2.5. The Siltie and their Neighbours: Inter-ethnic and interfaith relations 
 
The Siltie intra and inter actions with various people have been characterized by peaceful co-
existence among its constituents and its neighbors on the one hand, and some forms of conflicts 
among each other and its neighboring groups, on the other. The Siltie clans, as informants23 said, 
had conflicts with each other over the control of resources, expansion of territory and political 
hegemony to take an upper hand over the other clan. Nevertheless, when a common enemy 
came, they assembled their forces under a single administration in the form of clan 
confederation. The people then abided by the Siltie administration under the rule of Gerad Abo, 
the highest leader of the Siltie traditional administration. The intra-ethnic disputes persisted until 
Menilik's forces controlled the area in 1889. 
The Siltie people have developed a mixture of relationships with their neighboring groups 
characterized by both amicable and conflict interactions with their neighbors. There are also 
followers of Christianity who peacefully live with the Muslim majority Silties for long. 
Tewahedo Christians, for instance, have lived in Siltie land at least since the late 19th century. 
Despite the fact that peaceful coexistence characterizes inter-faith interaction in the area, there 
were some forms of inter-faith conflicts as well. Some studies indicate that there were inter-
religious conflicts among the various groups because of religious differences or revivalism 
during the Islamic expansion of Hassan Enjamo of Qabena (Aklilu 2002:46-47). 
Informants said24 that even though the Siltie were in conflict with their neighbors, they also 
established amicable relations and alliances with different religious groups at various times. The 
Siltie also established strong marriage relations with the Arsi Oromo in the east. A good case in 
point was an inter-marriage between Wesenute who was a daughter of Hajji Aliye’s son Gun-Silti 
with Arsi Oromo religious leader named Sheik Adem whose descendants are believed to be a 
source for the genesis of one of the Oromo clans called Dembel.  
The Siltie, on the other hand, formed an informal alliance called Gogot (coalition) with the 
Oromo, Shashogo, Gurage, the Halaba, and the Qabena to resist the territorial expansions of 
Menilik in late 19th century (Dinberu et al. 1995:218-219). 
                                                     
23 Interview with Ato Kairedin Hussein, and Hajji Abdurrahman. 
24 Interview with Hajji Hamid, Gerad Awel, and Hajji Hussein.  
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The integration of Siltie into Menilik’s empire brought a disaster to the Siltie. First, after the 
incorporation the Balabats (Highlanders) settled in the fertile areas of the Siltie and introduced 
the Gabbar system. The central government also punished the Siltie by dividing the Siltie land 
into different adjacent areas. In fact, the Siltie land was subdued by Menilik's troops for the first 
time in 1879.The marriage of the daughter of the Summu Silti (Eight Siltie) chief; Azma Qalbo 
with Negus Sahelsillasie (r.1831-1834) of Showa Kingdom facilitated a comparatively friendly 
relation between the leading families of the new rulers and the Siltie. In the 19th century, scarcity 
of land and frequent conflicts with the neighboring Gurage forced the Siltie to leave most of the 
highland areas except Mugo, Eneqqore, and Alicho Wuriro to the Gurage. The Siltie, in turn, 
expanded their territory to the pastoralist areas in the east and southeast. This incident again 
brought the Siltie into conflicts with the Arsi, Libid.o, Lemmo, and Sasoogo Hadiyya (Bustorf 
2011:461-62). Thus, the basic causes for most of conflicts in the area were competitions over 
resources, particularly land among the ethnic groups as well as rivalries for territorial and 
political hegemony.  
2.6. Local Livelihood Strategies and Resources 
The Siltie practice mixed agriculture and cattle breeding. Like in many parts of the country, the 
Siltie economy largely depends on agriculture based on plow animals. The Siltie’s main income 
source is agriculture. Peasants coming from different areas of the region sell their agrarian 
products in various Siltie local markets. Siltie peasants widely produce also livestock like goats, 
sheep, cattle and chicken. 
The distribution of vegetation depends on the climatic conditions of the Siltie areas. In the 
Highland Siltie, the principal crops are Enset25, barley and beans. In the semi-highland and 
lowland areas where a significant amount of cultivable land is found, cereals such as maize, 
wheat, vegetables, fruits, and legumes are produced. In these areas, local investors that are 
generating jobs for local people have practiced large-scale farms with mechanized agriculture. 
The big farms have now become knowledge and skill transferring centers to the local population. 
Cash crops such as red pepper and Khat are also highly produced in Siltie land. The Khat market 
has now become another huge cash crop market in the last few years in the country (Aadland 
                                                     
25 Enset (Enset Adulis) is a drought-resistant crop with an edible root and stem. It is a staple food of the Siltie, 
mainly in the highland areas. 
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2002; 31). Women are highly involved in Khat market especially in Werabe and surrounding 
areas. In the highland areas, women are actively involved in local subsistence production 
activities like Enset cultivation and other agricultural works. Most of the households in the 
Highland Siltie are also headed by women as men go to urban centers for work. In lowland and 
semi lowland areas, women are engaged in the household work, and the local markets, in the 
construction sectors, in daily labors as well as in the selling of traditional coffee. Each house 
among the Siltie has a garden to support the household. In the Highland Siltie, the garden is 
mainly crammed with Enset and various vegetables, while in the lowland Siltie, different cereals 
including maize and wheat dominate the local production. Following the establishment of Siltie 
zone, the construction sector has become an important source of employment for the youth.  
The Siltie people herd goats, sheep, cattle, and chicken for their subsistence economy. Animals 
are sources of meat, milk, butter, and egg. Animals, particularly cattle, are regarded as a symbol 
of wealth and pride among the Siltie. The Siltie usually say, „Mist Angedo Dinet Allay?“ which 
means „How many heads of cattle does a person have?“ to know how much the person is rich in 
the community. So, an individual who has a significant number of livestock, irrespective of the 
amount of milk /meat or income he/she gains, is regarded as the wealthiest person in the society. 
The Siltie do not separate their animals' abodes from their homes. Rather, they tie their cattle in 
front of them under the same roofs. It is thus an indication of the Siltie's strong attachment with 
their cattle. Nevertheless, currently due to health extension programs in the countryside, the 
people have begun to build separate houses for their animals.  
Animals also have ritual significances among the Siltie. End of feuds between disputants is 
heralded through slaughtering of animals. It is believed that animals can end murder case. They 
thus serve as a symbol of ritual reconciliation during Gudda ceremony26. Slaughtering of animals 
is a customary practice among the Siltie during Arafa, Edul fitr and Mawlid ceremonies. It is 
believed among the Siltie that slaughtering of animals and touching the foreheads of the 
bridegroom with the blood of the slaughtered animal can prevent any evil spirit on their way to 
the new home during the wedding time. This activity is called Meticha Egedote.  
                                                     
26 Gudda is a ritual ceremony in which both disputant parties attend a ritual reconciliation process at the end of 
dispute settlement, in particular on those disputes that involve murder. It also marks the end of the conflict between 
the two groups on the one hand and the onset of fictitious kinship between the groups on the other.  
 
 
55 
 
Animals also serve as special gifts during wedding time, the Gerads’ inaugural ceremony and 
during the return of pilgrims from Islamic pilgrimage from Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Animals such 
as horses, mules, and donkeys are important pack animals for transportation purposes. Horses 
and mules are specially used in the highland areas, while donkeys are mainly employed in mid 
highland and lowland Siltie areas. Local markets serve on various days in a week to allow the 
society to attend markets in different days. In these local markets, various locally produced 
materials such as Enset, cereals, craft products, Khat, red pepper, and animals are traded among 
the people and the neighboring societies. These markets also serve as a source of communication 
and exchange of information between the countryside and the urban. Various neighboring groups 
also attend these markets based on their proximity. Siltie elders, Ragas (cultural legal experts) 
use market days to handle dispute cases. I observed that the majority of the participants of Siltie 
markets are women. Women who transact locally produced produces like cereals and other cash 
crops in the markets.  
Apart from rural markets, the Siltie have a long history as trans-regional traders. My respondents 
said that there is a division of labor in the local economic activity. Hence, the market is mainly 
controlled by women, while men dominate the agricultural activity. In medieval Ethiopia, the 
Siltie were actively involved in slave trade and caravan trade activities (Cecchi 1818 in Bustorf 
2009:607). In the urban centers of the country, the Siltie have been known mainly as business 
persons.  
They have now become the well-known entrepreneurs in Addis Ababa and major cities of 
Ethiopia. They represent one of the dominant economic groups in Merkato27 (Abdulfeta 2002:20, 
25: Bustorf 2009:207).  
In the fast growing Werabe town, the capital of Siltie Zone, apart from various business 
activities, small-scale industries such as food processing, and food complex factories are 
mushrooming. According to Werabe town annual report (2017), there are fifteen such factories 
that produce flour. There are also other factories under construction. These factories serve as a 
source of employment for the Werabe residents and its environs. The town has now become the 
political, economic, and cultural power house of the Siltie people. Werabe University has started 
functioning by receiving around 1300 students in January 2018.  
                                                     
27 Merkato is the largest open market in Africa. It is found in Addis Ababa, Addis Ketema sub city. 
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The town has also got one of the modern hospitals in the country. The community has built the 
hospital worth more than quarter a million Ethiopian Birr (around 80 thousand Euros). The work 
ethos of the Siltie is appreciated widely since the people are involved in various jobs including 
micro-economic activities. In this regard, the Siltie's industriousness has been mentioned as an 
example in the country. It is observed, however, that there is a significant number of unemployed 
people mainly the youth who migrate from various Siltie areas to Werabe town. There is a place 
in the town where unemployed and displaced villagers (due to urban expansion and other part 
time peasants) hang out looking for daily work. The place is called Dide Mascha. These people 
are mostly peasants who are displaced due to the expansions of growing towns and shortage of 
land in the countryside. 
2.6.1. Land: An Identity and an Asset 
Land is a vital resource for the Siltie. The issue of land is strongly tied also with the identity of 
the people as well. Literally, the Siltie call land Deche. Nevertheless, whenever the people want 
to associate land with identity, they call it Shegne. Shegne means one's land that can become not 
only a means for living and an asset, but also a final resting place.  
Land has thus become an integral part of the identity of families, clans, and villages. Land is 
owned communally among the Siltie. Thus, the Siltie have a strong attachment to the land. A 
well-known Siltie proverb which reads, „ስልጤ ደችዋ ኢንዳች ዮዳን,“ which literally means „The 
Siltie strongly like their land and women,” also depict how land has strongly become associated 
with identity among the Siltie. Even until this day, key informants said28that land is a cause of 
disagreement among the Siltie, and it is the primary source of dispute in the area. Scales of 
disputes are intensified in those areas which the communities or member of a family consider 
land as Shegne. It seems that there is a conflict of norms in this regard. This may arise owing to 
the introduction or transplantation of „capitalist economic practices that encourage individualism 
and considers land as a property to be bought and sold, which is a valuable economic asset, 
especially for the purpose of serving as collateral for loans“ (Tamanaha 2008:408) on one hand, 
and the local conception of land as a communal property on the other hand. The government 
declares in 1995 Act that has been enshrined in the 1995 constitution that land belongs to the 
                                                     
28 Interview with Ato Kaire Sule and Hajji Hussein Kedir on June 10 and July 26 /2015 Lanfuro and Misrak Azernet 
Wereda respectively. Siltie zone good government office and Zone High Court reports also indicate that land 
constitutes the primary cause of disputes reported to the state courts. 
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public, and it is not allowed to sell or buy it. However, it is widely observed that land is freely 
sold and bought in the Siltie area and possibly beyond. In the transaction of land, we see also a 
clear involvement of plural legal systems. The parties involve both the state, and elders in the 
process. The state is, however, absent in the transaction, yet given a place in the contractual 
agreement between the parties. The parties indicate in the contractual paper that the state can fine 
one or two of a party who breaks the agreement. They use elders as witnesses and guarantee for 
the transactions. Informants indicate that the parties are afraid of elders' curse rather than the 
state's prisons whenever they are involved in the transaction. The state has become „an 
embedded state“ (Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann 2006: 10) 
whereby the state institutions and state agents have got little significances in the local settings 
and hence the state is represented only symbolically. In this regard, the parties rely more on 
elders and informal transaction rather than a municipality or other state agents.  
Despite the commercialized nature of land, one can also observe an aspect of legal pluralism in 
the application of land right. Both local kinship and an official form of land right claims are used 
in the local settings. In the countryside, the most used legal way to apply to the land right is 
through kin lines. A father can inherit the land to his children; especially male children are 
entitled to inherit the land. This may be due to the patriarchal relations that dominate the Siltie 
social life. Thus, with a growing population, children vie for land, and hence land has become 
one of the major sources of dispute among the people. This scenario strengthens the importance 
of lineage councils, and customary laws in the daily life of the people. Elders also resolve land 
disputes which are mostly tethered with individuals or elders than state agencies. This indicates 
the existence of normative clashes between liberal and non-liberal values. 
On the other hand, the government has introduced land ownership certificate since 2008. It is 
also used as a means to own land privately. Due to some factors including increasing population 
and scarcity of land, new land distribution by the government is rarely observed. The 
government, however, has set up land administration committee at Qebele administration29, the 
level which is in charge of registering land and giving ownership certificate for members of the 
Qebele who have already had land holding rights.  
                                                     
29 Kebele is the smallest administrative unit in the state administrative structure. 
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It seems that the certificate has granted a person to have an exclusive right to the land. As the 
issue of gender becomes an important agenda, both husbands and wives are usually registered in 
the land ownership certificate.  
However, the certificate could not resolve property right claims whenever the size of the family 
increases and children want to access land. It is children who are considered the instigators of 
property disputes that involve land dispute cases reported in the state court. According to Siltie 
Zone High Court report (2016/17), 2/3rd of family disputes which are brought to the tribunal are 
related to land. Qebele land administration committee is also involved in a land-related dispute 
as dispute settler. Here, family Shengo and Abotgare are most powerful local institutions which 
take part in the distribution and redistribution of collectively owned lands by a family. Abotgare 
is a male-lineage based council that is composed of a localized patrilineage circle of male- 
lineages that affect members in various ways, including distribution of land. It is also involved in 
the distribution of land and oversees dispute cases among members (Kairedin, 2012). It acts like 
the semi-autonomous social field that dominates the Siltie rural life. This group functions 
properly even if various state's controlling strategies, such as one to five organization, 
development groups, Qebele administration, land administration committee have been 
introduced by the government to control rural life. The local forums are important local dispute 
settlement institutions, for members of the family are strongly controlled by kinship 
organizations.  
Thus, whenever land dispute cases are initiated, these two forums are actively engaged in 
calming down tensions, and if actors in the institutions are not able to solve it, clan leaders or 
elders will be involved. However, if the disagreement continues, the state will also be involved.  
Women mainly resort to a government installed women's development group and Qebele's land 
administration for interventions. This happens whenever Abotgare, a men dominated institution, 
could not consider women as having inheritance rights owing to the patriarchal relations 
prevalent in the area. However, due to some gender-based interventions launched both by the 
government and NGOs in the past two decades, women's awareness has increased, and they have 
begun to challenge the status quo. It is due to this fact that elders have now seriously considered 
gender issue including property rights in various customary court hearings. Thus, the various 
government and NGOs interventions and teachings on equality of all sorts including gender 
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following the introduction of global norms (Tamanaha, 2008) are now affecting rural life. It is 
now observed that elders are employing international laws to adjudicate disputes that involve 
gender cases or inheritance cases. Thus, elders are also participating in the distribution of land 
and women inheritance rights have got due attention by elders this time. This arises primarily 
because of the influence of global gender issues. One can also say that local institutions are 
becoming part of the transformation and even at times appropriating state's social program and 
hence accelerated „democracy from below“ (Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Keebet von 
Benda-Beckmann 2006: 9). 
2.7. Local Political Life and Concept of Territoriality: An Embodiment of Modernity 
and Traditionalism 
Various attempts have been made to bring social changes in the country since at least the late 
19th century, yet they proved to be futile. The Derg regime (1974-1991), for instance, introduced 
Qebele structures (youths, and women's as well as farmers' associations), the current government 
has also introduced one to five administrative structure and various leagues in an attempt to bring 
social changes. All attempts could nor supplant local systems of administrations. This is due to 
the responses of the local actors to state's interventions in local affairs. It is observed that the 
Siltie people have maintained a strong attachment to their local administrations. Informants 
mentioned30 that in pre-Menilik II era, the Siltie land, as the natives call YeSiltie Bade, was 
categorized into twelve administrative regions, Asrehoshete Siltie Mautas.  
During the Italian occupation (1936-1941), the Siltie elders’ council also played a significant role 
in providing local means of administration. It filled the administrative vacuum that occurred due 
to the weakening of central government following Italian’s interlude. During this time, YeMula 
Siltie Melcho some call it YeSiltie Nubre incorporated the various ethnic groups, mainly the 
Amhara settlers that came to the land at least since the 19th century, as part of the Siltie local 
administration under their own district called Gogot. Gogot which means unity. Informants sated 
further that the Amharas were followers of Ethiopian Tewahedo church, who by then, were 
persecuted by Italian occupiers as part of the Italians’ “divide and rule“ colonial policy. 
                                                     
30 Interview with the main Siltie elders, Gerad Awel (died in August 2014), Hajji Hamid Ahmed, Gerad Kedir Teka, 
Ato Kaire Sule, and Ato Abdulwaris Redi and Ato Kairedin Hussein in Silti, Sankura, Lanfuro weredas and Werabe. 
Ideas are also taken in earlier interview works, and except for the first informant, others were also interviewed in 
November 29, 2015, in Werabe. 
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Rejecting the colonial power's policy, the Siltie local leaders declared that the non-Silties should 
be incorporated into the local administrations and ordered members to defend the other ethnic 
groups mostly non-Muslims. Following this incident, the Amharas settled areas have become the 
thirteenth administrative unit of the indigenous land. So, the Siltie land has been since then 
divided into thirteen administrative units, Aserasheshete Mauta (thirteen districts). These are 
Weleya, Gora, Abezana, Tite, Mukere, Aratebere, Anshebeso, Danecho, Azerenet Berbera, 
Melga, Alicho Wuriro, and Gogot Mautas. Each Mauta comprises another administrative level 
called Azegag (Village assembly). Each Azegag has also comprised smaller units called Burda 
(See More in Chapter Four). According to Bustorf (2011:461), the „pre-modern“ socio-economic 
system of the Siltie, however, was based on small independent groups which had four levels. 
These were extended family, local sub-clans or lineages, clans and clan Federations. Currently, 
based on the Federal structure, the Siltie areas have been divided into eight weredas, a city 
administration, and 196 Qebeles. There are also some small administrative levels called Got, 
which is tantamount to the traditional smallest administrative level called Burda.  
The local governance system called YeSiltie Serra, as respondents said31 was fully functional 
before Menilik's forces incorporated the Siltie in late 19th century. Menilik's forces defeated the 
Siltie's last Gerad, Mulla Gerad Tem Lezebo in the battle field called Ansenbet Amara 
(Saturday's invasion) in 1889.  
Bustorf mentioned that important features of the Siltie local system of administration, however, 
have persisted until today. Nevertheless, the institution lost its authority after the Christian 
Ethiopian conquest and the 1974 revolution (Bustorf 2011: 461). Informants mentioned32 that 
even if the Siltie area was incorporated into the expanding forces of Menilik, the local 
administration had persisted for an extended period. After Menilik controlled the area in 1889, 
the Siltie adapted to the institutions imposed on them while retaining their systems. Experiences 
in the country sides and some of the urban areas indicate that the Siltie’s socio-economic and 
local legal activities have been practiced through the various kin groups like Aberose (Family), 
Gicho (Clan), abotgare (Male-lineage) and Ummigare (woman's lineages) meetings. Failing to 
                                                     
31 Ato Kairedin Hussein  
32 Interview with Hajji Hamid Ahmed, Gerad Teka Kedir, Ato Kaire Sule and Ato Abdulwaris Redi and Ato 
Kairedin Hussein in Silti, Sankura, Lanfuro weredas and Werabe from March 2-15/2015.  
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take part in the meeting will bring one or another form of ostracism and social boycott in the 
community.  
Wars are the principal elements in the formation of the Siltie administrative units, and informants 
keep on explaining the various 'Siltie heroes' who fought mainly with Siltie clans rather than the 
neighboring groups. Anyone who is born in the family will be part of a patriclan. Hajji Aliye's 
clans considered themselves as peacemakers who founded the present Siltie modern group. 
Unlike other traditions that consider some lineage groups to be people of the land who can get 
privilege on others in political titles due to their ancestral birth in the place than late comers 
(Bureau 2011:37), the Siltie late comers have pre-eminence on yeafer seb/people of the land.  
On the other hand, the Siltie have developed a local notion of territoriality. They divide the land 
according to its usage for the community (e.g Yemesjid Deche (Mosque land), Yinebrebuyan 
Deche/ residential land), Yekebere Deche (Burial land) ,Yegaze Ungga (Operation road) ,Yire 
Ungga (Animal road), Yingere Ungga (Pedestrian road), Yegebeya Ungga (Market road) ,Yireset 
Deche (Cultivable Land ), Mulla (open field for play and grazing). However, it is observed that 
Mulla or public land which is owned communally has recently become one of the first dispute 
factors in the area. It can thus be said that the Siltie has maintained a delicate balance between 
modernity and traditionalism. 
2.8. Religion in Everyday life: the Nexus between Islam and the Siltie Identity  
"Religion constitutes an integral [part of] culture, capable of forming personal and social 
identity and influencing subsequent experience and behavior in profound ways“ (Appleby 
2012: 9)  
Islam is the dominant religion among the Siltie. Islam and Silties’ early contact goes, as some 
written sources such as (e.g. Abdulfeta, 2002; Braukämper 2001) indicate, back to the 9th 
century. This was mainly connected to the establishment of ancient Islamic states such as the 
Makzumite Shoa dynasty, and the medieval Hadiyya sultanate in Ethiopia. The Siltie call 
themselves as „Islam” and their language „Islamic.” It is in this context that Markakis (1998: 
230-231) noted that religion [Islam] is the cornerstone of Siltie identity.  
Some sources indicate that Islam made deep incursions through religious missionaries and 
caravan traders since the 9th century in the Southern Kingdoms and Sultanates via central and 
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southeastern Ethiopian frontiers (Lapiso 1999:211-15). The Siltie are among the various Cushitic 
and Semitic speaking people who established the ancient Muslim Hadiyya Sultanate in the 13 
century in southeastern Ethiopia (Braukämper 2001:54).  
Even if Islam's presence among the Siltie has been confirmed since the 9th century (Abdulfeta, 
2002), it was further intensified during the 16th century following the expansion of Imam Ahmed 
Ibrahim Ben al-Gazi popularly known as „Ahmed Gragn” or the left handed to various parts of 
the country (Dinberu 1995:38; Lapiso 1999:191-192). The Siltie's popular 16th-century saints are 
also regarded as important historical figures who played a significant role in the intensification as 
well as the spread of Islam and Islamic knowledge not only among the Siltie but also among 
neighboring societies such as the Mareqo, the Mesqan Gurage, the Oromo and the Hallaba. Hajji 
Aliye Omar, Sheik Nasrallah, Gistit (queen) Tahirat, Gistit Makia, Gistit Muluka, Gistit /Etat 
Zabere are mentioned as iconic individuals of the 16th century Islamic scholars among the Siltie. 
The existence of more than five centuries old mosques named after these saints can be taken as a 
confirmation of Islam’s long existence among the Siltie.  
The 19th-century Islamic revivalism under the leadership of Hassan Enjamo also played an 
important role for the expansion and intensification of Islam and Islamic knowledge among the 
Siltie (Aklilu 2002: 46-47). The Siltie joined Hassan Enjamo of Qabena in 1881 against 
Menilik's expanding forces, though in vain (Bustorf 2011:461). Bustorf also stated that the 19th-
century Siltie area was characterized by Islamic revivalism fuelled with an intensified contact 
with Ethiopian Islamic centers like Wallo, Jimma, and Qabena. In these areas, there was the rise 
in popularity of Islamic Brotherhood and opposition towards the expanding Christian empire 
under Menilik force. 
2.9. Local means of Communication 
The existence of communication among the Siltie can be evaluated from infrastructure building 
such as road and telecommunication services. According to informants33, in the past, the Siltie 
were neglected by central governments as far as road construction is concerned.  
Most of the Siltie Weredas, however, are now connected to the center of the zone and the main 
asphalt roads. Still, Weredas such as Dalocha, Alicho Wuriro, Lanfuro and Misrak Azernet 
                                                     
33 Interview with Hajji Hussein, Ustaz Umar (died in 2014), Ato Kairedin and Sheik Yusuf Kemal in mentioned 
time and places. 
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Berbera cannot get access to the main roads. As far as telecommunication services are 
concerned, almost all 196 Siltie Qebeles have mobile services and wireless telephone services 
(Siltie Zone Administration Annual Report, 2016/17). Therefore, peasants' decisions for selling 
their produce have been driven by such technological developments in the area. They solicit the 
market situations in the capital or any urban areas before they sell theirs produces. 
2.10. Migration as a Culture 
Migration forms an integral part of family life among the Siltie and has done mainly since Addis 
Ababa's establishment in the late 19th century. Driven by marginalization in the countryside 
following the introduction of a new system of administration and the subsequent takeover of 
their land by Balabats, the Siltie began to migrate to Addis Ababa and major urban centers of 
southern Ethiopia since late 19th century(Abdulfeta 2002:35). According to Bustorf, it was since 
early 20th century that urban migration have become part of the Siltie culture (Bustorf 2011:460-
461). However, whatever the time of the start might be, migration to the urban centers and the 
Gulf States has now become a norm rather than exception among the Siltie. Today, the Siltie are 
one of the largest migrant groups in southern Ethiopian towns and Addis Ababa where they are 
known as shopkeepers and merchants (Bustorf 2011:460-461). Werabe and some other cities 
have provided a new focal point for migration. Such centers have proved especially attractive to 
women. Mainly during annual Islamic Holidays, most of the urban immigrants come back home 
to celebrate and strengthen social ties between family members. During these times, the urban 
Siltie enhance their kinsfolk's ties among their parents and their extended family members. It is 
customary during the holidays that the urban Siltie bring special gifts such as clothes, animals for 
slaughter, kerosene as a source of energy for their families. These situations and the flow of 
information from urban to a rural area of Siltie also serve as a further instigating or pushing 
factors for younger generations to make similar ventures to the urban areas. Despite its economic 
significances in the form of local and international remittances to the place of origin, migration 
has been resulting in demographic changes since it accelerates depopulation, dependency, high 
elder age ratio, and finally negative impact on the economic development of the area as a whole. 
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2.11. Crafts  
There are various social groups among the Siltie. Black smith (Yeberet Biletegne), tanners 
(Faqi), and pot makers (Fuga) are categorized locally under crafts. Crafts are hereditary within 
the matrilineage and patrilineage lines. Pot makings are women's business and transmitted to the 
daughters through her line. Others like tannery have passed from father to a son. 
2.12. Social Stratification 
Siltie society is internally differentiated and consists of several stratified descent-based 
subgroups. These include the dominant majority of farmers and traders (woleba) and the 
marginalized craftworkers (awneya), e.g. blacksmiths, tanners, and potters. People also 
differentiate between believers in Islam and non-believers, in those of higher (sharafic) descent 
and those of low, e.g. Non-sharafic descent, also called yeafer seb (native) and finally between 
highlanders (ansewa) and lowlanders (qalla).  
The craftworkers have no right to own land or local titles. These group of the society are socially 
marginalized and not allowed to intermarry with the farmers and traders, never chosen for a 
dispute settler position and treated differently during dispute settlements in the elders’ councils. 
As informants indicated, members of minority groups prefer the state legal system over the 
customary courts, since the latter are said to treat members of the dominant majorities 
favorably.34  
Recently, one could also observe another form of social stratification emerging. Due to the 
expansion of development and education in the area, Siltie are categorized into urban, and rural, 
as well as elite and ordinary people. Related to the recent economic progress in the area, one can 
also see an emerging middle class, next to lower class and upper class Silties as reflected in the 
living standards of the community. Furthermore, we also observe a gender segregation in the life 
of the Siltie. Women are predominantly housewives and control house economy, while men 
section of the society work on the field as farmers or traders. But in the urban centers of the 
Siltie, women also joining various fields including business.  
                                                     
34 The reason behind it that the craftworkers are said to have ‘impure blood’ (deme keleb). If, a craftworker kills a 
farmer, the victim’s family will not prosecute him/her in the customary court, because at the end of the dispute 
settlement the families of the perpetrator and the victim have to forge a fictitious relationship. To avoid this social 
tie, the families of such victims usually deliberately drop the case. 
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Rural women prefer customary courts to handle marital disputes than urban ones. But due to the 
patrilineal natures of the customary court, women prefer property cases to be handled by the state 
courts than the customary one. In the urban areas, more educated women prefer both the Sharia 
and state courts to handle cases that involve property disputes. Nevertheless, rural women also 
resort to state courts whenever property disputes emerge since the state courts handle seriously 
those cases that involve women. This is due to government’s commitment to redress the gender 
imbalances witnessed before. 
2.13. Marriage and Family 
2.13.1. Marriage (Biter) 
According to anthropologists, ‟marriage is a social arrangement by which a child is given a 
legitimate position in the society determined by parenthood in the social sense” (Radcliff-Brown 
1952: 5). In marriage, new social relations are created not only between the husband and the 
wife's/wives’ family members, but also between the relatives of the man and those of the wife. 
Therefore, marriage plays a significant role in cementing social bond among the society. It is in 
this institutionalized relationship that various social structures could be created. Marriage (biter, 
as the Siltie call it) is considered as a religious act by which a man and a woman come together 
to form a union for bearing children.  
As key informants35 said, a childless marriage is not valued among the Siltie. The Siltie also 
practice polygamy, consistent with their Muslim law but contrary to the state law that can also 
indicate the existence of legal pluralism in the area. Among the Siltie social life, biter (marriage) 
has a central place. The Siltie's social life is governed by the rule of exogamy that forbids 
marriage between two members of the same clan or sub-clan. As a result of this, the Siltie boy's 
choice of a wife is firmly controlled by his parents. The boy is prohibited from marrying a girl of 
his patrilineage and matrilineage. If one breaks this rule of exogamy, he would be liable for 
public curse and ostracism as dictated by YeSiltie Serra norm. Nevertheless, according to key 
informants36, such trend has now been softened. Nowadays, a boy and a girl who are in the same 
clan can be married if they can trace their genealogies more than or equal to seven ancestors. 
                                                     
35, The above Informants have been mentioned in 22. 
36 Interview with Gerad Hussein Busier (clan leader), and Hajji Mifta Siraj/Sharia court judge in Dalocha and 
Werabe towns on February 27 and 30/2015. 
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Different factors contributed to these changes. According to key informants37, the family policy 
that gives the right to spouses to decide their choices, and the spread of globalization that is 
eroding local norms, leading the new generation to not respecting YeSiltie Serra norm, are 
among other factors contributing to the changes. 
The Siltie not only prohibited marriage within the lineage or members of the same clan but also 
sexual relations between the members of the same lineage groups. The people consider this act as 
a grave offense to YeSiltie Serra norm and Islamic teachings. Therefore, the rule of incest 
prohibition dictates people to marry outside their kin groups. Due to these factors, various issues 
can be taken into consideration by the parents during mate selection for their sons. Spouse 
selection among the Siltie also gives due attention to such matters as' purity' of the genealogical 
ties of the girl, blood or clan relationship between the future partners, Islamic discipline, and the 
economic and social status of the families of both partners. For the Siltie,' purity' means the 
absence of a genealogical link to the despised cast (Awneya) such as Fuga (potters), Faqi 
(tanners), and Buda (evil eye) (see more about social stratification below).  
Each family also studies whether the other family is free from genetically transmittable serious 
diseases such as leprosy, and breast cancer (Abdulfeta 2002:114-123). Omen interpretation (Unfe 
Inzote) is also considered before any decision for selecting a mate is considered. Furthermore, as 
key informants said38, the girl’s house handling ability, her politeness, attractiveness, her 
mother’s conduct, and hospitability are also crucial for spouse selection among the Siltie.  
The Siltie mainly value the behavior of the mother before the selection of the girl is considered. 
There is a famous saying among the Siltie that can substantiate this idea. As an informant puts 
it39, the people say, „Endetesh Hinzane Geredeshe Bidda,” which means, „It is after looking at 
the general situation of the mother that one should consider her daughter for marriage.” There are 
six forms of marriage arrangements among the Siltie. These are arranged marriage (Tukesho), 
abduction (Zimedot), arrangement by the free choice of the female (Agga), sudden marriage 
arrangement by the male (Tequalo Gibot), inheritance marriage (Yewurshet biter) and secondary 
                                                     
37 Interview with Weizero Rukia, Weizero Rewda in Werabe and Silti Wereda. 
38 Interview with Weizero Rukia, Gerad Awel, Weizero Rewda in Werabe and Silti Wereda. 
39 Interview with Ato Abdulwaris Redi in Werabe Town on February 29/2016. 
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marriage (Wagiyet). According to a key informant40, the most socially accepted and popular type 
of marriage arrangement among the Siltie is Tukesho (arranged marriage).  
An arranged marriage follows various procedures that widely give time for the parents and 
spouses to know each other. The wedding ceremony is called Bolocho or Digelaye. After 
Bolocho, the families of the male spouse are expected to provide necessary materials for the 
bridegroom. This includes a piece of land, residential area, and food stuffs. This process is 
known among the Siltie as Biter Atinzot. Patrilocal norms govern residence and settlement of 
newly married couples. The newly married couples are expected to settle in nearby (Burda) 
surroundings. Hence, the Siltie are patrilineal, patrilocal, and patriarchal. Briefly, marriage 
decisions and marriage Serra are mainly embedded in the traditional, social, and cultural 
frameworks of the Siltie. Islamic customs and values also synchronously play a pivotal role in 
marriage process in the society.  
2.13.2. Family 
The family is a micro society that expands to form the larger community. It also lays the 
foundation for the genesis of a society (Makec 1988:54). The Siltie call family Aberose, and 
members of a household Yegarseb.  
Yegarseb is a nucleolus family that comprises a husband, his wife, and the unmarried children. 
Aberose, on the other hand, implies an extended family that encompasses members of a family 
and the children of married couples.  
As mentioned above the Siltie value marriage if it bears children since children are considered an 
asset as well as essential elements to make a family. The property, among the Siltie, is 
transmitted from a father to a son as an aspect of a patriarchal society. Hence, if a man dies, his 
widow may hold the land and other capital properties under her control. As the guardian of her 
children, she is expected to marry by the rule of levirate marriage one of the relatives of the 
deceased person. This is done to manage the asset and not to make the property pass to others. 
The Siltie call such type of marriage Yewurshet Biter (Inheritance Marriage). Nevertheless, if she 
wants to marry out of the patrilineage of her ex-husband, she would lose the land and other main 
properties without any compensation.  
                                                     
40 Interview with Ato Kaire Sule on 10, July 2015 and data from 2012 field notes in Lanfuro Wereda Tora Town. 
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The respect and authority pattern within the family are high between the child and his parents. 
The power and respect pattern among the children flows from junior to senior. Children always 
show respect to their parents and in return receive their parents’ blessings. The Siltie believe that 
such blessings as they call Yabot-Endet Du'aa will play a significant role in the success of the 
children's future life. Therefore, to secure their parents' Daot, children usually support their 
parents. The supports include herding animals, and cultivating the land and generating income 
(mainly sons for the father). Daughters also conduct such activities as fetching water, collecting 
fire wood and dried animal waste (Kubet) for fuel, and helping domestic work (Yegarebille) for 
the mother. Failing to have parents' prayers' Daot is believed to bring curse and ostracism. 
Unlike most patrilineal society, the Siltie value both male and female children. Indeed, the male 
child is considered as an additional asset for the strength of the family and the patrilineage as a 
whole. Owing to such reasons, male children enjoy some privilege in the household. 
Nevertheless, females are also considered as the source of wealth in the family. The first-born 
female child in the family is regarded as good fortune and harbinger of wealth in the family, as a 
key informant41 said, “Geredwold Durashnet Tatketalte” which means, “A baby girl can bring 
wealth to the family.” In spite of this, women's property right and inheritance are very limited 
due mainly to patriarchal relationships dominant in the area. This situation has been changing, 
however, in the last two decades due to the various interventions by government and non-
government organizations which intensively have been working on gender equality. 
The Siltie call a father abot and a mother ade or dako. A son is named lije and a daughter gered. 
Children call their father Wajjo and their mother Washito or awete. The juniors call elder brother 
children Waje, and the seniors called their junior brother Matte. Siltie woman addresses her 
husband relatives in politeness using the term atum not ate. That is a plural form (honorific 
pronoun) used in the case of respect. Whether her husband's brothers and sisters are less in age 
than she is, she is expected to call them in that way. 
 The Siltie value the family and the social bond that can result from it. They also have special 
annual Arafa and Edul-Fitr festival days to greet their families, and this further strengthens their 
family relationships. On these holidays, married children are expected to visit their parents. It is 
believed among the Siltie that anyone who is married or goes to the urban areas for work should 
                                                     
41 Interview with Gerad Awel, and Sheik Yusuf Kemal 
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come back home for a visit (Ziyara). Those Siltie Diasporas who are back from towns to the 
countryside are known locally as Fagno. If he/she does not come back on these annual holidays 
for a visit, it is considered as if he/she is dead. To avoid such thinking and avoid cursing and get 
the blessing (Daot), the children visit their parents on these special days with various special 
offers for their parents. 
2.13.3. Kinship and Social Organizations 
According to anthropologists, for the understanding of any aspect of the social life of an African 
people such as political, economic, social or religious, it is essential to have a thorough 
knowledge of their system of kinship and marriage (Radcliff-Brown1950:1). A system of kinship 
and marriage can be looked at as an arrangement that enables persons to live together and co-
operate with an orderly social life (ibid.: 3).  
Plurality characterizes the Siltie's social structure. It is observed that each subgroup has its own 
semi-autonomous legal structure that operates under the frameworks of YeSiltie Serra. 
Supporting this state of affair, Pospils (1971:125) said that „society be it a tribe or a modern 
nation“ is not an undifferentiated amalgam of people. It is rather a patterned mosaic of subgroups 
that to some degree are usually well defined (or definable) types with different memberships, 
composition, and degree of inclusiveness.  
Every such group owes its existence to a great extent to a legal system that is its own and 
regulates the behavior of its members.“ Thus, the existence of subgroups and the subsequent 
legal systems, I argue, demonstrate dimensions of local variations among Siltie groups rather 
than a separate identity. The multiplicity of jurisdictions, whose legal provisions necessarily 
differ from one to another, sometimes even to the point of contradiction (Melga and Silti 
subgroups), reflects precisely the pattern of the subgroups of the society that is called „societal 
structure,“ a structure of the society (Ehrlich 1971: 125).  
It also seems that kinship structures are very powerful at the grassroots level rather than the state 
which is a psychologically far away institution than kin, or other group institution and hence not 
influencing the local community. It is also observed that Siltie elders have a divided loyalty 
between the state, their kins, and Islam. However, more importantly, they are loyal to their 
group, for group institutions are more conversant than the other two in the daily activities. As 
members of traditional communities, most of African people are tied into a network of social 
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relations, and a web of mutual obligations and these obligations are much stronger than 
obligations as a „citizen” (Pimetel 2011: 14).  
The Siltie, on the other hand, have kinship terms and various kin organizations. The Siltie 
kinship systems, for instance, used different words for father's brother or sister and mother's 
brother. One's brother's children refer Father's brother as Habot, while mother’s brother as 
Umme. Moreover, memberships to various levels of kin ties give special political and social 
privileges within the society. The Siltie word for kinship, Abotweld defines a relationship in 
general as well as in particular sense.  
The term Koba is also a wider inclusive term that surpasses Abotweld and includes farthest 
relatives that trace their kin ties both from man's lineage (Abotgae) and woman's lineages 
(Ummegae). The term YeBadewold (person from my land) is also a wider term that is extended 
to non-relatives as a title of affection and gratitude.  
The rule of patrilineal descent is a key factor to the Siltie social organization. This is because the 
patrilineal descent is the basis of a localized organization that is generalized through the social 
system as a whole by a group of dispersed clans. Indeed, the Siltie trace their descendants from 
both their father lineage and mother lineage Abotgae and Ummegae respectively. Nevertheless, 
Abotgae) is much more superior to the Ummegae in various aspects. Every person of patrilineal 
descent (Abotgae) is by birth a member of his father’s clan (Yabot-Gicho) and a citizen of Siltie 
land (YeSiltie Bade). He/she also becomes YeBadewold, which is inclusive of relatives and non-
relatives under a wider political umbrella (YeSiltie Bade). 
To the Siltie, a lineage (Abotweld) consists of all descendants of both sexes by a known 
genealogy of a single known ancestor in the unbroken Abotage and Ummegae line. Every Siltie 
village (Azegag) is categorized into small communities (Burda), each of which is occupied by 
the majority of the members of both the male and the female lineages.  
Marriage and lineages mainly determine settlement pattern. In some cases, this lineage would be 
maximal lineage, tracing common descent from an ancestor seven to nine generations back. 
Despite the fact that females as part of exogamy come from other clans in marriage, they can be 
called by their husband’s clans. However, they consider themselves part of their clan and they 
attend their father’s clan assembly (Yegicho Melcho). 
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 Each clan has a male head (Yegicho Moro). As my interviewees42 said, the Moro is chosen from 
among all living male members based on his age, experience, acceptance by the will of his clan's 
general assembly (Yegicho Melcho). In the selection and approval process, women are not 
allowed to take part. Here, only matured and married men take the post. The decision depends 
mainly on the elder men.  
My key informants said that personal qualities such as the ability to sort out truth, leadership 
capacity, intelligence and knowledge of the social affairs determine the choice for clan leader. It 
is thus the duty of the clan head (Yegicho Moro) to keep the welfare of the whole group.  
He has the power and obligation to settle marital disputes especially between husband and wife 
in the Burda and Azegag councils. He also helps YeBurda and Azegag Baliqes (Hamlet and 
Village elders respectively) to resolve conflicts between or among the members of his clans. 
Thus, clan head plays an important role for peace and solidarity to prevail in village councils.  
Here, YeBurda Baliqes are the chief representatives in its political and legal relations with other 
villages (Azegag) or lineage groups. They mobilize the society for various corporate obligations, 
such as funeral ceremonies (Yeqebere Serra) and dinner programs (Yurbat Serra).  
The starting point of the Siltie kinship system is Yegarseb, which is the elementary family. 
Yegarseb is a parental family that consists of the parents (Abot-Endet), i.e. father and mother, 
and their young unmarried children. This first family is the basic unit of kinship structure among 
the Siltie. The group living in the homestead is always impermanent and fluctuating, affected by 
marriages, births, deaths, migration, and immigration. At the same time, initial behavior is 
molded in the elementary family (Gare) with its local basis (Burda) in the homestead. Here, the 
individual acquires the stereotyped norms reflecting the economic, legal, and religious values of 
the society essential for the stability and perpetuation of the social structure. In some instances, 
Yegarseb serves as the local political unit of the Siltie. 
                                                     
42 Interview with Ato Nasir Muale, Sheik Yusuf, and Ato Dilebo Gebre interviewed in Werabe Town in November 
2015. 
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As the key informants43 said, the Siltie have employed various kinship structure levels. These are 
Yegarseb, Mechebaye, Medrabaye, Mekekebaye, Ankekebaye, Bedetekakaye, Aberose, Abotweld, 
Koba, Gicho, Jinese and finally YeBadewold or Yebadseb.  
As mentioned earlier Yegarseb is a name which includes members of a family such as a father, 
mother, and the unmarried children. Thus, Yegarseb can be understood as limited or nucleolus 
family. Nevertheless, whenever the family establishes marriages and a child is born, a new 
family line will be formed. This line of kin forms Mechebaye for the parents. Mechebaye refers 
to the children of the head of the family’s children. In short, this is synonymous with the 
grandsons of the chairman of the household. Next, we found Medrabaye. It is the children-
children-children for the head of the household. In short, Medrabaye is the children of 
Mechebaye. Mekekebaye is also the children-children-children of children for the chairman of 
the family.  
The next kinship structure for the household is Ankekebaye, which also includes the wider 
members of the family that are the children-children-children-children and children of the head 
of the household. In tracing the family tree, both the father and mother can trace their 
descendants equally from their ancestors.  
Bedetekakaye is also the next family tree that includes the members of the family that are found 
at the six level of the family tree. It includes the children-children-children-children-the children 
and children of the head of the household. Those members of the family who trace their kin only 
from the father line are called Abotgare. Abotgare is a semi-autonomous social field that 
dominates not only the countryside but also urban Silties as well.  
Abotgare has „rule-making and inducing capacities“ (Moore, 1978) in the framework of YeSiltie 
Serra, and enters negotiations with the same agnatic group in the community and clan chiefs. It 
is the most politically dominant social structure that oversees day today activities of members. 
The Siltie, for instance, when dispute occurs, especially among members of a clan, first ask 
members, „What does the abotgare say?“ That is, they resort to the father line forum rather than 
the state institution to resolve differences between clans or inter-clan clashes, which are 
indicative of the principal activity the semi-autonomous social field exercises in the society. 
                                                     
43Interview with Ato Abdulwaris Redi, Ato Aman (Aba Fedlu), Weizero Rukia and Ato Hamid in Silti, Dalocha and 
Werabe on April 3-5/2016 and also taken from earlier works. 
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This group is responsible for settling disputes by collecting 2/3rd of the blood price whenever a 
member of the family commits murder. It is also this group's mandate to identify as well as 
extradite the culprit who commits a crime to elders' forum. Abotgare is usually ruled by an elder 
male member of the family. Whenever women face difficulty or dispute relating either to 
inheritance or to marriage, they address their cases to the Abotgare forum. This also indicates the 
existence of semi-autonomous social field which develops its rules and is involved in 
“reglementary activities” (Moore, 1978) among the Siltie. 
We found Aberose next to Bedetekakaye. It can be understood as an extended family that 
includes the wider members of the family. Aberose also includes the grandfather, grandmother, 
father, and mother in law of the couples. The children of the members of the family are also 
considered as Aberose. Next to Aberose, there is Abotweld, which literally means relative that 
includes the wider members of the family who trace their genealogies both from Abotgae and 
from Ummegae. The members of one’s grandmother’s and grandfather’s clans may also be 
regarded as Abotweld. According to the key informants44, YeAabotweld Shengo is also an 
important council that serves as a lineage level forum to settle disputes in the village. Koba is 
also the wider kinship term more comprehensive than Abotweld. It includes farthest relatives 
who trace their kin both from the male and female clans. Sometimes Koba is expanded to include 
more extended kinfolks. YinAbot is a circumcision father, a person who takes a male boy for a 
circumcision purpose is considered a kin folk among the Siltie. According to my key 
informants45, YinAbot is responsible for supporting financially and morally his eye son until he 
grows up. Sometimes even if the child grows up, the circumcision father may refer the son as his 
own and support him for long. According to informants46, the next kin structure is called Gicho, 
which means clan. Gicho (clan) is a unit that includes a group having unilineal descent in which 
all the members regarded one another in some particular sense. The next one is Jinese that can be 
considered as people. It includes all members who can trace their genealogies from legendary 
common decent. The last social structure is YeBadewold (country person).  
                                                     
44 Interview with Ato Abdulwaris Redi, Ato Aman (Aba Fedlu), and Ato Hamid in Silti, Dalocha, and Werabe on 
March 21, 25/2016, and updated in April 2015 and July 2016. 
45 Interview with Ato Abdulwaris Redi, Ato Aman (Aba Fedlu), Weizero Rukia and Ato Hamid in Silti, Dalocha, 
and Werabe on July 20, 23 2016. 
46 Interview with Ato Abdulwaris Redi, Ato Aman (Aba Fedlu), Weizero Rukia and Ato Hamid in Silti, Dalocha and 
Werabe on April 3-5/2015 and taken from ex-field notes. 
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It is a wider term that includes relatives and non-relatives that live in Siltie land. Anyone who 
lives among the Siltie can be considered as YeBadewold (a country person) as a title of affection 
and gratitude.  
2.14. Concluding Remarks 
The Siltie people are one of the ancient South Semetic societies in the country. The various 
social groups are also functioning as a semi-autonoumus social group and are playing an 
important role in maintaining the social order of the people. Peaceful and contentious 
interactions also chracterized the Siltie-state relationship. The late 19th century has marked the 
onset of 'modern state' and society relationship. The Silties' local and national economic 
participations have contributed not only to economic developments, but they have also served as 
a pipeline for the flow of various ideas which in turn enrich the legal and social norms of the 
community.  
The Siltie kinship and social organization are also pivotal modes to local production, and they 
maintain the social order of the community at the grassroots level. The chapter indicates that the 
Siltie has developed an elaborate form of interaction both among themselves and with the 
neighboring ethnic groups. Pluralism of versions has also characterized the ethno genesis of the 
people. 
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 CHAPTER THREE 
3. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter deals with the conceptual and theoretical foundations of the research. It investigates 
the concepts of dispute, and modes of dispute settlement relying much on legal anthropological 
and sociological literature. Additionally, the chapter dwells on the precursors to legal 
anthropological thoughts, the genesis to the scholarship of legal pluralism, and the change and 
continuities the discussion about the notion has undergone through the course of time. In this 
regard, the chapter argues that even if there has been a debate about legal pluralism over the past 
four decades, scholars cannot come up with a universally agreed upon definition of legal 
pluralism, and the concept has continued to be hotly debated issue so far.  
The chapter also investigates the development of anthropological inquiry since the late 
nineteenth century up to the post-modern world, and the various stages the subject has gone 
through to reach the present level where every walk of human life has become an area of focus 
for anthropologists. It looks further into Africa’s in general and Ethiopia’s experiences on legal 
pluralism in particular. It observes that paying attentions to the dynamism of legal pluralism 
helps the academics and policy makers to have the actual picture of the development of legal 
pluralism. It is also essential to bridge the gap between the normative and empirical 
understandings of the notion. Moreover, the chapter sheds lights on the newly emerging legal 
reality conceived as legal hybridism and finally it links the new reality of legal dynamism with 
the socio-legal and legal anthropological discourses the post-colonial literatures focus. The 
chapter argues that the Ethiopian experience, with its constitutionally installed legal pluralism 
and the introduction of developmental democratic state, can also become an area of exploration 
and is necessary for a comparative understanding of legal pluralism literatures. As the concept of 
law is one of the major issues socio-legal scholars debate whenever legal pluralism is invoked, 
the chapter sheds some lights on the contested nature of the concept of law and its place in the 
state-society relation.  
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Apart from relying on normative analysis, the theoretical-empirical analysis approach I 
employed in this book will create bridges between the theoretical based literature and empirical 
legal realities based on the data generated for more than a year among the Siltie. Finally, the 
chapter has recapitulated the main ideas and has linked the empirical data with the existing 
literature and theories of legal pluralism and theories of power aimed at contributing for 
discussions on the legal pluralism.  
3.2. Some Concepts from Socio-Legal and Legal Anthropological Perspectives 
Since disputes and the ways they have been understood vary from context to context and involve 
different actors, defining the basic terms and concepts that have a salient bearing on disputes and 
dispute processing is crucial for understanding the socio-legal framework upon which this book 
has been based. This section thus contains some terms and concepts I employed in this book. 
3.2.1. Legal, and Non-Legal 
The word legal may entail more formal, state sponsored and institutional form of dispute 
settlement. It includes institutionalized state-imposed legal systems, Sharia courts as well as 
customary courts. It also includes the activities of local communities in various socio-legal 
settings that have developed their rules to manage the activities of members (Moore, 1978). 
Legal scholars employ the legal centralist or Hobbesian approach which considers the state as the 
sole source of social order (Robert C. Ellickson 1987:67, 81). However, legal centralists do not 
give due attention to the other institutions that can also perform similar functions in society. 
Customary and religious courts, for instance, are one of the many forums disputants can address 
their cases and choose among legal fora even if the state declares its judiciary has the upper hand 
or monopolizes handling of many cases including homicides. The roles other courts play in 
regulating the day to day activities of societies indicate how the social order can emerge without 
state imposed law. Thus, this book argues that „law is sometimes best studied not in isolation but 
as an element of a complex cultural milieu” (John Conley and William Barr 1993:44; Moore, 
1978). Therefore, I use the concept of “legal” in this book to denote all forms of social orderings, 
including the customary and religious, which a community employs to regulate its day to day 
activities. 
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3.2.2. Forum, Session, Mechanism and Institution 
Studies indicate that in every society, most of the disputes and dispute processing fall into a 
relatively limited number of patterns. The repetitive patterns of dispute processing are perceived 
as institutionalized. In a social event that involves institutions, participants like dispute settlers or 
disputants occupy roles within the institution that handles the dispute” (Richard Abel 1973: 219, 
229). Since the different legal actors and disputants occupy positions in the process of dispute 
settlement, dispute settlement systems have occasionally been referred to as institutions of 
dispute resolution.  
In addition, for the sake of consistency and clarity, I will also explain the different terms I 
employed in this book. I used ‘forum’ or ‘session’ to denote the legal dispute settlement centers, 
and ‘mechanism’ to indicate the various ways and strategies dispute settlers employ during 
dispute processing. In this regard, different settings allow individuals to use a variety of methods 
for settling disputes. Let me thus shed some lights on the difference between forum and 
mechanism. Forum implies the setting where dispute settlers meet to handle a dispute. The 
notion of forum not only refers to the dispute settlement center (court or arbitration center or a 
Podocarpus tree in the case of customary court), but more broadly to the place or environment 
where the dispute settlement occurs.  
On the other hand, by a mechanism, we mean the way in which disputes are dealt with, and the 
actual method or series of steps that the parties utilize to end dispute cases. Therefore, an 
institutionalized forum would be one with a visible structure, usually an organization with clear 
boundaries and some level of autonomy (Richard Scott and John Meyer, 1994). I use forum in 
this book to refer to the state, customary, and religious dispute settlement centers. The state, the 
religious and the customary courts operating in the study area have visible structures where 
dispute processing follows certain patterns or rituals, and participants have predefined roles and 
are expected to abide by specific standards (Gomez 2008:25-26). Therefore, the legal systems 
this study focuses on would easily fit into this frame as forums, sessions, and institutions. 
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3.2.3. Legal Orders and Legal Systems  
There is a difference between legal order and legal system. Legal order refers to an aggregate or 
a plurality of general and individual norms that govern human behavior, which prescribes, in 
other words, how one has to behave.47On the other hand, a legal system refers to a procedure or 
process for interpreting and enforcing the law. It elaborates the rights and responsibilities in a 
variety of ways.48Additionally, Hart (1961:1-14), a legal scholar, states the features of legal 
systems as follows. He states that legal systems are 
"Institutions that comprise rules forbidding or enjoining certain types of behavior 
under penalty, and requiring people to compensate those whom they injure in 
particular ways. Rules can specify what must be done to make wills, contracts, or 
other arrangements that confer rights and create obligations.”  
Hart also states that legal systems include courts to determine what the rules are and when they 
have been broken as well as to fix the punishment or compensation to be paid. He further 
illustrates that legal systems are composed of a legislature to make new rules and abolish old 
ones49. Since it embraces wider legal connotation and depict the interactions of actors in more 
meaningful ways, I preferred using legal system rather than a legal order to analyze the legal 
reality exhibited in the study area.  
3.2.4. Plural, Inter-legality, Customary laws, Indigenous or Traditional laws 
This section highlights on the concepts of plural, inter-legality, customary/indigenous or 
traditional law. Plural means more than one element or systems, while inter-legality refers to 
relations and interactions between legal orders and sets of norms. Inter-legality is best viewed as 
a dynamic process rather than as static structures (Santos de Sousa, 2002). On the other hand, 
customary normative systems include „shared social rules and customs, as well social institutions 
and mechanisms, from reciprocity to dispute resolution tribunals, to councils of traditional 
leaders“ (Tamanaha 2008: 397).  
                                                     
47 https:ukessays.com/essays/concept/and-concept of -the legal-order- translation(accessed on April 04, 2017) 
 
48Legal System Law of Legal definitions.uslegal.com/l/legal-system (accessed on November 26, 2016). 
  
49 https:ukessays.com/essays/philosophy/the purpose/and role- of- law-philosophy (accessed on April 04, 2017). 
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Studies indicate that the denominations found in classical literature like ‘indigenous law' or 
‘traditional law' and customary are the creations and reactions to colonization and post-
colonization. The denominations have been used to create dichotomous relations with other rules 
in which „the norms and institutions of indigenous societies were marked (for various purposes) 
as distinct from the transplanted rules and systems of the colonizers (Tamanaha 2008:397). 
Tamanaha further asserts that these terms „are not sociological notions“ (ibid.). In the context of 
this study, the book uses customary legal systems rather than indigenous or traditional to denote 
the local modes of dispute settlement systems operating in the Siltie area This is because „the 
local systems operate by local customary or cultural norms and rules as opposed to those set out 
from above from state or global forces“ (Alula and Getachew 2008: viii). 
3.2.5. The Concept of Conflict and Dispute 
Anthropological literature has dealt with conflict and dispute settlement since the mid-nineteenth 
century. The word „conflict“ can be defined as „clash, competition, or mutual interference of 
opposing or incompatible forces or qualities (as ideas, interests, wills). In most cases, conflict 
and dispute are used interchangeably, and the term „dispute can also be defined as verbal 
controversy, strife by opposing argument or expression of opposing views or claims, 
controversial discussion“ (Gove, 1976 in Assefa 2005:52 ).  
On the other hand, legal scholars define conflict in the same way as dispute. For example, Black 
defines conflict as „claims or right, an assertion of a right, claim or demand on the one side met 
by contrary claims or allegations on the other“ (Black 1951 in Assefa, 2005:52). Similarly, 
Miller (2005:322) defines it as an „engagement in a fight or possible confrontation between two 
or more parties aspiring towards incompatible or competitive means or ends.“ Imobighe 
(2003:32) also defines conflict as „a condition of disharmony in an interaction process and 
usually occurs as „a result of a clash of interest between the parties involved in some forms of 
relationship and clash of interest could occur because either pursue to get their incompatible 
/chosen goals done.“  
For political scientists, conflict is defined as antagonistic collisions of interests, principles, ideas, 
policies, or programs that characterize many of the interactions carried on political systems 
(Plano, 1978 cited in Assefa, 2005: 52). Others like Marxist scholars define conflict as a struggle 
to bring new social structures (Coser 1967 in Tilahun 2011:10).  
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Conflict is thus conceptualized as an essential creative element in human relationships. It is the 
means by which our social values of warfare, security, justice, and opportunities for personal 
developments can be achieved. Socio-legal scholars indicate that dispute can arise when a given 
individual violates a norm or a standard that can bring sanction. A type of dispute that involves 
violation of norms is called a normative dispute (Robert C.Ellickson 1987: 67, 69). 
Even if different scholars view conflict as a negative scenario, Bohannan conceptualizes it as an 
important social event for societal development. He contends that as culture is central to society, 
so does conflict if it can be controlled and utilized for cultural development and maintenance of 
social order. For Gluckman (1956), Gulliver (1963) and Nanda (1994), conflict is considered an 
inseparable part of social life, and without which the very existence of society is impossible. 
Thus, taking into consideration the various disagreements and collisions ranging from the 
individual, and family to inter-ethnic and inter-faith disagreements and collisions that can be 
subsumed under the concepts of dispute and conflict, this study has employed both dispute and 
conflicts interchangeably in the context of disagreements that arise between two contending 
parties. 
3.2.6. The Relationship between Society and Dispute Settlement 
Socio-legal scholars point out that there is one or another form of link between settling disputes 
and the society in which the dispute settlement process takes place. In this regard, two elements 
of the relationship between parties to a dispute have a particularly strong influence on the type of 
dispute settlement mechanism disputants resort to. First, it is important to single out whether the 
parties have multiplex relationships (the density of the relationship between parties in a conflict). 
Second, it is also essential to know whether parties have prospective dealings to grasp whether 
the relationship endures into the future (Richard and Joseph 1986: 235). In light of this 
framework, if a multiplex relationship dominates the social life of a given society, one can 
expect that the society's predominant dispute settlement institution will be oriented to produce an 
outcome of the form specified in the first case and hence the parties resort to informal means of 
settling disputes than the state (ibid.:236). In this regard, customary courts have been operating 
„most efficiently and with the least trouble when dealing with parties who share enduring, multi 
complex relationship“ (ibid.: 236).  
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Nevertheless, if a relationship is periodic and if parties do not expect prospective dealings among 
each other, disputants may resort to more formal means of dispute settlement. Richard and 
Joseph (1986) have to say the following in this regard. They said that:  
"...going to the court is likely to be least necessary when parties have 
enduring multi-complex relations. People in such relations can get their 
opposites to listen to their complaints (itself is an important reason to 
invoke the law), and they usually have the capacity, independent of the 
law, to reward and punish each other. This means the law is the less 
valuable resource to them than to those in episodic relationships” 
(p.238).  
They indicate further that one of the factors for the existence of dispute settlement institutions in 
society is their „functional“ value (ibid.: 236). 
The linkage exists because these dispute resolution institutions "promote the well-being of the 
society they are embedded“ (ibid.). Thus, the study argues that had the customary dispute 
settlement institutions not benefited the society, they would have disappeared and been replaced 
by „those that did“ (ibid.: 236). The second reason for the very existence of dispute settlement 
institutions will be the roles they play in maintaining the identity of the society they are a part. 
The Siltie employ the institutions as custodians of their culture. Using their mediation role, local 
dispute settlers employ the institutions for accumulating social power.  
3.3. Notes on Modes of Dispute Settlement, Conflict Management and Conflict 
Transformation  
Modes of Dispute Settlements (MDS) refers to the strategies employed using both the judicial 
and customary approaches to contain, prevent and manage disputes. Most dispute processing 
models are categorized into two major parts depending on the presence or absence of the third 
party in the conflict. As a result, a dispute process in which a third neutral party is involved is 
called a Triadic Model, and when contending parties or disputants are the only ones participating 
in the process, it becomes a Dyadic one. The latter involves direct negotiations between parties 
or involves forgiveness practices. Even if some dispute settlements can be initiated only to settle 
disputes, there are possibilities where a dispute can also be used to generate power.  
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Scholars like Benda-Beckmann (1979) called this scenario as shopping forum since dispute 
settlers may also employ disputes to negotiate with various actors and hence influence power 
relations.  
In this regard, it is often difficult to know whether a dispute has been processed, or resolved, or 
even to know what the dispute was about in the first place (William Felistner 1974:62). Austin 
Sarat further states that „the end of dispute in one forum implies the beginning of it in another, 
indicating that „the drama of seeking settlement is repeated“(Austin Sarat 1976:339,343).The 
people who create and use dispute settlement institutions and the disputants may have different 
objectives about what constitute dispute resolution ( Robert and Anderson 1979:3).  
Various definitions have been put forward by scholars for conflict transformation, conflict 
management, and conflict/dispute resolution. First, conflict transformation is defined as the 
transformation of violent with non-violent means of dispute settlement, while conflict 
management entails the prevention of conflict from becoming violent or expanding to other 
areas. Conflict resolution entails removing to the extent possible, the inequalities between the 
disputants using mediation, negotiation, and advocacy and testimony on behalf of one or more 
parties to a conflict (Appleby 2012:212). Imobighe (2003:7) also suggests that dispute 
management is concerned with the ways and means of doing away with a disputable relationship 
with the aim of creating a fertile ground or space for the long-term resolution of the fundamental 
causes of the conflict.  
Gulliver (1979: 11) states that every society regardless of their location spatially and temporally 
has modes for handling disputes. Dillon (1991:45) also indicates that the regulation of 
differences in societies varies widely and depends on the social and cultural variables in the 
society. In complex industrial societies, coercion rather than conciliation is consistently 
employed usually indicating the social distance between members of the societies. In societies 
where the stratification is not as well developed such as the Siltie, other techniques that involve 
mediation, conciliation or even forgiveness can be used to handle disputes. The modalities 
disputes can be settled are divided into violent and peaceful. Violent modes include duel or 
combat, self-help, and warfare, while peaceful modes include avoidance, negotiation, mediation 
and adjudication (Gulliver, 1979: 11). Dispute avoidance is one of the peaceful modes of dealing 
with conflicts or disputes.  
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Gulliver states that not all disputes are resolved, settled, or ended, and hence dispute avoidance is 
brought into the stage as a mode to cease disputants’ disagreements by the disputant parties 
(Gulliver 1979:2). This mode of dispute settlement can be fruitful if there is a possibility for 
either disputant to leave their rival area and move to other places permanently or temporarily.  
According to Gulliver (1979), negotiation is another peaceful mode of dispute settlement. It is a 
voluntary act that permits the disputants to take part directly in decisions that affect their 
interests. This process does not involve a third party as a decision maker and is controlled by the 
disputing parties' themselves.  
Singer (1990) divides negotiation into two categories, namely competitive and collaborative 
negotiations. In the former case, each party in dispute aims to maximize his/her gain at the 
expense of the other. Disputants employ such techniques as „exaggerating (even lying), flexing 
muscles, or threatening to walk away to achieve their goal. This strategy may be appropriate only 
in one shot, and single-issue negotiation over a limited resource“ (Abebe Demewoz, 2016)50. On 
the other hand, collaborative negotiation (also called a „problem solving“ negotiation) seeks to 
help all the parties meet their needs. This is because the negotiators give place for future 
relationships. This method aims at ‘win-win' solutions. The technique is aimed at gaining and 
distributing the pain of losing between the disputing parties (Singer 1990: 17). If negotiation 
failed, other techniques such as conciliation, arbitration, and litigation would be used.  
According to Shellenberg (1996), mediation is a voluntary dispute settlement process whereby a 
mediator (a third party) promotes reconciliation between the disputant parties. The mediator 
manages the process and facilitates the issues in a dispute between the contending parties. 
Despite the fact that the mediators suggest different remedies for the problem, they have no 
power on the outcome. Instead, the final decision will be reached based on the mutual consensus 
of the disputants.  
Arbitration is also another mode of dispute settlement. Singer (1990:27-29) explains further that 
arbitration is different from mediation and litigation. In this case, the disputants would agree to 
submit dispute cases for adjudication, and they are ready to accept the decision of the third party. 
                                                     
50 The Role of Sidama Conflict Resolution.http://article.sapub.org.10.5923.j.sociology.20160601.02.html (accessed 
April 5, 2017). 
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There are rules of procedures to be followed here. According to Kestner and Ray, the disputant 
parties present their perspectives and positions to the arbitrator who is a neutral party. The 
arbitration decision can be binding or not binding according to the rules of the arbitration 
program (Kestner and Ray 2002: 229). 
 Litigation, also called adjudication, is another peaceful mode of dispute settlement. Gulliver 
(1979) describes the use of court and civil justice systems to resolve legal controversies. 
Adjudication refers to the process of decision making that involve a neutral third party to whom 
compulsorily or voluntarily the disputants surrender their ability to decide the outcome. 
Adjudication is characterized by the fact that a third party that exercises some degree of accepted 
authority controls decision-making and the results of the issues in dispute. This means the people 
directly involved in disputes have little control over the process or the outcome. An adjudicator 
determines the results of a dispute by making a decision for the parties that is final, binding, and 
enforceable. 
 Singer (1990:29) also states that „decisions are made by a public employee, in public 
proceedings and publicly enforced“. Comparatively speaking, the state legal approach falls under 
this category sine it emphasizes on sanctioning legal norms as well as executing retribution and 
punishment giving little room to reintegrating the culprit into the society. In short, the state 
judiciary is not a restorative justice. Studies indicate further that the customary modes of conflict 
settlement are geared towards reconciliation, whereas western justice system aims at imposing 
legal norms and sanctioning the violation of legal norms (Tamanaha 2008:407-408). The western 
legal system employs physical and material penalties and use of force, including costly prisons 
providing the sanctions against offender (Utne 2001:4). Moreover, in the state judiciary, legal 
approaches are adversarial, and evidence must be direct and specific. The process effectively 
encourages the accused to deny responsibility, while the customary legal systems have used 
various local strategies to let the offenders admit their problems. In this regard, the various local 
values and belief systems are employed as legal sanctioning strategies. Thus, customary 
institutions make the culprit take responsibility without any external enforcement through using 
various rituals and beliefs as a way of enforcements (Utne 2001:4). Thus, one can understand 
that the customary modes of dispute settlement focus on conflicts between groups while the state 
legal system considers individual crimes, offenses committed by individuals, only individuals are 
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responsible. Therefore, the customary legal systems will bring sustainable results rather than the 
western paradigm and are widely applicable in the communal based societies like the Siltie.  
This study adopts the definition of conflict resolution as means of dispute settlement the Siltie 
people employ to diffuse tensions among each other and beyond. 
3.4. Intellectual Precursors of Legal Anthropological Thoughts 
 
Despite the fact that the origin of legal anthropological thoughts is tied with the genesis of the 
field of anthropology (Tamanaha, 2008), some sources indicate that the inception of legal 
anthropological thoughts goes back to the classical political philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, 
Hobbes, and Rousseau. This group of classical scholars considered law as the product of 
civilization, and hence lower stages were characterized by anarchy (Lewellen 2003:3). Others 
even push the origin 2000 years ago as it was practiced in what is known as European lands 
(Tamanaha, 2008). Nevertheless, the late 19th century laid the foundation for the beginning of 
the modern notion of legal anthropological inquiries. In this regard, with the involvement of 
biologists, social scientists and other scholars, anthropological thoughts started to sprout since 
the middle of the 19th century. As a primary architect of evolutionary theory, the British jurist Sir 
Henry Maine in his seminal work „Ancient Law (1861)“ postulated that primitive society was 
organized along the lines of kinship. It was patriarchal and was ordered by sacred prescriptions 
(Griffiths 2002:291; Lewellen, 2003). Maine further emphasized that evolution is in the direction 
of secularization, and organization based not on kinship but territory. He further states that „local 
contiguity“ became the basis for political action (Fortes and Evans Prichard 1940:10; Lewellen 
1983:2; 2003:3). Maine's idea indicates that the change of a society based on kinship to one 
based on territoriality was crucial for the development of political action including legal systems. 
An American anthropologist, Lewis Henry Morgan, further developed Maine's famous idea that 
kinship could be a primary socio-political structure. Maine's idea of a blood relationship bases to 
societies of primitive antiquity was a concept that was adopted by Morgan and his followers.  
They embraced Maine's idea of primitive societies of the contemporary world (Colson1968:190). 
Morgan further developed "an evolutionary sequence based on the mode of subsistence, the 
stages of which he termed as savagery, barbarism, and civilization“ (Lewellen 2003:3). 
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However, early 20th century also witnessed fundamental changes as far as the developments of 
anthropological thoughts are concerned.  
The reaction to the evolutionary thoughts and methodology appeared since the beginning of the 
20th century. These paradigm shifts had got more strongholds in the United States and Europe.  
In USA, Franz Boas’s historical particularism dominated the study of societies by 
anthropologists. Boas emphasized detailed descriptive studies of particular cultures. Europe also 
saw a paradigm shift in anthropological theory. This change was based on the work of Emile 
Durkheim who used structural analysis in the study of society. Durkheim's ideas led to the 
emergence of cognitive structuralism in France, which finally laid the foundation for the works 
of Claude Levi-Strauss. Nevertheless, Durkheim's ideas were also dominant in England, and this 
finally led to the emergence of scholars who gave more emphasis to social facts and theoretical 
point of view dominated by function and culture. In this regard, the 1930s England saw the 
coming into being of two brands of functionalism that competed for dominance: the 
psychobiological functionalism of Bronislaw Malinowski and the structural functionalism of 
Radcliffe-Brown. Malinowski was an important man as the founder of modern fieldwork 
techniques for his extensive research in Trobriand Islands which radically changed 
anthropological methods of evolutionists that had been labeled as armchair whose analysis was 
not based on actual natives' lives in the field. Despite this, he had little contribution to political 
anthropology. Nevertheless, Radcliffe Brown's structural functionalism dominated 
anthropological studies in the 20th century. 
For Radcliffe-Brown, society was an equilibrium system in which each part functioned to the 
maintenance of the whole (Lewellen 2003:6). This theoretical approach focused on those norms, 
values, and ideal structures that form the framework within which an activity takes place. Based 
on this theory, British scholars developed a strong interest to study African societies to 
understand the social systems of societies for so-called „Divide and Rule“ colonial policy 
(Tamanaha 2008:382). The great lust for colonialism led to the production of a collection of 
studies that was published in 1940 called „African Political Systems“, edited by E.E. Evans–
Pritchard and Mayer Fortes. The publication of African political system’s ethnographic articles 
established the theoretical foundation of structural functionalism and its methodology for more 
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than a decade of research into politics of pre-industrial societies (Lewellen 2003:7-9). This study 
also marked the beginning of modern anthropology (Lewellen 1983:7).  
On the other hand, this type of indirect administration and transplantation of legal regimes in 
overseas „relied upon pre-existing sources of political authority using indigenous leaders. It 
involved the creation of so-called ‘native courts' that enforced customary or religious laws and 
hence led to the production of “new forms of legal pluralism” (Tamanaha 2008:182).  
Indeed, before 1930 anthropological studies were highly concentrated in a relatively small-scale 
society of Native Americans, Australian, and Melanesian societies while political and social 
organizations were not treated as a separate field of inquiry in mainstream anthropology. It was 
structural functionalists (e.g., Radcliff-Brown) who began to study still functioning large-scale 
political units in Africa since the 1930 (Colson1968:191). Thus, for about two decades, studies 
on political anthropology were dominated by the structural functionalist theoretical orientation of 
Radcliffe-Brown and his students. 
The theory looks at society as a closed system in an assumed equilibrium (Radcliff-Brown 
1952:3).The static structural-functionalist paradigm maintained through some studies of Evans-
Pritchard, Raymond Firth, Daryl Ford, and Meyer Fortes. E.E. Evans Prichard's classical work, 
„the Nuer (1940a)“, for instance, in its chapter on political system tried to show how a society of 
200,000 people maintain equilibrium even though there was almost constant feuding with the 
lack of any centralized government. Nevertheless, structural functionalist theoretical orientation 
got ardent criticism since the 1960s. Its static nature and its being servant of colonialism became 
areas of criticism by later scholars (Lewellen 2003:82).  
 According to Colson (1968:190), the period after 1960 was marked by a paradigm shift in 
anthropological theories that gave wider rooms for “change, faction, party and political 
maneuver“. Thus, with the decline of the significance of structural functionalist’s approach for 
the understanding of various issues in anthropological studies, including legal systems, a new 
approach appeared on the stage. These theories considered social change, conflicts, processes 
and actions as significant factors for social developments rather than the vice versa. Turner's 
‘Schism and Continuity in an African Society' (1975), and Edmund Leach's ‘Political Systems of 
Highland Burma'(1954) and Max Gluckman's various works, ‘The Zulu in African Political 
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Systems' (1940), as well as ‘Custom and Conflict in Africa' (1956), and ‘Order and Rebellion in 
Tribal Africa' (1960) represented the new paradigm in political anthropology.  
These seminal works focused on conflicts, processes, and changes as an inevitable part of 
societal development than as phenomena deterring social progress. Gluckman, for instance, said 
that „a phrase that came to represent a new orientation to society based not on structure and 
function, but on process and conflict“ (Lewellen, 2003; 9; Barnard, 2004:84). 
Following the emergence of nation-states and industrial revolutions that brought about 
colonization, there emerged a need to directly or indirectly govern the colonies. This inevitably 
required having a law. Thus the legal system of the West was considered as a weapon to control 
the local community. Anne Griffiths (2002:291) noted that  
"...while European or Western law was imposed on colonial subjects, it 
was also recognized that such law was inappropriate in certain cases, for 
example, in governing the family life of subrogated persons and that 
regulation of such matters should be left to the local, customary, or 
indigenous law of that group. It, therefore, became necessary to make a 
study of these forms of law to provide for its incorporation within the 
framework of the colonial state. In this way, the local, customary, or 
indigenous law was viewed as something 'other' than Western law, as a 
separate and distinct form of law. Under this model of legal pluralism, 
the state defines the parameters that mark the territories of legal systems 
within its domain, such as customary and Islamic law, in ways that 
depict them as separate and autonomous systems." 
Tamanaha (2008:382) further outlined the three strategies the colonizing powers employed to 
expand their system of influence and incorporate customary or religious law. These strategies 
were: „the codification of customary or religious law; the application by state courts of unwritten 
customary or religious law in a fashion analogous to the common law; and the 
creation or recognitions of informal or ‘customary’ courts run by local leaders.“ We see from the 
excerpt, the emergence of legal pluralism in its „weakest“(Griffiths J.1986); (Merry 1988: 869), 
(Griffiths A.2002)) and “new form“ (Tamanaha 2008:384) dates back to the late nineteenth 
century. This time, however, does not by any means mark the genesis of strong legal pluralism. 
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Rather, it marks the onset of the decline of the legal status of customary and religious laws vis-a-
vis state law since the introduction of a nation state modeled after European context curbed the 
activities of customary and religious courts hitherto handled multiple of cases in the continent. 
Therefore, these developments are considered as precursors for the development of legal 
anthropology in general and new form of legal pluralism that laid a foundation for contemporary 
legal pluralism, in particular, as an academic pursuit.  
Recent research works indicate further that the contemporary emerging legal anthropology 
focuses on „the complex dynamics of plural legal constellations in current social formations in 
the context of globalization“(Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann 
2006:1).The general frameworks of this study also lie in the context of developments as 
mentioned earlier and try to link the empirical analysis with the mainstream literature on legal 
anthropology in general and legal pluralism in particular. 
3.5. The Genesis of the Modern Study of Legal Pluralism  
There are various explanations of the genesis to the scholarship of legal pluralism. One version 
attributes the modern conception of legal pluralism (the weak or the juristic view) as was 
conceived in 1772 as a fixture of European experience (Griffiths 1986:6). According to Merry, 
for instance, the intellectual genesis of legal pluralism harks back to the discovery of indigenous 
forms of law among remote African villages and New Guinean tribesmen to debates concerning 
the pluralistic law under advanced capitalism (Merry1988:869). Other scholars (e.g. Benda-
Beckmann, 2002) indicate that four decades have passed since the scholarship of legal pluralism 
was born, and it is still under discussion among scholars. He further continues saying that in the 
roughly forty years in which the concept of legal pluralism has been used in legal and social 
scientific writings, it has become a subject of emotionally loaded debates.  
Griffiths A (2002:290), and Gad Barziali (2008:395-396), for instance, outlined that the idea of 
legal pluralism originated in the 1970s, while Tamanaha (2008) noted that the concept has 
emerged as an academic discussion since 1930s. Other scholars, however, push the origin of the 
concept back into earlier times. Pimentel, for instance, states that „the concept is ancient, having 
been an issue wherever competing societies have overlapped, including undoubtedly the earliest 
cases of conquest and occupation'' (Pimetel 2011:1).  
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Twining (2010:12) also noted that the idea of legal pluralism is not a recent phenomenon. 
Rather, monopoly of a coercive power by a centralized bureaucratic state is a modern exception.  
Thus, state legal system has a recent history than legal pluralism does. It has always proved 
easier to govern a conquered people according to their laws (Pimetel 2011:1). Even if some 
sources attribute the emergence of legal pluralism to the colonization era, others indicate, 
however, that legal pluralism is everywhere long before this time (Merry 1988: 869). Tamanaha 
(2008:375,379) goes on further to trace the origin of legal pluralism 2000 years back as a 
dominant legal system in Europe pinpointing its existence before the contact of the so called the 
Western law with the indigenous system in a colonized world. He observes that „Until recently, 
however, no one thought to describe these ubiquitous situations as a matter of legal pluralism“ 
(ibid.: 389). Additionally, the existence of the broader EU laws and member states' laws have not 
until recently been conceived as legal pluralism, albeit the situation is a manifestation of the 
notion (Tamanaha 2008: 389). June 23, 2016, Brexit event has also become indicative of the 
conflict of laws between national and laws in EU quarter in Brussels. Thus, despite the fact the 
genesis of legal pluralism harks back to ancient time, the 1970s has marked a turning point for 
the notion to have got attention within the academics in legal anthropology through studies of 
law in colonial and post-colonial situations (Merry1988, Tamanaha 2008:389). Nevertheless, 
legal pluralism has been part of the humanity until nation state emerged and limited its 
application. Tamanaha (2008) further states that legal pluralism is a common historical 
condition. He also said that the positivist view of law obscures the place of legal pluralism in 
society, and that „the long-dominant view that law is a unified and uniform system administered 
by the state has erased our consciousness of the extended history of legal pluralism“ (ibid.: 376). 
Tamanaha argues that the transplantation of legal regimes by Western European powers and the 
subsequent production of legal systems are „new forms of legal pluralism that laid the foundation 
for contemporary legal pluralism which combines the legacy of the past with more recent 
developments connected to the processes of globalization“ (ibid.). 
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The legal history of Ethiopia is also a reflection of the rich historical episodes Ethiopia has 
passed through that involves the inner jumbling and intermingling of the country's ethnic groups 
(Lapiso, 2000).Taking into the complex interactions and intermingling of the Ethiopian people 
have undergone before the creation of the modern Ethiopian states at the end of the 19 the 
century consideration, I also believe that the history of legal pluralism hacks well back to beyond 
the late 19th-century colonization era. In line with this, Tamanaha (2008: 381) makes the 
following argument. 
"Wherever there were movements of people, wherever there were 
empires, wherever religions spanned different language[s] and cultural 
groups, wherever there was trade between different groups, or different 
groups lived side by side, it was inevitable that various bodies of law 
would operate or overlap within the same social field. Hence, these were 
common conditions; the kinds of legal pluralism that existed in medieval 
Europe no doubt existed elsewhere." 
I also argue that the creation of the modern Ethiopian state in the 19th century has limited the 
application and status of legal pluralism rather than becoming a turning point for the genesis of 
the plural legal systems in the country. 
3.6. Law as a Contested Terrain in A State-Society Relations 
"[l]aw and the social context it operates must be inspected together" (Moore 1978: 719).  
The place of law in a social structure is a bone of contention among scholars who focus on legal 
pluralism. Researchers indicate that the concept of law has never been resolved since various 
disciplines ranging from law, socio-legal studies and legal anthropology have their own versions 
of the notion (Griffiths A. 2002 309; Tamanaha 2008:391).  
Law was classically considered as “a sign of civilization marking a transition for humanity and 
society from an irrationality to rationality state of being as well as a weapon for bringing 
development“ (Evans Pritchard, 1940; Fortes, 1940; Griffiths A. 2002). In this regard, Europe's 
law was considered as a reflection of its advanced stages of development, while others with 
“indigenous law” or “savages”(Malinowski, 1940) were at the lower stages of development. 
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Kelsen, a jurist, views law as „a hierarchical system composed of norms promoted by a set of 
centralized institutions whose validity is in turn derived from a supposed fundamental norm 
(1960). Twinning (2010:4) states that even if it is contested, many consider the conception of law 
as „confined to state law leaving out too many important phenomena deserving sustained juristic 
attention, including religious law, customary law, and certain other kinds of transnational and 
supranational normative orders“. As mentioned above, Sally Moore conceives law as having 
„contextual character“ (Griffiths A. 2002: 302), while Fitzpatrick (1984) considers law as the 
„unsettled resultant of relations with a plurality of social forms and hence law's identity is 
consistently and inherently subject to challenge and change“ (Griffiths A. 2002: 303).  
Anthropologists, however, approach law as a form of normative ordering that includes rules and 
processes. The anthropology of law has evolved significantly from viewing law as a measure of 
civilization and savagery to understanding it as a new cultural feature and form of power.  
Malinowski considered law as 'all the rules concerned and acted upon as binding obligations' 
(1926:55). Contemporary anthropologists investigate law ethnographically, by looking at 
disputes in spaces that lack formal legal institutions and codified law, as well as in the 
institutional sites where a law is produced. With the growth of globalization and transnational 
law, anthropology has extended its scope to explore the dialectical interaction between multi-
forms of law. Plural legal systems, each invested with particular modes of authority, are seen as a 
feature of all societies (Merry, 2000). 
Two major debates have surfaced out among socio-legal, anthropological and lawyers in 
delimiting the conception of law. To begin with, for legal centralists „law is and should be the 
law of the state, uniform for all persons, exclusive of all other law, and administered by a single 
set of public institutions“ (Griffiths 1986:3; Griffith A. 2002:289).This version assumes law as a 
single unified, exclusive and hierarchical normative ordering and considers „the state as the 
fundamental unit of political organization“ (ibid.). Other scholars, however, criticize making the 
state to have a monopoly of violence as stipulated in the Weberian conception (Klute and 
Embalo, 2011). Moore further asserts that “...neither effective sanctions nor the capacity to 
generate binding rules is the monopoly of the state“ (Moore 1978:744). Growing literature also 
indicate that there are various forms of conceptions of law that co-exist in a plural social setting. 
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Scholars have begun to pay attention to a broader and pluralist conception of law. Contemporary 
works have explored, for example, the dynamic plural legal systems (Franz von Benda-
Beckmann and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, 2006; Tamanaha, 2008, Twining, 2010). 
Therefore, legal anthropologists and socio-legal scholars conceptualize law from the nexus 
between state and society perspective. In this regard, researchers observe that the state 
enforceable rules (Pospisil 1971:4), socially binding rules (Moore 1978:744), and the ordering of 
social groups of all kinds (Malinowski, 1926; Griffiths, 1986; Woodman, 1996; Tamanaha 
2008:391) should be considered as law.  
This is due to the different roles the rules play and function as the law of a particular group they 
are a part. This group of scholars state also that law is not limited to official state legal 
institutions, and there is a multiplicity of legal levels and legal systems in a social group. 
Moreover, Woodman's concepts, for instance, extend the concept of „law“ to include non-state 
modes of social ordering (1996:158).  
Tamanaha, however, tries at least implicitly to criticize the second position that „just about every 
form of norm-governed social interaction is law, and hence, we are swimming, or drowning, in 
legal pluralism (Tamanaha 2008:393). Nevertheless, he attests that law characteristically claims 
to rule whatever it addresses, but the fact of legal pluralism challenges this claim (Tamanaha 
2008:376).The idea of understanding of the law in pluralistic ways seems to gain ground. 
Griffiths, for instance, indicates that all activities engaged in regulation activities in a social 
group, in Moore's semi-social field, are considered as law (Griffiths 1986:35). This assertion 
seems to be going with the contemporary conception of law by Tamanaha who expounds that 
law has taken pluralistic form in the modern world (Tamanaha 2008:376). 
Understanding the problem of differentiating between the legal from the non-legal, Woodman 
attests that ‘law covers a continuum which runs from the clearest form of state law through to the 
vaguest forms of informal social control (1998:45). As a leading scholar in the field of legal 
anthropology, Griffiths John points out that „all social control is more or less legal“ (Griffiths 
1986:39).  
Researchers, however, state that the contemporary legal system is characterized by „hybridity or 
fluidity“(Tamanaha 2008:403),and “legal hybridism“ (Santos de Sousa 2006; Franz von Benda-
Beckmann and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, 2006; Berman, 2012). 
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Tamanaha goes further to indicate the plural nature of law as a problem to have a clear 
understanding of law in the state-society cosmology. He said that the difficulty of the term is that 
legal pluralists are unable to distinguish ‘law’ from other forms of normative order (Tamanaha 
2008:392).  
As a result of the continued argument, some scholars seem bored of the debate over the concept 
of law and recommend dropping the discussion of the notion of law and focus on social life 
(Merry 1988:878). John Griffiths set forth the concept of law that is adopted by most legal 
pluralists (at least among anthropologists and sociologists). 
 As a way out to a stalemate, Griffiths argued that Sally Falk Moore's concept of the ‘semi-
autonomous social field', according to which social fields have the capacity to produce and 
enforce rules ( Moore 1978:719), is the best way to identify and delimit law for legal pluralism ( 
Griffiths 1986:38). One of the challenges, argues Griffiths, to studying legal pluralism is the 
notion of „legal centralism“ that is a reflection of the moral and political claims of the modern 
nation state (Griffiths 1986:1).  
He further said that, though not overt, Moore's theory of semi-autonomous social field latently 
expresses the theory of legal pluralism. Griffiths (2002:309-310), on the other hand, has 
developed three ways in which an actor-oriented, ethnographic study of law in the strong legal 
pluralist vein could make a contribution to the debate on the place of law in society. He has 
outlined these points as a crucial way to understand the law. These are:“ law as a system of 
representation and meaning; mobilization of law at a local, national and international level, as 
well as state law as shaped by other normative orders.“ The first category analyses law in terms 
of a system of representation that creates meaning within a system of state power. It also 
considers or focuses on the processes by which law comes to be a sign of cultural identity and 
the implications that this has for claims to citizenship and for the rights of various ethnic or 
minority groups. Griffiths (2002:310) states that in this process it is not only the law of the state 
that constructs meaning but religious law, local normative orders and customary law also 
generate their versions of identity. As far as the second category is concerned, analysis of law is 
crucial to construct the cultural identity of the community of which it is a part and link it with 
national and international networks to champion the right of the local community, including 
asserting self-administration.  
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Law is employed by the community in everyday life as the „weapon of the weak“ (Scott, 1985), 
and to foster „democracy from below“ (Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Keebet Benda-
Beckmann, 2006). The third significance of strong legal pluralism is that it serves as an approach 
to explore the ways in which other normative orders shape state law that would provide for 
detailed analyses of its plurality and diversity within legal fields. Anne Griffith's development is 
a big contribution to understanding law in a contemporary world not only due to its proposition 
of pluralist nature of law but also owing to pinpointing the “interactive natures of legal 
systems“(Moore, 1978) in dual ways rather than one. 
3.7. Pluralists' vs. Monists' Debate on the Concept of Law  
Legal pluralism has brought the concept and meaning as well as the range of law into academic 
debates since its genesis in the past century (Tamanaha 2008:375). Sociologists, anthropologists, 
and legal theorists have put forward their views of the concept of law. It ranges from recognition 
of the existence of legal pluralism by the state law on the one hand, and the non-significance of 
the state recognition of the existence of differing legal systems for their validity, on the other. 
The last perspective asserts that state law is only one of some elements that lead to the genesis of 
legal pluralism in a given social field (Griffiths 1986, Griffiths A., 2002). Law, according to 
social scientists, is conceived as an empirical state of affair „ (Griffiths A.2002: 290). Moreover, 
legal pluralism looks into law in its social context. Others, however, describe the law as „a social 
engineering „(Roscoe Pound 1965 cited in Moore 1978:719) which is pivotal to bring social 
change in society. Scholars also consider that it is a society that can control law, not the vice 
versa. On the other hand, legal scholars have viewed „official legal institutions and their 
normative framework as society's most important component, responsible for the achievement of 
social order, progress, and economic efficiency“ (Gómez, Manuel Alejandro 2008:3). Moreover, 
they give much attention to formal and official institutions, with a particular focus on the 
importance of state-sponsored modes of enforcement (ibid.). However, according to scholars like 
Moore (1978:719), taking a middle ground may help understand the place of law in society. For 
Moore, law and the social context it operates must be scrutinized together, which is indicative of 
the plural nature of law in a social arena. Tamanaha further argues that law as a monopoly of the 
state is a testimony to the success of the state-building project and the ideological views which 
supported it, a project which got underway in the late medieval period (2008:379). 
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 He goes further to say „the longstanding vision of a uniform and monopolistic law that governs 
a community is plainly obsolete“(Tamanaha 2008:410). 
The forces of globalization have facilitated the cross-fertilization of legal systems. Hence, „law 
and legal institutions trespass local, regional and national boundaries in which the 'local' is 
embedded in and shaped by regional, national, and international networks of power and 
information“(Griffiths A.2002:298). This development has also become one of the challenges to 
the legal centralists' perspectives. This development indicates that law has no more become a 
centerpiece to analyze legal systems in a society. It also clearly illustrates that there is a 
multidirectional relationship among various legal systems rather than one source of law as a 
centralist conception of law. With this development at hand, scholars (Twining 2009; Griffiths 
A.2002; Santos de Sousa, 2006) emphasize that nation states are no longer treated as a separate 
legal entity or source of law either internally or externally. 
 Anne Griffiths's approaches to legal pluralism which he named, „juristic and deep legal 
pluralism,“ have introduced new ways of „reconceiving law.“ According to this perspective, 
deep legal pluralism allows for an analysis of the law that avoids the kind of critiques leveled 
against the weak, juristic or classic legal pluralism. It acknowledges 'legal porosity', which is ''the 
conception of different legal spaces superimposed, interpenetrated, and mixed in our minds, as 
much as in our actions that constitute inter-legality“ (2002:302). Actors in semi-social fields use 
their agency to resist and influence the state law, and the interaction is characterized by 
„reciprocity“, wherein both the global and local influence each other in dialectical ways 
(Griffiths A.2002:298). 
Due to the development of globalization that dissolves the boundary between different forms of 
rules and processes, a law can only be understood in a combination of conceptions rather than in 
a hierarchical procedure governed by the nation state (Nader, 1965; Berman, 2012). Legal 
anthropologists have placed more emphasis on the process by which disputes are settled, rather 
than on the substance of the law that emerges from legal decisions. These studies adopt a 
transactional perspective looking into the strategies actors employ to manage disputes and the 
choices they make between alternative modes of dispute settlement. This has been referred to as 
„forum shopping and shopping forums“ (Keebet Von Benda-Beckman 1981, Merry 1979). 
Others further stress that social research should focus on the activities of individuals rather than 
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law (or how the courts have interpreted the law) to have a good understanding of a given 
society's internal and external social interaction. Thus, the law itself may have little significance 
in the understanding of how a community resolves its disputes compared to the social norms or 
the religious values its people attach to it (Faraganis 1993:13 cited in Khristin, 2016). 
 It is also essential to recognize the priority officially accorded to state law in these situations, 
which rarely focuses on the power of law in social life (Tamanaha 2008:385). It is due to this 
fact that local elders' social power is more influential than state appointed judges among the 
Siltie. Thus, while the transplanted law held the upper hand on „its domain within the context of 
the legal system, matters were reversed in social life, where the state legal system frequently was 
unable to dictate its terms“(ibid.). Nevertheless, the local community also employs state law to 
champion for their rights in the courts, including customary ones. Thus, the law has become a 
„weapon of the weak“ (Scott, 1985), yet law still remains relatively uninfluential in the day to 
day activities of the local community.  
In this regard, courts of religious leaders and elders are playing a significant role for dispute 
settlements, on the one hand, and have also become a setback for the protection of minorities and 
socially secluded communities like potters, blacksmiths, and potters, on the other. Moreover, 
they are also directly a reflection of local values and norms.  
Tamanaha clearly illustrates that state law was impotent, capable only of episodic or targeted 
interventions. In all situations, norms and institutions that rivaled the state in controlling and 
influencing the behavior of people continued to thrive (Tamanaha 2008:386).  
Taking the above analysis into consideration, my stand on the place of law in state-society 
relation is the legal pluralist perspective, for the legal pluralist view considers non-state orders as 
part of law against the positivist's explanation. Thus, in the context of an legal anthropological 
approaches study, this study adopts non-state orders as law (Twinning 2010:4) since the non-
state modes of dispute settlement regulate every day activities of the community (see also 
Moore,1978) even more than what some consider state law.  
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3.8. Defining Legal Pluralism: A Contentious Notion 
 
 Legal pluralism's cross-disciplinary natures have become one of the problems scholars face to 
come up with a universally agreed upon definition of legal pluralism (Griffiths 1986:9; 
Tamanaha 2008: 376). Scholars also explicate that it is difficult to bring one definition of legal 
pluralism, for the mainstream legal pluralism literature has quite different intellectual roots 
(Twinning 2010:11).  
Twinning further outlines that „the main literature has been bedeviled by an obsession with 
continuing jurisprudential problems surrounding the concept of law and legal positivism. It 
neglects theoretical issues both about pluralism and general normative theory“ (2010:1), and 
brings different concepts and orientations to the subject which contribute to the "confusion and 
disagreement on the very notion of legal pluralism“(Tamanaha 2008:376, 390).  
Nevertheless, it is also mentioned that the problem is inherent in the term itself as it connotes or 
as it is applied „indiscriminately to almost any kind of complexity or diversity“ (Twining 
2010:16). Even if it is hard to figure out the agreed upon definition and conceptual frameworks 
for the notion, some authors have attempted to define the pluralistic socio-legal structures at least 
since the 1930s. The very concept of legal pluralism has witnessed gradual development in line 
with the development of the scopes and orientations of the socio-legal and anthropological 
disciplines. To begin with, legal pluralism in the late 19th century referred primarily to „ the 
incorporation or recognition of customary law norms or institutions within the state law, or to the 
independent coexistence of indigenous rules and institutions alongside state law whether or not 
officially recognized „ (Tamanaha 2008:390).  
Secondly, with the emergence of the interdependency of various institutions due to globalization, 
the definition and concept of legal pluralism have also undergone changes. Additionally, as a 
notion that has crossed different disciplines, legal pluralism has also got various explanations by 
the fields. For a clear understanding of the intellectual heritage and gradual development of the 
concept of legal pluralism, it is better to see the trajectories the scholarship of legal pluralism has 
undergone so far.To begin with, Ehrlich (1936) who is known by his idea called “Theory of 
Living Law,“ developed a new conception of plural legal systems in the 1930s. His legal 
pluralist idea was emerged as a refutation to the legal positivist conception of the law of his time. 
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The idea had been commended by his explanation about the empirical nature of sociological 
aspects of the law. He has identified such legal settings as „positivist aspect of law“ and 
“practical juristic science, which Griffiths Jhon calls “the normative aspects of law” (1986:23).  
Ehrlich differentiates „the scientific conception of law” which stands for „rules for decision” and 
from „the practical“ one that contains „rules for conduct“ (Ehrlich, 1936). He even 
acknowledges the existence of social forces that deal with the problem of violence apart from the 
state denouncing the very idea of the Weberian concept of the state. He said, „the state is not the 
only association that exercises coercion; there are the untold number of associations in a society 
that exercises it much more than the state” (Ehrlich 1936:63-64). He emphasized more on the 
sociological aspects of law and contributed to sorting out the existence of some social 
associations that do not require recognition or installment from the state. He postulates that these 
social institutions sometimes operate more coercive power than the state in society, and hence 
points out clearly the existence of strong legal pluralism (Griffiths 1986:23). 
Ehrlich has even gone further in explicating the position of the state in society. He states that 
“[t]he state is an association like all others: it has no particular place to others, nor does its law 
have a special attribute requiring a distinct descriptive treatment” (Griffiths1986:27). 
Nevertheless, his theory of „Living Law“ has been criticized, for it gives little attention to non-
state laws so much as they did not have relevance to the practical aspects of judges. This 
indicates that Ehrlich's analysis suffers from, albeit his criticism of the state, positivism which 
assumes that the state and its institutions are dominant legal systems in society (Griffiths, 1986).  
Pospisil's „Theory of Legal Levels“ (1971, 1978), and Smith's (1974) “Theory of Corporations“ 
are also some scholarly works that discussed the notion of legal pluralism at a time when little 
attention to the notion has been given. Pospisil criticizes, for instance, some literature that 
regards a state law above other laws, and hence his work is considered as “a reaction against 
legal centralism“ (Griffiths 1986:15). Pospisil further states that „legal systems can be viewed as 
belonging to different legal levels that are superimposed one upon the other, the system of a 
more inclusive group being applied to all members of its constituent subgroups“(1971:107,125). 
On the other hand, Smith has developed an idea which considers a corporation a unit of analysis 
in a social group. 
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Griffiths observes that legal pluralism which is conceived by Smith's (1974) „Theory of 
Corporations „consists in a description of the various corporate groups of their internal 
regulatory activity, and of their external corporate relationships with each other (Griffiths 
1986:20). Law for Smith is „the inner self-regulation by corporate groups of their public affairs.“ 
Griffiths criticized earlier works such as that of Pospisil’s which was“ influenced by the whole 
society perspective and unable to figure out the law operating in each subgroup rather than 
pointing “legal levels”(Griffiths 1986:17).  
Later on, authors such as Moore, whose seminal work,“ Law and Social Change: The Semi-
Autonomous Social Field as An Appropriate Subject of Study“(1978), still dominates legal 
plural studies, have refined the various ideas that describe the existence of plural legal systems in 
a given socio-cultural setting. Moore’s “semi-autonomous social field”(1978) has contributed 
some points to the development of the descriptive theory of legal pluralism.  
Moore's contribution has been accredited for citing the existence of “normative heterogeneity 
instead of emptiness or vagueness of the social space”(Griffiths 1986: 34). She rejected the state 
as “the only source of legal rules”(ibid.). All activities engaged in regulation or reglementary 
activities in a social group, in Moore's semi-social field, are considered as law (Griffiths 
1986:35). Moore's concept does not limit the number of distinct systems of semi-autonomy in a 
given social group. Rather it depends on the “purposes and perspectives of the 
observer”(Griffiths 1986:35).This assertion goes with Pospisil's explanation which considers that 
“no society has a consistent legal system, but like many such systems as there are functioning 
subgroups'' (1971:98). He called this kind of legal arrangement or simply legal pluralism as 
„legal levels.“ Nevertheless, Moore focuses on „interacting systems“ rather than the 
constructional conception of the socio-legal structure like scholars before her, such as Pospisil 
and Smith (Griffiths 1986:37). 
The semi-autonomous social field points the existence of an identifiable social group which 
engages in reglementary activities (Griffiths 1986:36). Reglementary activity means a social 
autonomy as a center of regulatory activity whereby a local community resolves its differences in 
its subgroup. The tendency of a self-regulating social field and partial autonomy, which Moore 
focuses on, enables a social group „to fight any encroachment on autonomy previously enjoyed“ 
(Moore 1978:80). 
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This classical literature laid implicitly, with all their shortcomings, the foundation for the 
empirical or sociological aspects of law which Griffiths names, „strong conception of legal 
pluralism“ (Griffiths,1986: Griffiths A.,2002). 
According to Griffiths A. (2002:302), the legal conceptions of Pospisil, Smith, and Moore 
connote a deep or strong legal pluralism, which considers legal pluralism as a social fact or an 
empirical aspect of social life rather than something imposed by the state in juristic perspective. 
The concepts further lay a foundation for the understanding of law as a process, and an 
interacting aspect that has no discrete boundary with social norms. Moreover, the semi-
autonomous nature of social fields, for instance, undermines the “hegemonic claim to universal 
validity and dominance of state law“ (Griffiths A.2002:303).  
Moore's concept further deconstructs the classic or juristic perspectives that consider all legal 
systems are rooted in state law. Scholars have appreciated the model as one of the ways of 
grasping the descriptive conception of legal pluralism (Griffiths 1986; Griffiths A. 2002:303). It 
is also crucial to understand the dynamics of change and transformation in society.  
With the above explanations of plural legal settings at hand, let us now cast a glance on how 
scholars delimit legal pluralism. Taking ideas from Vanderlinden's (1971) definition of legal 
pluralism, Griffiths underlines that legal pluralism is not a theory or an ideology, and it does not 
require the existence of more than one legal system. The existence of multiple legal modes is 
enough in this regard (Griffiths 1986:12). According to lawyers, for instance, legal pluralism is 
defined as “the existence of multiple systems of legal obligation within the confines of the state” 
(Hooker1975:2). 
 Pluralism as a normative concept, also refers to a system that recognizes certainly other norms 
emanating outside state institutions along with a state ordained system of standards. In an 
attempt to clarify the concept of legal pluralism, I entirely count on Twinning's (2010) 
conception not only because he has gone in detail to define pluralism, but also because his 
studies have taken ideas from Ethiopia's legal experiences (ibid.:376). In this regard, he states 
that „plural“ implies more than one, and it can be applied to persons or objects. It assumes that 
these units are discrete or individuated. Thus, he stresses that pluralism is used as a normative 
and descriptive concept. Taking an idea from political science dictionary, Twinning states that 
pluralism is “[a] theory which opposes monolithic state power and advocates instead increased 
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devolution and autonomy for the main organizations that represent man's involvement in 
society“ (ibid.: 2).  
In an attempt to resolve an intellectual battle over the concept of legal pluralism, Tamanaha 
(2008:396) introduces what he calls a „simple approach“ to understand contemporary legal 
pluralism without indulging into conceptual problems of law. He observes that „legal pluralism 
exists whenever social actors identify more than one source of ‘law' within a social arena „. He 
defines legal pluralism as multiple uncoordinated, coexisting or overlapping bodies of law that 
may make competing claims of authority (ibid. 2008:375).  
The existence of multiple active sources of normative ordering is considered as a yardstick for a 
social arena to be legally pluralistic. In this regard, Tamanaha (2008:398) sorts out six categories 
of normative orderings that have mostly been discussed in studies of legal pluralism to this day. 
These are (i) the official legal systems, (ii) customary/cultural normative systems, (iii) 
religious/cultural normative systems, (iv) economic/capitalist normative systems, (v) functional 
normative systems, and (vi) community/cultural normative systems. 
Even though Tamanaha's identification is helpful to understand the notion of legal pluralism in a 
given social arena, his analysis is not without pitfall. First, he could not clearly outline the 
difference between cultural/customary normative and community/cultural systems that derive 
their legitimacy from a community they are a part. I believe that the seemingly two categories 
are one and the same. Second, others like functional and capitalist ones derive their legitimacy 
and are also reflections of a nation-state interest rather than standing as a separate legal system 
by their own. Rather, they can be subsumed under state or positivist legal system. Thus, I argue 
that instead of having six categories, a social arena can comprise at least three legal regimes: 
state, customary and religion.  
However, global norms that have been orchestrated by WTO, WHO, and UN can also become 
fourth nominee legal systems, especially in a contemporary world. Griffiths John (1986), on the 
other hand, has introduced two approaches to understanding the concept of legal pluralism: 
weak, juristic, or classic pluralism that is linked with lawyers' perspective, and “strong, deep, or 
new pluralism“ which is the social science's perspective.  
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He was very much keen to develop “a descriptive conception of legal pluralism” based on the 
empirical world rather than normative analysis. The strong, deep or new legal pluralism provides 
a model for doing this. It recognizes that legal pluralism exists in all societies.  
He states further that the existence of multiple forms of ordering and their authority in a society 
is not necessarily dependent upon a state’s recognition (Griffiths A.2002:299). Anne Griffiths 
further delineates that the juristic perspective or classic legal pluralism „that cannot serve as the basis for 
an analytic and descriptive framework of pluralism because the relationship between the law of the state 
and other law is predefined.“(2002:303). Anne Griffith’s criticism on the weak legal pluralism 
amplifies two issues which the juristic perspective mainly stands for. First, the notion stresses 
that any conception of law must necessarily be based on Western legal theory.  
It is thus a denial that a more adequate, less ethnocentric theory of law can ever be developed for 
comparative purposes. Second, it leaves the ideology of state law intact, for it continues to define 
law in parochial terms that continue to exclude all those that are 'other' because they fail to 
conform to its remit (Griffiths A. 2002:309). On the other hand, Twining has tried to construct 
eight definitions of what he calls “social fact legal pluralism“ that can be accepted by „most 
anthropological and socio-legal studies up to the mid-1990s” (2010:11).  
He briefly outlines the feature of social fact legal pluralism as it “is mainly concerned with a 
plurality of co-existing institutionalized normative orders“ (2010:15). First, he states that if one 
adopts a broad, positivist, conception of law, legal pluralism is as much a social fact as 
normative pluralism. Second, he noted that it is important to distinguish between state legal 
pluralism (Merry, 1988) (sometimes called weak legal pluralism (Griffiths, 1986; Griffiths A., 
2002)), legal poly-centricity (the eclectic use of sources within different sectors of one state legal 
system (Petersen and Zahle, 1995), and legal pluralism conceived as the co-existence of two or 
more autonomous or semi-autonomous legal systems or sets of norms in the same time-space 
context. Third, he explained that legal pluralism is pervasive in all multicultural societies. He 
also observes that acknowledging legal pluralism does not necessarily entail ignorance of state 
law, abandoning of human rights, democracy and liberal ideology including „the withering away 
of state institutions (2010:13).  
Moreover, the notion of legal pluralism has become a major topic in legal anthropology, legal 
sociology, comparative law, international law, and socio-legal studies (Tamanaha 2008:376). 
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Twinning has stated above that scholars in various fields define legal pluralism in one or other 
ways. Pospisil and Griffiths, for instance, defined it as „ a situation in which two or more legal 
systems, based on different sources of ultimate validity and get their legitimacy of various 
sources of law, coexist in the same social field“ (Pospisil, 1971; Griffiths 1986:38).  
According to Twinning (2010), the concept of legal pluralism refers to legal systems, networks 
or orders co-existing within the same geographical space or jurisdiction. The term is also 
descriptive of a situation in which two or more distinct legal regimes exist within the same 
political community.  
Taking ideas from Moore’s „semi-autonomous social field theory“(Moore, 1978), Griffiths 
asserts that since „law is present in every semi-autonomous social field, and since every society 
contains many such fields, legal pluralism is a universal feature of the social organization“ 
(1986:38).  
Socio-legal scholars also stress that legal pluralism is everywhere, as Griffiths (1986:38) calls its 
existence as „omnipresent,“ refuting the traditional ideas that emphasized the origin of the 
concept to be during the colonial time (Moore 1986; Tamanaha 2008:375). It is argued that 
between the body politic and the individual, there are interposed various smaller social fields to 
which the individual „belongs.“ These social fields have their customs and rules and means of 
coercing or inducing compliance (Moore 1978:721). The Siltie, for instance, employs local 
values such as Berche, Tur, Fero (See also Chapter Seven) as sanctioning or enforcing 
mechanisms in the customary and religious courts. Based on this idea and ideas from Pospisil, 
we can say that having the monopoly of using coercion or threatening to apply force cannot 
become a yardstick to differentiate the legal norm from other like social norms, as various social 
fields have the capacity to induce compliance.  
Some literature (e.g., Twinning, 2010) also indicates that there is a reciprocal relationship 
between state and non-state orders. He, for instance, observes that a state may acknowledge the 
existence of a non-state order without giving it any legal status. However, the state may also 
subject certain conditions or limitations to non-state orders (Twining 2010:9-10).Griffiths, on the 
other hand, states that if a state's recognition of customary law is a prerequisite for existence of 
legal pluralism, it is a „deviant situation“ rather than strong legal pluralism (Griffiths 1986:9).  
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Twining, however, indicated that classifying normative orders into legal and non-legal has no 
practical and theoretical importance (Twining 2010:5). Tamanaha states, however, that there is 
an empirical distinction between state law and other forms of normative ordering. And hence, 
putting all normative orderings under one category is unscientific (Tamanaha 1993:88).  
Griffiths Anne states, however, that Tamanaha's rejection of strong legal pluralism, albeit he has 
converted his stand on strong legal pluralism later (Tamanaha, 2000), emanated from legal 
pluralism's anti-state law's ideology which presupposes that non-state or indigenous law is right, 
a bias that renders the concept inadequate as an analytical tool for legal analysis ( Griffiths A. 
2002:307, Woodman 1998). 
As the conceptual aspect of legal pluralism is rare to define, some social settings that appear 
legally plural should also be clarified for the better understanding of the notion. The diversity of 
rules within a single legal system, for instance, vary from the existence of coexisting legal 
regimes that derive their authority from different sources to the multiplicity of norms that operate 
under the same legal system. John Griffiths, for instance, mentioned that the existence of the 
various rules for different classes of the population does not constitute legal pluralism in a strong 
sense so long as it is recognized by a single legal system (1986:11). For him, the existence of 
different rules for the various groups in various geographical areas also cannot qualify a country 
to have legal pluralism in a strong sense. John Griffiths also spells out that the recognition, 
incorporation or validation of laws by the state should not be a prerequisite for the existence of 
legal pluralism. In criticizing the state's recognition of non-state orders, Twinning (2010:10) 
states that „what the state accords or imposes may not be what a given group wants and that such 
demands or claims may be contested within a given population.“ 
Thus, recognition of non-state orders is a contending issue that is considered by scholars as a 
„political matter” (Twining 2010:10). Moore notes that this state of affair is emanated from a 
„juristic view of legal pluralism“ or „state legal pluralism“ (Moore, 1988) 
Despite all these attempts to define the notion, Woodman presents his version of the notion by 
viewing legal pluralism as an ethnographic field that includes state law (Woodman, 1998). 
Woodman’s perspectives by challenges the dichotomic division of legal systems in a given 
socio-legal settings. This idea also challenges the hot debates between legal pluralists and legal 
centralists over the supremacy of state law over others (Greenhouse 1998:61).  
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For Griffiths (1986: 4), legal pluralism is „an empirical state of affairs in society“. Legal 
pluralism has been defined as „the idea that more than one legal system operates in a single 
political unit” (Santos de Sousa 2002:89). However, a close inspection of the various definitions 
of the notion underpins that legal pluralism entails not only coexistence but also conflict or 
competition among the different systems of law (Masaji, 1998). 
Masaji goes on to say that most of the definitions of legal pluralism have focused on the 
coexistence of legal systems as if each system of law is working in harmony with another system 
in the social structure. He asserts that „[i]n practice, there are numerous conflicts between 
coexisting plural systems, albeit irregular they may be“ (ibid.). Moreover, it is indicated that the 
various studies done so far on legal pluralism have not treated the subjective perspectives or the 
viewpoints of the local communities on the practices of legal systems in a social life. 
While broadly indicative of the general understanding of the concept of legal pluralism, Jhon 
Griffith's definition of legal pluralism is not without pitfalls. He, for instance, places much 
emphasis on the social aspects of law, paying little attention to what he calls to „weak legal 
pluralism or juristic legal pluralism.“ A similar attempt to define legal pluralism was made by 
Tamanaha (2008) who has gone in detail to trace the genesis of the notion and goes further to 
provide the contemporary definition of legal pluralism. In his seminal article, „Understanding 
Legal Pluralism: The Past to Present, Local to Global“(2008) Tamanaha explains in depth how 
legal pluralism originated and operated historically and developed in due course of time in 
various parts of the globe including the western world. He further notes that legal pluralism is 
everywhere. It seems that he emphasized on the lawyers' perspectives in defining the concept, 
but candidly explained that legal pluralism by its nature challenges the supremacy of state law, 
and he portrays legal pluralism as a „rival to legal authorities“ and politically challenging the 
nation states.  
He also underlines that the existence of multiple legal systems may pose „potential conflict that 
can generate uncertainty or jeopardy for individuals and groups in society who cannot be sure in 
advance which legal regime will be applied to their situation“ (Tamanaha 2008:376). He further 
indicates that this state of affair creates opportunities for individuals and groups within society 
who can opportunistically select from among coexisting legal authorities to advance their aims.  
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Keebet Benda-Beckmann (1981) calls this aspect of legal pluralism „forum shopping“. To wind 
up, the above definitions also indicate that the very aspect of legal pluralism entails not only 
coexistence of various legal systems, but it also entails that complementarity, competitions, 
negotiations, and isolationism are its features (Moore, 1978; Griffiths 1986:39). To recap, legal 
pluralism challenges the assumed monopolies of the state in making, administering, imposing, 
and sanctioning the law.  
3.9. Legal Centrism's One-Size-Fits-All Approach: A Declining Paradigm 
 
As described above, legal pluralism is viewed in literature from two perspectives: social 
scientists’ and lawyers' perspectives. One of the major areas scholars disagree whenever they 
discuss legal pluralism is the role of the state in maintaining social order in a given social arena. 
The idea that considers the sole monopoly of violence is subsumed under the notion of legal-
centrism. 
As mentioned earlier, most sociologists and anthropologists including some lawyers define legal 
pluralism as „the presence in a social field of more than one legal system“(Griffiths 1986:1; 
Griffiths A, 2002; Tamanaha, 2008; Twining, 2010). One of the challenges that have become a 
hurdle, Griffiths argues, to study legal pluralism is the notion of „legal centralism“ which is a 
reflection of the moral and political claims of the modern nation state. Legal centralism or „legal 
monism“ (Maldonado (undated 1)) underlines that „there must be one and only one centralized, 
and hierarchical legal system in each state“ (Griffiths, 1986; Twinning, 2010; Kelsen (1960)51.  
Kelsen (1881–1978), an Austrian jurist and philosopher who is known by his „a pure theory of 
law“ , also underlines the state as he main actor in administrating justice (1960:1, 7). He goes on 
to say the „Pure Theory describes the positive law as an objectively valid order and states that 
this interpretation is possible only under the condition that a basic norm is presupposed“ (1960: 
217-18). He further notes that there is no difference between state and law.  
                                                     
51 The Pure Theory of Law (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) 
https://plato.stanford.edu.entries/lawphil-theory/ (accessed on April 5, 2017).  
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For him, the state is the group of norms created by the sovereign. Law, according to Kelsen, is a 
hierarchical system composed of norms promoted by a set of centralized institutions whose 
validity is in turn derived from a supposed fundamental norm. For Kelsen, hence, the law of the 
state excludes any other system of standards which poses competition. He also stresses that all 
legal norms of a given legal system ultimately derive their validity from one basic norm giving 
the state law the ultimate power for a monopoly to use force.  
Griffiths states, however, that social fields vary from each other with the relative existence of 
pluralism, and some are more pluralistic than the others. It is not, however, easy to define legal 
reality due to the prevalence of the legal centralist idea that overestimates the state law as the 
principal authority and hence becomes a hindrance to the development of a general theory of law 
(Griffiths1986.4). Additionally, scholars such as Moore indicate how the state encroaches social 
fields in an attempt to monopolize violence. She states that one of the most usual ways in which 
centralized governments invade „social fields in their boundaries is through legislation“(Moore 
1978:723). Thus, legal pluralism has challenged the idea which considers the state the only 
institution which contributes to maintain social order. As controversial as it is, the discussion 
seems characterized by an ideological debate. In this regard, some literatures have discussed the 
issues, yet rarely have they come up with consensus on the subject. 
 Twinning (2010:6), for instance, observes that state-centrism or the concept of state centralism 
connotes four ideas as part of extended debate. First, he states that at the level of description, the 
state is the only institution that contributes to social order. Secondly, in his view, the empirical 
cases indicate that at least in modern societies, state law is in practice the most important form of 
law: it is dominant, technically superior, and stronger than other forms of institutionalized 
ordering. Thirdly, Twinning observes that in his normative claim, the state has sole and supreme 
authority in a given territory or space and it has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Last, 
he asserts that the state's ideological claim that offers the best or only hope for the realization of 
liberal democratic values, such as democracy, equality, human rights, and the rule of law.  
As a leading socio-legal scholar, Denis Galligan points out that there are forms of non-state law 
that coexist and intersect with state legal systems. He acknowledges that many claims made for 
the state's social role are extravagant, that it can be ineffective or worse, and that non-state 
normative orders, whether recognized as legal or not, often have social utility. However, 
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Galligan concludes that „the modern democratic state provides the best hope for achieving some 
social goods, including human rights, the rule of law and democracy „(Galligan, 2007). 
In respect of the subordination of non-state law, he recognizes that there can be semi-
independence or semi-autonomy, but denies claims to complete autonomy (ibid. 176-7 that 
grounds the propositions of Moore (1978). 
Other scholars also stress that the centralist view of legal pluralism may only work in a 
culturally, and economically homogeneous society (Hooker, 1975). He, however, said that „this 
kind of society is an exception (ibid.1975:1-2). He further goes on to the extreme position by 
recommending that the national legal system to abolish the indigenous one by taking the superior 
political position among other laws. His proposition to put the national legal system in superior 
strata (1975:4 cited in Griffiths 1986:9) to the extent of validation of the indigenous systems to 
the standard of the national legal system resembles partly the Ethiopian reality. The Ethiopian 
1995 constitution gives concessions to the religious and customary laws to consider private 
matters without empowering the system’s legal status (Art.34/5/;78/5) and making the 
constitution the supreme law of the land (Art.9(1)). Thus, Hooker's dichotomy of the legal 
system into „dominant and serving law“ (1975:4) is a clear indication of the influence of 
centralist perspective in his analysis. Anne Griffiths (2002), on the other hand, notes that 
adopting legal pluralism as strong or deep is crucial to understanding the gender, globalization as 
well as the lived realities of a social group than the normative, a historical orientation of the 
weak or juristic perspective of legal pluralism. In pointing the agency of local actors, Norman 
Long (2001) states that actor-oriented perspective is essential because it refuses an analysis of 
the local as a system that is simply acted upon through the imposition of external institutions that 
derive from national, regional or international agencies.  
Added to this, Griffiths Anne contends that an actor-oriented perspective provides an opportunity 
to examine not only how the global shapes the local but also how the local responds to the 
changes (Griffiths A.2002:305). Thus, the weak legal pluralism gives more power to the state to 
regulate other laws; activities to ascertain whether they go against the moral of the society or to 
review their decisions by the state courts or by other authorities.  
 
 
110 
 
One of the problems with the notion of weak legal pluralism is also that it privileges unity as a 
must meet goal and a prerequisite towards progress and development of modern nationhood 
rather than valuing diversity.  
Thus, in multi-ethnic states such as Ethiopia, the state centralist project cannot be harmonized 
with the values and norms of the people. In addition, the legal centralist jurists push for the state 
to have a “recognizing” status as a validating source to other forms of normative orders is a clear 
indication of the ideological battle of the legal centralist project with the pluralist one. On the 
other extreme, Griffiths has gone further to say that legal pluralism is a fact, and legal centralism 
is a myth, and illusion (1986). Galanter also stressed that law in the modern world is plural rather 
than monolithic (Galanter 1981:20), and he further said that an official legal system is a 
secondary form of social regulation in social life. These kinds of discussions further indicate the 
inherent battle among scholars over the concept of legal pluralism. Moreover, Twinning 
underscores that individuation of legal systems is difficult as „not all normative and legal 
systems have precise boundaries“(ibid.: 3). Twinning’s conception also hints the emergence of 
legal hybridism in the social world. He further indicates that legal pluralism is a social fact, and 
he has also become puzzled why many lawyers are not convinced of the existence of legal 
pluralism even if each of the scholars experiences it on a daily basis (2010:4). 
Griffith further states that legal pluralism is conceived as „imperfect law“ by legal centralists, 
which leads them to give it less value even if it has got formal recognition in various states 
(Griffiths 1986:8). Some, however, consider the existence of plural legal setting as a challenge 
that brings the possibility of forum shopping and hence conflict of laws (Alemayehu 2004:8). 
Nevertheless, several kinds of literature (Santos Bonaventura de Sousa, 2006; Tamanaha, 2008; 
Twining 2010; Markakis, 2011) indicate that globalization has indicated the state law has rarely 
had a monopoly over others. Rather it has weakened the sovereignty of the state itself. 
 In an attempt to indicate the bilateral relation between the society and the state, Fitzpatrick 
(1984) developed the concept of ‘integral plurality’ that underscores the interaction among 
normative orders based on the scheme that the state law is constituted in relation to a plurality of 
social forms. In this case, Anne Griffiths (2002:303) states that Fitzpatrick introduces the idea of 
how the state law is shaped by its constituents and the vice versa.  
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 Moore further said that the new or deep legal pluralism has reoriented legal analysis from the 
ideology of legal centralism towards a dialectical analysis of the relationship among normative 
orders. This new approach provides a framework for an understanding of the dynamics of the 
imposition of law as well as a resistance to it“ (Griffiths A. 2002:304). 
On the other hand, the state seems to have only minimal control in the Islamic society where 
Islamic laws are applied based on the perceptions and understandings of four schools of law 
which accept each other's differences. In an Islamic court, a Qadi can act without any 
consideration of the existence of the state itself. This is because „...Islamic law historically 
precedes and transcends the state (Sherman, 20)52. Islamic law, thus, intrinsically antagonizes 
with the idea of a modern state. This means that there is an entire universe of legal rights and 
obligations that are authoritative and deeply felt in the hearts and minds of people yet entirely 
independent of the state. The political theory underlying the modern nation state is ill-equipped 
to deal with this reality. Consequently, modern Muslim states tend either to seek to co-opt the 
religious law or to suppress it (ibid.). This clearly indicates that Islamic law is not grounded in 
any commitment to the dictates of legal centralism. Nevertheless, „it emphatically and 
unequivocally endorsed the principle of the rule of law“(Sherman, 14). Even though he upholds 
the legal centralist perspective, Sherman attests that „whether we are talking about the Muslim 
world or America, the homogenizing agenda of legal centralism finds itself in increasingly 
apparent competition with sub- and non-state reglementary regimes of various forms, origins, 
and degrees of authority“ (Sherman 19-20). 
3.10. Some Points on Criticisms of Legal Pluralism 
Even though the expansion of globalization had blurred a nation-state’s boundary and reshaped 
the Weberian state concept which in turn has brought about plural legal settings to operate more 
effectively than before, the strong legal pluralism which scholars proposed could not escape 
criticism. Teubner (1992) and Tamanaha (1993), for instance, regard the concept as vague and 
hard to define, and analyze empirically. 
 Tamanaha further states that acknowledging the non-state norms may bring about incorporation 
into state law as a result of their recognition by designated state officials.  
                                                     
52 Sherman, A. Jackson. Legal Pluralism and the Nation State: Romantic Medievalism or Pragmatic Modernity? 
Accessed on 22/10/2015 at 8:45. 
 
 
112 
 
When this occurs, he argues, the non-state norms become transformed in such a way that they 
can no longer be identified as non-state norms. Thus, weak legal pluralism cannot exist (Griffiths 
A.2002:305), on the one hand, and the idea of the monolithic vision of state law also seems to 
hold no water, on the other. Tamanaha stresses further that „the longstanding vision of a uniform 
and monopolistic law that governs a community is plainly 'obsolete' „(Tamanaha 2008:410). 
Greenhouse (1998:61-62) also describes the state law's discourse for supremacy as „contested“ 
that it cannot take into account the social movements, ethnic and identity politics as well as 
globalization that have unfolded in a contemporary world.  
Studies indicate that complex and dynamics plural legal systems have become the features of 
contemporary legal systems in various parts of the world (Franz von Benda-Beckmann and 
Keebet von Benda-Beckmann (2006: 1). Taking the legal realities of Ethiopia (the Siltie as an 
ethnographic field as a case), this study further argues that a legal centralist approach, which is 
the basis of the one-size-fits-all approach, can only be effective with populations that are more or 
less substantively equal. It is due to this understanding that scholars like Sherman state that 
employing a homogenous law in a multi ethnic states where peoples who differ historically, 
socially, religiously, culturally live will often produce a different effect“ (Sherman, 20). Thus, 
more than becoming a hot table debate among scholars, legal pluralism „may offer some very 
practical alternatives for the culturally, religiously and ethnically diverse 21st-century nation-
state“ (ibid.). I argue that the state-centrist project is at its dead end. Thus, for the purpose of this 
book, I adopt the legal anthropological conception of legal systems which is subsumed under the 
definition of Jon Griffiths (1986) and Woodman (1998).  
Jon Griffiths (1986) defines a legal reality of a given socio-cultural setting that includes „the 
activities of all legal systems operating in the study area based on their authority not necessarily 
controlled by the state law, and rather the state law itself is equal among all” (Griffiths 1986:4).  
Nevertheless, other scholars indicate that a social researcher should also focus on actions of 
individuals than structures or institutions for a better understanding of the social life of a society 
like such as the legal system. By drawing on Giddens's analysis of structure and action, 
according to which action shapes structure and structures constrain and enable actions, Henry 
(1983) creates a space which allows for human actions to have an impact, even where the 
persons who carry out them may be powerless (Griffiths 2002: 303-304).  
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Greenhouse (1998: 66) notes that the ethnographic attention paid to the political and normative 
connections among social fields is crucial to grasp the legal realities. Thus, a theoretical 
framework and analytical approach, I adopt the agency-structure to better understand legal 
pluralism among the Siltie. 
3.11. Globalization or Glocalization: The Development of Legal Hybridism as an 
Emergent Legal System  
The introduction of the new world order in the post-WWII in most developing countries brought 
about profound legal and judicial reforms that were alien to the cultures of the distant people 
such as Africa. These new paradigms gave little room for multicultural, and local modes of 
dispute settlement that had existed among these people from time immemorial. This 
development has also weakened African countries’ sovereignty (Gunderson, 1992; Santos de 
Sousa, 2006). As a result, the newly independent African states could not deliver public services 
including judiciary to their people (Klute and Embalo, 2011). Following these developments, 
most of the post-independent African countries have become fragile, and this cleared the ways 
for the emergence of microstates within a state that challenged even the very existence of the 
state apparatus. Santos indicates that the inefficiency of multi-ethnic states like Mozambique has 
led to the emergence of local power as alternative non-state actors and later brought about what 
he calls a „heterogeneous state“(ibid.:6). By a heterogeneous state, it means a state that lacks a 
unity of the state and its legal and administrative structure. The development of the fragile nature 
of the state owing to both external and internal factors has thus paved the way for the resurgence 
of the traditional authorities that have become alternative legal and political modernity in the 
developing countries (Santos de Sousa, 2006). Studies indicate that the imposition of external 
pressure has met strong challenges from the traditional authorities, whose power sprouted 
afterward (Bellagamba / Klute 2008; Santos de Sousa, 2006; Klute and Embalo, 2011), and even 
questioned the significances of the centrality of the state.  Recent studies further indicate that „ 
...despite securing political independence in the 1950 and 1960, many African countries have 
remained dependent on foreign governments, calling into the value and meaning of their 
sovereignty“ (Cheeseman 2016: 2), Thus, the infiltration of foreign forces into African countries' 
internal affairs has influenced the “internal and external sovereignty of the state”(Franz von 
Benda-Beckmann and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann 2006: 9).  
 
 
114 
 
In some cases, the state and its agencies have socially been embedded where local actors have 
resurrected their powers and are actively involved in administrating and maintaining social 
orders (Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann 2006: 9).  
Studies by Klute and Embaló, among others, note that the re-emergence of non-state political 
actors can not only be associated with the weakness of state structure has partly been exacerbated 
by the above factors (Klute, Georg; Birgit Embaló, Idrissa Embaló 2006: 4). Rather it can also be 
fermented by „a particular vitality of sometimes very innovative, at times revitalized neo-
traditional forms of social and political power on a local level” (Bellagamba / Klute, 2008). The 
global and local changes Africa has experienced in the last decades have brought about a 
hybridized form of institution. This new kind of institutions has got various names, which 
include „Entangled State“ (Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann 2006: 
9; Klute, Birgit Embaló, Idrissa Embaló, 2006) or „Heterogeneous State“ (Santos de Sousa, 
2006). In this social setting, no unidirectional relationship has been observed among legal 
systems. The state law becomes one among the existing laws. It has, however, become 
sometimes embedded by others notably customary ones. Empirical data indicate that the local 
community uses both state and non-state versions of law such as Berche to bring justice and 
social orders. They usually use state law as a weapon to protect their rights.  
The community has also used the state legislation to force state officials and oppressors, like 
women used to bring back their husbands in case of domestic violence, to abide by the law. 
Warrie, Gogot, Abotgare and clan institutions (See more in Chapter Five and Six) are important 
tools to maintain social order in the area. This indicates the existence of complex power 
relationship between state and non-state actors and how state and its agencies are socially 
embedded. This development also shows the changing status of state from controlling and 
protecting violence to becoming one among the many.  
Studies also indicate that the hybridization or mutual influences of coexisting legal systems are 
not a recent phenomenon. It was also observed during colonization period (Tamanaha 2008:384).  
Both sides of this dual system influenced one another in various ways, including exchanging or 
recognizing the other’s norms (ibid.). Nevertheless, the increasing economic and social pressures 
that surpass national boundaries (Santos de Sousa, 2006; Tamanaha 2008:386) due to 
globalization further accelerate the porosity of legal systems' boundaries to interfere with each 
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other's prerogatives. This state of affair has led to the coming into being of what Griffiths calls, 
“cross-fertilization”, a process whereby rules in one system are shaped by and are shaping those 
in another (Griffiths 1998:134).  
Moore (1978) has also underscored the existence of, albeit not openly, interlinking social fields 
or legal systems in a given social setting. Moreover, the expansion of migration and the blending 
of various norms into national traditions in different parts of the globe has also led to the 
emergence of the hybridized form of culture, and hybridized form of legal system including the 
western world (Tamanaha, 2008). Additionally, the post-1990s political changes Africa has 
experienced have brought quite a large number of projects mainly from the West, which were 
aimed at developing, reforming and bringing social changes. These processes „fragmented 
organized state structures and administration or caused their collapse'' (Santos de Sousa 2006; 
Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann 2006; Klute; Birgit Embaló, 
Idrissa Embaló 2006:4). These new developments have weakened the African states' capacity to 
implement state laws. Thus, post-modern enthusiasm for fragmentation, diversification, and 
indeterminacy further threatens to reduce the value of „pluralism“ as an analytical concept 
(Twinning 2010:17). Such circumstances may provide opportunities for customary and religious 
dispute settlement institutions to re-emerge and become at times even more robust than state 
laws in maintaining the social order of the society (De Jong, 2005; Klute and Embalo, 2011). 
Santos de Sousa (2006), for instance, introduces the notion of ‘shared sovereignty' which exists 
between local and global forces and the nation states in the African continent. Studies such as by 
Brock-Utne indicate that since indigenous values and norms are embedded in society, the 
customary system seems to work quite effectively (Brock-Utne, 2001) and also developed a 
certain power to embedded “state” (Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Keebet von Benda-
Beckmann 2006).Thus, the state could not become a powerful institution which imposes its rules 
and norms on the community. Rather state actors including state court judges have developed 
alliances with local actors and have become members of various local institutions, customary as 
well as religious ones. This personal union of membership has further boosted the local actors' 
legitimacy on the one hand and indicated the weaknesses of the state agency, on the other. 
Moreover, globalization has brought about clear impacts on “declining roles of the state's 
traditional legal functions” (Tamanaha 2008:386), for it is observed this day the sprouting of 
privately owned security firms that maintain social orders in various social settings.  
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Thus, this state of affair challenges the Weberian perception of the state, on the one hand, and 
has heralded the emergence of hybridized form of legal systems in the world including Africa, on 
the other. 
3.12. Legal Hybridism: An African Perspective 
As mentioned above, Africa is a legally pluralist continent. Many people of the continent have 
developed customary dispute settlement and religious institutions. Legal pluralism is a practical 
reality in a number of countries in the world, most notably in the post-colonial states of Africa. 
These newly independent states are grappling with how to preserve the cultural heritage reflected 
in their customary law and institutions, even as they attempt to function as modern constitutional 
regimes (Pimetel 2011:13). Many of these constitutions specifically preserve a role for 
customary law and recognize the inevitability of legal pluralism in the state ( ibid.: 1). Access to 
justice has come out as one of the major failures in achieving the rule of law in many post-
colonial African countries ( Pimetel 2011:13).With the inefficiency of the states to deliver 
justice, the customary and religious actors provide efficient justice to the community (Tamanaha 
2008, Pimettel,2011).This is also true in the case of Ethiopia since much of the justice system is 
delivered in the country at a local level using customary systems (Alula and Getachew 2008: V). 
This indicates that the customary laws must be harmonized with any reforms built on such 
retention.  
Public confidence in the customary courts is high, even higher than it would be in any newly-
imposed statutory court (Pimetel 2011:14). Moreover, African states are also suffering from 
political interferences in the judiciary systems that further worsen the operation and reliability of 
the state justice systems.  
Studies indicate that despite the fact that some improvements have been witnessed in the 
application of the rule of law in the continent, the judiciary still suffers from political 
interference from the executive organ of governments in Africa (Peter Von Doepp 2013:37).  
Cheeseman states further that there is an absence of „an independent judiciary and police in 
contemporary Africa“ (Cheeseman 2016:3) which can influence delivering justice to the 
community on the one hand and negatively affects the legitimacy of the state judiciary on the 
other. Other studies, however, indicate that there is cross-complementarity between local, global 
and national legal systems within African societies. 
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 This phenomenon is conceptualized as legal hybridization (Santos de Sousa, 2006). Some 
scholars further argue that hybridism is a normal condition in our globalizing world (Boele van 
Hensbroek 1998:14; Tamanaha 2008: 409). In a globalized world, frontiers are no barriers for the 
movements of ideas; boundaries are breached all the time, and it is hard to draw boundaries for 
systems due to the diverse and complex nature of the changing world (Long 2001: xi; Tamanaha 
2008:386). In this sense, hybridism seems to characterize the legal pluralism existing on the 
contemporary African continent.  
Heterogeneity can also be categorized into two: individual and group-based heterogeneity 
(Tamanaha 2008). This socio-political heterogeneity exists in social arenas that contain 
individuals oriented to Western liberal norms and with persons who are oriented to non-Western 
customary or religious normative systems, respectively. Taking the heterogeneity of its 
constituents into consideration, one can say that Africa is bound to hybridism. In the same vein, 
Ethiopia in general, and the Siltie area in particular, are also characterized by both individual and 
group heterogeneous social settings. This applies to both rural and urban Siltie. 
Despite attempts to delimit features of legal pluralism defined the concept as a co-existence of 
legal systems in a socio-cultural setting, the empirical data indicate that legal actors cross-
reference legal norms from the different legal regimes characterizing the growing of complex 
legal landscape that can be perceived as legal hybridism.  
3.13. Practice of Legal Pluralism: Experience from Ethiopia 
Ethiopia's historical and political milieu is particularly rich, for the country is one of the oldest 
independent political entities in the world and has existed as an independent polity for more than 
two thousand years (Bahru 2000; Alula and Getachew 2008:2). The country is also said to be 
characterized by socio-political heterogeneity because it hosts some discrete groups, often 
differentiated by language, religion, ethnicity, and culture, or sometimes by clans, factors which 
can exist in various combinations (Tamanaha 2008:403). 
The country is a legally plural state not only because it hosts different ethnic groups that have 
their normative orders but also has embraced constitutionally sanctioned federal and state laws 
that co-exist with other normative orders such as customary and religious ones since 1991. This 
coexistence has got constitutional guarantee after the ratification of the 1995 constitution since 
the country has introduced a new political experiment known as “Ethnic Federalism”. 
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The current Ethiopia's legal system reflects the country's history and politics including the 
various doctrines, be they religious or ideological, institutions and other historical episodes the 
country has passed through at least since the 19th century. In this regard, the legal landscape of 
Ethiopia has passed via some doctrines and ideologies that enriched the national legal systems, 
and with its ethnic groups having their cultural practices, we can say that Ethiopia already 
functions as a legally pluralistic society. Studies indicate, however, that the national legal system 
does not incorporate the customary and religious aspects tantamount to the diversity of the 
country (Alula and Getachew, 2008). 
3.13.1. Interactions between State and Non-State Actors: A Diachronic Approach 
The interaction of legal systems in the country depends on the political as well as the ideological 
orientations of the various regimes that have ruled Ethiopia. I understand interaction as „the 
reciprocal influence of individuals upon one another's actions when in one another's immediate 
physical presence“ (Goffman 1959: 15). The modern secular imported Ethiopian state installed 
modern state structures, including the new legal systems, in the newly incorporated areas like the 
Siltie since the late 19th century (Bahru, 1991). The Ethiopian state was vigorously involved in 
reforming the national legal system since the 1940s.  
The aims of the state formulated and codified laws were „providing a comprehensive body of 
law in the criminal (penal code) and Civil matters (civil code)“(Alula and Getachew 2008:5). 
Their motive was conceived based on the belief that „providing a uniform and modern legal 
regime would be necessary for the socio-economic development of the country and a 
precondition for effective nation building“(ibid.). Thus, the national legal system has been 
influenced not only by traditional or customary laws of the country but also by foreign forces 
like British scholars who were the core advisers to the 19th and the 20th century Ethiopia's 
Kings.  
Contemporary Ethiopia's legal system also has elements from the socialist-oriented Derg regime 
and the incumbent Federal state (Alula and Getachew 2008:2). The empirical data and some 
written works (Alula and Getachew, 2008), however, indicate that these different doctrines, 
institutions, and practices persist today and co-exist in unhomogenized and unharmonized ways 
with the state legal system (ibid.). Against the country's feature as a pluralist state, the various 
Ethiopian regimes tried to supplant the local systems since the 19th century. 
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 The local Siltie Serra has, however, persisted to this day. The 1931 and 1987 constitutions did 
not recognize the customary laws as legally necessary for the country. Studies show that 
Ethiopia's governments have employed various strategies to regulate the interaction of multiple 
legal systems in social arena that range from developing neutrality to curbing the free exercise. 
Studies indicate that in an attempt to control the local systems, official state legal systems can 
utilize some strategies, ranging from permissive to prohibitive (Tamanaha 2008:403). 
Even if it is appreciated by many as a radical departure from the past by legally recognizing 
pluralism, a scrutiny of Ethiopia’s 1995 constitution reveals that it does not allow other 
normative systems apart from the state to operate freely.  
The customary and religious laws cannot be fully implemented as per the values and norms of 
the society they are a part. Rather, the constitution conditions their activities in some ways. Other 
studies indicate, however, that „there were times in Ethiopian history when the state legal system 
officially incorporated elements from the traditional institutions of dispute settlement in the state 
courts“ (Meron, 2010). As the ratification and reform projects were initiated politically, they 
became futile.  
Following these challenges, legal pluralism has formally been recognized by the 1995 
constitution. The constitution has legitimized traditional systems and has validated the cultural 
values that underlie them. The constitution limits, however, the mandate of the customary and 
religious institutions to private and family matters. After 2008, these rights have dwindled and 
come to be devoid of considering these areas. It has since then that the revised family law that 
has mandated inheritance cases to the state court alone has been introduced in southern Ethiopia. 
Nevertheless, the customary institutions are playing a very significant role in other domains such 
as criminal matters. The customary legal systems also continue to consider inheritance cases as 
well.  
The strong social tie existing in the community makes the customary court, whose principal 
work is reconciliation, an essential forum for dispute settlement. Studies indicate that the 
customary systems serve as alternative institutions of dispute resolution in a country where the 
state legal system is failing to fully provide the judiciary needs of the nation (Meron, 2010). 
Alula and Getachew (2008:2) have further gone to say that the customary system is the dominant 
legal system delivering justice to the grassroots level in the country.  
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In general, the three regimes’ approaches to legal pluralism, and their policies and orientations 
have influenced the national legal system since the early 20th century. In this vein, the 
contemporary legal system has incorporated ideas from the capitalistic orientations of the 
Imperial period, the Derg's socialistic as well as the current government’s ethnic federalism.  
As mentioned before it has, however, been since the last two decades that Ethiopia has chosen to 
embrace legal pluralism in its new constitution, which was adopted in 1995. In this regard, 
Article 34 (5), entitled “legal pluralism” and Article 78 (5) specifically contemplates linkages 
between statutory courts, religious courts, and non-state dispute resolution fora. Article 34 /5/, 
for example, stipulates that “this Constitution shall not preclude adjudication of disputes relating 
to personal and family laws in accordance with religious or customary laws, with the consent of 
the parties to the disputes.” Therefore, the 1995 constitution has given recognition to legal 
pluralism. Article 78/5, for instance, underlines that “pursuant to sub-article 5 of Article 34, the 
House of People's Representatives and state councils can set or give official recognition to 
religious and customary courts.” The constitution further goes to say “Religious and Customary 
courts that had state recognition and functioned before the adoption of the Constitution shall be 
organized on the basis of recognition accorded to them by this Constitution.” Thus, the national 
and regional constitutions have given some spaces for religious and customary laws to operate in 
their communities.  
If one looks at the various articles that give recognition to the religious and customary laws, one 
can understand that the legal pluralism of Ethiopia is a bit weak, and can be categorized as „weak 
legal pluralism“(Griffiths 1986:6). This is because the 1995 constitution gives a supreme status 
to the constitution. It reads that,“ The Constitution is a supreme law of the land. Any law, 
customary practice or decision of an organ of state or a public official which contravenes this 
Constitution shall be of no effect” (Art 9(1)), and hence gives little concession to customary and 
religious laws.  
The constitution, however, indirectly empowers the state law that can validate the activities of 
other laws. The cases mentioned in this book indicate, however, that non-state actors deal with 
all forms of dispute cases against the constitutional limits. On top of all this, the empirical data 
show that legal pluralism does not exist in a clear dichotomy in the country.  
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Rather it exists in a unified ethnographic field (Woodman, 1998) characterized by "legal 
hybridity“(Santos de Sousa 2006; Berman, 2012).  
In light of the above explanations, Ethiopia's legal pluralism can be characterized by two aspects. 
First, the official judiciary is characterized by the existence of multiple tribunals that get their 
authority from central laws enacted by the state. Scholars name this kind of legal system “state 
legal pluralism“(Woodman, 1998). Lawyers call this scenario ‘a legal system whereby the state 
incubates a number of tribunals in every sector apart from the judiciary’, and they all get their 
legitimacy from the state and employ mainly the crime and civil codes of the country. Second, 
the legal system of the country also embodies what Griffiths (1986) and Griffiths A. (2002) call " 
Deep or social fact legal pluralism." This legal setting is characterized by the coexistence of 
conflicting legal systems as it embraces the state, religious and customary courts that derive their 
legitimacy from different sources. The latter has got constitutional recognition (Art.78). 
Moreover, some call it faith-based legal pluralism (Woodman, 1988; Alemayehu, 2004). 
The empirical data indicate that the local legal actors' legal perceptions are also characterized by 
cross-referencing than a discrete legal system. It can also be said that legal pluralism as an 
empirical phenomena and conceptual analysis varies. This is because Siltie civil servants are 
subject to multiple judicial legal systems, party disciplinary measures, work disciplines, and state 
legal and civil codes.  
A multiplicity of norms also characterizes the customary court. The religious system is also 
composed of Islamic and local beliefs that serve dispute settlement forums among the Siltie and 
beyond (Meron, 2010; Kairedin, 2016). This goes with what Tamanaha (2008) describes 
"pluralism of legal pluralism." 
3.13.2. The Siltie's Legal World: Legal Pluralism as an Empirical Phenomena 
Customary law is made by the people and not the state and derives its legitimacy ‘from the 
participation and consensus of the community, and its recognition of the same by the 
government’ (Abera 2003: 839). Studies indicate that customary dispute resolution is both 
general and specific in Ethiopia, and it is widespread and found everywhere in the country and 
has worked historically in the absence of the justice system now and before. Also, it is localized, 
and the constituency and jurisdiction of customary dispute resolution institutions are limited to 
particular localities within ethnic groups (Alula and Getachew 2008:1). 
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 As for the characteristics of the customary dispute settlements, Pankhurst noted that they operate 
at the community level based on trust among people who know each other personally in face to 
face contexts where the resolution of a conflict is crucial for day to day coexistence. On the other 
hand, the Siltie's social structure is pluralistic as it embodies at least three legal systems. I have 
observed that each subgroup among the Siltie has developed a legal structure though it does not 
as such vary place to place. The empirical data indicate that contradiction of dispute settlement is 
observed whenever a dispute occurs between subgroups. Every such group owes its existence, to 
some extent, to a legal system that is its own and regulates the behavior of its members. These 
multiplicities of legal systems, whose statutory provisions necessarily differ from one to another, 
sometimes even to the point of contradiction, is also a characteristic of the Siltie legal world, for 
the social setting indicates the interactions between the various Siltie groups such as the Melga 
and Silti subgroups. This episode reflects precisely the pattern of the subgroups of the society 
that I have termed „societal structure,“ or structure of the society (Pospisil 1971:125).  
A variety of institutions can deal with disputes among the Siltie. Some of the institutions such as 
customary court and Awchachign53 derive their legitimacy from Siltie Ada or culture, the Siltie's 
system of normative rules and usages, while Shari'a courts, other faith-based courts and the state 
court derive their legitimacy from Islamic jurisprudence and national legal system, respectively. 
Siltie disputants thus can choose from several institutions. This plural legal setting plays an 
important role for the existence of Forum Shopping in the area.  
Forum shopping is briefly defined as disputants' choice of one or another forum of dispute 
settlement institutions to resolve their problems (Benda Beckman 1979:117). The forums, 
community leaders or customary court functionaries themselves use disputes to accumulate 
power and strengthen their leverage among the local community as well as for their local 
political ends (Benda Beckman 1979; 117). Awchachign is employed by both the state and non-
state actors as a local investigative mechanism in the area. One can say that the aspects of legal 
pluralism characteristic of the Siltie dominion can be explained as „pluralism of legal 
pluralism“(2010). In this regard, state law may be one element in an instance of legal pluralism, 
and there are also cases of pluralism within the legislation of a state itself as well (Woodman, 
1998). 
                                                     
53 It is a local crime investigating institution used by both elders and police officers to sort out hidden crimes for 
which it is hard to get evidence.  
 
 
123 
 
3.14. Concluding Remarks 
To recap, anthropology in general and legal anthropological thoughts, in particular, has 
undergone a number of changes since the late nineteenth century. The notion of legal pluralism 
has crossed multiple disciplines and has become an important concept in socio-legal and 
anthropological studies. The place of law has also made changes from positivists' view that 
considers state law is only the law of the state excluding the roles of non-state forms of social 
orderings that also have the capacity to maintain social order. Having used the diachronic and 
synchronic approaches, this book has thus indicated that legal pluralism has become not only a 
concept under hot debate among scholars but also a practical reality which can be analyzed 
empirically in multi-ethnic states. The book has examined the current concept of legal pluralism 
against the development of legal hybridization in the study area, and attempted to portray how 
legal hybridism has become an emerging legal sphere not only in developing countries but also, 
in the developed world too. Some African countries and the Siltie's socio-legal settings and the 
various notions and practices of customary, state and religious courts indicate that legal actors 
are cross-referencing various social and legal norms to consider dispute cases.  
This phenomenon shows the coming into being of hybridized legal system in the contemporary 
world. Hence, I believe that my research contributes to the concept of law (Griffiths 1986; J. 
Griffiths 1986; Allot and Woodman 1985) by explicating the contested nature of law and how it 
exists in every semi-autonomous social field (Merry, 1978). It is also believed to contribute to 
the fluid and hybridized nature of legal systems (Gluckman, 1956; Santos de Sousa, 2000; 
Lewellen; 2003; Klute and Bellagamba; 2006, Berman, 2012). The research will also have one or 
another form of contribution to how the local community uses various legal systems to get the 
best out of dispute processing what Tamanaha calls, 'Strategic Choices' (2008), which Benda-
Beckmann names, „Forum Shopping“ (1979; 1986 & 2006). It also shows how the community 
uses state law as a weapon of the weak (Scott, 1985) to coerce state officials and judges to „abide 
by the law“ and bring democracy from below (Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Keebet von 
Benda-Beckmann, 2006). 
The research's intertwined conceptual and empirical based analysis also indicates how dispute 
settlers use mediation services to accumulate power or shopping forums as an instrument to 
boost their agency in the community. I believe that the study will add some notes on the notions 
 
 
124 
 
of 'Shopping Forums' (Benda Beckmann 1971; 1986; Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Keebet 
von Benda-Beckmann, 2006). Moreover, by linking the Siltie's local experiences with Ethiopian 
ethnic federalism, the study demonstrates how the nexus between the local, the national and 
partly global norms can create diversified legal perceptions for dispute settlers. The data also 
indicate the features of cross legal fertilizations that are unfolding in the local arena that in turn 
help understand the interactions of extending local actors to the theoretical debates of legal 
pluralism. It is also important to grasp the notion from empirically based insights. The various 
conceptual and empirical analyses presented in this study are necessary to grasp the changes and 
dynamics of the concept of legal pluralism in a globalized world (Franz von Benda-Beckmann 
and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, 2006).  
 
In sum, the combined conceptual and empirical analysis of religious, state, and customary courts' 
activities will help to understand the interactions between state and society in Africa and possibly 
beyond. The analysis also indicates that the post-colonial African countries' active interest to 
resurrect their norms and values coincide with the coming of new world order that paralyzes the 
power of the nation state which in turn weakens the capacity of African countries to maintain 
their sovereignty. This scenario has affected the countries' powers on the one hand and created a 
power vacuum which helped traditional or neo-traditional actors to resurrect, on the other (Klute, 
Embalo and Emballo, 2006; Santos de Sousa, 2006). It has become one of the factors for the 
rebirth of local systems as instruments of maintaining peace in parallel with the state on the one 
hand and the emergence of diversified the legal system in the local arena, on the other. 
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 CHAPTER FOUR 
4. THE LOCAL POLITICO-CULTURAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXTS: AN ALTERNATIVE 
MODERNITY 
4.1. Introduction 
The chapter presents empirical data generated from the field on the genesis and operations of 
Siltie's local administration that embodies kinship and territorial based systems of governance. It 
also looks into the local cultural and socio-legal contexts of the kinship and territorial systems 
that indicate the roles of local governance for dispute settlement. The chapter also illustrates that 
the local socio-cultural structures are regulating the daily life of the people and work 
concomitantly with the state imposed systems by maintaining their cultural foundations. It also 
discusses the local community's modes of resistances to the political and cultural systems 
imposed on them by state. The chapter argues that even though the state establishes its 
administrative system, the Siltie's local governance system functions parallel with the local 
administrative structure and becomes an alternative systems at the grass-roots level. It further 
argues that the local politico-cultural setting is characterized by plurality.The chapter further 
argues that the state actors at the grass roots level develop a divided loyalty between the state and 
the local system by involving into both the state social courts and local dispute settlement 
sessions. It also argues that clan leaders employ the state system as a mechanism to control those 
whom they consider to be deviant to the local norm, while the state actors use clan leaders as 
instruments of local development mobilization. 
4.2. The Genesis of Siltie's Grand Norm: YeSiltie Serra 
The Siltie had been governed through YeSiltie Serra local governance since at least 9th century. 
The Siltie have given two versions to YeSiltie Serra. First, they describe the various norms and 
values that regulate the interactions of members as YeSiltie Serra. Second, YeSiltie Serra is also 
associated with a traditional system of governance the Silties employed to govern themselves in 
the form of territorial and kinship organizations (See section 5.4 for the discussion of YeSiltie 
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Serra). The Silties have been employing elders' assemblies that operate from Burda (band) to the 
Bade (supra-tribal or chiefdom) levels since a long time.  
According to some written sources (e.g.Abdulfeta, 2002) and some informants54, the origin of 
YeSiltie Serra as a system of local administration goes back to the 9th century Muslim Hadiyya 
Sultanate in central and eastern Ethiopia.  
Even though they are unable to tell how it came into being, some informants mentioned that the 
Siltie employed this institution to administer themselves for a long period of time. Nevertheless, 
other key informants55 said that the Siltie system of local governance emerged in the 16th 
century. According to these informants, the Siltie ancestors (e.g., Hajji Aliye) who came from 
ancient lands in the east settled in the present Siltie land in the first half of 16th century. After the 
Siltie arrived at the present land, the legendary father of the Siltie, Hajji Aliye distributed the 
lands for elders of the people, and they began to administer their respective lands based on 
YeSiltie Serra. Hajji Aliye is believed to be the first administrator of the Siltie land.  
Furthermore, there are studies that strengthen the genesis of YeSiltie Serra in the 16th century. 
Abraham and Habtamu (1992), for instance, indicated that YeSiltie Serra emerged following the 
arrival of the Siltie ancestors from Eastern Ethiopia in the first half of 16th century. The authors 
further stated that the system came to be undermined in the mid-19th century with the emergence 
of strong men who concentrated power in their hands (Abraham and Habtamu 1992:41-43). 
Abdulfeta (2002), on the other hand, pushed back the origin of the system to the mid-9th century. 
According to his reconstruction, the Siltie have passed through three systems of governance: clan 
based segmentary systems of administration, centralized systems of Islamic sultanates' 
administration and supra-tribal organizations or chiefdoms (Abdulfeta 2002:96-97).  
Abdulfeta points out that the clan-based system of administration was employed by the people 
before Islam came into the Siltie land in the 8th century. He underscores that the Siltie had used 
the Islamic system in Shoa and Hadiyya sultanates from the 8th to 16th century. Following the 
                                                     
54 Interview with Sheik Yusuf Kemal, Ato Kaire Sule, Ato Hamid Azma Hassan, Ato Kairedin Azma Hussein in 
February and April 2016 in Silti, Lanfuro Wereda, and Werabe Town. These individuals are the most valuable 
informants who know the history and culture of the Siltie deeply. Most of them have started a movement aimed at 
reviving the Siltie traditional institutions in the area. But I understand that the activities to revive the Siltie Elders' 
Council have proved to be futile.  
55 Interview with Hajji Hussein Hassan, Gerad Kedir Teka, Hajji Hussein Busser on April 1/2015 in Worabe Town. 
These individuals are also a member of the committee. Some of them such as Gerad Kedir Teka and Hajji Hussein 
are clan leaders in Sankura and Dalocha Weredas, respectively. 
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collapse of Hadiyya sultanate in the 16th century, the Siltie, however, developed YeSiltie Serra as 
a local governance system that persisted until Menilik ΙΙ conquered the area in the late 19th 
century (Abdulfeta 2002: 97). Thus, both written sources and informants emphasize 9th and 16th 
centuries as the origin of YeSiltie Serra local administration since these historical episodes are 
associated with the collapse of Shoa and Hadiyya Islamic Sultanates to which the Siltie claim to 
have historical relations.  
4.3. YeSiltie Serra: Meaning and Functions 
According to some informants56, YeSiltie Serra has a broader meaning that goes beyond being an 
appellation for system of local governance. It signifies the norms and values that every member 
of the Siltie society is expected to respect and abide by. It also implies treating someone 
modestly and developing good relationship with humans and forgiving one's wrongdoing. 
YeSiltie Serra also teaches one to treat his/her guests hospitably. Visiting patients and burying 
the dead are also subsumed under YeSiltie norms and values. Aadland (2002:41) defines Serra as 
an „asset of local cultural norms or codes regulating the communal social structure and 
interaction.“ From local legal perspective, YeSiltie Serra is defined as an amalgamation of social 
norms and values that regulate the day to day activities of members. Furthermore, informants 
also stated that57, YeSiltie Serra has been playing a pivotal role in maintaining the unity of the 
people. By using this institution as a centripetal force, the various segmented clans and sub-clan 
of the Siltie were united to combat the expanding forces of neighboring groups, and push their 
lands further into the neighboring areas as well. Moreover, the system was employed to resist the 
expanding forces of the central government in late 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries. 
Also, the institution has helped the people foster and sustain the common identity. It has also 
played important roles in mobilizing the society for local development endeavors.  
Thus, YeSiltie Serra can be expressed as an important institution and has been deeply integrated 
into the political, social, and cultural lives of the Siltie society. In the post-Menilik II period, it 
was reduced to ritual than a strong political institution. YeSiltie Serra has begun to resurrect in 
the post-1990s period when Ethiopia has adopted an Ethnic Federal system. Based on this new 
                                                     
56 Interview with Ato Abdulwaris, Hajji Mifta Siraj, Hajji Hussein Bussera, and Ato Kairedin on March 25,27, and 
June 2016 in Silti, Dalocha, and Werabe Town. I also used the data from an ex-field note and updated for the new 
dissertation.  
57 The informants mentioned in 38 above. 
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orientation, the various ethnic groups have started to develop their customary system of 
governance.  
Such a paradigm shift in central government policy paved the way for YeSiltie Serra to gain an 
opportunity to revive due to the recovery of identity assertiveness and sentiments in the country 
in general, and among the Siltie, in particular.  
My key informants noted that the Siltie local social, legal and political leaders, such as Moro, 
Murra, Ragas, and Gerads are important political figures who work at local socio-legal 
assemblies. Ye Siltie Serra has two broad wings in the local administration of the community: 
kinship and settlement based systems. Siltie elders work in the various levels of YeSiltie Serra as 
local leaders, and mediators. For instance, the smallest customary local administration parallel to 
state's administration level called Gote58 is known among the Siltie as YeBurda Baliqe Shengo 
(Hamlet elders Assembly). Next to this level, we find YeAzegag Baliqe Shengo (Village 
Assembly). Then, there is YeMewta Baliqe (Supra-village Assembly), and finally Yebad Baliqe 
Shengo/Chale (Local Chiefs' Assembly).  
Local assemblies comprise both the offices of a local leadership and those of the customary 
courts. According to the FGD participants59, such local actors as Mesaki/head of family/, Murra, 
Moro, and Gerads exercise the local political power, while the Maga and Raga and Ferezagegne 
(See more in chapter five) are legal actors who are working in the customary courts. There are 
also various kinship organizations that function as political and legal forces in different levels of 
YeSiltie Serra assemblies. As one of the clan leader60 in Dalocha Wereda said, the traditional 
elder assemblies are organized based not on territory but on clan and sub-clan groups to oversee 
cases in their respective localities. These are Yechiro Dilapa Serra, Yemelga Serra, YeSumm Silti 
Serra and YeAlicho Serra. These institutions also come together once or twice a year to discuss 
their common issues such as how to keep the norms and values of YeSiltieSerra and hand over 
suspects who move from one locality to another to avoid punishment. According to the 
                                                     
58 Gote is the smallest state administrative level below Kebele that consists of less than 500 people. 
59 This relies on FGD that was conducted with eight informants, namely; Hajji Hussein Hassan, Hajji Hussein 
Bussera, Sheik Yusuf, Hajji Mifta, Gerad Kedir, Ato Kaire Sule, and Ato Hamid Azma Hassan on May, 2016 on the 
annual Siltie History, culture and language Symposium in Werabe town. 
60 Interview with Girazmach Hussein Bussera on April 3/2016 in Dalocha Wereda. The informant serves as Chiro- 
Dilapa clans in Dalocha and Hulbareg Weredas. He also works, as the traditional judge (Raga) in the area. 
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informants61, such assembly is known as Melcho, and the general assembly where 
representatives of Siltie clans attend is YeMula Siltie Chale or Melcho (Supra-clan Assembly). 
Men dominate the Melcho assembly.  
My experience and observation among the Siltie reveal that Melcho leaders consider every issue 
including social and dispute cases. The Gerad, for instance, can decide or act as a local elder to 
settle disputes at various levels of administration. Therefore, most of the time, the two offices are 
held by a single individual. A Raga in one locality can become Maga in another area. The local 
power, particularly Murra and Gerad positions can pass from father to son. Even if it is not clear 
how the people choose the local legal experts or Ragas, informants said that one can become a 
Raga based on his maturity, marital status (should be a married one), knowledge to handle issues 
and social acceptances in the society. There is also a high possibility of transferring the position 
from father to son. The value and belief systems of the people serve as powerful enforcing 
modes for the decisions of elders (See more below). There are also strong sanctions that oblige 
the members of the society to abide by the decisions of the Siltie Melcho at various levels. 
Therefore, every pronouncement of Melcho meetings is binding for the Siltie at all levels. Here 
also, only male head of the household can attend the council meetings. In addition to becoming 
areas for ending disputes, such gatherings become stages for elders and household heads to 
deliberate on various issues pertinent to the communal life in the area. 
4.4. The Kinship-Based and Territorial Assemblies: Two Wings, One Grand Serra 
The Siltie local socio-legal systems are composed of two forms of governance that are mutually 
interdependent. The local community uses the territorial and lineage based systems to regulate its 
daily activities and live peacefully among themselves and with their neighbors. Local actors like 
Mesaki, Dagna and Gerad have developed a divided loyalty to their customs and the state as 
they cooperate and compete with the state and religious institutions. There are two systems that 
are organized in territorial and lineage lines. 
                                                     
61 Interview with Ato Kairedin 
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4.4.1. Territorial Assemblies 
4.4.1.1. Hamlet Assembly (YeBurda Melcho) 
Burda is the smallest territorial administrative unit of the Siltie local governance. It is comprised 
of socially and geographically defined contiguous households each of which is built on the 
separate land of a given family. Burda also comprises of neighborhood people (Yeola Sebbe) 
who in everyday life are engaged in more or less regular face-to-face contact, have strong ties 
and engage in mutual cooperation. Burda members share joy and grief more closely than other 
configuration of YeSiltie Serra structures. Every household within Burda level has an obligation 
to take part in the social life of the community. Burda consists of 20-3062 households that are tied 
in various social gathering (e.g., dinner party-Yurbat Serra) and cooperation like house building 
for elders who cannot repair or build their houses. If the house of a member of the Burda is 
damaged, members of the Burda are expected to repair or build new house for the victim. Yurbat 
Serra is a local system of cooperation whereby every member of the Burda is expected to 
contribute food for a dinner in mourning ceremony when a given individual passes away in the 
village. YeBurda Baliqes regulate minor issues such as disputes between the husband and wife, 
neighbors, quarrels over boundaries, debt cases, and absence in mourning ceremonies. YeBurda 
Baliqes also oversee such physical works as building mosques, repairing elder's houses, and 
destruction of property by animals are all brought first to YeBurda elders before taking them to 
either state courts or other customary courts.  
The Siltie name the legal actors at this level YeGenet Baliqes, which means local elders. 
Nevertheless, YeGenet Baliqes are involved if parties want to invite a mediator or resort to the 
third party (Yegute Baliqe). Although it is changing now for various reasons including dispute 
over land, my experience at this level indicates that most of the household disagreements are 
settled through forgiveness (Afeytu) between the two sides. However, if a case is once referred to 
elders, members of the society respect elders' decisions. According to the respondents63, the 
oaths and belief systems of the Siltie are the forces behind the implementations of elders' 
decisions. In this regard, as part of YeSiltie Serra elders’ decisions are respected and accepted. 
Any failure to respect elders’ decisions provokes curse from elders that is believed to cause 
                                                     
62 The households in different territorial level are roughly counted by elders who lead the local social activities. 
Since the local settlement pattern is a patrilocal one and is mostly dispersed, members the community can easily 
guess the number of households in a given area. 
63 Interview with Ato Kaire Sule, Weizero Rukia and Gerad Awel 
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failure in social life, business, harvest and any other bad fortunes in the life of the person (See 
more on the concepts of Berche and Tur in the next sections).  
In addition, since it is the smallest territorial arrangement, Burda level is also an important area 
for the society’s interaction at birth, bereavement, marriage, harvest, house construction, farming 
and land clearance, and road and bridge construction. The services rendered at Burda level are 
not only confined to social activities, but the Murra64 as a leader of Burda, also mobilizes 
members for local development. One can get the Murra position based on seniority, wisdom, 
spiritual prestige, and material wealth. These criteria also work for other levels of YeSiltie Serra. 
Local politics is decided in formal and semi-formal meetings of male elders. Women's role at 
this level is advising their husbands on various issues. The socio-jury functions of Burda and its 
proximity to the community make it to be strongly tied to the society as an important grassroots 
peacemaking force. Some cases, however, may not fully be resolved here. For instance, murder 
cases, land disputes, and any problems that the Murra and Magas are unable to resolve at Burda 
level will pass to the next level called, YeAzegag /YeGenet Serra (village assembly). 
4.4.1.2. Village Assembly (YeAzegag /YeGenet Serra) 
Azegag is the second local territorial level among the Siltie. It is also called Genet. Azegag is a 
village-wide assembly of the people. It is headed by village heads or YeAzegag Baliqes. It 
comprises a number of Burda in a village. It roughly consists of 30-75 households that are tied 
together in various socio-economic activities in the village. Those issues that are not resolved at 
Burda level will be considered here by YeAzegag/YeGenet Baliqes. YeAzegag (Genet) level 
comprises also a number of clans and sub clans. Funeral ceremonies (Yeqebere Serra) are 
organized at this level. Participants of Yeqebere Serra gather from different villages where the 
deceased person's extended families lived. In this system, every male member of the village and 
nearby areas is expected to attend the funeral. It is the role of the head of the village to oversee 
the participants. Like Burda level, YeAzegag Serra/Genet level also encompasses Yurbat Serra65 
(dinner collection system). 
                                                     
64 The man who holds Murra position exercises the smallest political power in Burda (Hamlet council) level and 
works also with YeBurda Baliqes (elders), and the Mesaki. 
65 Yurbat Serra is a local form of cooperationthat is also found at the Azegag levels (parish council) to 
help the deceased families in providing food for mourners. 
 
 
132 
 
This system is mainly regarded as the occupation of women. Every member of the Azegag is 
expected to contribute its share for the dinner program. Furthermore, Yurbat Serra also plays 
significant roles in social and economic activities of the society. It is pivotal for alleviating the 
socio-economic problems of the society at YeAzegag level as well. Even if herding cattle is 
arranged at the household level, village heads also organize herding called locally Yerri-Weddo 
and local labor cooperation called Gezze and Usacha across village boundaries. The heads of 
Yurbat and Yeqebere Serra organize members of the village for these purposes, and if any one 
violates the Serra, the head excommunicates them from various social activities in the village. 
This institution resembles the local self-help organization called Iddir66. Together with YeBurda 
Serra, it acts as a social court at Azegag level. Azegag is similar to Qebele administrative 
structure. One of the key informants67 expresses the importance of YeAzegag Serra for the social 
life of the local community in the following way: „YeAzegag/YeGenet Serra (village assembly) 
is an important institution that helps us solve our local problems through a communal effort or 
intervention. If someone passes away in the village, members of the village bury the deceased 
together. The society at this level also helps each other to alleviate the common problem of the 
members of the village. Everybody is expected to respect the decisions of the leader of the 
village. If not, it is believed he/she will have a „bad luck immediately.” The state Qebele 
administration uses YeGenet Serra to distribute agricultural inputs and collects state's debts from 
the local community. Informants indicate that the local community mostly follows Genet elders 
rather than state officials as the latter become disloyal to the custom and corrupted individuals. 
Even if Azegag level is important institution at the village level, it cannot end every dispute 
cases. Thus, serious dispute cases like murder, which are beyond the level of Azegag, will be 
transferred to the next step: YeMewta Serra (Supra village Assembly). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
66 Iddir is an institution that serves society as traditional insurance to help somebody, who is a member of it, solve 
his/her economic problems when she/he dies, or death occurred in the family member. It is a local insurance 
institution destined to help the community in case of difficulties. 
67 Interview with Ato Abdulwaris Redi on April 10/2016 in Werabe Town. Updated from previous data. 
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4.4.1.3. Supra-Village Assembly (YeMewta Serra) 
Mewta68 is the third administrative layer within the wider YeSiltie Serra territorial structure. It 
comprises between 200-350 households. The pre-modern socio-economic system of the Siltie 
was based on Mewta territorial system. In this segmentary system, small independent groups 
administrated their Mewta. Mewtas were led by local chiefs or Gerads. According to the 
informants69, there were fifty Mewtas in the late 19th century in Siltie area. These were the 12 
Siltie (Asrehoshete Siltie), Five Melga (Amiste Melga), Alicho Wuriro, fourteen Azernet (Aserra 
Arate (14) Azernet), and seventeen Berbera (Asera Sabet Berbera). Nevertheless, FGD 
participants said70 that the pre „Modern” Siltie socio-economic and political system was 
composed of 17 Mewtas where the major Siltie clans and sub-clans settled.  
These were Summu Silti (the eight districts of Silti), five Melga, Alicho, Wuriro, and Azernet and 
Berbera. Each Mewta comprises a number of clans that were governed by their own Moro and 
Gerad. The Moro controlled the socio-economic activities of the society, while the Gerad 
headed the legal and local politics. According to informants71, one can get the Gerad position 
based on the services he gave to the community (e.g. mediation), maturity as well as his wealth. 
It is the Moro who can contact local legal actors on dispute cases. The socio-economic system 
here is also dominated by men. Nevertheless, women’s role here is not altogether forgotten. They 
advise their husbands on various socio-legal issues that concern their husbands in the Mewta 
gatherings. The Gerads also gather weekly under a tree called YeOdda Chale. The assembly of 
Mewta council is called YeMewta Melcho (Supra Village Assembly). Here, the Gerads consider 
issues that have not been resolved at the Azegag level. The Mewta leaders also act as Ragas to 
settle dispute cases referred from other levels. Abduction cases, disputes between clans and sub-
clans, and intra and inter-ethnic boundary skirmishes are the major issues that have been 
considered at the Mewta level. Murder cases are also investigated under the leaders of Mewta. 
The border of each Mewta is hard to draw.  
                                                     
68 The idea of Mewta as an administrative structure is widely employed in those areas where the Gun Silti families 
settle. Lowland Siltie areas use Mewta more than Highland ones.  
69 Interview with Ato Abdulwaris, Ato Kairedin, Ato Kaire Sule on March 25, April 2/2015 in Lanfuro and Werabe 
Town. 
70 This is based on FGD that was conducted with Ato Dilebo Gebre, Ato Kairedin Azma Hussein, Hajji 
Abdurrahman Shewajo, Hajji Hussein Barsebo on April 16/2016 in Werabe Town. 
71 Interview with Ato Abdulwaris, Ato Kairedin, Ato Kaire Sule on March 25, April 2/2016 in Lanfuro and Werabe 
Town. 
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However, an informant72 said that Mewtas’ geographical size is determined by the power of the 
clans that settled on the territory. Those strong clans with big numbers and influential groups 
occupied wider areas than the weaker ones. According to informants73, Qalbo, Urago, Dilapa, 
Summu Silti in general and Wezir clans occupy wider areas in the lowland Siltie.  
Even though the functionality of Mewta system dates back to the pre-19th period, the local 
community is using the system to this day, especially in identifying one's place of origin. It is 
usual to hear the saying, „Mewtahe Aynen?“ which means, „Where is your district?“ to know the 
birth location and residence of an individual. As mentioned above, Mewta is a system of 
administration the Siltie have employed for long.  
However, some informants said74 that it is widely used in lowland areas rather than in highlands. 
Nevertheless, FGD participants said75 that Mewta is employed in all parts of Siltie land. I, 
however, observed that lowlanders employ Mewta more often than Highlanders who rather use 
Joforo which is more or less similar to Mewta. According to informants76, Mewta Gerads 
assemble weekly, monthly and annually to discuss various issues in their boundaries. They have 
assistants and advisers on different matters including dispute cases. Weleb Gerad and Yesar 
Gerad are nominee local leaders who are expected to replace the Gerad in the future after 
achieving the status to lead. This status can be conceived both as ascribed and achieved. Weleb 
Gerad also served as a spokesperson for the chief of the Siltie.  
Informants said77 that each Mewta is led by its own chief Gerad, who is answerable to the central 
ruler of the Siltie land or the highest king called Gerad Abo. Each Mewta or region is composed 
of a number of clans which have their clan chief called Moro/Yegicho Moro or clan chief. It also 
has its assembly called YeMewta Melcho where various socio- economic, political and religious 
issues are discussed among members. FGD participants78 came to a consensus that each Mewta 
governed its territory without perceptible centripetal force that united them. Thus, they do not 
have a chief that rules the Mewta.  
                                                     
72 Interview with Ato Kairedin Hussein on 12/2015 in Werabe Town 
73 Interview with Ato Kairedin Azma Hussein. 
74 Interview with Hajji Hussein Hassan and Gerad Teka on April 2/2016 in Werabe. 
75 This is based on FGD that was conducted with Ato Dilebo Gebre, Ato Kairedin Azma Hussein, Hajii 
Abdurrahman Shewajo, Hajji Hussein Barsebo, Yassin on April 16/2016 in Werabe Town. 
76 Interview with Ato Kairedin Hussein on April 12/2016 in Werabe Town. 
77 Interview with Ato Abdulwaris, Ato Kairedin, Ato Kaire Sule on March 25 /2016 in Lanfuro and Werabe Town. 
 
78 This is based on FGD mentioned above in 58. 
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Also, they said that there was no regular communication between each Mewta head and Gerad 
Abo, which is indicative of the existence of chiefdoms than state level organization in the area 
(Lewellen, 2003). Nevertheless, other informants79 noted that there were times each Mewta 
formed a united front to attack common enemies (e.g. the territorial expansions of adjacent 
groups, the central government). Good cases in point were the formation of Gogot and YeSiltie 
Gogot coalitions in the 18th, 19th and the first half of 20th centuries. During these times, the 
various Siltie clans and Mewtas including sometimes the neighboring people (e.g. Sodo Gurage, 
Mesqan and Hallaba communities united together to confront the Libid.o, the expanding 
Ethiopian Empire and the Italian forces respectively (Aklilu, 2002; Bustorf, 2011). Therefore, 
this clan federation came to unite based on the needs of time and segmented later. Therefore, 
Mewtas were mainly operating at their level of organization, yet they were vertically connected 
to Azegag (found below them) and Bade, the supra-clan (found above them). Mewta leaders also 
worked as social mobilizing agents for local development programs. They were and still are 
active in leading the society to plow its land on time, to plant and harvest the land by organizing 
labor organizations such as Gezze80. They also encourage the society to plant trees so as to 
protect its environment from degradation. These are areas of cooperation between local actors 
and state agents. Furthermore, urban residents also use the Mewta system to raise money to help 
various development programs in their places of origin. They set up such social organization as 
the Siltie Self-Help Organization using their local Mewta names. Azernet Number One and 
Number Two Idirs in Addis Ababa and Saudi Arabia are good instances in this regard. These 
institutions are established based on their Mewtas to help each other in their urban life as well as 
to extend their helping hands to their compatriots in the country sides. According to an 
informant81, there are schools, roads and drinking water projects that are built by these 
institutions in their respective Mewta. The judicial bodies at this level are called Raga, a 
customary lawyer who gets the status through lived experience and in-depth knowledge of 
dispute settlement strategies.  
                                                     
79 Interview with Ato Mohammed Hussein, Ato Kairedin Hussein and Gerad/Hajji Hussein Bussera, and on April 
13, 14 in Werabe and Dalocha Towns respectively. 
80 Gezze is a corporate activity in which the members of the Mewta organize themselves to plow land by 
paired oxen that comprise 12-14 pairs.  
 
81 Interview with Ato Mohammed Kedir on June 17/2016 in Addis Ababa. 
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They resolve dispute cases that came from Burda and YeAzegag Baliqes (Magas). Nevertheless, 
those cases that are not resolved at Mewta level will be transferred to the next level of 
administration, YeSiltie Bade Shengo (General Siltie assembly). 
4.4.1.4. An Assembly of Local Chiefs (Ye Bade Serra) 
We found Bade as the upper tier in the territorial organization of the Siltie. Bade is politically 
self-sufficient level that can control its own institutional machinery for determining its affairs, 
settling internal disputes under Yebad Baliqe Melcho (Siltie Elders’ Assembly). Those areas that 
lie outside YeSiltie Bade boundary are referred to as Dare. Dare is an adjacent country found in 
neighboring Siltie Bades. These areas are mainly populated by other ethnic groups. 
 Before the late 19th century, the Siltie area (Bade) was divided into different districts that had 
defined boundaries and were settled by local corporate groups. These areas were called Bade or 
Gae that has a meaning closer to a 'country'. According to informants82, there were twelve Siltie 
Mewtas/Gae (Asrehoshete Siltie) in pre-19th century period. It was developed into thirteen 
Bades (countries) during the Italian occupation (1936-1941) after recognizing the Amhara 
settlers as part of the Siltie administration. Bade's boundary was formed following roads 
(Ungga), geographical features such as mountains and the settlement patterns of the residents.  
In Siltie oral traditions, the legendary ancestors of the Siltie (Gerads) divided the land according 
to their earlier settlements. Hajji Aliye, who was considered as the founding father of the local 
system of administration during the 16th century, settled around Umnan, his sons settled in 
Azernet Mewta/Bade and formed Azernet, while Ahmedel Berbera, who came together with 
Hajji Aliye, became the foundation for the genesis of Berbera Gae. Gerad Oucha, the father of 
Alicho, also settled around Waira River and later laid the milestone for Alicho Gae.  
YeBadenet Serra is also a local organization that unified the Siltie society for an extended period. 
Each YeSiltie Bade (similar to country level) was ruled by its own Gerad, and Azma for a 
prolonged period before the incorporation of the Siltie. As mentioned above, the Siltie had no 
common political or judicial body above the elders' councils or Serra of the different subgroups 
of the society. Nevertheless, there were also supra tribal integrations that had been organized by 
local Islamic leaders. Bustorf (2011) mentioned that Haruna Goshete, Sheik Walle’s movement 
in 19th century and Sheik Alkesiye’s wider movement in the 20th century were good instances of 
                                                     
82 Interview with Ato Abdulwaris and Ato Kaire Sule, May 25,2015, in Lanfuro and Werabe Town 
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forging supra tribal organizations. This was also achieved by military and political alliances like 
Gogot. YeSiltie Gogot was composed of two or more groups including the neighboring Mesqan 
and Hallaba groups. In this case, YeBadenet Serra also works as an important local institution as 
a military unit under the leadership of local war leaders called Abegaz or Azmach. It has also 
jurisdiction over non-Siltie groups who lived in the area. Whenever war broke out, YeBadenet 
Serra contributed its contingents under these local war leaders to the Mulla Siltie Harbe (the 
whole Siltie army) organized by YeSiltie Serra local governance. 
As informants said83, Azma Ormora Gona and Azma Sugato Zeyne’s unified army in the 1930s 
under the banner of Gogot alliance to defend the Siltie land from Italian occupation was a good 
example in this regard. Leadership was based on merit than hereditary.  
The Siltie local army was known as Gifate. On the other hand, the different Siltie clans clashed 
with each other over grazing lands and supremacy for long. In this sense, as informants said84, 
they referred to the clash of one Siltie Bade with the other. However, each Mewta refers to the 
other as Dare to indicate the land lying outside its area. Each Bade deals corporately with 
adjacent Bade in amity or animosity incidents, but can also regulate the interactions of its 
members as a semi-autonomous social field (See also Moore, 1978). The internal affairs of 
YeSiltie Bade and disputes among its members have also been resolved through the institution of 
Yebad Baliqe Shengo (assembly of elders).  
Yebad Baliqes are involved in dispute cases that range from marital conflicts between husband 
and wife to property disputes including land. They also settle murder cases. Men dominate 
members of Yebad Baliqe forum/Shengo. Women, however, play an advisory role for the elders. 
This suggests that some women participate in this forum. Yebad Baliqes also deal with issues of 
theft, slander, personal injuries, and unintended incidents (Sekebe), various murder cases, 
adultery, and violation of the norms and values of Siltie (YeSiltieSerra). YeBadenet Serra 
Shengo’s elders are usually summoned when dispute cases are initiated as well as when the 
elders want to discuss the general conditions of the society. Yebad Baliqes also resolve murder 
cases. 
                                                     
83 Interview with Hajji Abdala Mohammed and Ato Mohammed Hussein on March 29, April 7/2012 in Mirab 
Azernet and Silti Weredas respectively.  
84 Interview with Hajji Kedir Abdela and Ato Mohammed Hussein on March 20, May 26, 2015 in Mirab Azernet 
and Silti Weredas, respectively. 
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 In this case, there are some procedures disputants should follow to settle homicide cases. 
Decisions made by Yebad Baliqes Herrat (Elders’ reconciliation) are binding in that disputants 
should accept and implement them. It is believed that rejecting elders' decision can bring curse 
and lose Tur (See about Tur more below).  
If someone violates this decision, he/she may face social ostracism. YeBadenet Shengo also 
works on development issues in the area. The members of YeSiltie Bade are unified during 
cultivation and harvesting time to plow the lands of members of the group and collect the crops 
under various labor organizations. It is also the duty of elders to organize members of YeSiltie 
Bade for this purpose. Therefore, YeBadenet Serra assemblies do not only play important roles 
for the development of socio-economic lives of the people, but they are also crucial local forces 
for maintaining order at the grassroots level.  
Despite the various state systems’ attempts to supplant or at least minimize the role of the Siltie 
local system, YeBadenet Shengo is still active in the countryside. On the other hand, as 
mentioned above, YeBadenet Serra comprises the various Mewtas of Siltie land. It considers 
cases that are not resolved in Mewtas and clan-based systems. In YeBadenet Serra Shengo, 
sometimes called Shenecha or Yebad Baliqes take central place to consider dispute cases. My 
respondents said85 that the customary court session comprises three individuals (all male), who 
have in-depth knowledge about local dispute settlement. The chief judge is the one who takes a 
seat in the middle. YeBadenet Serra Shengo can exercise their executive power if a suspect 
refuses to comply with its decision. The punishment includes seclusion or boycotting from the 
day-to-day activities. 
                                                     
85 Interview with Hajji/Gerad Hussein Bussera and Kaire Sule, Ato Dilebo Gebre on March 15, April 20, and May 
3/2016 in Dalocha, Lanfuro, and Alicho Wuriro Wereda. The former serves as the leader of fourteen Chiro- Dilapa 
clans in Dalocha and Hulbareg Weredas. 
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Figure 4 The Fourteen Chiro-Dilapa Inter-Clan Assembly Dalocha Wereda (September, 2014) 
Both the claimant and the accused have the right to appeal against the verdict given by 
YeBadenet Serra Shengo. The Siltie’s local governance system also comprises clan systems that 
operate concomitantly with the territorial levels. 
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Organizational Structure of YeMula Siltie Melcho (Gogot) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
           
 
Graph One: The organizational structure of YeSiltie Melcho 
 
4.5. Kinship Assemblies (YeSiltinet Shengo) 
The second category of the Siltie local governance that is led by a kinship-based system is called 
YeSiltinet Shengo. It has multi-layered institutions. The first institution is called YeAbotgar 
Shengo. 
4.5.1. Patrilineal Assembly (YeAbotgar Shengo) 
YeAbotgar Shengo is a family forum which comprises those individuals who have common ties 
through their patrilineage line. YeAbotgar members have agnatic lines, and they have common 
ancestor through male lines. It is the elder male line of the family member that leads the forum. 
The head of the forum is called Dagna or Mesaki.  
     YeMula-Siltie  
Melcho(Gogot) 
      Territorial Levels           Kinship levels 
YeBurda 
Serra/Baliqe 
YeAbotgar Shengo 
  YeAzegag Shengo   YeAabotweld Shengo 
         YeMewta Serra 
   Yegicho Serra 
     YeBadenet Serra/Shengo  YeSiltinet Shengo/YeMula Siltie Serra 
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However, he is also known as Murra. YeAbotgar council works in parallel with Burda territorial 
level of administration, which is indicative of the existence of plural political and legal systems 
at the grassroots level. It observes issues like family disputes, ethical violations and boundary 
disputes among the members of YeAbotgar lines or Burda. YeAbotgar Shengo mainly deals with 
disputes at Burda level. However, the higher administrative levels such as Azegag and Mewta 
refer their cases also to YeAbotgar Shengo if the culprit becomes a member of the YeAbotgar 
line. In this case, the Murra is expected to take the issue to YeAbotgar council and discuss it with 
members of the father line of the culprit. The members then discuss the case with the accused 
person and encourage him to confess the truth, i.e. whether he/she has committed the crime or 
not. The Murra also forces the members of YeAbotgar to present the accused to the YeAbotgar 
Shengo on appointed time. Then, the culprit and the victim are expected to submit their defenses 
to the judge who is known as Maga at this level to show their innocence and problems 
respectively. In this case, YeAbotgar Shengo plays a great role making the accused admit the 
crime he/she has committed. The perpetrator, if found guilty, is expected to pay blood price if the 
case is murder. YeAbotgar is in charge of collecting the blood money or Gumma as per YeSiltie 
Serra norm. According to the norm, the party in conflict can collect the compensation for 
murder, which is locally referred to as blood money as follows. The party collects 2/3 of the 
blood money from his male's lineage (Abotgare), and 1/3rd from his/her female's lineage 
(Ummegae). YeAbotgar Shengo plays a great role in identifying the hidden crimes that have been 
committed by the members of same father line at various socio-political units of YeSiltieSerra. It 
is also paramount in investigating some disputable issues like murder cases that pass from 
Azegag and Mewta structures. The Shengo also has a role to play in helping the works of clan 
leaders like Moro. YeAbotgar is thus the smallest lineage administrative unit that generates its 
rules and regulations to regulate the daily activities of its members. Despite the fact that men 
mainly dominate YeAbotgar Shengo, women are also crucial in resolving the social problem of 
the society, especially with their circle. They, for instance, contribute 1/3rd of the blood price 
(Gumma). My women informants indicated that they initiate domestic violence cases to be 
considered by the Shengo whenever it happens.  
Abotgare forum is also the vibrant and possibly more important form of kin-based local 
governance the community employs to resolve some issues including domestic violence, 
property disputes like land, murder and other grave crimes in the area.  
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Nevertheless, those matters that have not been settled by YeAbotgar Shengo will pass to the next 
lineage unit in the tiers of lineage groupings: YeAabotweld Shengo. 
4.5.2. Patrilineal and Matrilineal Assemblies (YeAabotweld Shengo) 
The word Abotweld among the Siltie stands for relatives of a given individual that can trace their 
kin both from his father and mother lines. YeAabotweld Shengo thus comprises those kin groups 
that can trace their relatives from both the Abotgae and the Ummegae. YeAabotweld Dagna or 
Murra lead the Shengo. It considers those cases that can pass from YeAbotgar Shengo.  
The members of Abotweld assume that they have a common ancestor that unites them to resolve 
their social and economic problems. Accordingly, whenever a member of Abotweld is suspected 
of committing a crime, it is the responsibility of Abotweld forum to search and persuade the 
suspect about the case. If he/she is found guilty of murder, members will pay and contribute their 
shares of the blood price to resolve the problem. YeAabotweld lineage structure is found below 
clan level. It summons whenever a need arises. Although the members do not meet regularly, 
they control various social problems in different social settings among members. It works in the 
Azegag or YeGenet territorial levels. It helps the local legal expert or the Raga especially in 
providing witnesses and decisions of lower legal expert tantamount to first instant court judge, 
Maga,  in his conciliation process. YeAbotgar Shengo considers various issues among different 
families that range from four to six villages.  
4.5.3. Clan Assembly (Yegicho Serra) 
The word Gicho stands for clan among the Siltie. Yegicho Serra is clan level forum where elders 
discuss various local socio-economic and political issues and deliberate on matters relating to the 
natural environment, conflicts in the family and among the clan members or even other clans in 
the society. Yegicho Serra also organizes Yurbat and Yeqebere Serra (dinner and funeral 
ceremonies) respectively. Clan leaders discuss how to regulate the socio-economic activities of 
the society including settling disputes. The clan leader is called Moro. The Moros are men who 
lead their clan members and discuss the clan with other clans in the inter-clan meetings. Moros 
are thus local actors who control the political and legal offices in the society. A clan’s Moro is in 
charge of maintaining the social order (Wegeret) of the clan members. It is the duty of the Moro 
and local religious leaders to organize the society to come together in an open field or town 
square to invoke their God, Allah for rain.  
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In this regard, various rituals play important roles in bringing the society for a common purpose. 
The Gicho Dagna at this level acts as customary court judge86 who plays a significant role to 
resolve various disputes within the clan and neighboring clan members. The Siltie call inter-clan 
meeting Gogot, which means unity. Gicho meeting takes place monthly to discuss the various 
socio- economic and local political issues. Thus, Yegicho Serra plays a significant role in 
resolving various conflicts among its members and its environs. The Siltie’s concept of dispute 
as they call it teshinenot or zena implies disagreement between individuals or groups over ideas, 
property or other resources that lead to disputes that involve the exchange of hot words to 
physical combats. Thus, it is the responsibility of local actors including clan leaders to diffuse 
the tensions between disputants. Thus, if a given individual commits a crime either intentionally 
or unintentionally, it is the Moro or Yebad Baliqes (elders) who are to find out whether the 
culprit's ancestors have committed Berche as a way of tracing the root of the crimes she/he has 
committed. Thus, the person is expected to purify him/herself from such remnants of evil things 
through compensation or Afeytu (forgiveness).  
However, if he/she commits murder, his/her clan members are responsible for paying the blood 
price (Gumma) to the family of the dead person. In this regard, even though the offender is 
capable of paying the Gumma him/herself, YeSiltieSerra norm does not allow them to do so. This 
is because it is believed that the crimes of the offender will be transmitted to his/her clan 
members as part of Berche. Thus, the convicted person is expected to go to every part of his/her 
clan members to collect the compensation. This act also serves as condolences or grief sharing 
on the part of the offender to show that his/her heart is deeply broken by the loss of the deceased. 
This act is also considered as ritual purification. Yegicho Chale is a significant force to 
implement the decisions of elders in executing homicide related or other disputes. 
                                                     
86 Interview with Azma Jabir who is a Dagna or leader of the Four Abalcho Clans on September 12/ 2014 in Lanfuro 
Wereda. 
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Figure 5 Customary Court Sessions hearing both Civil and Crime cases while inter-clan leader Girazmach Hussien 
handling dispute case in the right side Dalocha Town (September 2014) 
The leaders at this level are also called Azma, Gerad, and Moro. The Siltie clans mainly 
administer themselves independently in their areas. They are a semi-autonomous social field, as 
they develop their rules and regulations to regulate the daily activities of its members. 
Nevertheless, if any individual commits a crime and flees to any other clans, they exchange and 
extradite the convict to his members to be judged by his leaders. They then come together under 
the leadership of Gerad Abo who is considered as the spiritual and political head of the society. 
According to FGD participants87, although the clan system is an institution on its own, all clans 
are answerable to the central ruler of the society, Gerad Abo. 
                                                     
87, This is based on FGD that was conducted with Ato Dilebo Gebre, Ato Kairedin Azma Hussein, Hajji 
Abdurrahman Shewajo, and Hajji Hussein Barsebo on April 16/2016 in Werabe Town. 
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 My informants’ further indicated that clan leaders consider the property disputes, murder cases, 
domestic violence and disputes over grazing land. Those issues which are beyond Yegicho Serra 
will be passed to the next and final level of administration, YeMula Siltie Melcho. My personal 
observation among the Siltie reveals, however, that clans are very powerful local institutions in 
the area.  
4.6. General Siltie Assembly (Ye Mulla Siltie Melcho/Gogot)  
The higher body of YeMula Siltie assembly can resolve murder cases, arson (Garemagdot), 
conflicts over land among clans, inter-clan disputes like boundary disputes with neighboring 
societies and other related issues. Gerad Abo is also responsible for the highest assembly of the 
Siltie, YeMula Siltie Chale (the whole Siltie assembly). Scholars such as Walelign (2010) and 
Bustorf (2011) stated that the Siltie did not experience a convenient form of jury-political 
systems. Key informants88 , however, said the Siltie had the centralized judiciary and political 
systems that were functional until Menilik's incorporation of the area in the late 19th century. 
However, I did not see the whole Siltie meeting where all clans gather for a common cause. 
Rather there are meetings in which majority of clans summon to discuss the peace of the country, 
which is locally called Yebad Wegeret. It is also stated that YeMula Siltie Chale had tiers of 
political power that was intact until the late 19th century 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
88 This is based on information mentioned above in 72. 
 
 
146 
 
 
The graph below illustrates the local political power configurations practiced in the area. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
(YeSiltie Harbe-Gifat) 
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Graph Two: Local Political Power Configuration Hierarchy 
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Figure 6 YeMula Siltie Melcho, Lanfuro Wereda (December, 2015) 
 
It is also observed that those issues that could not get a final decision at lower levels will be 
resolved at the highest authority of the Siltie: YeMula Siltie Melcho or Chale (the whole Siltie 
assembly). Thus, those issues that were considered at Maga and Raga levels will finally be 
adjudicated at the whole Siltie council. Other FGD participants89, however, said that the Siltie 
did not experience centralized administration. Nevertheless, they agreed that the whole Siltie 
clans met in the customary court forums, and commonality has further been strengthened by their 
common language and religion.  
                                                     
89 This is based on FGD that was conducted with eight informants, namely; Hajji Hussein Hassan, Gerad Awel, 
Hajji Hussein Bussera, Sheik Yusuf, Hajji Mifta, Gerad Kedir, Ato Kaire Sule, and Ato Hamid Azma Hassan on 
April 1/2013 on the annual Siltie History, culture and language Symposium in Werabe town. 
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Informants further noted that the whole Siltie community came together under the leadership of 
Gerad to defend their land from invading armies. This was achieved under the guidance of local 
leaders like Gerad during 18th and the late 20th centuries when the Shoan invading armies and 
the neighboring people tried to conquer their lands. The Siltie defended their lands from invading 
forces of Libid.o, Gurage, and Shashogo people’s right from 17th to 19th centuries under the 
leadership of Azma Qalebo, Azma Atero, Umar Bele, Mula Gerad Teme Lezbo, Azma Ormora 
Gona, Haruna Goshute, and Azma Sugato indicating some form of centralized leadership.  
During Menilik's expansion, the Siltie also set up a military alliance with each other and with the 
neighboring groups, an alliance referred to as Gogot. Some informants called this level of 
administration as Gogot or YeSiltieSerra while Bustorf (2011) describes it as a system of clan 
federations (Bustorf, 2011:461). According to Bustorf (2010), the Siltie had no common political 
or judiciary body above the elder council (Baliqe). However, the empirical data indicate that 
Siltie Islamic leaders such as Haruna Goshute and Sheik Walle in the 19th century and Sheik 
Alkesiye conducted supra-tribal integration in the 20th century. This was achieved by a military 
and political alliance of two or more Siltie subgroups including neighboring Mesqan and 
Hallaba.  
Even if the existence of a centralized form of leadership seems a contentious issue, YeMula Siltie 
Melcho still exists in the community. Thus, YeMula Siltie Melcho (the whole Siltie groups' 
council) was the final authoritative body where the various lineages and sublineage groups of the 
Siltie gathered under a large tree to discuss the general situations of the Siltie country. At this 
level, the members of the Siltie Bade (country) discussed the implementations of the decisions of 
the elders (Baliqes) of the Siltie. Elders checked the implementations of sanctions, harvesting 
conditions of the various Siltie areas, and they also make and unmake leaders such as Azmas and 
Gerads. The assembly would set the future directions of the society. They also discuss how they 
can cope up with changes and developments in the area. At the YeMula Siltie Melcho which was 
held under a tree called Chale, the Gerad Abo heard the general situations of the various Siltie 
groupings. The Gerad Abo’s spokesperson is known as Weleb Gerad who acted as a common 
channel between the leader and the participants. The various issues that the assembly would 
discuss include death, marriage, harvest, natural disasters, the preservation of the environment, 
and the norms and values of the Siltie.  
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This situation has been called Yebad Wegeret (the security of the Siltie country). At this national 
or higher level, YeSiltieSerra works as a centripetal force that unites both the territorial and 
lineage groups. Some respondents90 referred to this level as Gogot, while FGD participants91 
identified it as YeMula Siltie Melcho or YeSiltieSerra. Therefore, YeMula Siltie Melcho is the 
Siltie level organization where every local elder’s decisions and murder cases will get final 
approval by Gerad Abo, and the Siltie assembly. I also observed that in the meeting, it is not only 
most of Siltie clans that gathered together, but neighboring people of Hallaba also took part. 
According to YeSiltieSerra, every Siltie clan has the right to govern its land. Although it is hard 
for one to locate the area of each clan exactly, the Siltie simply tell that such „Mewta“ belongs to 
this or that clan. So, each clan is expected to graze its cattle on its land, defend its boundary from 
aggression either from other clans or from a neighboring community. 
The assembly has the right to adjudicate murder cases. The sentence of death by YeSiltieSerra 
Shengo was executed by the members of the accused. Accordingly, relatives of the defendant 
would be asked to throw him into a deep gorge called Yelemorefane. The throwing of the 
defendant by his family would help the two parties avoid further retaliation or revenge upon each 
other. According to an informant92, although it has been improved since Menilik's incorporation 
of the area, theft case was previously punished by death penalty. This time theft is punished in 
kind; especially the suspect is expected to pay back the material or cattle with some form of 
compensation to the victim. The plaintiff and defendant can appeal against the verdict reached by 
YeMula Siltie Melcho (Shengo). YeSiltieSerra Shengo is the general assembly of all Siltie male 
elders. Women provide food for the participants. It is linked with the concomitant territorial unit 
of YeBadenet (YeSiltie Bade Serra) at the Siltie level organization. YeSiltieSerra Shengo would 
also come together to set up a united front against external aggression by neighboring ethnic 
groups such as the Mareqo, the Shashogo, and the Oromo in the past. Such incidents helped the 
Silties to strengthen the spirit of oneness and solidarity among the people. Gogot, as the Siltie 
general assembly is called, has now become a forum where not only the Siltie clans but also 
neighboring Hallaba people can attend to discuss inter-ethnic issues, peace, and local 
development programs. 
                                                     
90 Interview with Ato Hamid Azma Hussein, 
91 This is based on FGD that was conducted with Ato Dilebo Gebre, Ato Kairedin Azma Hussein, Hajji 
Abdurrahman Shewajo, Hajji Hussein Barsebo on September 2015 in Werabe Town 
92 Interview with Hajji Hamid, and Hajji Shewmolo on April 25/2016 and October 11 April 2016 in Silti Wereda. 
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The gathering summons in various parts of the Siltie and in adjacent areas whereby a clan or 
clans are pre-informed to prepare the venue or YeOdda Chale and coffee for the participants. I 
understand that the smallest state administrative bodies are more answerable to the clan leaders 
than the state officials.  
4.7. Concluding Remarks 
To recapitulate, the territorial and lineage local administrations have played important roles in 
maintaining the social order of the community and its members. Even if the various regimes tried 
to supplant the local systems, the people employs the systems so far. Maneuvering the 
constitutional concessions they have got since the 1990s, non-state actors have been playing 
paramount roles in delivering justice and regulating the socio-political lives of the community at 
the grassroots level. YeSiltie Serra has become not only an integral part of dispute settlement 
process but also has been employed by the dispute settlers and the community alike as an 
instrument to protect the identity of the people. The political and judicial natures of local 
institutions and the less legitimate state actors among the community have earned local actors 
more social acceptance and legitimacy on one hand and have made the local modes of 
governance become alternative modes of institutions in the study area, on the other hand. 
However, the state actors’ endeavors to co-opt local actors for political ends have made the 
relationship between the state and local institutions unpredictable, i.e. it is characterized by 
enmity and friendship. The state actors, who are also abide by the local custom and values, have 
developed a sort of divided loyalty between the custom and the state.  
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                  CHAPTER FIVE 
5. THE PRAXIS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: STATE, RELIGIOUS MODES OF DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT AND THE LOCAL BELIEFS AND VALUES 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the genesis and consolidation of state dispute resolution institutions, the 
different mechanisms the state used to get involved in the local life and how the state has also 
used the judiciary as a weapon for state building processes since at least the late 19th century. By 
exploring various state and non-state actors' perspectives on legal pluralism, the chapter argues 
that there is not a normative commitment to legal pluralism in the study area. Rather, the various 
political interferences into the state legal systems, and the religious, as well as the customary 
systems, partly indicate the existence of temporary accommodation in the process of legal re-
centralization in the study area and possibly beyond. It will illustrate how the state encroaches its 
legal system with various pretexts including achieving development.  
The chapter also looks into the legal transplantation processes, the resistances it has met from the 
local community, and how the local community uses state and non-state laws to make state 
agents abide by the law. It has also gone through the different incidents the local community has 
passed in its appropriation of the social transformation process that depicts the existence of 
grassroots justice or democracy from below. Additionally, the chapter investigates the formation 
of religious courts, notably Sharia courts in Ethiopia, the historical trajectories they have 
undergone, and the natures of Islamic pluralism. It also looks into the coping mechanisms or 
strategies the Qadis develop to compete with other legal actors in the context of the plural legal 
setting. It also indicates the intra-faith interactions and the various ways the Qadis employ to 
attract clients in the plural legal setting. It also portrays the agencies the religious legal actors use 
to make their courts not only resistance to the interferences of the government but also against 
the Muslim youths who accuse the Qadi of playing „government agenda“ rather than standing 
for Islam. Moreover, the chapter will examine the local politico-legal contexts, the various 
values, and belief systems, their natures of conquering all aspects of life and the enormous 
pressures they impose on the local community to abide by not only the social norms but also, by 
legal norms too. It also casts a glimpse on the intertwined natures of actors in the field and how 
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local settlers dispute use local values and beliefs to accumulate power and hence negotiate with 
actors including the state. The chapter contains some dispute cases that indicate the interactions 
of various legal systems which will also help partly understand the legal realities in the study 
area. 
The chapter argues that law has become a weapon of the strong, an instrument state officials use 
to hunt those who oppose their interests. The chapter argues also that state legal actors' activities 
are influenced by local values and norms, indicating the emergence of hybridized legal practices 
as a new legal reality in the area. The chapter also argues that both state and non-state actors 
reshape the norms, institutions, and activities of modes of dispute settlement in the process of 
hybridization indicating the emergence of cross legal referencing which in turn boosts the legal 
agency of local legal actors.  
5.2. The State Legal System: Genesis and Consolidation 
It has been described in the previous chapters that the late nineteenth century has become a 
turning point in the modern history of Ethiopia, for it has marked the creation of the modern 
Ethiopian polity in its current shape on one hand and the genesis of legal pluralism on the other. 
It has been since this time that the state introduced its legal system as part of strengthening its 
grip on power, and state building processes in the Siltie area too. Moreover, authors such as 
Bustorf (2011:468) said that  
„The process of integration of the Siltie into the Ethiopian state was followed by 
broad cultural and socio-political changes in the area. The local population lost its 
independence and had to accept a system of taxation that reduced the majority of 
the people into tenants“ (ibid.).  
Despite this, the local politico-legal systems of the people have continued to operate side by side 
with the new regime. Studies indicate that after the battle of Adwa (1896) under the Kambata 
governor Abata Bwayalaw, a large number of the „Amhara” naftagna (malkagna) immigrated 
into Siltie land. They formed a new privileged class and brought their religion, language, and 
culture. The new settlers tried to establish their way of life as the new norm. Nevertheless, co-
operation with the new lords enabled the Siltie to „continue their territorial expansion into 
neighboring areas. 
 
 
153 
 
 Menilik's troops subdued the Siltie area for the first time in 1879“ (Bustorf 2011: 468-469). 
Thus, the people have witnessed new forms of land tenure system, modern centralized state 
bureaucracy, a new judiciary system and economic order since then. 
The new regime also brought changes in the application of the customary system. This shift has 
been witnessed on settling homicide cases. Before this time, a person who committed homicide 
was thrown into a big gully called Lemore Fan by his relatives to end the feud and avert revenge. 
Thus, the customary court’s practice of ''killing the murderer”, which is believed by the local 
community to have been taken from Shari'a law, was replaced by paying blood money in cash 
called Gumma to the victim’s family. Nevertheless, some informants said that the Siltie used to 
pay the Gumma in kind (cattle, etc.) in the form of compensation, especially for intentional 
murder cases, before the late 19th century and continued practicing it in cash afterward.  
On the other hand, following the incorporation of the Siltie into Ethiopian state, the people had to 
go to neighboring ethnic groups to access state justice for long. The Siltie land could not get state 
justice offices in the area until 1954 when a state court at district level was set up in Silti Wereda. 
Since then, the state legal system has been introduced to the area, and the people began to 
employ the system in Chebona Gurage, Haikochina Butajira and later in South Shoa Awrajas. 
My respondents said that the capacities of the state judiciary systems to deliver justice to the 
community was very limited to urban areas of neighboring ethnic groups during both the 
Imperial (1931- 1974) and the Derg regimes (1974-1991). Even if the first constitution that was 
enacted during the Imperial regime (1931, and revised in 1955) as well as the Derg's 1987 
constitutions gave little concessions to the customary and religious laws in the country, empirical 
data among the Siltie indicate that both the religious and customary courts have continued to 
operate. The customary court, for instance, has delivered justice to the community on one hand 
and has also become a hub for maintaining the identity of the people on the other. 
The state's inability to provide justice to the community had continued even in the early periods 
of EPRDF's regime. There were, for instance, three First Instance State courts with a low number 
of trained judges in Silti, Dalocha and Lanfuro Weredas between 1991 and 2001. Other Siltie 
areas like Azerenet Berbera, Sankura, and Alicho Wuriro had been included in Kembata, 
Hadiyya and Gurage Zones. The inability to easily access state judiciary had thus become one of 
the factors for the identity struggle in the post-socialist Ethiopia since the 1990s. 
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On the other hand, though one can trace the existence of plural legal systems in the area at least 
since the late 19th century, pluralism has got legal recognition under the Federalist Ethiopian 
constitution (FDRE 1995 Article 34 (4-5), 78(5)). Nevertheless, the 1995 Constitution itself 
cannot escape criticisms not only from the local community and local legal actors, but also from 
state court judges as well. The constitution has given power to customary and religious laws to 
consider only some family cases without empowering legal status to them (FDRE 1995: Art 
9(1)34(5); Alula and Getachew 2008:8). An additional gap can identify in FDRE constitution is 
that it could not unequivocally define the relationship between the pluralistic institutions though 
there are some concessions for local dispute settlement institutions, and it recognizes the 
existence of various legal systems, customary and religious ones.  
The Federal State has also set up different institutions that can deal with various forms of 
disputes both at national, regional and local levels since 1991. At the country level, the Federal 
Affairs and House of Federations have constitutionally been empowered to resolve conflicts on 
inter-ethnic boarder (Art 48) and inter or intra-ethnic conflicts (Art .62).93The state legal system's 
capacity, however, has been dwindling, for the various civil service sectors are now empowered 
by the government to adjudicate those employees who can break the rules and regulations of the 
respective sectors through staff disciplinary measures as well as political interferences in the 
judiciary (Baker, 2013). Each sector has its disciplinary committee that can oversee members' 
activities. 
The Federal Constitution also establishes three tiers of courts: Federal Instance Court, Federal 
High Court and the Supreme Court (FDRE 1995: Art 78). At the Federal level, the First Instance 
Court is equated with Wereda court, while Zonal Higher courts are equal with the Regional 
Court. Regional Supreme Court can also exercise the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court; 
State High Courts can also exercise the jurisdiction of the Federal First Instance Court (Art.80 
(1-6)).  
                                                     
93 The House of Federation has been involved in the inter-ethnic conflict between the Siltie and the Gurage. It was 
considered as one of the mechanisms the state used to resolve the Siltie- Gurage inter-ethnic conflict that lasted for a 
decade (1991-2001). It was the Federation that oversaw Siltie elders' petition to reconsider the resolution of Butajira 
Conference on which the participants decided the Siltie as part of the Gurage. Following the petition, the House of 
Federation has referred the case to the Constitutional Inquiry Committee that revisited the Constitution in the spirit 
of the Siltie-Gurage conflict. The committee recommended that people's identity questions should be looked into by 
direct participation of the individuals who raise the quest (Aklilu, 2000). The House thus voted for a referendum in 
which majority of the Siltie took part and voted for an independent identity on April 01/2001(Abdulfeta 
Huldar,2002; Zerihun, 2007; Kairedin, 2012, 2013 ).  
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The government has also set up further state dispute settlement institutions like custom and 
revenue sections, and Good Governance and Appeal Office that are involved in dispute 
resolution processes. After the establishment of Siltie Zone, the Siltie has set up nine First 
Instance Courts since 2001 in eight weredas and a city administration including a High Court in 
Werabe town. There are also more than 150 social courts in 181 Qebeles. The social courts, 
however, have not been established by the Constitution, but by proclamation94. The roles and 
functions of social courts are also declining from time to time due to legal reforms in the country. 
They can consider minor civil cases. The Southern Regional Court has an appeal court in 
Hossana town 60 km from Werabe. This court has the responsibility to oversee cases from 
Hadiyya, Gurage, Kembata, Siltie Zones and Yem Special Wereda. Thus, the state modes of 
dispute settlement are also characterized by intra plurality. The various mechanisms the state has 
developed since the 1990s indicates that the government has tried to expand the state judiciary 
system in the country, yet its effectiveness has proved to be futile. 
5.3. Prospects of the State Legal System: Opportunities and Challenges 
The introduction of state legal system since the late 19th century and the legal frameworks the 
constitutions, especially that of the 1995 one, have provided can be taken as good opportunities 
for smooth operations of state justice systems in the area. In this regard, the establishment of 
Siltie Zone and the subsequent opening of nine state justice courts and justice offices including 
the police departments seem to have contributed their share to the smooth operations of the state 
legal system among the Siltie. However, according to the President95 of Siltie Zone High Court, 
thirty judges are working in ten courts including the High Court in the Zone. This is a clear 
indication of the fact that the state court could not deliver justice to more than a million Silties 
with thirty judges alone. 
                                                     
94 Interview with Ato, Nesere Issa a former judge on legal pluralism on 25 December 2014, Werabe Town. 
 
95 Interview with Ato Akmel Ahmedin, Siltie Zone High Court President on 07 April 2015 in Werabe Town. Age 
43. Ato Akmel has worked in Siltie and neighboring areas as judge and court President for more than a decade. He 
also worked in Southern region court. I understand that his ideas and perspectives on the roles of customary, Shari'a 
and state courts are crucial to grasp the legal realities in Siltie, and possibly beyond. His lived experiences on how 
disputes are processed and how the various courts and the political systems view each other also have a paramount 
significance to understand aspects of legal pluralism and the changes and continuities of norms, legal systems have 
undergone in the area. 
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 Judges are trained lawyers, but appointment to the presidents of the Zone High Court and 
Wereda First Instance Courts seems based on political loyalty rather than merit. 
The dearth of judges qualified to adjudicate in statutory courts in the study area seems one of the 
factors that contribute to the decline of the demand of the state courts in the area. Moreover, the 
consolidation of state power and state legal system brings two severe effects on legal pluralism. 
First, it prevents an equal legal status for religious and customary laws with the state. Secondly, 
it changes the roles of law to achieving common purposes like political and economic objectives 
of government rather than enforcing social norms which are the typical characteristics of the 
religious and customary courts (Tamanaha, 2008). 
In addition, recent studies also indicate that African states' judiciary systems are very weak and 
have met frequent interferences from the executives in Africa despite some recent improvements 
in the application of „the rule of law“( Peter Von Doepp 2013:37). Studies (e.g. Baker) indicate 
that the political interferences into the judiciary systems in Ethiopia is done in the context of 
bringing local development on one hand, and lack of enough qualified human resource in the 
state legal system, on the other. Baker (2013:202), for instance, states that the judiciary sectors of 
the country are hit by frequent interventions from the political offices as the ruling party is 
insecure due to various factors. Nevertheless, he points out that this may not be partly true at 
lower administrative tiers like regional and zonal levels. Even at this level, the relative 
independence of the legal realm does not emanate from the state's commitment to the rule of law. 
Rather, it is mainly because of the absence of qualified human resource to uphold the law (ibid.: 
203).  
 But the 1995 constitution clearly indicates that „courts of any level shall be free from any 
interference or influence from any government body, government official or any other source“ 
(Art.79 (2)). Maneuvering this vacuum, and crisis of legitimacy, customary and religious modes 
of dispute settlement have been gaining much ground at the grassroots level. Studies also 
indicate that much of the justice system delivered in Ethiopia is provided at a local level using 
customary systems and mechanisms (Alula and Getachew 2008: V). My informants said that the 
state judges employ local values and religious ideas to reconcile the disputant parties which 
indicate cross-referencing of legal and social norms among legal systems. This state of affair also 
shows the existence of “inter-legality” (Santos de Sousa, 2002) in the area. 
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 So, one can say that the state is psychologically far away institution than kin, or other group 
institutions and hence not influencing the local community's day to day activities than the 
customary and religious courts. In short, the state's endeavor mentioned above and the 
subsequent developments illustrate that the Ethiopian government pays much attention to 
enforcing legal norms than social one which is relevant to the day-to-day activities of the local 
communities. Thus, the constitutional recognition and the subsequent establishment of state 
courts up to the lowest level of administration as well as giving delegation to regional tribunals a 
federal court status to consider cases, among other things, can be taken as good opportunities for 
the state judiciary to deliver justice to the grassroots level. Moreover, more than any other 
regimes, it is the current EPRDF led government that manages to conquer and establish its legal 
system to the grassroots levels. But the elders who are assigned to lead Qebele social courts have 
developed a divided loyalty between the culture and the state as they opt to consider dispute 
cases as elders rather than social court judges. Added to this, the low number of qualified judges 
and political interference, as well as a lack of good governance, can also be regarded as one of 
the factors that contribute to less efficiency as well as declining legitimacy of the state legal 
system in the area. Ethiopia's government also admits that lack of good governance, inefficiency 
and poor service delivery in the state justice are the problems the justice sector suffered in the 
past five years, as it calls the First Growth and Transformation Plan time (2010-2010).96 This 
episode has deteriorated the legitimacy of the state legal system on one hand and has boosted the 
legal agency of the customary and religious legal regimes on the other. 
5.4. The Perceptions of State Court Judges on Legal Pluralism: Manifestation of 
Contestation: Some Views from State Legal Actors 
The state court actors have a different perspective on legal pluralism and on how the customary 
and religious courts operate in the local arena. Generally speaking, state court judges have a 
positive outlook towards non-state legal actors, i.e. legal pluralism. This seems associated with 
the identity manifestations the non-state modes of dispute settlements embodied in them. 
                                                     
96 Taken from a meeting by „A Joint Forum of the Justice Sectors' Representatives that include Judges’ 
Administration and the Sharia Qadi in Adama Town), Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation (EBC) News 
on October, 11 2015 at 8:20 pm.  
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However, as far as the activities of non-state actors are concerned, the state legal actors have 
criticized the less active roles local modes of dispute settlements have played in reducing 
tensions in the area. They said that the state court suffers from caseloads that have influenced the 
courts' activities to deliver justice to the community. This happens, they explained, due mainly to 
the failure of elders to properly manage civil cases at the grassroots level. 
One of my key state court actors, however, ascribed this problem to the state. He said that there 
is a limited and very controlled legal pluralism in the area for the customary and religious courts 
are not legally empowered and hence their decisions are not binding, and this frustrates elders 
and prevents them from working aggressively in maintaining the social order.97 He further 
explained that the government is not committed to the existence of legal pluralism. However, 
other state actors including the Zone High Court President said that the state courts are 
overloaded with dispute cases initiated by members of same families like brothers, sisters, and 
relatives over land, inheritance, property disputes cases, etc. For state legal actors, this is an 
indication of the declining legitimacy of elders due, among other factors, to partiality and bribery 
in the customary court. According to Siltie Zone High Court Report (Siltie Zone High Court 
2016/17), 75% of the cases reported to the state courts are related to domestic violence and 
disputes among family members which can easily be settled by the customary courts. It seems 
that state actors appreciate the customary system and its role in dispute settlement in the area 
(See more how the state demands the intervention of non-state actors for bringing peace in the 
country in Appendix I).  
Ato Akmel, Siltie Zone High Court President, also noted that almost 75% of the civil cases 
referred to Southern Region Supreme Court, Hossana Regional Court division had been initiated 
from Siltie Zone compared to Gurage, Hadiyya, Kembata Zones as well as Yem Special Wereda. 
These cases are supposed to be considered by customary courts if they are robust enough to 
consider cases. His exposure to the experiences of elders of neighboring people helped him 
appreciate the roles of elders for dispute settlement. State actors further indicate that elders in the 
neighboring Zones and Weredas are actively involved in dispute resolution processes including 
crime cases. 
                                                     
97 Interview with Ato Nesere Issa, an ex-judge on December 25, 2014, Werabe. 
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I also understood that some state court judges are very much determined to see an active 
customary mode of dispute settlement in the area. This may arise, among other factors, due to the 
social and cultural embodiments of the customary dispute resolutions that have been used also as 
an identity marker. It is due to this factor that the partial revival of the customary system is 
linked with the revitalization of ethnic sentiments, and identity construction processes the Siltie 
have been undergoing since the 1990s. I have observed that President of Siltie Zone High Court 
and Siltie Zone Council98 has urged representatives of the people in Zonal Council meetings to 
support elders who take part in the local modes of dispute settlement so as to reduce the burden 
of state courts, which have become overcrowded by family dispute cases that can easily be 
resolved by elders in one hand, and to strengthen the identity of the people on the other hand. 
The Zone High Court also discussed with Wereda First Instance courts to give due support to 
local modes of dispute settlements in the form of changing family dispute cases and 
acknowledging the reconciliation elders have effected to end disputes etc. According to Siltie 
Zone High Court report (2016/17), the number of dispute cases referred to the court includes 
family disputes, land disputes, denial of someone's trustee, death cases due to car accident and 
domestic violence cases. Despite the fact that there is a constitutional limit that does not allow 
religious and customary courts to consider crimes, the customary modes of dispute settlement 
intervene on murder cases (See more about the involvement of customary court in murder cases 
in chapter seven). This is partly because homicide cases involve groups than individuals as a 
result of the group conceptions of crime that prevail among the Siltie. According to key Raga 
informants99, the state courts cannot end homicide, arson and other main dispute cases in the 
area. They stress that if the state court passes verdicts and punishes the suspect, the disputants 
always see each other in revengeful eyes on one hand, and the culprit cannot be reintegrated into 
the community even after he/she finishes prison terms, on the other. 
This is due mainly to the fundamental Siltie values and norms, which might have relevance in 
the violation or protection of human rights. One of the basic Siltie values that underpin the 
customary justice system is Berche– dignity of human life the breach of which has grave 
consequences if it is not redressed. It is believed among the Siltie that prisons cannot end the 
spirit of enmity between disputants.  
                                                     
98 Taken from Siltie Zone Council Meeting, July 2015, Werabe.  
99 Interview with Ato Kaire Sule on April 10/2016 in Lanfuro Wereda. 
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Homicide cases, particularly, cannot be settled by the state judiciary alone. It is the mandate of 
the customary courts that should be involved to end Berche (See also Chapter Seven). Siltie Zone 
High Court Report (2016/17) indicated that disputes over property right between couples 
following the termination of marriage ranked number one case among others reported in the state 
courts. Land-related disputes ranked second, while economic exploitation of women by their 
parents especially denial of women's own generated properties after they work in the Gulf areas 
as maids takes the third. 
In the case of women's exploitation, Siltie women who work in the Gulf States send their money 
in the form of remittances to a member of the family for deposit, yet most of the time they are 
denied by the family. Regarding the first case, however, disputes between or among family 
members such as children and fathers, husbands and wives, brothers and sisters take the first 
level that is frequently referred to the court. Property right disputes following divorce cases also 
overload the state court operation. State legal actors ascribe this overcrowding to the failure of 
local modes of dispute settlement. Therefore, according to some state legal actors' perspectives, 
the elders do not play an active role in creating a social order in the area, albeit, elders said the 
other way round. Nevertheless, the overcrowding of Zone and Regional courts by family dispute 
and Siltie dispute cases respectively does not necessarily indicate the failure of elders, but it may 
depict the failure of the state judicial system in the area, for people can go to regional courts for 
appeal that could occur due to legal errors as well.  
My key informants100 further said that dispute cases sometimes travel from one court to another, 
and there is a possibility of the transfer of some cases that include negligence crimes like a car 
accident and arson, family dispute cases from state to customary courts and vice versa.  This is a 
clear indication of the existence of complementarity and competitiveness among various courts 
in the area. This apparently also portrays how each system views each other and the realities of 
power contestations among the various legal regimes in the area.  
Even though the post-1991 political system opens the space for local modes of dispute settlement 
to flourish by providing constitutional and legal frameworks that sanction legal pluralism, some 
                                                     
100 An informant mentioned above in 125 and Ato Kairedin Hussein on 3, April/2015 in Werabe. 
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state court judge informants 101 explained that the local politicians are not tolerant enough to 
accept elders' role in ending disputes.  
The elders also understand the problem in this way, for the officials want them only to help the 
state in mobilizing the society for local development rather than for empowering elders. I, 
however, observed102 that the Zonal High Court103 has emphasized the significance of elders for 
justice, especially to end civil cases. Azma Jabir104 , leader of one of the age long clan councils 
in Siltie area, said that the Abalcho clan considers both crime and civil cases, including 
matrimonial disputes like divorce cases. He further said that there seem to be negotiations 
between the state and customary courts on how to deal with family disputes. Elders further 
mention that the Wereda administration ordered the state courts better not to consider family 
dispute cases before elders' involvement into the cases. According to my key elder informants, 
this is due to the failure of the state courts to consider dispute cases in honest and just ways. 
Elders underscore further that the state court fails to adjudicate high rates of disputes without the 
help of the elders' court. However, my elder informants, especially elders who take part in the 
conflict settlement process, said they are confused as they always wait for the go on order or 
mercy from the state officials to consider such reconciliatory cases like car accidents. They also 
ask as to whom should recognize whom, who should come first, that is, whether it is the Siltie or 
the state For them, the Ethiopian legal landscape is not favorable for all jurisdictions.  
My key state judge informants also explained that justice cannot be achieved without the active 
involvement of elders in the area, since elders are active agents for delivering justice at the 
grassroots level. The roles elders played for ending disputes are now declining in the area for 
reasons not clearly mentioned by them. Nevertheless, one thing most of the informants seem to 
agree on is the interference of the Siltie Zone officials in the activities of customary courts. The 
informants state that some agents of the state could sometimes not allow elders to exercise their 
local roles to settle disputes in case elders will become politically subversive. 
                                                     
101 Interview with state court judges from different areas (Anonymous). 
102 I had interviewed state court judges about their perceptions of customary courts. I have understood that they are 
very much committed to seeing the revitalization of the customary system. Some local chiefs also said that in some 
Weredas like Lanfuro, state officials instructed state courts to give first chance to elders to oversee family disputes 
before they are referred to state courts. This is also an indication of the negotiation of the tribunals and cooperation 
even against the constitution.  
103 Taken from Siltie Zone Council meeting (six months report on judiciary work) that was held on 7 February 2015 
and in February 2017 Werabe Town. 
104 Interview with Azma Jabir who is a leader of Abalcho clan on April 26/4/2015 in Lanfuro Wereda, Mitto Town.  
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 On the other hand, state actors argue that the customary courts’ legitimacy is declining by its 
own failure than external interferences. The weaknesses of elders’ council, state actors argue can 
be understood from the high number of family-related dispute cases that are referred to the state 
courts. State court indicate that 85% of the cases that referred to, for instance to the Wereda First 
Instance and Siltie Zone High court is family related cases that could have been settled by elders 
(Siltie Zone High Court Annual Report, 2016/7). State court judges state further that that 
previously families settled their differences at home, if not with elders' settlement, without 
involving the third party. They stress that members of families initiate most of the dispute cases 
even between children and their parents. As the Siltie practice polygamy, the children of the first 
wife usually instigate their mother to quest her rights like land or other property and push her to 
sue their father in the court. In this case, elders are not given right to adjudicate inheritance cases 
and at times, the disputes ended with divorce. This is against the social theory that explains the 
multiplex relationships (the density of the relationship between parties in a conflict) and the more 
the closer the social relationship, the less the disputants to go to formal court (Richard Lempert 
and Joseph Sanders 1986 237-238). Therefore, according to state court judges, disputes between 
nonrelated or socially independent groups are very rare in the area. Rather, the courts are 
overloaded with cases initiated by members of families. The following factors are responsible for 
the prevalence of marital dispute cases in the area. My key elder and young informants indicate 
that the introduction of the new family law since 2008 encourages divorce rather than 
coexistence and intolerance rather than forbearance between partners. They accuse the revised 
family law which is influenced by Feminist ideology than the prevailing situations like religious 
and cultural values of the community. The increasing number of the population over the limited 
resources like land, the decline of cultural values, and norms, the drop of respect to elders as well 
as the impacts of globalization that fosters individualism than collectivism have also been 
mentioned as factors for the breakdown of family ties and modesty in the society. Thus, people 
resort to faith-based and customary forums to end disputes. The state court judges, however, did 
not accept the Siltie's conception of crime as collective and deal with it accordingly so as to 
avoid further damage by mitigating earlier hidden crimes. Rather, state court informants believe 
that the government legal system deals only with the accused.  
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They further expressed their conviction of state legal systems with the phrase wanjal aywarasim, 
meaning 'crimes are not inherited’, which indicates the states' courts individual orientations 
rather than collectiveness, which in turn shows a value conflict with the customary ones. 
5.5. Islamic Reform Movements: Implications for Dispute and Dispute Settlement 
Islam has made its way into the land of Siltie ancestors at least since the 9th or 10th century 
(Kairedin, 2013). The religion of Islam has now become one of the identity markers of the Siltie. 
The nexus between Islam and the Siltie is very strong that the people for long have addressed 
themselves as „Islam“ and their language „Ye Islam Afe,“ meaning Islamic language. One can 
find arts and pictures in government and private buildings, and residential houses, and Islamic 
artistic designs that depict the strong presence and place of Islam among the Siltie (See the figure 
8 below).  
Islam is thus quasi-identical with the ethno-name Siltie. According to my Siltie Imams and 
Islamic scholar informants, Sheik Dana of Wello, Ifat Sheik, Jimma Aba Jifar Sheiks from 
Western Ethiopia and the Qabena traditional Islamic learning centers are the sources of Islamic 
education to the Siltie. Imam Shafi'i school of thought is also the dominant Islamic legal school 
among the Siltie. Hajji Aliye is one of the great Siltie ancestors who were in the forefront in 
reconstructing the genesis of the Siltie ethnic group. He and his colleagues who led the 16th-
century exodus to the present area from the east are also mentioned as iconic figures in the 
expansion of Islam since the 16th century. Hajji Aliye is considered as Waliye (Saint) who played 
a major role in Islamization process in the area and its environs (Bustorf 2009, Kairedin 2012). 
The historical Siltie five Queens known locally as (Amisti Gesticha) were also regarded as 
female saints who played a significant role in the expansion of Islam in the area. It seems that the 
Siltie place much emphasis on the post 16th-century developments as their identity marker. A 
good case in point is the Siltie Cultural Museum that has been built with five traditional houses 
(Gojos) reminiscences of the five Kings and Queens who led the 16th-century exodus. 
 
 
164 
 
The second historical episode that has been mentioned as an important period for the resurrection 
of Islam and Islamic ideas was the 19th century. In this regard, Sufi based movements of the late 
19th century spearheaded by known Siltie and neighboring people Sheiks and warlords such as 
Hassan Enjamo of Qabena, and Siltie clerics such as Dangeye Awelu, Yeqiqora Sheiks, Alkesiye, 
Ye Jaremo Sheik, Yemofegne and Yemoye Sheiks were in the forefront in this regard. Above all, 
Hassan Enjamo of Qabena is considered as one of the prominent persons that strengthened Islam 
and Islamic teachings among the Siltie and the nearby people.   
He instructed the local community to pray, and defend Islam from expanding forces of Christian 
Menilik II in the late 19th century. This incident also played a significant role in the 
intensification of Islam among the Siltie (Bustorf 2011:461). Some written sources (Bahru 2000, 
Bustorf 2011, Kairedin 2012), and my key informants expound that he had become successful in 
defending the central government's expansion at least for some time, and played a paramount 
role in the expansion of Islam. 
Key informants said that the Siltie Islamic scholars have been instrumental in teaching not only 
religious knowledge but also in bringing social changes crucial for the society to peacefully live 
with each other and with their neighboring people.  
Figure 7 Siltie Museum that depicts the culture, belief and history of the Siltie, Werabe Town 
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They employ cooperation, integration and reconciliation strategies in their local teaching-
learning process. The Siltie faith leaders have developed intertwined and multifaceted roles as 
peacemakers, religious figures, social actors as well as customary court judges in the community. 
My informants said that this devotion to the society helped them earn moral legitimacy that has 
persisted for long.  
These Islamic scholars are revered highly by the local community up until now as they were 
mobilizing the community for local development and teaching children religious knowledge in 
harmonizing with the Siltie culture. They are also key figures as dispute settlers. Some of them 
are now celebrated highly and continue to influence the Islamization process. The community 
also reveres the Sheiks because they developed their strategies to preserve Islam and Islamic 
teachings both from external challenges posed by the then Christian oriented states and internal 
decays of the Muslim community. Siltie Zone Islamic Affairs Council president105 said that the 
Meshayiks106 were moderate in their teachings, for they taught the ‘right and correct’ Islamic 
teachings that reconcile culture with religion for the local community. Some of the Sheiks' 
Mosques serve as centers of local pilgrimage and dispute settlement. Annual Mawlids are 
celebrated in the Mosques. Alkesiye’s, Hajji Aliye’s, Baydi’s and Dangiye’s Mawlids are good 
examples in this regard. 
These mosques, especially Alkeso and Hajji Aliye Mosques, are used as Sufi shrines whereby 
quite a large number of people go there annually for prayer, dispute settlement, and blessings. It 
is observed that the significance of the traditional Sufi shrines is declining from time to time due 
to the influence of Salafis oriented teachings that made their ways to the Siltie at least since the 
1980s. The third period of Islamic revitalization was the late 1980s when the Dawetul Tablig, a 
movement that encourages people to leave their residence for three or four months’ time and go 
somewhere far away from the place of living for religious purposes. One is expected to have his 
expense for food and other requirements during this time. My informants said that this 
movement played an important role in liberating Muslims from various non-Islamic acts like 
worshiping idols and asking blessings and prosperity from such deities as sorceries among the 
Siltie and its neighbors.  
                                                     
105 Interview with Sheik Mohammed Kelil, President of Siltie Zone Islamic Council and one of the local dispute 
settlers who is involved in various dispute settlement sessions on 25/04/2015 Werabe Town.  
106 The Siltie call well known Islamic scholars who contribute to the expansion of Islam and dispute resolution 
Meshayiks. 
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As it is done with one’s own expense, the Tablig group is considered as the right way to Islamize 
one's self. According to my informants who are very much associated with Sufi teachings, the 
Tablig way is very much related to them and the Shaff'i teachings. During the Derg and early 
periods of EPRDF regimes, it played a paramount role for Islamization of the Siltie.  
As its supporters said, it does not attack cultural practices due to its principle of „noninterference 
in local practices, values, and norms of a society it operates ''. I also observed107 that the Tablig 
group is the dominant reformist movement in the country sides of the Siltie area, yet not as such 
dominant in the urban centers of the Siltie. 
The third Islamic movement that is found among the Silties is ‘’Yetewhid Jemma’’, known 
locally as Tawhid group or the Salafis. Young educated Muslims actively lead this movement. 
My informants said that this movement started when some Saudi-educated scholars came back to 
the area around mid of the 1980s. However, it has become more active in the post-1990s period 
following the coming into power of EPRDF. 
The classical Siltie religious scholars' education centers have got little attention this time due to 
the deaths of the Sheiks on one hand, and the change in the orientations of the younger 
generations to the Salafi’s teachings on the other. These developments have contributed their 
share to a rise of the Salafi's teachings in the urban centers and some rural areas of the Siltie. 
This group mainly focuses on teaching the Quran, and Hadith108 as the only guiding books for 
Muslims rather than intermixing with local customs. The group considers mixing culture with 
religion as innovations or „bidaa“. Therefore, the young, educated Muslims see themselves as 
puritanical movements which come to filter the religious innovation or „Bida'a“ from the pure 
Islamic teachings. This movement has been spearheaded by young Salafis and new emerging 
Siltie elites. However, the movement has got a challenge or resistance from the local community 
as it does not accept the roles of the much respected Siltie Sheiks and their Mawlids as Islamic.  
Furthermore, my Sufi-oriented scholars said that this group does not adhere to the four well-
known Islamic schools of laws: Shaff'i, Hambali, Hanefi, and Maliki. Rather, it is led by Sheik 
Mohammed Abdulwahab's teaching which focuses on a puritanical and non-reconciliatory ways 
                                                     
107 I attended the group's teachings since 2008 and traveled with the group's members in various parts of Siltie and 
neighboring areas. The group is blamed for giving little attention to Islamic knowledge than teaching morality. Its 
acceptance seems dwindling from time to time, in particular by the youths.  
108 Hadith is the teachings and practices of Prophet Mohammed. 
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to culture. Thus, it was observed that there had been some forms of disputes whenever the Salafis 
started religious sermons during their early appearance publicly at the beginning of the 1990s. 
My Salafi informants109 said that the true Islamic teachings could not enter Ethiopia before the 
1990s owing to the policies of the previous regimes which were depicted as anti-Muslim. Islamic 
books and teachings were restricted to spread freely. Despite the fact that Ethiopia is the second 
state to accept Islam next to Mecca, Islam could not deeply penetrate into the lives of the society 
due to the factors mentioned above. As a result of this, culture dominates Islam and intermixed 
with Islamic teachings. Thus, the young Salafis consider their acts not new but as bringing the 
‘true Islam'' and endeavor to disseminate Quranic-based Islam and purify it from innovations. 
This seeming rift, however, seems too narrow when the new forms of government-supported 
Ahbash teaching have come as another option for counter attacking the extremist teachings of the 
hard Salafis since 2011. It seems that this Islam-Islam tension dwindles due to the reconciliatory 
teachings of the Salafis, and the changes in the strategies of this group in accepting the roles of 
Meshayiks for the local communities. But for the Sufi-oriented Scholars, this change comes as a 
result of the government's involvement in curbing the foreign funds for hardliner Salafis. 
Whatever the cause, it is clearly observed among the Siltie that the rift between the classical 
Sheiks and the young, educated Muslims seems now decreasing.  
The significant difference between the previous scholars and the contemporary ones is that the 
former give much emphasis to the existing situations of the local community, the problems they 
face, and focus on cooperation as well as integration rather than on differences. The latter, 
however, consider the former and elder sheiks as less educated and reluctant to challenge 
religious innovation or ''bidaa''. But the Sheiks consider the younger generation as less educated 
and as if they are reading '' Alif lam before reciting Alif'' to indicate that these young Muslims are 
hastily becoming religious scholars without the proper ways of perusing religious knowledge. 
They further said that the young generation of religious scholars is not tolerance as the 
Meshayiks were.  
This potential dispute over the authority to represent the real Islam is observed in various 
domains including the Shari'a Courts and the Siltie Zone Islamic Council activities as both of 
them are not liked by the younger generation and even by the local communities as legitimate 
                                                     
109 My Salafi informants do not want to be mentioned in the study. I kept their identities anonymous.  
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Islamic institutions. This generational tension seems to persist at least for some time in the 
future. Additionally, the contentious relation between the Muslims with Islamic Institutions like 
Islamic Council shortly Mejlis in Siltie zone is the extension of the state and Muslims conflict 
that rocked the country between 2011-2013. This is due to the fact that the youth associate the 
Mejlis with the state as an instrument to control Muslims than to serve them. 
5.5.1. Salafism: A Contested Notion  
It is observed that each Islamic movement has addressed itself as Salaf, pious pioneers of Islam. 
The elder Sheiks, for instance, did not accept the young as the sole representatives of Salafist 
Movement. This appellation connotes a strong adherence locally to the teachings and ideas of the 
pious ancestors of Islam after the companions of Prophet Mohammed rather than a sect. Thus, 
each Muslim wants to live after Salaf. Therefore, elder Sheiks consider themselves Salaf. They 
emphasize that every Muslim wants to follow the footsteps of early Muslims who lived the Ideal 
Islamic ways. The elder generation group further said that it employs the Manhaj/Methods /of 
Salafis which teaches moderate ways than extremism. And hence, for them, their teaching 
represents a true Salafi way. According to the younger generation, however, the classical Sheiks' 
teaching is contaminated by local traditions, and hence needs purifications. Rather, the youths 
argue that Tawhid (Oneness of obedience) group's teachings entirely depend on the Quran and 
the Prophet's teachings, and thus are not contaminated by various cultural practices. Therefore, 
the Tawhid addresses itself as the true Salaf. The local community calls the youth as Wahabiya 
after the 18th century Islamic Scholar Mohammed Ibn Abdulwahab's movement though I have 
not found anyone who addresses himself as Wahabiya. Nevertheless, I understand that I did not 
see as such vast doctrinal difference or debate between the groups. 
 However, one can clearly understand that the generational tensions and contradiction between 
the two parties will become a source of dispute in the future. 
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5.6. The Religious Courts: Religious Legal Pluralism and Intra-Faith Contestations 
5.6.1. The Genesis of Religious Legal Systems: Interaction of Intra and Inter-Faith 
Legal Systems  
The religious legal system comprises Sharia courts, courts of local Meshayik/Waliyes110 , Courts 
of internationally and nationally renowned Sheiks such as Abdul Qadir Jailani and Sheik 
Hussein of Bale (Zerihun 2013: 146). Actors of customary courts have also employed the 
religious dimensions of the Siltie culture as a strategy to end disputes. It was also noted that 
followers of Ethiopian Orthodox belief resort to Siltie customary courts and the faith-based 
modes of dispute settlement to mend tensions among themselves and with the predominantly 
Muslim Siltie.  
On the other hand, Islam and the Siltie have strong interactions, since the religion has played an 
important role not only in the identity-construction of the people (Markakis 1998: 130-3) but 
more importantly also in dispute settlement as well. The Sharia courts which have been in place 
since the1950s also play a paramount role as faith-based modes of dispute resolution. 
Nevertheless, some young Muslims accuse the Qadi of being acquiescent to the state agenda. My 
findings indicate that despite the fact that the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
constitution (henceforth, FDRE) has given a legal recognition for customary and religious modes 
of dispute settlement (FDRE 1995(34/5/, 78/5/), the Sharia courts could not deliver justice due to 
a number of internal and external factors (Mohammed Abdo 2010). With these problems at hand, 
another form of dispute settlement forums like the Sufi Shrines and the Social Committee 
(mainly orchestrated by the young, educated Salafis) have been developed since the 1990s.  
 The local community resorts to these centers for faith-healing and reconciliation, not only 
among themselves but also with Allah, since they consider the Sheiks as mediators between them 
and the Devine (Dinberu et al, 1995; Kairedin, 2012; Zerihun, 2013). This indicates the existence 
not only of Islamic legal pluralism but also of a number of plural legal systems amongst the 
Siltie. The book further argues that owing to the institutional inability of the state legal system to 
                                                     
110Wali or Meshayik refers to a human religious figure, dead or alive, popularly recognized as important 
Islamic symbol by the majority of Muslims. It is usually represented by a tomb and in some cases by a 
Mosque, and is associated with a shrine.  
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deliver justice, customary and faith-based modes of dispute settlement have maneuvered the 
opportunity to play a significant role in delivering justice at the grassroots level. Hence, the 
Sharia courts' significance seems dwindling, and institutions such as the youth's social affairs 
committee and Sufi shrines seem to have gained more legitimacy. 
5.6.2. Local Religious Practices: Faith-Based Modes of Dispute Settlement  
The genesis of the faith-based dispute settlement centers goes back to Islam's entrance to the 
Siltie's ancestors sometime in the 9th century (Kairedin, 2013). Nevertheless, the significances of 
the centers have strengthened since the late 19th century with the conquest of the Siltie by the 
expanding forces of Menilik II. According to Zerihun, two factors are identified in the formation 
and significances of venerating Waliyes as an essential element of local religious practices for the 
Siltie. To begin with, he noted that the importance of the local faith centers had been 
strengthened mainly following the Siltie's responses to the formation of the modern Ethiopian 
Empire in the last decade of the nineteenth century. This is primarily because the local Sheiks 
were leading the resistance to the expansion of Christian dominated forces of Menilik II and 
playing a role in defending Islam. Secondly, he noted that the Islamization process was 
spearheaded by the Sheiks themselves, whose shrines then played a crucial role in the expansion 
and consolidation of Islam in the area (Zerihun 2013:144). I observed in the various parts of 
Siltie that the Sheiks and their shrines are still enjoying legitimacy among the Siltie and the 
neighboring communities as important sites of pilgrimage and modes of dispute settlement. 
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Figure 8 Inter-faith dispute settlement forum (Dalocha Wereda December 2015)  
 
5.6.3. The Genesis and Practices of Shari'a Court  
Despite the fact that the Siltie are one of the Ethiopian societies who has had early contact with 
Islam, the 1950s is considered as the turning point in the history of Shari'a court among the 
Siltie. According to my key informants111 , the court was set up in the 1950s while the people 
were categorized under Haikochina Butajira, Chebona Gurage and Kembata and Hadiyya 
Awraja112s during the Imperial period.  
                                                     
111 Interview with Ato Kaire Sule, an important informant who has deep knowledge about Siltie culture and history, 
and Ato Shifa Seid who worked in the Islamic Affair offices including the secretary of Siltie areas’ Islamic Affairs 
and Shari'a courts at different levels between 1970s to early 1990s in Lanfuro and Dalocha Weredas.  
112 Awraja was the third administrative tier below the province/region during the Imperial (1931-1974) and the 
Socialist Derg regime (1974-1991). 
 
 
 
172 
 
The Alkesiye families, Sadat Alkesiye, and later Feydi/Said Asheraq were in charge of 
administrating the Qadiship. Sadat was in power from 1955-1962, while Said Asheraq worked 
from 1962 to1991.  
With no Wereda level administration, the Awraja Qadis appointed one or two Qadis within a 
given area of Balabat/landlords/. Informants also mentioned that the Qadis were very much 
respected by the society as they were fair and committed to serving the community. During the 
Derg regime, the Siltie were categorized under Southern Shoa administrative structure and had 
got Dalocha-Lanfuro Awraja Shari'a court which persisted until the demise of the Derg in 1991. 
Islamic Affair Council and the Shari'a courts had been set up in the area while the majority of the 
Siltie were in Gurage Zone from 1991 to 2001. It was after the establishment of Siltie Zone that 
the Siltie has established an independent Islamic Council and Shari'a courts since 2001. 
The Siltie High Sharia Court considers cases not only from the six First Instance Sharia courts in 
the zone, but also from neighboring Hadiyya, and Gurage zones. The proximity of the areas, as 
well as the cost-effectiveness to deliver the service, has become the main factors for this. The 
Sharia Court considers such issues as Nikah (marriage contract), inheritance and divorce cases. It 
also examines civil matters up to 5000Birr, wills (Wesiya), and gifts (Hadiyya), endowments 
(Waqf), and family sustenance cases. The court does not practice its de jure/constitutional rights 
as it is widely disliked by (or does not have acceptance from) the Muslim community. According 
to my informants, the establishment of the Sharia court was attributed to the political agenda of 
the state rather than the commitment to Shari'a law. The court did not have the mandate to 
enforce its rulings since the Sharia courts are not empowered by the constitution apart from 
overseeing some family cases provided that both parties want to refer the matter to the court 
(FDRE Constitution Art.34(4),78(5). As a result, the Sharia court seems not chosen by the 
Muslim community. The local community also mentions the following factors for the decline of 
the legitimacy of Sharia courts. To begin with, the young Salafis consider the Qadis as „Jahil“ 
(ignorant). Second, the court is seen as disloyal to Islamic values. Rather, it is deemed to be more 
loyal to the political situations of the state. Some of the Qadis themselves stress that they are 
frustrated by their jobs, for they are not practicing the Sharia in its true spirit. They also explain 
that even those rights which have been granted to the court are not fully implemented due to its 
low level of regard from the government that is manifested by its little-allocated budget, which is 
too small to allow the purchase of office equipment such as computers, copy machines, etc.  
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These circumstances influence the roles of religious actors for conflict transformation (Appleby 
2012:222). But Siltie Sharia High court president113 states that the government supports the 
courts with budgets, by appointing Qadis in different Siltie Weredas and providing trainings for 
the Qadis better than previous regimes. For him, it is the Muslims did not resort to the courts to 
resolve their cases. This seems due to the less awareness of the Muslims about the roles the 
Sharia courts play in maintaining the social order of the community 
The empirical data also show that the Siltie Sharia courts are very much occupied with Nikah 
(Marriage contracts) more than other dispute cases. Nevertheless, I observed from the various 
courts' files that the courts settled divorce as well as inheritance cases. The Sharia court files also 
indicate, however, that more than 70% of cases were related to Nikah contracts, while 20% of the 
cases relate to marital disputes in the period from 2010 to 2015. According to Siltie zone Sharia 
court report (Siltie Zone Sharia High Court report, 2016/17), 10% of the cases are linked to Waqf 
(Endowments) or dispute claims on Mosques and other minor civil cases. Based on my Qadi 
informants114, the number of cases referred to Sharia courts has decreased since the introduction 
of the Revised Southern Family law in 2008. This is because the newly revised law does not 
allow the Sharia courts to consider inheritance cases. Before this time, the Sharia courts were 
considering divorce and inheritance cases. The newly revised law proscribes the Sharia courts to 
consider inheritance cases.  
                                                     
113 Interview with Hajji Mifta Seid, President of Siltie Zone Sharia High Court on 18 July,/2017. 
114 Interview with Hajji Siraj, Silti Wereda Qadi, and Hajji Shemsu, Dalocha Wereda Qadi in April 2016.  
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Figure 9 Hajji Mifta Seid President of Siltie Zone Shari'a High Court (May, 2016) 
  
My Qadi informants further explained previously it was men who wanted their cases to be 
reviewed by Shari'a courts as women thought the Sharia courts would not rightly protect their 
rights. Even though the Qadis associate the positive changes Muslim women show to the courts 
to inefficiency of state courts to handle family cases and increasing awareness of Muslims 
towards Islam, my Salafi informants ascribe this misperception to the less competent Shari'a 
court judges in some areas who did not know Shari'a law well. Women informants115, however, 
said that state court judges are hasty to decide on divorce based on the family law, which is 
mainly based on Feminist Ideology rather than giving value to the family.116 Below I presented 
some dispute cases that have been settled with the involvement mainly of Shari’a and customary 
courts to show how cases involve number actors which in a way help us understand the legal 
realities in the area.  
  
                                                     
115 Interview with Amina Kedir, 45, Jemila Seid, 42, in Silti and Lanfuro Wereda. 
116 Interview with an ex-judge Nesere Isa, on 25/11/2015 Werabe Town.  
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5.6.3.1. Case 1. Divorce case 
Disputants 
1. Ato Abdela Bushira, Husband/Accuser 
2. Weizero Weliyat Hussein, Wife/Accused  
Dispute Settler, Silti Wereda First Instance Sharia Court, 
Customary Court 
Qadi: Hajji Siraj Sharif 
File number, 001808 
Sue Date, 02/06/2015 
Location: Qibet Town, Silti Wereda 
Abdela and Weliyat had been married in 2010 through elders' court involvement in accordance 
with Sharia's ways. They lived together for more than five years, yet they could not beget 
children. They, however, acquired property. They explained that barrenness had been mentioned 
as the major factor for the dissolution of the marriage. Thus, the parties took the case to Sharia 
court to have it approved. 
They first presented their dispute case to the court demanding official recognition to termination 
of the marriage on 02 June 2015. According to the file, the divorce was concluded on 10 June 
2015 by the customary court. Weliyat agreed that the marriage could be dissolved with the 
involvement of Shari'a court. The Sharia court has one major rule that allows the elder to 
intervene in the dispute between husband and wife before considering the divorce. 
The Qadi mentioned that this is based on the Quran's article that dictates Qadis to give due time 
for elders to mediate spouses than rush for dissolution of marriage (The Holly Quran, Chapter 4, 
Article 35). Based on this rule, the court referred the case to elders to consider the case. Thus, the 
case was sent back again to the customary court for reconsideration. Both Weliyat and Abdela 
could not agree in the customary court. Both disputants finally said to the Shari'a court that they 
wanted to separate. After considering the decisions of the elders that explained the disputants 
could not agree to live together, the court passed a verdict that Abdela should pay 5000 ETB as 
compensation and approved the separation. 
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5.6.3.2. Case 2: Forced Marriage/Attempted Abduction/ 
Name of the girl: Lubaba Shikur 
Age: 12, Grade 5 Student 
Residence: Elose Dere Qebele, Silti wereda 
Suspected perpetrators 
1. Ato Ayele Endesheawe /the main actor/ 
2. Ato Balo Aserate/Collaborator/ 
3. Ato Niguse Tilahun/Collaborator/ 
According to informants and the petition paper, the above three men abducted a 12-year-old girl 
called Lubaba on March 20, 2015, at 4:00 local time while she was returning from the wedding 
party in the village. The same source explains that the suspects abducted and handed her to Ato 
Ayele who tried to rape her. The police arrested the suspects after getting information. Witnesses 
presented themselves and gave their testimonies to the police. The suspects admitted that they 
did the crime. With the invitation of suspects' relatives,  elders were involved in the incident to 
calm down the tension, and the girl was returned to her parents. The police, however, released 
the suspects on 30,000 ETB bail. After this incident, Lubaba's father said that the suspects 
threatened him if he did not give the girl back to Ato Ayele for marriage. According to the 
father117, it is in this way that some economically powerful men try to achieve their demand by 
intimidating the less privileged ones. The father further mentioned that he received so many life 
threatening messages from the persons. He informed the police about the incident, yet the police 
could not react and proceed with the investigation. Instead, the suspects came and paid the bail 
money, and the case was ceased. 
  
                                                     
117 I talked with Lubaba's father several times on the phone and he explained to me that religious leaders and elders 
are more helpful than the public prosecutor, Women's Affair Office, the Police and the Wereda State court. It seems 
that he was desperate in the ways the state handled his case.  
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Hybridism in the State Court 
The Wereda First Instance Court sent a letter118 dated 08 June 2015 explaining to the father of 
the girl to end the dispute using the customary court. Having frustrated by the justice system 
delivered in the Wereda, the father went to the Zonal Good Governance and Appeal Office to 
present his resentment on the way his case was handled. He mentioned that it is unusual to 
involve elders with the order of the state court and showed his dissatisfaction and requested the 
zonal administration to intervene. The Good Governance and Appeal office which is in charge of 
helping those people who cannot get justice has been involved into the case and started to contact 
the Wereda court and various offices which were potentially related to the case. The office 
contacted the Wereda Police, and Women's Affairs Office to reconsider the case. The Good 
Governance and Appeal office also informally talked with the Zone High Court to see if the cas 
was mishandled by Wereda First Instance court. The High court requested clarification from the 
Wereda court to see if the accuser was asked to end the case using the customary court. The head 
of Good Governance and Appeal office said that rape cases are not allowed to have a bail. The 
Wereda First Instance court's registrar replied that it was a mistake to release the person on bail. 
The accuser did not agree with this idea, for the Wereda Women, Children, and Youths' Affair 
office could not help him. This person could not even get justice at the zonal level and thus 
returned home desperately. Finally, felt insecure due to threatening messages from the suspects, 
the father of the victim took his daughter to one of the clan’s leader and head of Siltie Zone 
Islamic Council President to ask him end the dispute. The elder summoned the village elders to 
condemn the crime, and warn the suspects not to send any intimidating message to the father or 
attempt to take the girl back. The elders also assured him to stand by him, and send the girl to 
school. Lubaba has started learning under the custody of local elders. The dispute is still not 
resolved. 
  
                                                     
118 I have got the letter from Siltie Zone Good Governance and Appeal Office after the girl's father submitted a 
petition paper that required the office to intervene. Against the constitution that banned the customary and religious 
courts from considering rape cases, the state court asked the victim's father to end the case using the customary 
court. The Good Governance and Appeal Court said that it is the indication of bad governance, while the Zone High 
Court President ordered the Wereda court to check how this occurred. Finally, it is said that it was a technical error 
than other factors. However, for the victim's father, it was bribery that changed the ways cases can be handled.  
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5.6.3.3. Case 3. Divorce case 
Disputants  
1. Ato Anwar Abdela/the accuser/ 
2. Weizero Zebiba Bedru/the accused/ 
Dispute Settler, Silti Wereda First Instance Sharia Court, 
Elder's court 
Qadi: Hajji Siraj Sharif 
File number: 0012044 
Sue Date: 24/7/07 E.C. 
Area of residence, Silti Wereda 
According to the petition letter, and my informants, Anwar and Weizero Zebeba were married in 
2008 with the involvement of elders as per Sharia rules. After living together for three years, 
Zebiba went to the Gulf State for work in 2011. As she stayed there for some time, she and 
Anwar disagreed over how long she could stay in Saudi Arabia. Anwar requested her to come 
back home, yet she did not agree. The dispute kept on, and Anwar wanted termination of the 
marriage. To this effect, he filed sued her in Silti Wereda Sharia court on 02 March 2015 
demanding a divorce. The court sent a letter to the woman to appear in person and present her 
ideas to the court the following day. Unfortunately, the court relied on Abdela's idea who said he 
could not find her in the area to give her the letter. As a result, the court asked the Qebele 
officials to post the letter in the Qebele's compound for a day so that everybody could read it 
openly. 
Decisions of the court in Absentia  
The court based on Sharia law Manhajal Muslim page 379-380 and Fiqh Sunna Chapter 2 page 
134-138 that allows the court to treat these kinds of cases decided that the application for divorce 
has been approved on 09 March 2015. One can understand from above cases that most of the 
Shari'a courts' jobs are related with marital cases. Though Shari’a courts’ decline is witnessed 
since 2008, they are still considering divorce and inheritance cases. Moreover, those individuals 
who do not produce assets want their cases settled in the Shari'a courts rather than those who 
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have property right claims. Some dispute settlers are also involved in resolving disputes, and 
there is a clear complementarity among the legal systems. We can also understand that dispute 
cases are traveling from one court to another without boundary, and hybridism seems to 
characterize the legal realities of the Siltie. It can also be understood that state courts are 
subordinated to the customary and religious courts to end marital disputes. 
5.7. Sufi Shrines: Plurality of Intra-Faith Institutions and Modes of Dispute Settlement 
Studies show that Waliye venerating practice takes a central place in the religious as well as 
communal lives of the Siltie (Zerihun 2013:139; Kairedin, 2012). Zerihun notes that there are 
three forms of Waliye veneration practices among the Siltie. These are Mawlid, Liqa, and 
Warrie. Mawlid is categorized into two: -Mawlid-un-Nabi and Mawlid al-Meshayik, which are 
the Prophet Mohammed's Mawlid and Meshayik’s Mawlids respectively. As it is nationally 
celebrated, I will not go through the first Mawlid.  
The Siltie revere the Meshayik and their mosques due to the various roles the Waliyes have 
played in bringing about the social order of the area, on the one hand, and in expanding Islam, on 
the other. Among the most celebrated Sufi shrines Alkeso, Dangeye, and Hajji Aliye are the main 
ones. The local community goes daily, weekly, monthly and annually for prayer, strengthening 
social solidarity and resolving disputes among themselves and the neighboring ethnic groups. 
These areas mainly serve to resolve interfaith, inter-ethnic as well as minor disputes which do 
not involve blood cases. Nevertheless, another group of informants119 said that local religious 
practices do not consider dispute cases. Rather, they play a potential role for peace building, 
since faith leaders advise their followers to give priority to forgiveness and peace rather than to 
retaliation. Moreover, actors of local religious institutions sort out causes of disputes or 
disputants and hand over the cases to customary court for dispute settlement.  
The local community also resorts to these centers during natural calamities like drought and 
earthquakes perceiving that these disasters can be averted by the intercession of the Waliyes, 
whose Du'aa/prayer/ is believed to be accepted by the Almighty. On the other hand, when 
disputants feel that their cases have not been resolved by the village or customary court elders, 
they also resort to the Meshayiks for intervention. The local community will also go to the 
Shrines to ask for blessings, wealth and faith healing.  
                                                     
119 Interview with Sheik Mohammed, Ato Bahredin and Ato Usman on 23/2/16 in Werabe Town. 
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5.7.1. Liqa Institution 
The second form of Waliye venerating practice is Liqa. Liqa is an Arabic word, which means 
get-together. According to Zerihun, the institution of Liqa is associated with a popular Sufi 
Sheikh of the Gurage known as Qatbarie Sheikh, Sheikh Isa Hamza (1866–1948) (Zerihun 
2013:146). There are three broad categories of Liqa among the Siltie.  
These are Yenebi (Prophet Mohammed's), Geweselazem (Sheik Abdul Qadir Jailani of Baghdad), 
and Ye Seidina Kedir's Liqa. Nevertheless, Liqa is mainly practiced in Silti Wereda more than 
other Siltie areas. There are two forms of Liqa among the Siltie. The first refers to a social 
situation at household level where individuals sit together and chew Khat, perform prayer, and 
other social practices as expressions of Islamic piety. This kind of Liqa can be taken as a 
religious practice for Muslims who aim to become a sort of spiritual client of a waliye of their 
choice (ibid.: 147). 
The second form of Liqa, which the local community calls Summu Senga Liqa, is performed at 
the village level. All the major three Liqas are performed twice a month in this context. The 
participants come mainly from Siltie, Gurage, and Mareqo ethnic groups. Except in Yenebi Liqa, 
Orthodox Tewahedo Christians also attend the Liqas.120It is important to note that even if the 
participants emphasize the spiritual aspects of Liqa institution, they also engage with issues like 
dispute cases, local and national development affairs. 
As the participants gather from various socio-cultural backgrounds, Liqa helps the Siltie develop 
solidarity with their neighbors. Moreover, Yebad Baliqe (the Siltie, Mareqo, and Mesqan Gurage 
Elders) are selected during Liqa gatherings. These individuals serve the community to oversee 
inter-ethnic conflicts. A good case in point was the post-Siltie Zone boundary demarcation in 
early 2000s period. Following the establishment of Siltie zone, elders who were chosen by Liqa 
members from all neighboring areas played pivotal roles in the smooth Siltie-Gurage boundary 
demarcation processes. Moreover, the Liqa leaders always pass various messages aimed at 
peaceful coexistence and forgiveness among members of the community.  
                                                     
120 Interview with Imam Yirdawe Juhar/Leader of Yejilale Liqa/, Hajji Sultan Hamza/Yenebi Liqa coordinator/, Ato 
Mukhtar Seid/coordinator of Yeseidina Kedir Liqa/, and Hajji Mohammed, head of Siltie zone Islamic Council in 
Silti wereda and Werabe town on 16,17 January 2016 and 23 February 2016.  
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5.7.2. Warrie Institution 
The third local religious practice which is celebrated twice a month in memory of Sheik Hussein 
of Bale is called Warrie. According to informants, Warrie, which is derived from Mareqo word 
and has the meaning „let us come and sit together”, mainly serves as a saint venerating practice. 
The local community also uses it for dispute settlement. The Siltie, Gurage, and Mareqo 
communities take part in the Warrie Ritual. Thus, it helps the people strengthen inter-ethnic 
solidarity with neighboring peoples. The leaders of the Warrie, called Imams, give messages to 
the participants about peaceful coexistence. They also extradite the suspected culprits who flee 
from neighboring areas, especially after committing murder. The Warrie leader disseminates 
information about the local development and mobilizes the community on behalf of the local 
government.  
5.7.3. Salafi Social Committee 
The new dispute settlement forum, which has been developed since the 1990s, is the youth's 
social committee. The youths formed their forums to consider disputes amongst their own socio-
religious groups. The formation of the committee seems to have emanated from partially a 
response to the rejection of the customary courts and Sufi-oriented social gatherings on the one 
hand, and the perceived failure of the Sharia courts on the other. Informants said that the pushing 
factor behind the genesis of this informal institution is that the Sharia court is not working 
adequately due to its limited constitutional rights, the interferences of the political system, and 
inefficiency of the Qadis. It informally considers marriage contract, disputes between husband 
and wife, and supports the needy. The group does not have its structure, yet gathers whenever a 
need arises. It is led by youth who are university graduates and civil servants. The group does not 
have a name, yet it is widely preferred by those youths who are now becoming emerging Siltie 
elites.  
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Figure 10 Elders commencing dispute settlement process with blessing in the customary court (Alicho-Wuriro Wereda) 
5.8. The Revival of the Sufi Shrines as Centers of Dispute Settlement: A Battle Ground 
between State and Non-State Actors 
The local religious centers where the local people perform local religious practices and dispute 
resolution have faced various challenges in the past half and two decades. The local community 
has developed various versions for the contradictory natures of the roles the forums play in the 
community. It is mentioned that local Sheiks like families of Alkesiye controlled Islamic Council 
and Shari'a courts for more than three decades. These individuals gave attention to Sufi 
teachings. Nevertheless, the expansion of Salafi teachings and the rise of Muslim youths who 
criticize Sufi Shrines have been mentioned as one of the factors for the decline of the centers 
over the last two decades. It is also indicated that the selection of Siltie Zone Mejlis121 leaders 
and Qadis in 2001 was not based on the consent of the society.122 According to this group of 
informants, Siltie Zone's first Islamic Council members and Shari'a Qadi had been dominated by 
Salafi-oriented scholars. 
                                                     
121 Islamic Councils which have been set up by the government have been called locally as Mejlis. 
122 Interview with Ato Shifa Seid and Ato Kaire Sule in Dalocha and Lanfuro Wereda on March 31, and April1, 
2015, respectively.  
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They also said that the Mejlis could not tolerate other Islamic teachings and tried to influence 
every activity of the Muslims for extended periods of time. It was during this time (2001-
2011/12) that the Salafi movement had developed a strong ground among the Siltie. 
Those who oppose the Salafis, however, accept that the community has learned about Islam 
during this period more than any time in the past. Nevertheless, the Salafi movement could not 
give due attention to the nexus between Islam and Siltie culture which had existed for a long 
time. Thus, the Salafi's forms of teaching have been considered less useful. They have met 
sometimes fierce resistance from the local community. However, the Salafis have become 
successful in disseminating their teachings across the Zone, particularly among the youth. 
Various cultural practices were attacked during this time. But following the new Mejlis’123 
election in 2012, it seems that a Sufi-oriented group comes to power and begins to revitalize 
those religious and cultural practices that had lost significance in the preceding decade. 
According to the young Salafis, and even parts of the local community, however, the new Mejlis 
is not viewed as an institution representing Muslims. But it is seen as a body created for the 
political agenda of the ruling party.  
The post-2012 period has also witnessed the negotiation of Salafists and Sufi-oriented 
movements, due to the introduction of the al-Ahbash124 ideology in the Zone, as mentioned 
previously. As a result of this, faith-based dispute settlement centers are reviving in various areas 
of Siltie. Faith actors' „spiritual leadership“ (the oversight of the negotiation by the dead Sheikh 
from his grave) is the characteristic of most of the faith healing centers or dispute settlement 
centers among the Siltie Meshayik, and Waliye, who are revered or invoked yet are not alive. I 
call this kind of leadership Virtual Leadership, i.e. leading a community without physical 
presence. 
                                                     
123, The local community employs the name Mejlis to call both the federal and zonal Islamic Councils. 
124 Al-ahbash is a religious teaching or an Islamic sect whose origin is mainly attributed to Sheik Abdalla al-Harari’s 
teachings. It is based on Asheriya and Maturdiyya Sufi creeds and dis-communicates the Salafis as, Khafirs /non-
Muslim, who do not follow the true doctrine (Aqeeda) (Kabha and Erlich, 2006). Nevertheless, the Siltie and the 
neighboring Gurage Muslims who address themselves as followers of Qadiriyya and Reshadiy'yya Tariqa of Sufism 
disregard the Ahbash creeds as not true Islam. They said that the Aqeeda of Ahbash does not emanate from the 
Quranic and the prophet's Hadith/traditions/. Rather, it is based on Aqqel or philosophy or logic of the mind. Thus, 
according to my informants, Al-ahbash followers give much emphasis to Aqeel/mind or logical inferences rather 
than the Quran and the Hadith. The Salafis, on the other hand, consider the Al-ahbash as a non-Islamic sect which is 
secretly supported by the Jewish state of Israel, and its objective is weakening Muslims. 
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5.9. Siltie Faith Actors' Approaches to Peace Building 
Despite the fact that various religious traditions have been used to justify conflict and violence 
throughout history, it is also observed that the same religious ideas' are employed for peace 
building processes by religious actors (Appleby, 2012). The Siltie faith actors and customary 
court judges, for instance, always say, „Ladege yaadiginiyane“ (for one who forgives, Allah will 
forgive him) as one of the strategies to settle disputes. They also frequently said that the divine 
reward would be multiplied for the one who forgives first. Mystic construct, and changing the 
negative perceptions of the disputants or the „other,“ and constructing positive relationships by 
interpreting the dispute positively, rather than exacerbating enmity or revenge are also 
approaches dispute settlers employ for peace building among the local community. 
Berche, defined as an unresolved dispute or hidden wrongdoing, among disputants of the past, is 
also taken seriously as a factor for one to resort to violence (See below more about Berche). 
Here, religious precepts like forgiveness and divine reward have been well utilized as a powerful 
tool to end disputes among parties. Studies show that irrespective of how they are used or 
abused, most religious systems incorporate ideals of peace, and promise peace as the outcome of 
their application (Seid and Fun 2001:31).  
All religious traditions embody a wide variety of cultural and moral resources which have 
configured the basis of personal and communal values that support nonviolence and prevent 
conflicts. Therefore, religion can play a constructive role in peace-building and reconciliation. 
Understanding the social, psychological, and cultural processes that play an important part in the 
way that religious texts are perceived can also significantly contribute towards that end 
(ibid.:26). Moreover, religion can bring social, moral, and spiritual resources to the peace-
building process. It can also inflict a sense of engagement and commitment both to peace and to 
transforming a relationship of a missing dimension from the mechanical and instrumental 
conflict resolution models (ibid.). Religious commitment can become a significant boost for 
engaging in peace building activities and bringing about social change. Engaging in religious 
peace building can provide a spiritual basis for transformation and compensate for mechanical 
and instrumental conflict resolution models. In addition, religious traditions offer rich resources 
for resolving conflicts by advocating values such as repentance, forgiveness, justice and 
patience, among others.  
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These values may be used to promote peace and non-violence by emphasizing common 
humanity and encouraging co-existence. Religious rituals and values can be powerful tools in 
transforming hatred and animosity into cooperation. Furthermore, religious values, beliefs, 
customs, and institutions can assist in healing deep social and personal injuries (ibid.: 32). 
Faith-based actors employ some techniques to resolve disputes among the Siltie. To begin with, 
religious leaders teach the people about peace and forgiveness during religious sermons (such as 
the Jumma Khutba-Friday sermon) emphasizing forgiveness and developing harmonious 
relationships, both among human beings and humans with the Devine, as a source of blessings 
and reward in the hereafter. Here, faith leaders emphasize nonviolence over violence and for 
forgiveness (‘afu) over retribution, to get the blessings of both worlds. Secondly, local belief 
dispute settlers also employ local religious institutions like Liqas and Sufi Shrines (monthly 
Thursdays) as dispute settlement forums for transferring messages of peace and cooperation 
among the members of the belief and beyond. Third, both religious and customary court dispute 
settlers employ religious precepts as a strategy for restructuring relationships between disputants. 
Fourthly, dispute settlers also narrate mythologies that embody the failures and success of 
individuals who could not stick to the faith's values and decisions of dispute settlers or abide by 
them respectively. Actors also employ faith-based centers not only as centers of dispute 
settlements among the members of the community but also as places for political mobilization 
for the inter-ethnic dispute between the Siltie and the Gurage that lasted for a decade since 1991 
(Zerihun 2013:149). 
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Figure 11 Siltie and neighboring communities gather at Shamsul-Jemal Mosque Alkeso Town for annual Alkeso Mawlid 
celebrations (July, 2016).  
I learned from the various local legal experts and customary court judges' narrations that the 
customary court actors consider and portray their jobs (mediating work) as having been 
bestowed upon them by Allah as a Trustee. This can be regarded as a strategy to strengthen 
dispute settlers' power. Dispute settlers also employ narrating religious myths, and stories as 
strategies to reinforce their legitimacy. These stories help them justify their job and accumulate 
power. What makes dispute settlers particularly special in this regard is that they employ both 
religious and cultural ideas to strengthen and win legitimacy. They also employ legal ideas from 
state judiciary to give verdicts. Thus, hybridization of the legal sphere seems to be an emerging 
socio-legal practice among the local community.  
The elders also associate the various calamities and accidents including environmental disasters 
like earthquakes, drought, the delay of rain, or personal ones, such as car accidents, illness or 
failure in business, to Berche, and the inability to implement the decisions of elders or faith 
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leaders in the dispute settlement process. They firstly look for crimes or any wrongdoing in the 
family of the accuser, for it is believed among the Siltie that anyone can perpetrate a crime or 
become a victim of one or another form of accident owing to an unaddressed Berche in his 
family, relatives or lineage up to his ancestors. This is also one of the strategies elders employ to 
reinforce their legitimacy since only legal experts or Ragas can interpret Berche or its 
repercussions. The strategy also helps local dispute settlers calm down the conflict between 
disputants as dispute settlers will make both parties responsible for the dispute case.   
Seid and Fun further expound that faith plays an important factor for conflict and conflict 
resolution. They underline that faith constitutes a strong set of cultural norms and values and 
embraces „the most profound existential issues of human life (e.g., freedom and inevitability, 
fear and faith, security and insecurity, right and wrong, sacred and profane)“ (2001: 1). As a 
result of this, faith is deeply mixed up in individual and social conceptions of peace. It is against 
the backdrop of all these potential roles that religion has remained a dynamic force in the history 
of man and society (Ani Casimir et al. 2014).  
5.9.1. Islamic Precepts as Strategies to Settle Disputes 
It is widely observed among the Siltie also that forgiveness or Afeytu is consistently held out as 
the preferred option for the local community in matters of requiting clear injustice or crime 
among the faith-based modes of dispute settlements. Informants accentuate that this idea has 
been taken from Islamic teachings. The Siltie religious dispute settlers also employ different 
Islamic legal sources like the Quran, the Prophet's Hadith, /Ijmah/ the agreed upon legal 
interpretations of the four schools of law, analogy or Qiyas as well as Ijtihad, one's logical 
inferences. Thus, the Islamic legal systems have also been characterized by plurality. The local 
informants further explain that even if the Qadi are partly trained in traditional Islamic 
educational centers and give credit to popular opinion and traditions of the societies, the local 
community could not mainly go to Shari'a courts to settle disputes. My Qadi informants said that 
this is partly due to lack of enough awareness about the rights the court gives to the community 
and the constitutional impediments that stipulate two parties must agree to settle their disputes in 
the Shari'a court (Art.34(5)). Other factors for this problem will be explicated below. Islamic 
legal pluralism is witnessed not only by the existence of the various Islamic schools of thoughts 
but also by the presence of local belief systems such as Sufi shrines and courts of Meshayiks. 
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5.9.2. Islamic Pluralism: The Existence of Various Mechanisms to settle Disputes 
According to my informants, most of the Qadi who are working in the Shari'a courts are trained 
in Shafi'i school of law. The Qadis profile, however, indicates that four of the eight have degrees 
in Islamic law from various Islamic institutions in Saudi Arabia. Thus, having Quranic and 
Hadith knowledge is given precedence during the selection process. Three of the Qadi have 
reached the highest level of Fiqh like Feq'ul Muqarena (The four schools of law agreed upon 
rulings, laws) that is important to consider all cases from the perspectives of the four Islamic 
laws. Nevertheless, there are some youth and sections of the community who also said that 
abiding by the four schools is not mandatory since the Quran and Hadith are the primary sources 
than referring to the Madhabs. The Qadis indicate that even if the Shafi'i Madhhab is the 
dominant school of law in the area, they use other interpretations of the three Islamic scholars to 
consider some issues like women's right during divorce which have not been interpreted by the 
Shaff'i school of law. The Shaff'i law, for instance, expounds that a female can inherit half of the 
property with her husband during divorce if only both declare that the property is acquired after 
marriage. The state courts also consider this case more or less in the same way. However, if both 
have not acquired the property during marriage and if both do not have children, the woman can 
only get 1/8 of the property. However, some of the Qadis said that they are employing the Abu 
Hanafi Madhhab that clearly declares a woman must get 50 % of the property whether both 
claim to have acquired it together or not. According to this school, their living together is enough 
to divide the property equally. Thus, the Qadi stress that they employ the combination of the four 
scholars' interpretations of Islamic laws whenever relevant in the court proceedings. They also 
underline that the Shari'a law has multiple options to treat a case of property right, unlike other 
legal systems. It is clear that using different legislation to settle cases is not only important to 
attract clients, but is also one of the strategies the Qadis employ to compete with the youth and 
the state courts. Despite this advantage to women in the Shari’a law, there are low number of 
cases that are initiated by women referred to the courts. This can be seen from the legitimacy 
crisis the Sharia courts are facing. Nevertheless, some women informants indicate that they are 
choosing the Shari’a courts than state courts to settle divorce cases. This is due to the possibility 
of bribery of state court judges by their husbands who can easily bribe some judges in the state 
courts than manipulating Sharia Qadis. 
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Qadi informants explain further that they are employing the following five ways or mechanisms 
to settle disputes whenever they consider dispute cases in their respective courts. For the Siltie 
Qadi, the four Schools of law are not mandatory to the courts indicating the changing 
orientations and the practical nature of the Shari'a courts. Rather, the following are the main legal 
sources for the Shari'a courts' activities. These are the Quran, the Prophet's Hadith, Ijmah/ the 
agreed upon legal interpretations of the four schools of law, /Qiyas/ analogy, and Ijtihad/one's 
logical inferences/. 
5.10. Local Community's and Actors' Perceptions on Religious Courts 
5.10.1. Why Are Shari'a Courts „more preferred „than others? Views from the Court 
Actors  
According to my Qadi informants125, women prefer the Shari'a court more than men do for the 
following reasons. The Shari'a court will give 2/3 inheritance rights to the women during 
termination of marriage if she has got children; otherwise, she will be given 1/4th of the wealth 
irrespective of her contribution to the asset. However, the Qadis indicate that having equal 
contribution to the property is a number one prerequisite to get equal inheritance right in state 
courts during divorce. Thus, informants suggest that even if the property is inherited from 
parents, or generated privately by the husband, the wife is entitled to get 1/4 of the assets during 
divorce in the Shari'a court. Moreover, the Shari'a law gives priority for elders’ mediation before 
considering divorce cases as clearly stipulated in the Quran/Verse,33/. If the Qadi divorces 
couples without giving a chance for elders, and if the disputants appeal, the verdict will be 
reversed. Local religious leaders126 also teach that the Quran strongly recommends elders' 
involvement in a marital dispute. They also stress that Allah dislikes divorce. Thus, elders' 
reconciliation is given priority by the Qadis in the court. Moreover, unlike the state courts or the 
customary courts, the Qadi consider every case in their offices without the presence of the court 
attendee that gives them the chance to mediate the disputants and hear their cases including their 
secrets freely. Thus, disputants, mainly women, resort to Shari'a court to pursue their cases.  
                                                     
125 Interview with Hajji Abdulhadi Ahmed, Hajji Zakir, Hajji Shemsu, Ato Sadik on August 27, 28 and 29, Werabe 
Town. These individuals are important religious figures who establish Siltie Islamic Council, and Shari'a courts in 
the early 2000s.They also worked as President of the Council, and Qadis in different areas. 
 
126 Taken from Friday sermon from Sheik Nuredin at Umar Mosque 30 December 2016 Werabe Town. 
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Additionally, the Shari'a court is flexible in its consideration of cases than mere sanctioning of 
norms. The Qadis also stress that the Shari'a gives due attention to the values and norms of the 
people. The informants further explain that since the Qadi are partly trained in traditional Islamic 
educational centers, they give credit to popular opinion and traditions of the societies. Despite all 
these advantages, it is observed that the local community did not prefer taking dispute cases to 
Shari'a courts. Qadi informants said that one of the factors to the decline of the significance of 
the courts is attributed to the local community's lack of enough awareness of the rights the court 
gives to them and the constitutional impediments which prevent the Shari'a courts from operating 
fully (Art.34(5)). 
5.10.2. Local Community's perceptions on Religious Courts: Voices from Various Social 
Groups 
The Shari'a courts have met challenges from some actors like the state, the state court judges, 
and the community. To begin with, the significance of the Shari'a court seems dwindling in the 
eyes of the community due to internal and external factors. Some factors can be counted for the 
decline of the importance of the courts. First, the courts do not have legitimacy by the local 
community. This is because parts of the community have the perception that the Qadi and Mejlis 
leaders are not working for the Muslims. They consider the Shari'a Qadis and Muslim leaders 
who are appointed by the government as serving the political agenda of the state. The members 
of the local community also said that even if there are some competent Qadis in the Shari'a 
courts, they are not working freely due to the constitutional impediments and the budget 
constraints the government allocates to the courts. Members of the local community further said 
that they do not also believe that Qadis have sound knowledge of the secular laws to 
comparatively see the jurisdiction, and follow the procedural laws. Moreover, they do not also 
believe that the Shari'a courts' decisions are binding, for they have observed most of the time that 
the police do not accept the Qadis' orders and bring the culprit to the court and not also fully 
execute the decisions. This can also be partly shared by a Qadi informant's experience on Sharia 
court's relation with the police department. He said that the Wereda police released a culprit from 
jail, who was imprisoned after his case was considered by Dalocha Wereda Shari'a court, by 
disrespecting its verdict in 2008.127 Moreover, my local community informants said that they do 
not want to go to Shari'a courts for marriage contracts, for they consider Nikah contracts 
                                                     
127 Interview with Qadi Ahmed/pseudonym/ on 23 August 2015, Werabe town. 
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everywhere as Islam gives them the right to do so provided that one fulfills the requirements. 
Thus, they stress that going to Shari'a courts is not mandatory. 
According to other key informants128, the Shari'a court does not have legitimacy among the local 
community due to the following reasons. First, it has been organized based on the structures and 
demands of the government rather than the needs of the community. Thus, it is more answerable 
to the state and loyal to the state's structure rather than to Islam. Second, the Qadi appointment is 
not based on meritocracy, and hence religious knowledge is not considered as a prerequisite for 
appointment to the courts of Shari'a. Informants said that those religious leaders who are known 
for their discipline and religious knowledge remain at home. They consider that the courts do not 
work based on the Shari'a principle. Rather, just like any other secular court, it suffers from 
networking, insufficient workforce and financial crisis. The Qadi sometimes conclude Nikah 
contracts in the middle of marriage or after the two parties lived for a while. One of my key 
informants explained that the Shari'a court is not treated well by the state court as well. Third, the 
self-perceptions of the Qadis who did not consider themselves as having authority to judge due 
to lack of both secular and Islamic knowledge have contributed to the case too. I observed129 that 
except the Shari'a High Court Qadi, other courts did not have computers for writing. As my 
informants said this is one of the strategies the state uses to weaken the Shari'a courts. Moreover, 
the Qadi could not evaluate their plans, and activities together, and the state supreme court also 
cannot include their reports in their quarterly, mid-term, and annual reports. Both the state court 
judges and Qadis said that the state court was working with the Shari'a courts previously, and the 
tribunals' programs were included in the Zonal court plans. This situation plays a major role in 
getting respect and support from zonal and wereda officials.  
The Qadi130 of Zonal High Shari'a Court admitted that some cases like women's rights are not 
protected well by the court. He stressed that this is due to the inefficiency and inability of Qadi 
rather than Shari'a. He said further that if the Qadis are well educated in Shari'a law, they can 
easily understand that Shari'a gives much right and protect the rights of the Muslim community 
than others.  
                                                     
128 Interview with Ato Mustafa, an ex-judge, Sheik Kedir, a Mejlis leader and Weizero Amina/Pseudo names/, zonal 
official and Qadis from Silti and Werabe areas in February, March 2015. 
129 I visited three of the six Shari'a courts to observe how the courts consider cases and collect data. I saw that except 
the Zone High court, others are not well equipped materially.  
130 Interview with Hajji Mifta Seid on 15 December 2015 Werabe Town.  
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The other factor that has been mentioned for the decline of the significance of Shari'a courts is 
the roles of legal representatives. Some informants also said that the attorneys advise their 
customers to go for state courts, for they could not get the translated Shari'a codes to stand as 
legal representative for their clients. Thus, the absence of translated Shari'a codes is one of the 
factors affecting the Shari'a courts’ operation in the area, and possibly beyond. Last but not least, 
the state did not allocate enough finance for the courts, and the state court presidents also 
administer the Shari'a court budgets in their respective areas. This state of affair complicates the 
activities of the courts131. Some sources both from the state and Shari'a courts132 further indicate 
that the Qadis were trained on the procedural law in 2002 and 2008 by Regional State Supreme 
and Zonal High courts. According to the Qadi informants, the state procedural law which shows 
how to process dispute cases is helping them to compile cases well. As it indicates how a case 
can legally be pursued, from initiating and hearing the cases to final verdict, the procedural law 
has facilitated their activities smoothly. The major aspect of the procedural law is the fact that it 
requires a legal expert to prepare documents and follow cases that are not easy for the Qadis who 
do not have enough knowledge on secular law procedures. According to my Qadi and state judge 
informants, the Qadi were helped by co-judges in procedural law from 2008 to 2010. Nowadays, 
the Zone High Court is not providing any support for the reason not clear to them. 
According to the state court sources, the Qadi are not getting help other than some kinds of 
capacity building training like training on procedural law. The same sources believe that the 
Qadi are not supported financially well due to the overall budget shortages as the financial 
aspects of the state court itself has fallen under the strict control of the executive body in the 
Zone. They further explain that they are functioning at the mercy of the executive body for their 
expenses including car and other logistical aspects.133 Thus, some internal and external factors 
have affected the legitimacy of Sharia courts in the area and beyond (Mohammed Abdo, 2010). 
Thus, one can say that the religious legal systems, especially Shari'a courts do not have equal 
legal footings in the area. However, we can also say that faith-based legal actors have used their 
agency to appeal to the community and end disputes. 
                                                     
131. Interview with zonal High state court judges and Qadis /Anonymous/, and deep narrative talks with members of 
the various state court judges and Presidents in July and August 2015, Silti, Werabe. 
132 Interview with zonal High state court judge/Anonymous/, and deep narrative talks with members of the various 
state court judges and presidents in July and August 2015, Silti, Werabe.  
133 Interview with zonal high state court judge/Anonymous/, and deep narrative talks with members of the various 
state court judges and presidents in July and August 2015, Silti, Werabe. 
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5.11. Forum Shopping and Intra-Faith Interactions  
The ways contemporary religious figures present themselves, as well as how stories of the 
Waliye are narrated, contributes to the significance of religious centers and the Meshayik 
amongst the local community. Self-presentation also affects the forum shopping tendency among 
the local community. Forum shopping is briefly defined as disputants' choice of one or another 
mode of dispute settlement to end their differences hoping for the best outcome of a dispute 
(Benda-Beckman 1979:117). Religious figures that the local community considers Waliyes are 
highly respected among the Siltie.  
Studies show that the people respect and visit the place of these figures for various reasons 
including dispute settlement. Respecting as well as venerating the religious figures constitutes 
one of the central religious and communal practices of the Siltie (Zerihun 2013:139). Local 
religious centers are also places of festivity, where the local and neighboring communities 
strengthen their Islamic identity and exchange various ideas about their social and natural 
environments. Additionally, the local religious scholars have significant roles among the Siltie; 
not only are they the main figures for the expansion of Islam, but they are also considered as 
Waliyes who interpret Islamic teachings and teach morality as well as intervene for blessings 
from Allah. I observed that the local community resorts to local religious actors for blessings as 
well as prayers during bad times like drought and other natural calamities.  
Thus, faith-based institutions serve as avenues for dispute settlement horizontally among human 
beings on the one hand and areas of channeling interactions vertically between humans and the 
Devine, on the other. Also, the local religious centers, their veneration, and pilgrimage to them 
serve as a centripetal force for the Siltie and for the neighboring ethnic groups as well. Studies 
also show that saints and pilgrimage to their shrines can be taken as an „integrative force“ and 
have integrative functions (Shack 1964, Pankhurst 1994, Zerihun, 2013). This circumstance also 
portrays the pivotal role faith-based dispute settlers’ play for peace building on one hand, and 
help the centers maintain their significance amid growing criticism from Islamic reform 
movements, on the other. This, however, is now changing as active, young, educated Salafi 
Imams134 are becoming more prominent than elders.  
                                                     
134 An Imam is a religious leader who leads congregational prayers in at a Mosque. 
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Studies in the area indicate that although the growing influence of Islamic reformist movements 
among the Siltie has got momentum since the 1990s, the local Islamic practices such as Warrie, 
Liqa, and Mawlids of the local religious figures continue operating using a number of strategies. 
The local community resisted the interventions of local officials who considered Warrie as “anti-
development“ (Zerihun 2013:50), using strategies such as refusing attending government 
meetings (Scot, 1985), and at times even resorting to violence (Zerihun 2013:50). For the past 
five or more years, these practices have revived as a result of the government's change of tack, as 
it became concerned about the growing influence of the Islamic reformist movements in the 
country. Due to its nearness to the Middle East, the dynamics of Islamic movements in Ethiopia 
has been followed closely by Western strategists (Erlich, 2007). Alkeso Shrine has been given 
attention by academics such as Erlich, who saw the promotion of Sufi movements as a counter 
strategy to the development of Islamic reform movements (Erlich, 2007; Mohammed Dejen, 
2016) which may come to oppose Western interests in the region. The other factor that 
contributes to the rise of faith-based dispute settlement centers can be related to the decline of the 
state legal system. The prevalence of bad governance, shortage of trained judges, and 
interference from the political system have been mentioned as factors for the decline of the 
legitimacy of the judiciary (Baker2013:202-218). 
Moreover, the attempted introduction of the „al-Ahbash ideology“ in the last seven years has 
played a role in narrowing the gap between the reformists and the local Sheiks. Following the 
widespread dissemination of Al-Ahbash sect, the Sufi Sheiks and young, educated Muslims have 
negotiated on the role of local religious figures, since both consider the „al-Ahbash“ as a new 
sect that can challenge the practices of Islam. In this vein, the reformists accept the historical 
roles of the Waliyes and their Mawlids for the expansion of Islam. The Sheiks, on the other hand, 
begin to consider the youths' criticisms as naive rather than disregard for their roles. However, 
this negotiation seems temporary as the reformists will not accept the various local Islamic 
practices which they regard as „bida’a“or innovations. However, what makes both groups 
unified for the moment is they accept the roles faiths can play in dispute settlement in the area. 
Although the religious significance of the „traditional” Sheikhs or Waliye and their veneration 
sites are not totally rejected, the young, educated Muslims have got an influential role in 
changing the perception of the way Islam was historically practiced and represented among the 
majority of Muslims (Zerihun 2013:151). 
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 Studies also show that not all Meshayiks' sites fall under criticism by Islamic reformists (ibid.: 
153). As mentioned above, the approbation of some Sufi practices by the reformists has 
characterized Islam among the Siltie 
5.12. The Roles of Local Belief and Values for Dispute Settlement: Agents of 
Hybridization 
The beliefs, values, and norms local dispute settlers employ are playing important roles in 
maintaining peace and harmony in the area. One can say that the various values and norms the 
people use in day to day activities can be considered as social control mechanisms which help 
the society maintain not only social order among members of the local community but also its 
interaction with other creatures and the natural environment. This is because the Siltie's ideas of 
the right to live, as they call it, Berche is a general notion that gives value not only to human life 
but also to everything, including animals and other material creations alike. The underlying 
principle of the concept of Berche is that „all are created for a purpose''. The notion Tur strongly 
discourages abusing any form of power, be it economic, social, knowledge and authority. It also 
forbids misuse of one’s resources like animals, plants and non-living things including stones. 
Thus, the Siltie believe that no one should abuse his or her power to oppress others, which 
indicates the socially embedded collective thinking about establishing harmony between not only 
humans but also between other animals and the natural world. If someone abuses power or 
resources, he/she may lose his/her God-given blessings or Tur, and bad fortunes called Boze 
Berche will inflict harm on him and on seven generations after him. The unbounded natures of 
the Siltie local values and norms have been manifested in the activities of not only local dispute 
settlers but also of state court judges and Qadis as well. Thus, these beliefs and values can be 
considered as „cultural mechanisms“ (Malinowski 1967:15-16) the local dispute settlers employ 
to maintain social order in the area. Below, I briefly discussed those values, beliefs, and 
procedures used by the local disputes settlers in the study area. 
5.12.1. Fero Or Kunene 
Fero is one of the values that the Siltie consider seriously in their relationship among themselves 
and with others. The concept plays a deterrent role as it curbs a person not to think or commit a 
crime on others. This is because the widely held belief among the Siltie that if someone does any 
crime or abuses others (does Fero), one day in the near or remote future, he/she or his/her 
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children or descendants up to seven generations would commit the same or more than even the 
first crime. The perpetrator himself or his progeny will also be affected by the injustices 
committed by him or by members of the family including losing a life. It is due to this local 
belief that the dispute settlers first probe the opposing parties whether disputants' or their 
ancestors did commit a crime before convening the conflict settlement process. Here, dispute 
settlers make an accuser and the accused partly responsible for the incident by giving them 
assignments to clarify if there is an unaddressed Fero among family members and hence calming 
the tension for a while.  
My key informants135 said that Fero plays a significant role in potentially preventing disputes for 
it will mirror in one's mind the consequences of a wrong act that even subsist forever by passing 
from generation to generation if not addressed well. If one of the parties or both confess that 
there is Fero among the family members, dispute settlers will tell disputants to purify themselves 
from the hidden crime first. This will be done by paying the blood price for the families if it was 
a homicide case or ask forgiveness from the victim/ his/her family members if the case is theft, 
insult, or physical attack. Thus, dispute settlers use Fero as a religious dimension of culture to 
identify any hidden crime or dispute case. They also use the notion as a tool for resolving 
conflicts.  
Fero does not require witnesses; rather, it can manifest itself in due course of time. If someone 
has met continuous accidents or problems like losing money, bankruptcy, failure of crops, losing 
a member of a family, the local community believes that he/she has got Fero or Kunene. They 
will tell the person that he should visit dispute settlers to cleanse him/herself from the perpetual 
calamities of the Fero. In this regard, there is a possibility that neighbors or relatives who suspect 
that there may be a Fero in a person may also be affected by Fero. Thus, it is recommended that 
these individuals should tell or remind the suspect of purifying himself from the hidden case. 
Once they tell to the person, they are considered as cleansed, and Fero will not approach them. I 
have observed136 that the Siltie people are highly scared of Fero in their social relationship. 
                                                     
135‘Interview with Girazmach Hussein Bussere and Ato Kaire Sule on 3 and 10 April 2015 in Dalocha and Lanfuro 
Weredas respectively.  
136 I have noted in the various customary court sessions and in the daily activities that Fero has a central place in the 
interactions between dispute settlers and disputants as well as in the social interactions of the community. 
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5.12.2. Tur 
Tur is also one of the values that the Siltie cherished most in their dealings among themselves, 
with other creatures, neighboring people, and their environment. Tur strongly discourages 
abusing any form of power, be it economic, social, knowledge or authority. It also forbids misuse 
of one’s resources like animals, plants and non-living things including stones. Thus, it is also 
believed among the Siltie that no one should abuse his or her power to oppress others, which 
indicates the socially embedded collective thinking about establishing harmony between not only 
humans but also between other animals and the natural world. Tur connotes good chances such 
as prosperity, health, happiness and many children, and good harvest one wishes to get in his/her 
life. According to this view, one can get good fortune because of his/her own or ancestors' good 
deeds. As an informant137 said, the Siltie consider Tur seriously in their daily activities and doing 
good deeds (Tur) would be the basic factor to gain successes in one's or descendants' life in the 
future.  
It is usual to hear „Beweldahe Tur Ategubl,“ which means, „Do good deeds today, and you will 
get it back later” in the day to day interactions of the Siltie. Therefore, this implies that one can 
lose Tur (fortune) such as power, prestige, and wealth because of evil deeds including becoming 
partial in dispute settlement, for the status of local judge Raga or Maga position can be gained 
either through accumulated Tur by the family or oneself. The Siltie say that „Tur awtote 
elatekashe,“ meaning it is not good to waste resources lavishly after one gets assets of any kind 
in his/her life. My key informants further said that „Manem sebe feye gize berekebe Tur awetote 
elebiye.Tur awetote bozine. Allah yabeneye ayane bewekitike wa besutike tedegelelote 
yatekeshane,” that is to say, „Anyone who gets a good chance or resource in his/her life should 
use it effectively, wisely and efficiently.“ Any bad thing or misfortune is ascribed to the loss of 
Tur in the area. The people say that „Tur Beweld Atigublote Feyane', doing good things and 
being reasonable and impartial in one's judgment in life will deposit multiplied social and even 
economic rewards to the children. In short, Tur means fortune, but this fortune is not something 
gained by chance or luck. Rather, it is believed that one can get Tur because of a person's and 
his/her ancestors' sincere, righteous and good deeds. An important aspect of Tur is that it is not 
                                                     
137 Interview with Ato Abdulwaris Redi on 12, April 2015 in Werabe Town, further ideas collected during 
fieldwork. 
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confined to the lifespan of a person. Thus, it surpasses generations and has the potential to 
manifest itself in the life of the descendants.  
The role of this value and belief system for peacemaking can also be inferred from the fact that 
whenever dispute settlers assemble to look at cases, they employ their power efficiently and 
impartially not to lose Tur. This state of affair plays a pivotal role for dispute settlers to pass a 
fair verdict for both parties and becomes one of the factors that affect forum shopping in the 
existence of many legal setting not only among various legal systems but also among local legal 
actors too. More dispute cases also flow to the local dispute settler who becomes impartial or to 
those who respect the value Tur rather than who abuse it. Thus, elders take every possible 
caution not to unfairly treat anyone or corrupt decisions for the fear that they and their children 
may lose Tur. 
On the other hand, Tur also has a central place in the transfer of authority as a local judge, 
religious as well as clan leadership status from generation to generation or from father to son 
within the family. Based on this belief, respect and legitimacy of power go to the man where Tur 
resides in. It seems that the patriarchal trends affect Tur's directions, for it can only reside in 
boys than girls. Nevertheless, in case a woman is more successful in maintaining Tur, the fortune 
will go to her son, and not to her. There is a possibility for the youngest brother to take all 
prestige and power if he does Tur or has got the blessings of the father. 
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Figure 12 Raga Kedir usually employs faith precepts to end disputes at Raga Odda Tree (Dalocha, Wereda September 
2014).  
It is also believed that evil deed knocks Tur (fortune) out of one's home. Moreover, everyone is 
afraid of losing Tur to accuse another of a lie. Thus, dispute settlers employ Tur as a strategy to 
settle disagreement including disputes among the local community. In short, whenever dispute 
settlers summon in dispute settlement forums to consider cases, they take precautions not to be 
partial i.e. abuse Haq (Justice), for the justice they abuse today could bring misfortune and 
misery to their home. It is based on this general belief that disputants put complete trust on 
dispute settlers. Nevertheless, if dispute settlers abuse Haq (justice), disputants believe that 
Almighty Allah will punish them for their misdeeds. Hence, local dispute settlers have become 
vigilant in the customary court sessions not to lose Tur, and Tur helps them strengthen their legal 
agency.  
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5.12.3. Berche: the Local Notion of Justice 
Berche is also another local value and concept the Siltie consider in their day-to-day relations 
with each other and with other groups. This belief also has a deterrent role for Berche is observed 
or considered seriously in the daily activities of the people, and it is widely believed that getting 
rid of Berche, indecent act, is crucial for preventing from committing a crime. My respondents 
said that138 „Berche involves relationships and interactions ranging from the way one treats 
his/her domestic animals such as cat, dog, and donkey to the treatment of people of different 
class, power, and wealth.“ Berche has the inverse meaning of Tur. It has two categories, namely 
Feye Berche/Good deed or fortune/ and Boze Berche /Bad fortune/. The second category 
involves the loss of Tur (fortune) following one's evil deeds. It is manifested in the suffering of 
an individual or her/his family from property loss, diseases, panic, anxiety, loss of children and 
various unpleasant things one would try to avoid in life. My key informants139 said, „Hade sebe 
boze bile bashe Bercheke tayewile tayandire yejejebiyane. Berchewa humare unga elegefere 
yilene. Yasuye Berche wale teyandire lijejanoko. Betani yeneke Teboze Berche Selam! 
Yeleneye,” which literally means „If a given individual wronged somebody, he/she might get the 
result of it immediately. That is why we say as a proverb donkey and evil deed do not leave the 
road. Moreover, that is why we stress keeping oneself away from bad things as an important 
factor for success in life.” Berche on the other hand implies the right to live as its meaning is 
comprehensive, and compels one to value everything including non-living things. Thus, suffering 
from Berche is believed to be the result of a misdeed or abuse of Tur by one or one’s family. 
According to this idea, if power or wealth is abused, Berche awaits at the door to get into. The 
all-encompassing and powerful nature of Berche can be understood from the fact that it can 
come by the wet tongue when one talks about things such as crimes without evidence, constant 
talk of blood cases140, hearing bad things and spreading news of bad acts without at least saying 
„May Allah keep me from the repercussions of bad Berche“ can also become channels for 
Berche.  
                                                     
138 Interview with Ato Kaire Sule on February 10 /2015, Ato Dilebo Gebre on March 7, 2015, in Werabe Town. 
 
139' Interview with Girazmach Hussein Bussere and Ato Kaire Sule on 3 and10 April 2015 in Dalocha and 
LanfuroWeradas 
140 The Siltie believe that talking about homicide or murder cases overtly can perpetuate homicide incidents. For 
them, „Silence is part of healing the wound“(Bellagamba, 2011) which is an integral part of local modes of dispute 
settlement.  
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It is due to the central place the notion of Berche has among the Siltie that one can always hear 
the phrase, „Teboze Berche Selam,“ which means, „Let me get rid of all forms of evil Berche.” 
Based on this belief, if dispute settlers become partial in judgment or abuse Haq (truth), the spirit 
of bad Berche would possess both dispute settlers and their descendants. Moreover, Berche is 
seriously considered by disputants whenever one of them or both accuse the other of a crime. In 
this vein, if a disputant accuses the other with false evidence, bad Berche will overtake him or 
bring an ill fortune on himself and on members of his/her family, and the ill fortune includes 
poverty and misfortune in life which persist up to seven generations. The Siltie also say, „Berche 
eladigim eledigedigim”, which means, Berche will never hurry to backfire, and will not also 
forsake its perpetrator. Such fears of Berche enable dispute settlers to deliver Haq (justice) in the 
dispute settlement forums. It also warns a person not to accuse the other of a lie. I also observed 
in the field that elders, disputants, witnesses, and legal representatives as well as state court 
judges frequently employ these belief systems during dispute settlement processes both in the 
state and local dispute resolution forums. The following excerpt from one of the state judges will 
help us understand how local beliefs and values are cross-referenced and have power in 
influencing the state court proceedings. The judge said that:  
„When I sit in the Court Hall presiding over dispute cases, especially 
divorce case, I do not usually refer to the legal norms and the revised 
family laws. Rather, I am scared of Berche. Even if I found enough 
evidence that can become a factor in terminating a marriage, I am afraid 
of Berche because if I facilitate the divorce and dissolve the family here 
in the court, I believe that I may find my family dissolved. Thus, I ask 
court attendants to leave the courtroom and talk with disputants freely. I 
usually advise them to drop the case and go to the customary courts for 
reconciliation. I was successful in aborting some serious divorce cases. 
However, if I thought that Berche's limit ends its negative impact after 
asking the disputants to reconcile several times, I will let them do what 
they want.141"  
                                                     
141 Interview with Nesere Issa, a state court judge, and worked as ad-hoc president of Siltie Zone High Court on 
December 28/2015 in Werabe town. He is now a legal expert in Siltie Zone Security Administration department.  
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5.12.3.1. Case 4. Berche as a Socially Imbedded Value: Explanation from a Woman 
While I was traveling for the purpose of collecting data in different part of Siltie and its 
neighbors, a woman in her 50s had got into a Minibus on 9 May 2015. The car was on its way 
from Werabe to Butajira Town. A woman called Amina has worked as local Chat seller. She was 
buying Khat from Alicho Wuriro Wereda, Kutere Town. She was taking it to Kibet Town, Silti 
Wereda for selling. On our way, she began to explain the power of Berche and its implications in 
social life if not taken seriously. Then, some of the passengers began to talk about a homicide 
case that was the news of the time. She said,  
"It is unusual to hear that a husband, a father of seven can kill the mother 
of his children. We also heard about the hitherto unheard cases in various 
parts of Siltie zone in 2014/15 years. The area experienced an 
earthquake, drought, and violent murder cases and a large number of 
divorce cases unlike other years in 2014/15. There was news from 
Alicho Wuriro Wereda about a man who killed his wife and committed 
suicide after that incident. For the Siltie, this episode has some woeful 
messages. Do not we have elders who can intervene in the case, and end 
Berche? The case should be seen seriously as it was unusual. We heard 
from our fathers and ancestors that anything cannot happen without a 
cause. Homicide is a result of unaddressed homicide in one's family. 
Elders have ascribed it to an unaddressed Berche in the family, and in the 
Wereda. It was said that the man who killed his wife and killed himself 
after that in March 2015 had got Berche when he was working in Oromia 
region, Agaro Town. It was said that he had beaten and killed some 
individuals who were working with him. You know Berche cannot be 
avoided if not addressed well.” 
This woman raised an interesting idea to show why one should give due attention to the blood of 
someone and stressed that violation of rights in the presence or absence of a witness would bring 
about severe consequences sometime in the future. She then added, 
"If one cuts his finger while cutting an onion with a knife, the hand that held 
the knife should recompense the one which was cut by providing various 
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things that help recover the finger well. If someone kills a chicken, he should 
pay a chicken by buying it even for himself, and if not he will kill sheep, and 
if he kills sheep, he will shoot a cow provided that he cannot pay the lost 
animal back. Moreover, if someone kills a cow, and could not address it well 
or pay it back, he will resort to killing a human being. We believe in the 
strong power of Berche that has a great power to influence our everyday 
lives."  
Thus, both the interview and the case clearly indicate the unbounded natures of local values and 
norms which influence not only local dispute settlers but also Qadis and state court judges in the 
courthouses as well. They also illustrate how state and non-state legal actors are cross-
referencing various legal and social norms to consider cases which in turn boost their legal 
agencies. They further indicate how local values are socially embedded and have a strong impact 
on the daily lives of the local community. The cases also clearly underscore that local legal 
actors consider dispute cases by putting oneself in the shoes of the disputants. This makes 
dispute settlers feel the pain of others and helps them provide appropriate decisions. Respondents 
also said that Berche inflicts much harm in those circumstances whereby the majority oppresses 
the minority and when anyone abuses the needy, the marginalized, as well as those the society 
considers as vulnerable groups such as orphans. Thus, Berche is serving as immunity for socially 
isolated parts of the society and has also become the weapon of the weak (Scot, 1985) and serves 
the local communty as instrument of justice.  
5.12.4. Swearing Ritual ( Terte) 
Terte (swearing ritual) is also another local value dispute settlers employ during local modes of 
dispute settlement processes. According to my interviewees142, the disputants, the witnesses or 
the „Mulli143„, as the Siltie call them, and the defendants are expected to make an oath (Terte) 
before the commencement of dispute resolution process. These individuals swear in front of 
dispute settlers to show their sincerity and impartiality.  
Terte also implies that disputants and witnesses stand for their rights and do not want to violate 
others’ rights and will not give false witness.  
                                                     
142'Interview with Gerad Hussein Bussiere and Ato Kaire Sule on 3 and10 April 2015 in Dalocha and 
LanfuroWeradas, respectively. 
143 Mulli is a name given to witnesses in the customary dispute settlement sessions.  
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The Siltie also believe that if those individuals who give witnesses or the Mulli vow falsely to 
give witness, the Almighty Allah will bring dangerous consequences including death on them 
and their descendants. It is also believed among the Siltie that any individual who gives false 
evidence on somebody and commits Fero will get the penalty of his/her evil deeds afterward. 
Since they are afraid of losing Tur or the result of Fero, the witnesses do not resort to false 
witness as well as false accusations. Thus, Terte (Oath) also helps elders facilitate dispute 
settlement process more efficiently than even the state court. Therefore, one can say that the 
various values and belief systems of the Siltie play a pivotal role as effective cultural 
mechanisms for identifying the hidden crimes that cannot otherwise be identified by the state 
legal system. It is mainly because of these values and beliefs that the state court judges refer 
those cases that lack enough evidence to pursue the due process of law to the customary dispute 
settlement forums. The various values and belief systems of the society are playing significant 
roles in facilitating the conflict resolution and peace building among the Siltie and neighboring 
people. We can also understand that the state systems also incorporate elements of customary 
laws, especially when dealing with family dispute cases. Thus, this is an indication of the 
existence of a process of „cross-fertilization where rules in one system are shaped by and are 
shaping those in another „(Griffiths 1998:134). 
5.13. Concluding Remarks 
The process of the modern state building that has started since the late 19th century has also 
marked the onset of legal pluralism on one hand and the local community’s resistance of state's 
intervention into the local affairs, on the other. Pluralism also characterizes the state and the 
religious legal systems. The state legal system has also suffered from political interferences that 
affect the legitimacy of the state judiciary which in turn has contributed to the re-emergence of 
neo-traditional leadership as well as local forms of dispute settlement. The state officials have 
also encroached upon the judiciary in the guise of development, and this also indicates the 
practical challenges legal pluralism faces in the area and possibly beyond. The religious legal 
systems have continued to operate, resisting the various problems including the constitutional 
impediments and political interferences. 
The emergence of young and educated Muslims who begin also replacing the hitherto respected 
traditional Sheiks can also be mentioned as a setback for the activities of local Sheiks in the area. 
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The local values and norms have been playing deterrent roles in that they have been potentially 
preventing the local community from resorting to crimes. They have also become instrumental 
for local dispute settlers to enforce decisions of customary courts. The state and non-state legal 
actors have taken various legal and social norms from different legal sources to consider dispute 
cases. The legal cross referencing have contributed to the relative peaceful natures of the area on 
the one hand and have also boosted the legal agency of local dispute settlers, on the other.  
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  CHAPTER SIX 
6. THE SOCIO-LEGAL, AND CULTURAL MILIEU OF SILITE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter explores the different non-state dispute settlement institutions operating in the study 
area. The chapter suggests that Siltie's legal landscape consists of at least three legal systems, 
namely: the state law; the customary law, and the religious laws. Each of these systems are 
inherently heterogeneous, contain a plurality of elements. Beside the state law, customary 
systems are composed of elders' courts, clan courts, and Raga courts, while the religious legal 
landscape comprises Shari'a courts, courts of local Mashayik/Waliyes144, and courts of 
internationally and nationally renowned Sheiks such as Abdul Qadir Jailani and Sheik Hussein 
of Bale. Actors of customary courts also employed the religious dimensions of Siltie culture as a 
strategy to resolve disputes characterized by the existence of overlapping legal systems. My 
empirical data have revealed that followers of Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church resort to 
Siltie customary courts and to the faith-based dispute settlement institutions to conciliate tensions 
between themselves and with the predominantly Muslim Siltie. Also, the local community 
prefers customary and the religious courts more than the state, as the state courts seem to lack of 
legitimacy due to some factors including political interference that affect, among other things, 
the impartiality and the operations of various state courts in the area. In this chapter I intend to 
demonstrate that the local people are resorting to customary law because of a popular mistrust in 
the official juridical system on one hand and the flexibility natures and the local values and 
norms the customary courts base in dealing with dispute cases on the other hand. I also further 
argue that the customary and religious actors manuvere the constitutional concessions and 
employ their agencies to resolve disputes including murder cases. In this regard, the faith-based 
dispute settlers use the customary laws' cultural ground of looking at dispute cases including 
grave crimes (e.g. murder) on which the religious courts are limited constitutionally as a 
                                                     
144Wali or Meshayik refers to a human religious figure, dead or alive, popularly recognized as important Islamic 
symbols by the majority of Muslims. A tomb usually represents it, and in some cases by a mosque, and is associated 
with a shrine. 
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mechanism to take part in the dispute settlement forums. On the other hand, actors in customary 
courts employ Islamic ideas and precepts while considering dispute cases. This leads one to 
conclude even if contestation characterizes the power relations of legal actors, dispute settlers 
also employs their agencies to resolve disputes in a given social setting where the state has a 
strong hold. 
6.2. The Agency of Local Dispute Settlers: A Manifestation of Power Contestation  
Disputes in Siltie are on a broad range of issues: land, murder, body injury, domestic violence, 
debt-related disputes, insult, and arson. Dispute settlers among the Siltie are divided into two 
broad groups: state and non-state actors. Under the first category, we can find the police, the 
Public Prosecutor, the Good Governance and Appeal officers, the state court judges, the 
administration officers, the Revenue Appeal Committee, and the Qebele land administration, a 
state institution at the grassroots level which is responsible for settling land-related disputes. The 
non-state actors in dispute settlement are the Shari'a court Qadis, elders (Baliqe), and family 
forums (Yeaberos Gubae) that mostly dealing with minor family issues like a dispute between 
husband and wife. Clan leaders (Yegicho Dangas), the Youths' Social Committee, faith leaders 
(Sheiks, Liqa) leaders and Warrie leaders (also called Imams) are also categorized under non-
state actors.  
Though Islam has a strong hold among the local community, other actors such as Ethiopian 
Tewahedo church, and Protestant followers and religious leaders are also involved in dispute and 
dispute settlement. Followers of Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church have lived amicably with 
the predominantly Muslim Siltie for more than a century and both have developed mutual respect 
and co-existence strategies emanated from faith-based modes of dispute settlement they cherish 
and from the shared local myths that consider both faiths as brothers. Nevertheless, the 
Protestant's evangelization process has had little acceptance among the local community. In this 
regard, the Protestants are considered as newcomers and intolerant to “otherness.” The 
Protestants' evangelization approach is perceived locally as intrusive. The ethnographic data 
illustrate that followers of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church are integrated well with the 
Siltie.  
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My key Christian informants said that the priests are well integrated in the community and have 
been adopting Siltie language as means of communication for generations. Thus, priests are also 
dispute settlers who are involved in local modes of dispute settlement. 
Religious actors like Qadis in the Shari'a courts are involved in various disputes. Though not 
officially assigned by the Shari'a, Imams, as religious-spiritual leaders, for instance, are preferred 
by some disputing parties as confidants. The Qadis are supposed to address ‘small cases' 
involving religious issues or family matters. The irony, however, is that it is elders or Magas 
who are called whenever a dispute over religion or land or family is reported in the area.  
Magas as heads of a village are among the first local legal actors that should be addressed when 
a conflict arises, sometimes even before approaching the police or the state agencies in the area. 
My key informants said145 that elders are not allowed to resolve conflicts on land issues due to 
the 1995 constitution that does not allow non-state actors to do so. But my daily experiences 
among the people indicate that elders are involved in settling land related dispute cases at various 
levels, which indicates that there exists a difference between what the people say and how they 
really act in the day to day activities.  
On the other hand, the Good Governance and Appeal Sector is not a legal institution, but its staff 
is involved in dispute settlement on land, and some administrative problems at the lower 
administrative levels, and also Zonal levels too. The office sometimes advises the state judiciary 
to give swift justice to the community. This can be an indication of the involvement or 
interference of the political system in the state courts (Baker, 2013; Peter Von Doepp, 2013). The 
office has set up line structures up to the ministerial level. Police officers are also the most 
approached state dispute settlers, especially when non-state dispute settlers have not successfully 
handled conflicts. This is also because some disputing parties' expectations on police officers are 
particularly high. Based on my empirical data, I argue that the legitimacy of the state justice 
systems seems to declining due to some factors. First, the local community expects the legal 
system to prevent or combat violence as well as to prove the innocent right and to penalize the 
culprits, but the data indicates the state justice becomes inefficient in delivering justice to the 
community (Baker, 2013).  
                                                     
145 Interview with Girazmach Hussein Bussera on April 3/2012 in Dalocha Wereda. The informant serves as Chiro- 
Dilapa clans in Dalocha and Hulbareg Weredas. Ato Dilebo Gebre in Alicho Wuriro Wereda. 
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My informants frequently say that „Haq Ele, Haqe qebeti,“ which means, „There is no justice, 
where can we go for justice?“ indicating the less legitimacy state justice has in the area (See 
appendix I to see how members of a community begins to take justice in their own hands).  
The ruling party of the country, EPRDF in its 10th organizational conference admitted that one 
of the challenges that the government faces this day is „lack of good governance including in the 
state judiciary in the country,“ which is indicative of the inefficiency of the state apparatus to 
deliver justice properly to the citizens. The state admits that the biggest problem in the legal 
sector is the inefficiency of the judiciary to provide justice to the people.146 Second, with the 
institutional crisis the state justice system faces, the local dispute settlers like elders and religious 
leaders who have got more legitimacy than the state actors because the former are more 
conversant at the grassroots level than the latter. In addition, I argue further that the plurality of 
dispute settlers among the Siltie points to the various options available to disputing parties or 
forum shopping, when they are involved in a conflict. However, it also raises questions 
concerning each dispute settler's particular competence, the degree of legitimacy to handle 
disputes, and possible forms of cooperation and competition.  
6.3. An Overview of Types of Disputes in the Study Area 
The types of disputes reported in the study area vary from time to time. According to participants 
of FGD147, the Siltie experienced inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflicts in the past. It was also 
not uncommon to see boundary conflicts with the neighboring Mareqo, Oromo, Shashogo, and 
Gurage groupings due to territorial expansions in the area. Furthermore, the Siltie clans disputed 
with each other over grazing land and for supremacy over each other's prerogatives. Thus, 
conflicts previously could arise between individuals or groups from the same clan (Gicho) or 
sub-clan and between clans, and ethnic groups, too. It is elders at the customary court who have 
been involved in resolving the disputes over land. This activity has persisted to date albeit there 
is a constitutional limit to do so.Currently, various types of disputes are reported in the area.  
                                                     
146 Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation News on August 18-21, 2015 Meqele Town. 
147, This is based on FGD that was conducted with the main eight informants in April 2012, November 2015 and 
September 2016 on the annual Siltie History, Culture and Language Symposium in Werabe town. 
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Indeed, some are extremely rare, such as homicide and arson, while others like land and money 
related skirmishes are very common. My field data collected from informants148, the formal court 
at Zonal and Wereda levels, the customary courts, police offices and Good Governance and 
Appeal office outline the major types and causes of disputes in the study area as follow. These 
are disputes over inheritance cases, property disputes including land conflicts between family 
members, physical injury, disputes over grazing land, arson (Garemagdot), theft, and betrayal 
among business partners, homicide, boundary conflicts, and adultery practices. Nevertheless, 
more than any other causes, land shortage has become an acute problem due to the growing 
population in the study area. Therefore, property related disputes are frequently reported both in 
the customary and state courts in the area and have become the primary causes of more serious 
conflicts such as homicide, arson (Garemagdot), and physical injury (e.g. breaking the teeth).  
There are also other disputes with social and cultural dimensions. Key informants149 explain that 
insulting somebody based on his/her social stratification or place of origin with the intention of 
defaming their good reputation can be mentioned as good examples in this regard. These 
insulting words include Fuga (potters), Faqi (Tanner), Kurkura (blacksmith), Mete/Outsider/ and 
Allega (non-Siltie). The social seclusion tendencies also indicate the existence of one or another 
form of sub-ethnic and ethnic level discriminations. However, the Siltie demonstrate that they 
have zero tolerance for discrimination as one informant said „the Siltie are working everywhere 
and should also think accordingly.“ Thus, calling somebody by these words and showing 
xenophobic trends are strongly condemned and socially regulated. They are also considered as a 
serious offense, and a person guilty of this act becomes liable to a penalty by YeSiltie Serra. 
 
 
                                                     
148 This is taken from FGD informants who discussed the various issues on April 1&16, 2015 in Silti, Dalocha and 
Werabe Town.  
149 Interview with Ato Kaire Sule, Ato Dilebo, Ato Hamid and Ato Abdulwaris on 20 and 24 May 2015 in Werabe 
and Lanfuro Wereda.  
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6.4. Local  Dispute Settlement Procedures and Strategies of Dispute Settlers: Shopping 
Forums 
According to the norms of the society, both parties in a dispute have the right to choose elders 
for the final arbitration. There are, however, times when the disputants do not want to involve 
third party.  
Instead, they may engage in negotiation leading to reconciliation and forgiveness through the 
practice locally called Afeytu. In this regard, the parties discuss their problem amicably, prevent 
the dispute from escalating and accept each other’s quest for forgiveness. Those disputants who 
could not settle their issue through negotiation can choose elders or Yebad Baliqes for the final 
arbitration. The Siltie elders’ council is usually set up in odd numbers (e.g., three, five, or seven). 
Each party can nominate two or four elders that can represent him/her at the court hearing, while 
one elder who is chosen by both always becomes a neutral jury.  
This neutral jury is called Yegute Baliqe. The elders always take the role of local judges to solve 
tensions. Their long-termed experience, wisdom, and aloofness are the major factors for the 
selection of elders. Yebad Baliqes employ their rich knowledge to resolve disputes between the 
disputants. Their wise strategies, skills to sort-out hidden and long standing causes, eloquence, 
and ways of digging the problems and treating the parties impartially make their dispute 
settlement endeavors result in a mutually accepted agreement, which is often presented in a win-
win format. The various values and belief system of the Siltie are central to the grassroots’ peace 
making process. Elders use witnesses to settle disputes. The Baliqes’ decision on a case is mainly 
dependent on the defense witnesses presented by the accused (defendant).  
The defendant is expected to present three witnesses from his father lineage (Habotgae) and two 
from his mother lineage (Ummegae). These witnesses are collectively known as Mulli. The 
Mullis strongly fear the consequences of giving false witnesses, and hence refrain from doing so. 
They are afraid of Berche and of losing Tur, too. Dispute settlers' mystic constructs in the sense 
of telling stories about the interaction between disputants and dispute settlers depicting the 
negative repercussions (e.g., losing life or experiencing accidents) encountered by former false 
witness givers play important role as strategies to adjudicate cases by revealing out truths. In this 
regard, Berche can play a very important role. The notion of Berche carries that anyone who 
wrongly accuses the other, will face negative consequences in his or her life for doing (See more 
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about Berche and Tur below). It is because of this that whenever a dispute occurs among the 
Siltie, and the case is brought before the elders, the first thing the elders inquire is whether there 
is a pending Berche attributed to the accused or his/her ancestors. It is believed among the Siltie 
that someone can commit a crime owing to a hidden or unresolved crime that has been hidden 
for long period of time. Thus, both disputants are expected to purify themselves from Berche by 
confessing their wrong doings.  
6.5. Some Notes on How Dispute Cases are settled: Case Flow Management 
The Siltie's concept of justice requires not only the victim but also the accused to look for truth 
and resolve the dispute. If one of them, or both ignore sorting out the problem, and fail to settle 
it, all of them up to even seven generations suffer from the problem, and the problem remains 
with the one who conceals it. On the other hand, dispute cases can be initiated or referred to 
customary courts mainly through three ways. At first, the plaintiff asks elders if he/she is going 
to take cases to the state court wishing elders' blessings. Second, the accused can also ask elders 
that the claimant takes the case to the state court bypassing elders and hence invoke elders to 
intervene. On the other hand, a case can be initiated by elders themselves, who take the 
initiations and interfere in the cases. It is observed that taking cases to elders or at least asking 
for advice and blessings from elders seems crucial for getting matters done.  
The local community first reports a dispute case to the Baliqes' court, and if the elders cannot 
resolve the issue, the victims or both parties ask blessings from the elders and will take the case 
either to the religious or state courts. Yebizihe haqahe yewetenke „may Allah maintain the truth 
and may you get an appropriate decision,” is the blessings one can get from elders. The data 
illustrate that some sections of the local communities do not trust the state system. They rely 
mainly on the social networks, and customary courts, rather than on religious courts. The Sheiks 
themselves intrinsically believe that the local values and norms have much more acceptance than 
religious ones. A good case in point is the local transaction process that involves house selling 
process, and marriage and resolving murder cases that are mainly handled by elders. Among the 
reason why resorting to local justice is so popular is that in customary courts people have the 
liberty to talk in their language, and the settings themselves are more preferable than court halls. 
Women, for example, prefer speaking under trees than in formal court hall sessions. As far as the 
compensation for murder cases and the processuality of justice are concerned, Abotgare should 
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pay 2/3rd of the compensation, while Ummigare is expected to pay 1/3rd. Figuratively Abotgare 
is considered as Qegnit Enjje (right hand) while the Ummigare as Gura Enjje (Left hand). The 
right hand the one which can incur in many costs, including murder, while the left hand's role in 
this regard is minimal. The people consider left hand as soft and incapable of retaliating in the 
case of murder. This is a manifestation of patriarchal or gender-based relation among the local 
community. Moreover, the Siltie believe that left hand cannot attack someone strongly (Gure 
Enji Tishe agnane ealje), while the right hand can attack strongly Qegnit Enjje tishit yagnane 
yajan). Power conflict is witnessed not only between actors in dispute settlement, but also 
gender-wise. Men perceive women as soft, weak and defenseless. 
6.5.1. Local Actors' Strategy of Dispute Settlement: Focus on Murder Cases 
In settling disputes pertaining to murder, the Raga handles the situation from different 
perspectives. The local actors' legal perceptions are not static nor written down. They are rather 
dependent on circumstances, and hence law is considered as a process. According to one of my 
key informants150 who passed away while I was in the field and was considered as one of the 
important local actors who served as clan leader and Raga for a long time in Silti Wereda, the 
Raga could pass his verdict on dispute cases, especially murder cases, at least from thirteen 
angles. Ragas settle an unintentional murder case by referring to it as Sebbebe (incidental 
murder), while those cases that may result in the death of a person while targeting another one, 
are addressed as Sekebe or accidental killing. The Ragas consider those murder cases wherein the 
perpetrator commits the crime intentionally as Telamo or a pre-meditated murder while killing 
someone by severe means is known to the customary court as Telago or killing in violent 
behavior. If a perpetrator kills a person intentionally in merciless ways, the Raga categorizes the 
case under Agarsa (i.e. deliberately and badly killing someone). Gasa (killing war captives), on 
the other hand, is killing the helpless who are in one's custody after winning a war. If someone 
attacks a group intentionally and kills more than one person, the case will be categorized as 
Gasan, meaning killing more than one person deliberately, while Ragas call those cases when a 
perpetrator kills unintentionally with a spear or other material as Telmama, meaning killing 
unintentionally through throwing a spear or other tool to another thing.  
                                                     
150 Taken from my previous work especially from Gerad Awel before he died in early July 2014. He died in July 
2014.  
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The Siltie customary courts refer those cases that involve killing on small materials that are not 
intended or are not capable of killing a person as Unshen. If an individual or a child kills another 
one while playing a game without them having any problems before, Ragas call the case Aseden, 
meaning killing during playing, while killing an infant who is not more than four months old is 
called Unbub. Zugub is a name given for those cases that involve abortion or killing an infant 
who is older than seven months.  
The Ragas' classification of murder cases aims at identifying the circumstances under which the 
crime is committed, which in turn helps them to sort out the context and the cause of the dispute, 
in order to pass a resolution. For this reason, the local legal actor gives priority to investigating 
deeply the category of blood price or Yedem Gumma under which the case falls.  
Sebbebe (Incidental murder), for instance, is a homicide that happens inadvertently. The parties, 
in this case, do not have any progressed conflict or they may not even know each other. 
Nevertheless, due to some incidents, the parties may suddenly go into conflicts, and one of them 
or both to lose their lives. The suspected killer may even try to rescue the life of the deceased. 
Such offenses are considered as YeSebbebe Dem, a murder that occurred inadvertently, and the 
killer is expected to pay half of the full blood price (Yedem Gumma).  
Moreover, if a Raga considers Telamo (pre-meditated murder) a case, which is a kind of 
homicide committed noticeably and deliberately, he follows different procedures. Such offenses 
can occur when the offender perpetrates murder on somebody. In this case, the perpetrator 
deliberately kills someone in a way he/she cannot defend him/herself. Most of the time, there is a 
history of conflict between the victim and the slayer. As participants of FGD151 said, such kinds 
of cases are resolved through YeTelamo deme Gumma, for it is believed to be a preplanned and 
organized act of the killer committed under absolute unawareness or less preparedness of the 
victim to defend herself/himself. Such type of homicide offense is the most serious conflict that 
can trigger anger amidst the wider community. Thus, the resolution involves critical scrutiny and 
rigorous procedures. Yedem Gumma on such incidents considers the offense as Telamo, and the 
offender is expected to pay the full blood price for his/her intentional murder. 
                                                     
151This is based on FGD that was conducted with Ato Dilebo Gebre, Ato Kairedin Azma Hussein, Hajji 
Abdurrahman Shewajo, Hajji Hussein Barsebo, Ustaz Umar Yassin on April 16/2012 in Werabe Town. 
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According to respondents152, Yedem Gumma (blood price) used to be concluded in kind rather 
than in cash. In this regard, animals such as ox, cow, and sheep were given as compensation. 
Nevertheless, particularly after Menilik's occupation of the Siltie area in the 19th century, 
specifically since the imperial regime, Yedem Gumma has been paid in kind. Nowadays, the full 
blood price ranges from 10,000-50,000 ETB (400-2000 Euros), based on the type of the case and 
the ways it occurs. This change was made after elders' initiative to form local dispute settlers' 
council aimed at revitalizing the Siltie customary law in 2010. As participants in FGD153 said, As 
participants in FGD154 said, the offender is not allowed to pay the blood price (Yedem Gumma) 
by him/herself even though he/she has the capacity to do so.  
It is believed that the offender should collect the blood price from the member of his/her clan to 
avoid Fero. It is believed that if the perpetrator fails to do so, he and his descendants are likely to 
commit similar crimes of murder. (See more about Fero below). Let us see one more example in 
Sekebe (accidental killing).  
Sekebe is the type of homicide that can occur accidentally. That is to say, the murderer and the 
victim do not have any ground that could lead them to dispute. Nevertheless, some unexpected 
incidents can cause death. For example, homicide by car accident is a kind of Yesekebe dem, and 
the suspect/the killer is expected to pay one fourth of the full blood price. The customary modes 
of dispute settlement modes that are discussed above are used by the Siltie to handle conflicts in 
different structural levels of dispute resolution processes. Local dispute setters like Ragas give 
due emphasis to the above procedures and investigations when they consider murder cases. The 
next section discusses the customary dispute settlement system that operates in the Siltie Zone 
and adjacent areas. 
 
                                                     
152 Interview with Gerad Awel and Gerad Teka on April 2/2012 in Werabe. 
153, This is based on FGD that was conducted with such key informants as Ato Kaire Sule, Hajji Abdurrahman, 
Werkicho Yusuf, and Hajji Hussein Barsebo for my previous works in various weredas in 2012, 2013 and 2014.  
154, This is based on FGD that was conducted with such key informants as Ato Kaire Sule, Hajji Abdurrahman, 
Werkicho Yusuf, and Hajji Hussein Barsebo for my previous works in various weredas in 2012, 2013 and 2014.  
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6.6. Local Modes of Dispute Settlement  
6.6.1. The Siltie Customary Court 
There are three types of customary courts which are widely used by the local community. These 
are Yebalique Shengo-Elders' Court-, Ye Gicho Dagna or Ye Gicho Baliqenet -Clan court- and 
Ragnnet -local legal expert court-. Despite the fact that the three courts have the mandate to 
consider conflicts, they are involved in different dispute cases (e.g. elders' court looks at minor 
disputes like family cases, clan court considers inter-clan and land disputes, while Raga court 
considers murder cases) in the area. Disputants have the right to take cases up the ladder in each 
court if not satisfied with a decision of a first layer of a customary court. Nevertheless, the 
parties must present their dispute cases, including domestic violence cases, to elders' courts 
before resorting to other legal systems. This is because elders' involvement is crucial not only to 
end disputes in a win-win result but also because their blessings and coursings are highly valued 
by the community. As they are very near to the local community, the customary courts are 
providing justice at the grassroots level more than other tribunals. It is also observed that local 
legal actors collaborate, and at times compete, especially whenever the claimant is not satisfied. 
He/she can take the case to one or another elder court as part of forum shopping (Benda 
Beckmann, 1979). Self-presentations and expressions in the court sessions affect the forum 
shopping tendencies in the area (See more in the next chapter). Below I have presented the three 
customary courts. 
The elders court /Ye Siltie Baliqes’ Shengo/ that operates as a customary court from Burda 
(village assembly) to the Bade levels is an important system that people employ to settles a 
variety of disputes. Dinberu et al. (1995) state that the Siltie customary law comprises Ye Silti 
Serra, Yemelga Serra, and Yedambus Serra, indicating the existence of the plurality of 
customary law in the area. Despite the fact that there is a variation in the practice of customary 
law, I argue that the difference in the application of customary law is the reflection of local 
variations rather than differences in the customary law itself, since the community resolves its 
disagreements using the Siltie Serra rather than developing a new customary law. I further argue 
that the variations observed in the name of the different Serras mentioned above emanate from 
the place where the customary law is applied.  
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One of the reasons that led me to this conclusion is that each of the system's verdicts will come 
to a specific center or area, YeFerezagegn Shengo as the people call „the Siltie Federal Court“ 
for final approval as the last appellant court than ending cases in their localities.  
According to Siltie zone high court 2016/17 annual report, more than 700 civil cases which are 
referred to the Wereda First Instance Courts have been transferred to elder's court in the 2016/7 
budget year. The state courts resolved also 411 minor crime cases (e.g. insult, adultery, boundary 
disputes between family members) using reconciliation that involve elders in the same budget 
year155. As most of the cases are not referred to the state court, it is clear that the customary 
courts can see more than 700 cases per year. Additionally, Siltie Zone High Court reports that 
between 2012 and 2016, 4816 dispute cases were reported to the High Court. Of these, 170 civil 
cases were transferred to the customary courts for settlement with the consent of the parties and 
none of the cases were refereed back to the court. Moreover, in the same time, 111 negligence 
crimes (car accident cases) were also settled both by the state and customary courts. This clearly 
indicates how much the customary courts are playing significant roles in settling disputes in the 
area. My key informants156said also that the local community prefers the customary court to 
settle its cases since the courts operate on the base of the culture of the people. This is because 
the customary court encourages the suspect to confess the crime and cleanse himself/herself from 
Berche or Fero, leading to the reintegration of the culprit into the society unlike the state where 
admitting a crime will result in imprisonment. 
6.6.1.1. Elders' Forum (Yebaliqe Shengo) 
Yebaliqe Shengo is a territory- based dispute settlement institution that the local community 
employs to settle mainly civil cases. It starts from lowest village level elders' assembly and goes 
up to national or Yebad Baliqe Shengo. Siltie elders are active local dispute settlers in the lowest 
Burda/ village elders' forum and consider the majority of the civil cases initiated at different 
levels. The Shengo considers such cases as conflicts between the husband and the wife, 
neighbors, quarrels over boundaries, debt payment, failure to attend mourning ceremonies and 
failure to participate in physical works like building mosques, repairing elder's houses, and 
destruction of properties by animals.  
                                                     
155 Taken from a report by Siltie Zone Justice Department on the occasion of annual justice day on July 17 2017 in 
Werabe Town. 
156 Interview with Sheik Muze and Hajji Shewmolo on November 4, 2016, in Werabe town.  
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Yebaliqe Shengo judges apply informal norms of neighborliness (Olinnet) to resolve disputes 
even when they know that their norms are inconsistent with the law (Robert C. Ellickson 1981: 
viii). At this level, a dispute between families or domestic violence are settled with the 
involvement of neighbors. Elders give great emphasis to neighbors. The Siltie relate a neighbor 
with the Creator, saying Ollam Allam hadin -meaning respect a neighbor as you respect your 
creator Allah.  
Since members of Burda meet frequently with the Creator during prayer times and ask help from 
Him when a problem comes, a neighbor is also very near to help and resolve a problem. Elders 
employ the concept of Olla to resolve most minor dispute cases like a dispute between husband 
and wife, children and father, and disputes between neighbors.  
Baliqes' court has four layers. These are YeBurda Baliqe/Hamlet Elder’s Court, YeAzegag 
(YeGenet Baliqe) Village Court/, YeMewta Baliqe/Supra-village Court/, and Yebad Baliqe/local 
Chief's Court/. The last Yebad Baliqe court is the final appellant court. Elders' court and other 
Siltie customary courts sessions commence dispute settlement process with prayer locally known 
as Du’aa. A local judge, most of the time the elder one, makes the Du'aa. He invokes blessing 
for all the society, justice and truth to prevail, elders to live long, and fertility, and he also curses 
all evil doers, false witnesses, and enemy of peace of the country and the people. Elders have a 
strong power among the Siltie.  
Yebad or YeSiltie Serra norm has empowered them to handle every dispute case among the 
community. Even an individual who has completed a prison term after the state courts' decisions 
should appear before elders' courts. Elders' ‘green card’ is a must to reintegrate into the society 
as part of restorative justice. It seems that there is double jeopardy where by a suspect will be 
punished twice. Nevertheless, the Siltie's justice system is constructed and based on collective 
values and social norms, rather than on sanctioning individuals. Elders' courts are thus crucial for 
peaceful re-integration of a wrong doer into the society. 
 Disputants bring most of the civil dispute cases (that do not involve crime cases) first to the 
elders (Baliqes' court), and if the elders are not able to resolve the issue, the victims or both 
parties ask blessings from the elders, and take the case either to the religious or to state courts. If 
elders are exhausted in dealing with the case, they will permit the disputants to resort to other 
courts by saying, Yebizihe haqahe yewetenke, which means, 'go with our blessings and let the 
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truth be uncovered more easily, and get your rights back'. But this situation seems to be changing 
now. In my everyday activities and experiences among the people, I understood that the local 
communities do not trust the elders' court as they do the state system. Rather, disputants rely 
mainly on the social networks to end disputes like marital disagreements. But the local 
community still has confidence in the elders' courts than the state or in the religious courts to 
settle their disputes. The Sheiks themselves intrinsically believe in the customary courts. 
 Good cases are the house selling process, the marital dispute cases, and murder cases, which are 
mainly resolved by elders in all customary court levels. I also observed that in the customary 
tribunals, people have the liberty to talk in their language under a tree, which gives them some 
sense of freedom to talk and debate. Also women speak their minds better under trees than in 
formal court sessions.157  
6.6.1.2. Clan Court (Yegicho Shengo) 
Yegicho court is a clan based court. It is a court where all individuals who trace their descent 
from the same ancestor can settle their differences under the leadership of a clan leader called 
YeGicho Dagna. Clan courts have five layered structures in the area. These are: 
1. YeAberose Shengo (Family Assembly) 2. YeAbotgar Shengo (Patrilineal Lineage Assembly), 
3. YeAbotweld Shengo (Patrilineal and Matrilineal Lineage Assembly) 
4. YeGicho Serra (Assembly) 
5. YeSiltie Serra /YeMula Siltie Melcho (The Whole Siltie Assembly) 
The clan court starts from Gar, which figuratively represents the house of an individual. 
However, apart from its dictionary definition, Gar has two meanings: Abotgare/the male lineage 
of the family, and Ummigare, the female lineage of the family. The Siltie's family is an extended 
one/Aberose/ that includes all children who are born from the father and his wife or wives, their 
grandsons, and grand-daughters, their children in law, and daughters in law. The family has its 
forum to resolve disputes among its members. Members of the different households who are 
                                                     
157 I observed two women who disputed over a goat which they bought together, and one of them betrayed after the 
goat multiplied and has become ten. Both presented the case freely to the elders' court, and talked freely turn by turn 
on 23 July 2014 in Dalocha. They finally settled the case. However, I understood that women are shy in the state 
court and often passed the case to the legal representatives. 
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related in blood are led by the eldest person in the family (Mesaki) of the household. Mesaki 
literally means tracer, the one who can trace and present the wrongdoer to the courts of the clan 
judge. Thus, heads of each family are responsible to the Mesaki. The Mesaki is in charge of any 
activities, including resolving conflicts among members and representing the family in the clan 
meetings, mourning, and funeral practices. If the father of a family dies, the eldest son of the 
family (Angafa) becomes the head of the household, and becomes the one who can contact the 
Mesaki.  
A woman cannot be the head of the gar and will be represented by her eldest son or her father 
line member (Abotgare). Above Mesaki, we have Moro, leader of all Mesakis within an 
individual household. Members of a Mesaki are determined by the numbers of households /Gars/ 
in a given area. Moro supervises and leads households under his line, and is also in charge of 
settling disputes in his prerogatives. At the end of the clan court, we have a Yegicho 
Dagna158/clan judge/ who gives the final verdict at this five-tier level of the court. The Dagna's 
position is mostly hereditary as it passes from father to son. 
 
                                                     
158 Interview with Azma Jabir, a clan judge, and Shukre Kemal in June 2016 in Lanfuro Wereda and Werabe Town. 
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Figure 13 Abalcho clan court in Edeneba Qebele in early January 2015. 
The Yegicho Dagna court is the final appellant court, which is always summoned up in every 
fifteen days in various areas, and where members of the clan meet to oversee the various socio-
economic activities of its environment and of the neighboring areas. Like Yebaliqe court, this 
clan-based court also has authority over matters related to civil cases. However, this court also 
considers murder cases. It also interacts with other clans' judges if a culprit crosses the boundary 
and goes to the neighboring clans.  
This court is highly structured and very powerful in controlling and maintaining peace and order 
among its members. On the other hand, my observation of the Abalcho court revealed that the 
court is a highly formalized setting. There is a procedure one should follow in the court hearings. 
In this regard, the clan leader or the Dagna hears cases from the parties who stand in the middle 
of a circled sitting court attendants and audiences (See Figure 13 above). 
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The open air clan court arrangement has also a spokesperson who is in charge of communicating 
the speeches between the judges, the disputants, and the court attendants. The person is called 
locally as Was-agache, means a person who is in charge of communication and keeping the 
security of the court by giving turns to disputants according to the time of the compilation of the 
cases. The communicator stands in the middle of the court attendee as a speaker of the court and 
is mandated to hear and talks back the case more easily to the court participants. The parties 
present the case one by one in turn, and after a while, the floor will be open to all to comment. 
Anyone who wants to talk or comment should first ask for permission from the court speaker. 
But if someone interrupts the hearings or talks without permission, he will be fined 50 ETB (2 
Euros). Finally, after cases are presented and commented by the participants, the clan Dagna 
gives the final decision. However, successors are trained well by accompanying the senior clan 
Dagnas in various clan court sessions. Women disputants can take part in the process, yet the 
Abotgare members present their cases. But if the issue is serious (e.g. rape, or property claim) or 
if she is the head of the household, and her rights are violated by her step children in case her 
husband has died and she does not have children, she can present her case to the court herself. I 
observed the petition of Alicho Wuriro community's court, a woman, Sajida Hussein to Alicho 
Wuriro Qicha Dagnas on April 5, 2015, explaining that her step-children were trying to take her 
land after her husband has died in July 2014. She requested elders to intervene. This state of 
affair clearly demonstrates how clan and elders court are involved in various dispute cases at the 
grassroots level. 
Clan courts can consider any malpractices that are perpetrated by members. It can also interact 
with other neighboring clans to consider inter-clan disputes. A clan exercises force on deviant 
clan members or systematically marginalize perpetrators from social lives. The court sometimes 
collaborates with the state agents (e.g. Qebele officials) to implement its decisions. If someone 
does not conform to its decisions, the Dagna may send Dambus (a group of elders who can be 
delegated by clan elders to implement the decisions of the court) to punish him/her up to the 
extent of slaughtering his/her ox or sheep as a means to bring back him/her to the court.  
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It is due to this violation of human right principles and encroachments to the state systems that 
the clan court sometimes conflicts with the state.159 Nevertheless, there are other instances that 
can show how clan courts cooperate with the state legal systems.  
As the Dagna of Abalcho clan, Azma Jabir said, his clan court (Ye Abalcho Chale) collaborates 
with the state courts whenever an accused or even a plaintiff could not accept the decisions of the 
Abalcho court. Informants further explained that if, for instance, the accused refuses to accept the 
rulings of the Abalcho court, the clan court would provide witnesses and even pay for legal 
representatives to stand for the victim in the state court. Despite the fact that informants 
explained that the clan court acts like „public prosecutor“ in filing the case to the state court, 
state court judges did not confirm the communication with clan courts in the ways mentioned by 
actors in the Abalcho court. Rather, the state court judges said that the state court provides 
training for elders on gender issues and family cases so that elders can play an active role in 
reducing high number of family related disputes reported to the state courts.  
                                                     
159 Interview in September 2015 with the state actor who presided over the case brought by a man from Alicho-
Wuriro Wereda. The person said that the clan court slaughtered his ox for not accepting its decision. He sued them 
in the state administration, they yet did not end the case due to reasons not clear to me. 
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Figure160 14 Inter-clan Assembly in Dalocha Wereda (September, 2014). 
Clan courts can settle various civil and crime cases. The courts are the most powerful institutions 
in the area. However, some informants said that the legitimacy of clan leaders is not necessarily 
associated with the local values and norms. Rather, the coercion strategies they employ over 
members and the link they establish with the state structures are mentioned as factors for the clan 
leaders to have power. However, some state officials accuse clan leaders of working against „the 
rule of law“ and consider them one of the factors for the prevalence of „bad governance“ in that 
they compel citizens, including lower level state officials, to slaughter their animals and bow to 
their decisions. Thus, the interactions between state actors and clan courts actors seem to be 
characterized by cooperation and contestations.  
                                                     
160 The clan assembly is held every fifteen days in different clan areas. I was invited by the clan leader after I 
interviewed him sometime before the assembly. Since the inter-clan assembly deals with various dispute cases 
including evaluating the status of Siltie Serra and any malpractices as well as government programs, I found the 
gathering very interesting assembly to understand the application of customary courts and its relations with the state 
system. 
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6.6.1.3. The Raga Court (Ragnnet) 
The third type of customary court which is widely employed by the Siltie is the four-layered 
Raga court. Some call it Shenecha court. Raga means old; the elder indicates an old socially 
accepted man who presides over the higher level of a customary court. Ragnnet court comprises 
four local level legal institutions: Maga, Raga, Ferezagegne and Wegagenge. I did not see a 
functioning Wegagenge institution. However, the third one usually is an appellate court, for cases 
that are not resolved at the lower level. Added to this, the verdicts of the lower Maga court will 
also be referred to the Raga for confirmation or with a possibility of reconsideration. The lower 
levels involve YeBurda Baliqes or elders, while the Raga office is handled mostly by a well-
known and reputed individual. However, sometimes, more than one person can hold the Raga 
office. The Raga courts are highly valued by the Siltie since they are led by highly respected 
socio-cultural legal experts known as the Ragas.  
This system considers cases that require deep investigation not only between disputants but also 
in their families back and forth up to seven generations (Seabit Gedda). The court considers such 
serious crimes like murders including hidden cases, unlike elders and clan courts that mostly 
consider civil cases. It is also an appellant court for cases that cannot be resolved by Baliqe 
courts.  
Raga court handles homicide, rape, physical injuries including breaking teeth, and any other 
parts of human body, car accidents, arson, theft, killing animals, and any crime cases that are 
especially committed during night time as well as in the absence of witnesses. Ragas have 
strategies to find out and persuade suspects. Local and religious mystic constructs are often used 
as instruments of dispute settlement. Yebalique court and Raga court could not interfere in each 
other's affairs, but they can exchange cases (e.g. murder cases). In this regard, the clan Dagna 
(judge) will refer murder cases, and other complex issues that involve multiple families that may 
potentially involve Berche, Fero to the Raga, for the Raga has the final say over these matters. 
Moreover, the local community highly respects Ragas in dispute settlement sessions, because 
their power or legitimacy emanates from their dedication and impartiality to the community, 
rather than a state-backed clan or co-opted elders who have got government support.  
 
 
226 
 
 The office of Raga is also hereditary as the sons of a Raga learn how to settle disputes their 
fathers. The empirical data indicate that Ragas consider between 40-60 cases per week.161 There 
are more than four Ragas in the various areas of Siltie. An average of 2600 cases mostly of crime 
cases are considered by Ragas annually. This does not include the cases dealt with elders' courts. 
Ragas convene on every market day in various areas of Siltie zone and neighboring zones. They 
assemble under a big Podocarpus tree called Raga Odda for reconciliation. The hearing begins 
by taking one case after the other according to order in which the cases are presented to the 
office. Before the start of the hearing, the Raga gives his blessing /Du'aa/ asking Allah to help 
them give fair and truthful decisions. Ragnnet comprises four courts. 
6.6.1.3.1. Local First Instance Court (Maga) 
The Maga court is the lowest customary or first instance Raga court among the Siltie. The 
people use it to resolve disputes at Burda/village level. It is sometimes referred to as YeBurda 
Baliqe (local elders’ council). Magas can also become village level elders who take part in 
resolving disputes among members of the area. However, when they serve as Magas/judges/, 
they can only see crime cases. Maga court is composed of three elders. It serves as first instance 
court in the area. A word that deserves mentioning here is Yebaliqe Herrat. The word Baliqe 
denotes, 'elder', while Herrat stands for reconciliation. Therefore, Yebalique Herrat means elders 
of (for) the reconciliation. Nevertheless, the Siltie also generally use Baliqe interchangeably with 
Maga. The Siltie’s benchmark for being the elderly (Baliqenet) does not necessarily rely on age, 
for those youths who have the capacity, knowledge, and commitment for resolving disputes, and 
have got the legitimatization from the society can also be counted as Baliqe among the Siltie. 
The Magas, on the other hand, are always called on to consider cases whenever disputes that 
surpass the Afeytu /forgiveness/ level occur at Burda or Azegag levels. 
 
                                                     
161 The estimation of the number of cases handled by Ragas is based on my field observation of the Ragas' setting 
and by looking at the number of cases at that particular point in time. 
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Figure 15 Magas while considering car accident case in Werabe Town (September 2014).  
But disputants can resolve their disagreements without involving third parties (Behoshete gute 
tefedote). Such dispute settlement approach through forgiveness also plays a great role in settling 
conflicts among members of family, clans, and sub-clans. According to the respondents162, minor 
disputes between or among members of families (e.g., husband-wife dispute) can be resolved in 
this way.  
                                                     
162 Interview with Hajji Hamid, Gerad Teka, Hajji Hussein, Sheik Yusuf, Ato Kaire Sule and Hajji Mifta in March 
2016 in Silti, Sankura, Dalocha and Werabe Town. 
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Figure 16 Magas concluding Wurkefena Gudda case at Burda level in Hulbareg Wereda (October, 
2014).  
The Maga court handles both civil cases (e.g., family disputes and land disputes) and any other 
crime cases like persona case (e.g. insult, adultery) that occur at Burda and Azegag levels. Magas 
are assisted by the institutions of Abotweld and Abotgare in settling disputes. Magas are also 
important local actors in calming down tensions relating to murder incidents. In this regard, the 
Magas role is more important than that of the state police, since the local community gives much 
respect to local elders. In this regard, if a person commits murder, he is firstly expected to leave 
the village and go far away from the area. It is then the duty of the Magas to intervene and 
initiate dispute settlement between the suspect and the victim's family. This can only be possible 
after the family's of the suspect invites the Magas. Nevertheless, there are possibilities Magas 
can also initiate the case. The suspect then summons his family and clans to interfere and resolve 
the conflict.  
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After advising each other and discussing the issue deeply, YeAabotweld and Abotgare of the 
offender solicit the Magas to formally initiate the dispute settlement process. The Magas go to 
the family of the victim to attend the mourning and pass the message of condolences first in the 
name of the suspect. They also inform representative of the victim's family that the suspect is 
formally asking them to intervene in the case.  
Magas then give some amount of money for expenses and make an appointment to continue the 
settlement process. During the next meeting, the Magas start hearing the case from both sides, 
and request the suspect and the victim's family to examine themselves to identify if there is an 
unaddressed Berche in the family. The Magas also make an appointment to conduct Wurkefena 
that involves some rituals, including tying the White Tread called YeKirGudda 163(See more 
about this in the next sections). During the next meeting, the Magas take the suspect to the 
victim's family for the Gudda ritual and make the accused meet with the family of the victim. 
Magas conduct the first step of the settlement that can bring temporary peace between the parties 
on one hand, and give further money to share costs of the mourn on the other.  
 
                                                     
163 YeKirGudda is a process that involves the tying of white tread to calm down the spirit of tension between the 
disputing parties. 
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Figure 17 Silti Wereda Magas while hearing a murder case before referring it to the Raga in early January 2015 (Agode 
Qebele) 
The Magas' role is limited to investigating the root causes of the conflict. They cannot give a 
decision on murder cases. It is beyond their jurisdiction. After investigating the underlying 
causes of the conflict, the Magas refer the case for the verdict to the second level, Ragnnet.. 
Even if the cause is incidental, Magas still cannot end murder cases, and thus refer the case to the 
next level. The Raga will hear the decisions of Magas when the case appears in his court. The 
results of the investigation will be approved or rejected, based on the level of the probe to the 
case as well as the perspectives from which Magas look at the case, especially by linking the 
cause with Berche. Thus, Magas play significant roles in settling disputes at the grass-roots level. 
The Magas have high legitimacy among the society. Nevertheless, the disputants also have the 
right not to accept the decision and the investigation of the Magas. If a disputant or disputants 
are not satisfied by the decision of the Magas, they can take their cases to the next Raga court. 
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6.6.1.3.2. An Appeal Court (Ye Raga Shengo) 
YeRaga Shengo is the second level of court in the third type of Raga's customary court among 
the Siltie. It operates at Azegag and Mewta levels. This court is presided over by one local legal 
expert called Raga. The Raga has a high reputation among the community. The Raga’s judgment 
is regarded as fair and impartial.  
 
Figure 18 Raga Lalu's Customary Court Session in Udasa Qebele Silti Wereda (December 2015)  
According to the FGD participants164, the Raga court considers those crimes that are beyond 
Magas. These complex issues range from Garemagdot (arson) to rape, theft, breaking any parts 
of human bodies, abduction, homicide, conflicts over land among members of the clan or sub-
clan, and boundary disputes that involve bloodshed. Raga also considers issues that come as an 
appeal from the Magas. Nevertheless, respondents said that except those complex problems such 
as homicide and arson, others are referred to the Raga as an appeal case from the Magas.  
                                                     
164, This is based on FGD that was conducted with Ato Dilebo Gebre, Ato Kairedin Azma Hussein, Hajji 
Abdurrahman Shewajjo, Hajji Hussein Barsebo, in March in Alicho Wereda and Werabe Town. 
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The Raga court operates under the shade of a big tree known among the Siltie as YeRaga Odda. 
YeRaga Odda is thus a Raga court where various crime cases are resolved.  
 
Figure 19 Raga Kedir's court which was also attended by Priest Awegechew in Dalocha Town (April , 2015 ) 
As an informant165 said, the yardstick for selection of a Raga includes such pertinent issues as 
impartiality, ability to see things from different angles, reputation from the society, age, and 
marital status (i.e. being married). Having enough wealth is also crucial to have the office of 
Raga.  
As a key informant166 said, being wealthy will help the Raga not to be bribed or liable to bribery 
when he judges on the matters. Only men household heads who control the legal and political 
offices. Women are not allowed to attend the hearings except when if it is their own case. In this 
case, if a given woman has a case, i.e. if she is abused, she can present the matter to any of the 
                                                     
165 Interview with Ato Kaire Sule on April in Lanfuro Wereda. 
166 Interview with Ato Kairedin Hussein on April 12/2015 in Werabe Town. 
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courts for the hearing. As my key informants167 said, more than any disputes, the Raga is highly 
skilled in settling those crime cases that lead to the loss of life or body. The Siltie refer to the 
settlement of disputes that involves loss of blood as „Dem Aknot.“ Dem means blood, but the 
contextual meaning of the term implies any physical injuries that involve loss of blood. Dem 
Aknot, which is also called as Gumma, can be employed for the resolution of conflicts which 
involve loss of life and arson (if it involves loss of life). It also includes physical injuries such as 
breaking of teeth, damage to the eye and the ear, abortion, amputations of different body parts, 
and associated conflicts that result in bodily harm. Nevertheless, if the conflict is a homicide, the 
informants said168, it is considered as Summera/Murder/. The Siltie do not call murder cases 
openly like that but call them with a different name, in order to avoid Yeafe Berche, severe 
repercussions of talking about blood. Rather, they call it Summera, for it is believed that murder 
cases bring more infliction or deaths if someone talks about it openly. They consider silence as a 
medicine (Bellagamba, 2011) which they believe help diffuse tensions. 
6.6.1.4. Cassation Court ( Ye Ferezagegne /Shenecha Shengo) 
Ferezagegne is a place that is found in Gurage Zone Mesqan Wereda in Embore Qebele. 
YeFerezagegn Shengo is considered as the High Appeal court or Cassation Court. Ferezagegne 
has got its appellation from two words: Ferez, 'horse' and 'agegne', which means „finding a 
place“, which connotes going on a long journey to seek the truth. The Siltie believe that one can 
get impartial decision and verdict at this tribunal. The community refers to this court as „the 
Siltie Federal Supreme Court“ which indicates the court is viewed as the higher and last local 
custom interpreting institution operating in the area. My key informants noted that this tribunal is 
composed of five to six Ragas who are highly religious men, have a fear of Allah and are legal 
experts. However, it is mostly presided over by three customary legal experts also called Ragas.  
According to FGD participants169, YeFerezagegn Shengo judges also bring their sons to be 
trained for what would be the Ferezagegne judge. YeFerezagegn status can be achieved through 
inheritance. Some informants said170 , however, that YeFerezagegn Shengo is not known among 
                                                     
167 Interview with Hajji Hamid, Gerad Kedir Teka, Hajji Hussein, Sheik Yusuf, Ato Kaire Sule and Hajji Mifta n 
March and April 2015 in Silti, Lanfuro, Sankura weredas and Werabe Town. 
168 Interview with informants mentioned above.  
169, This is based on FGD that was conducted with such key informants as Ato Kaire Sule, Hajji Abdurrahman, 
Werkicho Yusuf, and Hajji Hussein Barsebo on March 20/2015 in Werabe Town.  
  
170 Interview with Ato Kaire Sule on 10, April 2015 in Lanfuro Wereda Tora Town. 
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the Siltie. The informants contend that YeFerezagegn Shengo is located in neighboring Gurage 
zone rather than in Siltie area. Instead, the Siltie informants refer to the highest customary court 
as Shenecha. Nevertheless, most of the Siltie clients still refer their cases to YeFerezagegn court. 
I also observe that most of the disputants believe that this court can give them fair judgment if 
they cannot get an impartial decision at lower levels. FGD participants and other key 
informants171 also said that this higher court has existed among the Siltie for a long time. I 
observed that YeFerezagegn Shengo judges consider other local Ragas as Magas who are local 
level judges having little understandings of socio-legal matters. They did not want to refer to 
lower level judges as Ragas. I have also understood that YeFerezagegn judges are the higher 
interpreters of local norms and values after cases are referred to them from lower tiers. This 
clearly indicates the existence of intra-customary court actors' power contestations on one hand, 
and an aspect of shopping forum on the other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
171 The above FGD is conducted with my key informants in Silti, Dalocha weredas, and Werabe Town.  
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Figure 20 YeFerezagegn Shengo attended by Christians and Muslims in August 2015 (July, 2015). 
Therefore, the third tier of the Raga court is known among the people as YeFerezagegn Shengo. 
Most of YeFerezagegn hearings are referred to as an appeal from the Raga court from below. 
The Raga would transfer the unresolved issues to YeFerezagegn Shengo for a final decision. 
Procedurally, Magas are sent by Raga to elaborate the issue for YeFerezagegn Shengo. Here, the 
disputants have the right to defend the Raga’s decision. Then, after hearing the words of the 
disputant parties and the verdict of the Raga, YeFerezagegn Shengo would give its decision on 
the matter. They may strengthen the verdict or amend it or even object the Raga’s decision. 
There are times that YeFerezagegn Shengo may increase measures to punish the suspect. Finally, 
after going through the case, YeFerezagegn judges would refer the matter to the Magas for 
implementation.  
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Some people, however, view YeFerezagegn court is at the last customary court level. FGD172 
informants, YeFerezagegn court is the third level court in the four-tiered courts of Ragas in the 
area as they refer to Yewegagegne Shengo as the last tribunal YeFerezagegn Shengo works at 
YeSiltie Bade (country) level structure. It also serves at intergroup structure between various 
ethnic groups such as the Siltie and the Mesqan Gurages. The Kistane Gurages also employ this 
court as local dispute settlement forum.  
6.6.1.5. Yewegagegne Shengo 
Some informants indicate that Yewegagegne Shengo is the last court of Ragas the community 
employs to resolve crime cases in the area. They consider it a court found at the apex of the 
tribunals of Ragas. Yewegagegne Shengo is also a court that observes disputable cases that come 
as an appeal from YeFerezagegn Shengo. Nevertheless, the existence of this court itself is 
disputable. As some informants173 said, Yewegagegne Shengo is not known among the Siltie. I 
also could not come across this court during my research. Yewegagegne Shengo is not a separate 
tribunal, yet it is the title given to the veteran Ragas who served in Maga, Raga, and 
YeFerezagegn levels for an extended period, and who work as renowned legal experts in 
YeFerezagegn Cassation court. Yewegagegne elder is a man who plays a great role for 
resolution of disputes in the area. He plays an important role in transferring his knowledge from 
generation to generation by training his sons for Raga position. I also did not see disputants 
going to Yewegagegne court and could not find a separate court for this purpose. Therefore, 
based on the above information, one can understand that Yewegagegne Shengo does not exist 
among the Siltie.  
6.7. The Siltie Custom and Its Role in Day-To-Day Life: Retrospect and Prospect  
The Siltie custom embodies collection of rules that govern the day to day activities of the local 
community. The customs are not „derived from the enactments of the central government or its 
agencies“(Hamnett Ian 1975:705), yet are widely respected and have much more legitimacy than 
the state laws. 
                                                     
172 This is based on FGD that was conducted with such key informants as Ato Kaire Sule, Hajji Abdurrahman, 
Werkicho Yusuf, and Hajji Hussein Barsebo as part of my previous work in the area.  
173 Interview with Hajji Hamid, and Ato Dilebo on February 2015 in Werabe Town. 
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The Siltie customary court has passed through ups and downs since the late 19th century. Even if 
Hailesillasie I and Derg regimes tried to control the activities of local elders and did not 
recognize the roles of customary courts for dispute settlement officially, the courts managed to 
withstand the challenges. This is partly due to the agencies of local actors who manipulated 
every opportunity that allowed them to exercise their powers at the local level. Moreover, the 
local community also used „everyday forms of resistance“ (Scott, 1985) like the kinship systems 
to coerce local cadres into abiding by local norms, and ostracize them from social life. The post-
socialist EPDRF regimes have introduced a new system that is based on ethnic criteria and 
reorganized rural life accordingly. This development has given an impetus for local activities like 
local dispute settlements and religious systems such as Shari’a to resurrect and become part of 
the identity manifestations of a particular community.  
Despite the fact that the customary system has revived since 1991, elders said that the revival of 
the Siltie customary system has faced setbacks from home. ThInformants state that some state 
agents in the Zone showed little interest in the revitalization of the system for some reasons not 
clear to them. My key informants 174further explained that the various ethnic groups such as the 
Hadiyya and the Sidama have started to administer and develop their local system since 1991, 
but, the Siltie could not exploit this opportunity. They, however, could not deny the existence of 
such a paradigm shift in central government policy in Federalist Ethiopia, though it was late to 
allow the Siltie to self-determination only in 2001 which paved the way for the Siltie local 
system to gain a partial momentum after more than a century of hibernation. Informants further 
stressed that the customary system has reborn since 2001 after the people have started to govern 
themselves. However, the local customs and values could have developed more had the state 
officials been more committed. However, I observed that there are agents of the state and state 
court judges who support the revitalization and strengthening of local systems, especially 
customary courts. Siltie zone high court president175 said that the tribunal is overloaded by cases, 
mainly family-related disputes, which can easily be resolved by customary courts. He is 
                                                     
174 Interview with my key informants like Sheik Ahmed Kelil, Hajji Kedir Abdela, Imam Hussein Barqeda and Ato 
Bahredin Adem who were key figures in their communities in various Weredas. The identity of my informants is 
made confidential. Siltie elders always compare the status of local systems with their neighbors to show how the 
federal system seems characterized by double standards and hypocrisy, which shows inconsistency in the 
implementations of local systems. They associate the less implementation and challenges of the customary courts to 
the low commitment Siltie leaders have had towards local custom.  
175 Interview with Ato Akmel Ahmedin in December 2015 Werabe Town. 
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determined to support the customary courts not because they can help the state courts in reducing 
cases, but they are also more efficacious in settling family related disputes than state courts. This 
is mainly due to the social and cultural values the customary courts rely on.  
Respondents also said that some government officials helped elders' attempt to resurrect the 
system. However, this attempt was short-lived as other Siltie zone administration officials did 
not want to see robust elder's council so as “not to have two leaders in one area'' as a raga said he 
is regretful. As my informants said the Siltie zone officials did not want a strong elder's activity 
for dispute settlement for some reasons not clear to them, even if the constitution allows doing 
so, and other neighboring groups formed it as well. They, however, understand that the officials 
have made „loyal cadre elders“, who appear everywhere to show that the system favors the 
culture. Despite this, elders and some sections of the youth protest the intervention of the state 
officials in to elders’ activities in the past five and more years. This is due to the fact that there 
was a collision of state and religion particularly Muslims as the later accused the government of 
interference into religious affairs. Since the Siltie consider their culture more Islamic, they try to 
link the government’s interferences into religious realms as challenging the practice of Islam.  
Although sometimes the prosecutors reject elders' decisions, the data collected empirically in the 
area demonstrate that public prosecutors show tolerance for the practices of customary court 
especially if elders handle crime cases like car accidents that involve deaths. Despite this 
cooperation on some cases, there are times that the public prosecutors arrest the culprits after 
elders have settled the disputes (See more about car accident cases in the next section).  
Disputants who have experience in the customary court often say that they would not bring cases 
to elders' court since elders do not have a legal status to enforce their decisions (See also case 6 
in the next section). Even if the impact of local customs is traceable in every aspect of the lives 
of the Siltie, and the local customs regulate the operations of the customary courts, I there seems 
a growing tendency that some disputants show less interest in resorting to the local courts. This 
seems to arise from disputants perceptions that some actors in the customary courts have 
deserted local values and customary court judges have also become corrupted. With the 
challenge they face from the community, customary court judges use various strategies to attract 
clients by critically presenting the state court's inefficiency to deliver justice while portraying the 
non-economic and cultural natures of the customary courts (e.g. they criticize the state court for 
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not relating its juridical work with the local customs) (See more in chapter Seven about Self 
presentation and critical perspectives of Local Dispute Settlers). Even if some state judges 
criticize the local courts, some respondents indicate that the customary court could fill the gaps 
in delivering justice since the customary courts are working in accordance with the Siltie custom. 
Moreover, some Siltie elites associate the declining roles of Siltie customs in the daily activities 
of the people to the state interventions over the past two or three decades. They say that local 
custom including the customary court has faced some challenges including political interventions 
aimed at weakening the local system .176 They further traced the genesis of the crisis of 
customary court since the late nineteenth century and which was further worsened in the course 
of time following the changes of regimes. However, Siltie local elites figured out and considered 
the identity struggle period (1991-2001) an apogee of a crisis of elders hegemony, when 
cooptation had become an order of the time to „produce local loyal elders“ who could help the 
pro-Gurage political leaders develop the political stamina to implement government policies. My 
informants state further that elderliness was very active during the identity struggle time, as 
elders who were accepted by the community mobilized the people for the cause and challenged 
the Gurage party. However, the local state actors began to produce „loyal elders“ and let active 
elders down in the local political and social lives, albeit they could not totally prevent them from 
involving in the social affairs and providing mediation services177 they deliver to the community. 
Thus, the customary court has sustained the challenges. Furthermore, informants stressed that the 
crisis of elders' council had reached its zenith, especially in the late 1990s, due to two major 
reasons. First, local elites accused elders of not using their socially empowered power 'properly'', 
and not following the Siltie party cadres' advice effectively. Secondly, some Siltie elites also 
associated the crisis to the ruling party's co-opting strategies and intimidations of the elders, 
whose activities could become politically subversive.  
                                                     
176Interview with Ato Mohammed Yusuf, former head of Siltie zone culture, tourism and communication department 
on 20 June, 2015, Engineer Temam, a Siltie local investor known for his cultural knowledge specially about lowland 
Siltie, Ato Bahru Jamal, a lecturer/anonymous name) Azernet area and Weizero Aysha Balengo, a leader at local 
administration in development leagues in Alicho Wuriro in June 2016 and October 2016. 
 
177 When I say 'mediation service“, it is the service local dispute settlers give to the community in various dispute 
settlement forums. The dispute settlers will get the social respect and legitimacy that may serve them consolidate 
local power in exchange to their mediation services. 
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To this end, they argue, the government used a conspiracy theory and instigated systematic 
popular uprisings that could disturb the peace of the society. Afterwards, the local state 
administrations associated the unrest within the community with the acts of elders.  
Following these incidents, some well-known elders such as Abegaz Redi Hamdino of Alicho, 
Sheik Jamal of Lanfuro and many others were imprisoned, and two women, namely, Bahrite and 
Beydite, who took part in the struggle in Azernet Berbera weredas were killed. Since then, the 
politically induced and co-opted elders came to the stage and began to dominate the social and 
political arena. As these elders have back up from the ruling parties, they have continued to be 
called everywhere to settle disputes. Then, problems arose as these elders who were not socially 
empowered began to abuse the offices of elders, turning the situation to their and the ruling 
party's advantage. Thus, Siltie elders whom informants view „Ye Haq Baliqe,“ the true elders 
could not get legitimacy until now. Some informants further indicated that these elders have 
started taking bribes, and money has been introduced into the customary court as a form of 
exchange (Bohanana, 1955). This has continued to affect the customary courts negatively to this 
date. 
Added to this, local legal experts and other informants178stated that Salafi teachings have become 
another challenge for the existence of Siltie culture. They accuse Islamic reformists of violating 
the exogamous marriage by permitting marriage between relatives within a clan and providing 
dispute settlement forum in the form of the social committee. Local dispute settled accuse 
Salafists of labeling the local cultural values as well as belief systems like Berche as an 
innovation or against the actual creed of Islam. Informants further state that elders have involved 
aggressively in the society to divorce unlawful marriages and are teaching about harmful 
traditional practices like Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). They also indicated that local 
dispute settlers settle various dispute cases including murder cases against the state discourse. I 
observed in different customary court sessions that elders mentioned the past successes that the 
local system achieved to indicate the social power and agency of elders to resist every attempt 
that targets the customary system.  
                                                     
178 Interview with Hajji Keresema, leader of Ye Mulla Siltie Melcho in Lanfuro Wereda, and Kaire Sule, 
an important cultural informant in Tora Town, Lanfuro on November 28, 2015, werabe Town.  
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They further explained that the Siltie customary system was under attack by expanding forces of 
Menilik II who tried to dissolve the system and change YeFerezagegn appeal court in 
neighboring Mesqan communities rather than the ones in Siltie zone.  
Elders like Hajji Keresema stated that the Siltie's last appeal court is Shenecha rather than 
Ferezagegne. This idea seems to have developed since 2001, following the establishment of 
Siltie Zone as part of reviving and re-engineering Siltie's system, for YeFerezagegn court is still 
chosen by quite a large number of Siltie communities to appeal the decisions of lower first 
instance courts. It is observed that Siltie elders have a significant interest to revive and strengthen 
elder's power by setting up what they call, Yebalique Webaje Gar, or Elders' Council. 
6.7.1. Revitalization of the Siltie Customary Court: A Foiled attempt 
Even though they have faced some challenges including intimations and arrest, the Siltie elders 
have struggled to form zonal elders' council as the highest authority in the customary system 
since 2010. Some of the well-known and committed elders such as Gerad Awel and Hajji 
Hussein Hassena179, from Silti and Mirab Azernet Weredas respectively died naturally in 2014. 
Thus, with these challenges the customary court faces, and with the interest to get back to their 
local political powers at the local and zonal levels, elders pursued the project to revive the 
customary systems for an extended period, though in vain. Siltie legal experts and relevant local 
actors such as Moro, Ragas, and Gerads who act as local rulers and judges in various territorial, 
lineages, and sublineage levels of administration pushed the agenda of reviving the customary 
court across the zone. A number of Siltie elders started to revitalize the system, and codify the 
customary court codes and articles since 2010. However, they have only managed to meet in 
2011/12. Elders from eight Weredas and Werabe Town gathered in Werabe Town and 
deliberated on the following issues.  
 
                                                     
179 These two figures were the symbol of Siltie elder's council and highly respected elders as well as my key 
informants who died naturally in 2014.This is a big blow to the formation of the council as we could not see a 
leading figure. However, this time, Girazmach Hussein Bussera, a clan leader, has been nominated by eight wereda 
and Werabe city administration elders. The struggle seems to have persisted despite, fierce resistance from the Zone.  
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Figure 21 Elders discussing how to keep the Siltie customary court when gathered for annual language, culture and 
history symposium in Werabe Town (November, 2015). 
Elders kept on raising the question to state leaders whenever they met for zonal meetings in 
Werabe Town. My key informants and elites pointed out the following reasons for the need to 
form Elders' Council. To begin with, my key informants explained that the customary system is 
not homogeneous in its implementations across the area. They stated that the variations 
witnessed in the dispute settlement were considered as a threat to a unified Siltie identity.180 
Thus, elders wanted to homogenize the customary system to avoid local variations and set up all 
encompassing Siltie Serra. Here, as a prerequisite to set up zonal elders’ council, elders proposed 
an area in Werabe Town where a big Podocarpus Tree or Odda was found. They thought that this 
area could become in Werabe as an appellant court replacing YeFerezagegn court in Gurage 
Zone. The elders also intended to determine the amount of blood money paid for various murder 
cases especially for intentional murder.  
                                                     
180 I observed that members of two clans, namely Date Wezir and Melga disputed over the items that can be given 
during a cooling period, or Wurkefena after a driver from the former clan killed an eighteen years old girl in 
Hulbareg Wereda in May 2015. I attended the dispute settlement session, and there was a debate between the 
representatives of the disputants and a neutral jury. Finally, another elder who was invited by the driver’s family 
used local Siltie norms like Berche to narrow the gap, and leaving the clan variation, the parties came to a 
consensus. However, later I heard that the dispute settlement process did not end peacefully owing to the local 
variations on how to settle murder cases.  
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In this regard, elders were doing well, for they have decided that Agarsa/deliberate murder/ be 
compensated with 50,000 ETB blood money (a little more than 2,000 Euros) or Gumma against 
the previous rate from 5000-10,000 (200-300 Euros) ETB. Since then, it is observed that the 
decisions have been implemented on various premeditated murder cases. Moreover, elders are 
very worried about the younger generation that does not give much attention to the customary 
system, due to a growing religiosity among the youths' a result of the revivalism of Islam in the 
area and possibly beyond. That is to say, the younger generation is not very much concerned 
about the future of the scheme, and is reluctant to also employ it now. However, I observed that 
quite a significant number of young people still take dispute cases to elders' courts, provided that 
they impose some modifications in those areas they consider against Islamic teachings (e.g. like 
Gudda where they replace slaughtering of a black goat and tying disputant's toes with the 
intestine of the goat with a mere greeting). The youth, for instance, usually settles murder cases 
in the customary court by simple greetings or make the parties to embrace each other and hence 
replacing tying the toes of disputants with white thread and a black female goat intestine that 
symbolizes the end of enmity. Moreover, Siltie elders want also the customary system to be 
provided in a written form and be applied across the zone. They put a strong stress on the 
codification process. However, some other elders fear that the codification process may not 
allow the customary court to look at cases in a flexible way or according to circumstances.  
Furthermore, elders want to forge a working principle with the state actors, following the 
customary norms and the Islamic precepts. My informants indicated that one of the objectives of 
the revitalization process was to discuss and develop commonly agreed upon modes to work with 
the state justice system that can help dispute settlement actors to cooperate on settling disputes 
according to the Siltie norms and values. These all problems are challenging the very existence 
of the local system. However, it seems that the heavy-handed approach of the political office that 
inspects their activities as a politically subversive act is also a significant hurdle to materialize 
their dreams. As an informant put it,“ the federal system is hypocritical in that it gives the local 
community the right for self-administration in the constitution (see the 1995 FDRE Constitution, 
Art.39), while it does not allow the customary system to operate fully in the area“181. 
                                                     
181 I have taken this idea from one of the dispute settlers who was involved in the process of settling death case due 
to a car accident in Werabe Town August 2014.He was puzzled by the interference of the zone public prosecutor 
who sued the driver while elders were dealing with the case. Most of the time elders are allowed freely to settle car 
accident cases as the cases are not considered as intentional crimes.  
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Nevertheless, one thing which binds all elders in the Siltie community is that they appreciate the 
federal system that ushered in a new era that empowers the Siltie with an ethnic status that was 
not present before. 
6.8. State Actors’ Perceptions of Non-State Actors: An Ambivalent position 
The Siltie non-state actors have been involving in the national and local political affairs at least 
since the 1970s. They were one of the prominent figures who mobilized the Ethiopian Muslims 
that staged a nationwide demonstration against the Christian-oriented Imperial regime in 1974. 
Siltie religious leaders and elders have also actively participated in the identity struggle since 
1991. They are also prominent figures at the grassroots level as dispute settlers, and local leaders. 
Religious figures and elders also played important roles in smoothly demarcating the boundary 
of the newly established zone after the Siltie separated from neighboring Hadiyya, Kembata, and 
Gurage zones. Thus, non-state actors are socially, politically, religiously and culturally 
prominent figures in the area and in the surroundings. The relation between state and non-state 
actors should also be looked into from the high social leverages non-state actors have in the area. 
The idea of EPRDF political platform and the introduction of developmental state model seem to 
be not willing to recognize and incorporate any contending party including the customary ones in 
local and zonal socio-economic and political affairs. 
My state actor informants said that the zone encouraged elders to organize themselves and help 
the state's endeavor of maintaining social order. One of the informants182 who was the head of 
zone security department and who worked in Siltie and Gurage zones for more than 20 years 
indicated that there is an understanding of the roles of non-state actors for the peace of the area. 
But he did not deny the lack of a shared commitment to see a strong elders' council in the area. 
He underscored that the zone justice department initiated an idea to set up zonal elders' council to 
gather Siltie elders under one customary system in 2012. Its aim was to incorporate elders at the 
various levels of state councils, yet with no vote as an observer status, and to facilitate elders' 
involvement in the justice sector yet under the auspices of the officials in case they become 
politically subversive.  
                                                     
182 Interview with Ato Alewi Nuri and other state representatives while discussing with various 
individuals about the significances of elders for the justice sector Werabe town on 30 December 2015.  
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However, the ex-head of the security department said that the attempt to organize elders became 
futile due to involvement of some officials who could not understand the significances of elders 
for the general order of the zone. Elders, however, claimed that the idea was initiated by them, 
and this indicates contestation of actors in the area. 
I also observed that elders frequently requested the zone administration to help their initiatives to 
form a council that can be used as an umbrella to discuss the peace of Siltie and become a 
unified body of the customary system. They demanded the council to serve as a forum that can 
facilitate a preparation of a uniform customary court code and homogenize the customary system 
that is now characterized by variations in different areas. Elders keep on referring to the various 
neighboring Hadiyya, Gurage, the Oromo and the Sidama areas' experiences, and how these 
people use the customary system to maintain the custom and social orders of their respective 
communities. Nevertheless, the chiefs of the zone have frequently refused this idea since 2010. 
Rather, the new zonal chief responded to elders, on the 10th annual Siltie language, culture and 
history symposium183 by providing another option as a forum for elders that seems politically 
safe. He said that elders could make use of the Qebele and Wereda councils and become active 
participants in various organizations. He further explained that elders could employ the annual 
symposiums as an avenue for non-state actors' gatherings so that they can discuss and develop 
common working norms and values to settle disputes.  
Nevertheless, one of my key informants184 who took part in the process said that elders selected 
their leader and made frequent meetings to decide on how to achieve their objectives. The major 
reasons for their gathering apart from the ones mentioned above are the decline of the Siltie 
norms and values, the existence of disputes especially among family members due to the failure 
of respecting elders, and the death of well-known Ragas who know the customary court 
procedures that require urgent interventions to save the system. 
                                                     
183 Taken from the 10th Annual Siltie Language, Culture and History Symposium held from 28-29 November 2015 
in Werabe town.  
184 July 25, 2015, Interview with my key informants like She Ahmed Kelil, Hajji Kedir Abdela, Imam Hussien Kedir 
and Ato Bahredin Adem who were key figures in their communities in various Weredas. The identity of my 
informants is made confidential. Siltie elders always compare the status of local systems with their neighbors to 
show how the federal system is characterized by double standards and hypocrisy, and inconsistent applications of 
local systems. They associate the poor implementation and challenges of the customary courts to the low 
commitment Siltie officials have had towards local systems.  
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6.8.1.1. Case 1: Ato Ahmed Mohammed185 : A Critical Reflection of State Actor 
on Local Dispute Settlers 
State agents' perceptions of local legal actors vary from one actor to another. Some view local 
dispute settlers as politically subversive, while others understand them from the local identity 
perspective. Yet the majority of the state actors have developed an ambivalent position, they 
could neither openly criticize nor encourage the customary legal system. Here, I choose one of 
the state actors whom I consider may represent this state of affairs, and who has shared his take 
on the roles and prospect of local dispute settlers with me. Ato Ahmed’s reflections on the 
customary court and local dispute settlers are presented below.  
The customary court must operate in accordance with the local values 
and norms rather than in strange ways. The Siltie gives value to elders on 
the basis of elders' contributions to the community, their impartiality in 
dispute settlement, and loyalty to the community. I think that having 
representatives from each Weredas to form elders' zonal council is not in 
the interest of the culture. Thus, organizing elders into elders' council 
and letting them settle disputes including criminal cases contradicts the 
constitution. The constitution does not allow crime cases to be handled 
by customary and religious courts. Nevertheless, the customary courts 
will have more freedom if they operate in the cultural ways that form the 
foundations of their existence. As you know one cannot nominate elders 
for the community through elections. It is the community itself that gives 
an individual the status of an elder. Electing and bringing elders into one 
organization in the zone will detach the customary court from its cultural 
foundations. The customary court operates at a village, clan, family, as 
well as various lineage and sublineage levels. If we bring in elders as 
representatives of the contemporary Wereda rather than letting them 
operate based on the Siltie indigenous structure, we are creating 
inconsistencies.  
                                                     
185 On December 2016 I interviewed Ato Ahmed, an official in Siltie zone Security Department who has worked 
with elders on local security and dispute related issues for over a decade. I have discussed with some state actors to 
share with me their perceptions of the customary court and local dispute settlers. The above ideas have been shared 
by most of the state officers who met with me. 
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We may also homogenize the community by creating a unified local 
custom that is against the existing local variations in the area. It will also 
affect the social acceptance of our elders. For us, it will be more helpful 
if elders work according to the culture than conforming to modern 
organizations. If elders know it well, they will reject any possibility of 
organizing Siltie elders under one organization. We also know that elders 
are resolving some dispute cases including homicide. This is conducted 
on the basis of local values and norms. We cannot interfere in the local 
custom, for the constitution forbids us to do so. However, if elders try to 
organize and codify the customary laws and do accordingly, a conflict 
will emerge between state and non-state actors as their activities will 
contravene the constitution. Thus, it is better for elders to maintain the 
custom and local values of the community than trying to form a self-
appointed representative of the community. 
 Ato Ahmed's reflection indicates that he supports elders' involvement in dealing with disputes 
on one hand, is against elders' interest to form elders' council on the other hand. This stand 
reflects the ambivalent positions of state actors in the area. Some informants also said that some 
government officials helped elders' attempt to resurrect the system. Nevertheless, this attempt 
could not last long as some other agents of the state wrongly perceived elders' initiative as a 
project intended to form elders' council that could potentially bring „two leaders in one area’’ or 
a „state in a state“ as a Raga said regrettably. My informants further said that the Siltie zone 
officials did not want a strong elder’s activity for dispute settlement for some reasons not clear to 
them.  
Nevertheless, they understand that the state-officials prepare loyal elders who appear everywhere 
to show that the system favors the culture. The same sources indicate that Zone and Wereda 
prosecutors always give little attention to elders' decisions in the customary court. They have 
always experienced interventions after settling disputes. Elders also blame the Zone for not 
making Siltigna the state court's language as it is hard for the local community to express itself 
freely186.  
                                                     
186 Siltie Zone High court has introduced Siltie language as court language since July, 2017. 
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For them, the customary court can fill this gap as it is conducted in free and society friendly 
environments. Therefore, despite the fact that Ethiopia has endorsed various legal and 
constitutional frameworks that sanctioned legal pluralism, local dispute settlers and disputing 
parties on one hand, state actors on the other, have developed a suspicious relationship since the 
mid-1990s. 
I also attended a meeting of elders who came from all Siltie areas for a Symposium in Werabe 
town in November 2015. I learned that they were determined to set up elders' council at the 
Zonal level. I also attended Gogot meeting in Lanfuro wereda Shefode Debar Qebele in mid-
November 2015 whereby Abalcho, Chiro, Dilapa clans including the adjacent Hallaba ethnic 
group. Thus, the meeting was somehow an inter-ethnic meeting. The Gogot also stressed the 
importance of elders' meeting in the zone. They said that it is difficult to start discussing Yebad 
Wegeret or the peace of the country without having a council. What I have learned from elders 
discussions and meetings that non-state actors have demonstrated two versions to form the 
council. First, I observed that there are elders who are always invited by officials to give 
blessings, appear on Televisions and thorough Radios to tell about the success story of the state. 
This group of elders has had an interest in developing elders' council, yet demanded state's 
permissions to move forward. Second, I also learned that various elders are working freely, and 
seem to have been 'ignored by the state', yet socially powerful gather freely in different weredas. 
These elders do not want the state to give them permission; they would prefer to provide their 
usual mediation services and hold clan and inter-clan meetings by creating a friendly relation 
with the Qebele leaders.  
In some instances, the Qebele leaders are more answerable to clan leaders than the state agents 
up in the Wereda. These elders do not want the state to give them permission, yet work their 
usual mediation services and clan and inter-clan meetings by creating a friendly relation with the 
Qebele leaders. Nevertheless, the second group of elders uses their local gatherings to praise the 
Federal system since “it empowers self-rule to the Siltie and gives freedom to the customary 
court.“ Furthermore, the second group of elders had started the process establishing of uniform 
local governance, including customary court under the name of Gogot, which means 
consolidated alliance. Representatives from Silti, Lanfuro, Hulbareg and neighboring Halaba 
special Wereda further agreed that a unified group is a must to maintain local norms and values 
from adverse impacts of globalization, and state's encroachment into the social fabrics of the 
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community.187Thus, elders stressed that all members of the Siltie people should speak the 
language as one of the ways to maintain the custom of the people. They also emphasized that an 
extreme form of Islamic interpretation also poses a threat to Siltie culture. They underscore the 
fact that their youths have become more religious oriented and they must teach the significances 
of the Siltie culture to young people. 
6.9. Local Institution and Local Development: Area of Cooperation between State and 
Non-State Actors  
YeSiltie Serra, as mentioned above, plays a pivotal role in maintaining the social, economic, as 
well as the local political life of the Siltie. Melcho or Shengo meetings either at territorial or at 
lineage levels are not only politico-judiciary forums but also function as socio-economic 
development forums. Studies indicate that the Siltie people have started to migrate to urban 
centers of Ethiopia at least since the late 19th century. They are engaged in various economic 
activities in Addis Ababa and in different cities of Ethiopia like Addis Ababa, Adama, and 
Hawassa. The Siltie in the urban centers have established various organizations to help maintain 
their identities. 
As my key informant188 said, Azernet Berbera number one and number two Idirs that are found 
in Addis Ababa and USA, YeSiltie Iddirs, YeSiltie Saffer (villages) that are located in Addis 
Ababa and the Gulf states are good instances in this case. These self-help institutions have not 
only helped the members of the society to strengthen the social cohesion in the urban centers but 
also have played significant roles in mobilizing urban resources for rural development. The 
urban Silties and Gurages have also used elders' forums to settle disputes (Alula and Getachew, 
2008). Additionally, the urban Silties are obliged by YeSiltieSerra norm to contribute their share 
for their lineage (YeAabotweld) and YeSiltie Bade (Siltie country) development activities in the 
countryside in the form of local remittances.  
                                                     
187 Interview with Hajji Nasir Mohammed age 72. Judge, Azernet Berbera customary court, Hajji Hussein Bussera, 
Dilapa clan leader, Hajji Mohammed Kelil, Silti Wereda elder and President of Siltie Zone Islamic Affair. It is also 
based on field notes that have been collected from Chiro Dilapa, Abalcho, and Gogot Mule Siltie Meetings in 
various Weredas between August 2014 and March 2016. 
 
188 Interview with Ato Delta Mohammed on January17/2016 in Addis Ababa and field observation. 
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The state officials also use local norms and institutions to mobilize the community for local 
development activities. Furthermore, the various territorial, lineage, and sub-lineage councils 
also mobilize the rural community to develop their area, to protect its environment and to plow 
each other's land cooperatively during harvesting and post harvesting seasons. The elders also 
mobilize the rural community to work hard in business and agriculture. 
On top of all this, when the Siltie goes to a household for annual festivals such as Islamic Arafa 
and edul-Fitr holidays, YeSiltieSerra asks them to support their local kinfolks in various 
economic activities. Thus, one can understand that YeSiltieSerra, if used properly, can 
significantly contribute role for the economic development of the area. YeSiltieSerra also obliges 
an individual to provide resources first to his parents and then to his patrilineage, Burda, Azegag, 
Mewta and YeSiltie Bade as the most inclusive social organization. Based on YeSiltie-Serra 
norm, those individuals who take part in development activities for local development of their 
place of origin usually get blessing and prayer (Du'aa) by elders (Yebad Baliqes). Nevertheless, 
those who are unenthusiastic to provide resources for development activities are considered as 
indifferent and will be cursed by elders and are ostracized by the society. It is customary to get 
rural roads, bridges, and schools that have been built by urban Siltie. However, as my key 
informants189 said, government officials are not willing to collaborate with urban merchants. 
According to them, the politicians fear that these local institutions will get great acceptance and 
legitimacy and political advantages over the state systems. It seems that urban Siltie did not have 
trust in local politicians. This may arise from the identity struggle period's continuation of a 
strained relation the community had with the state, on the one hand, and the disappointment of 
some Silties with the continuation of some pro-Gurage Silties in the state structure on the other. 
Due to this local contestation, it seems that YeSiltieSerra cannot contribute at their maximum 
capacity for the local development. YeSiltieSerra uses its systems of sanctions and social boycott 
strategies to demand full participation of the members of the society in rural development. 
 
                                                     
189 Interview with Ato Jemal Adem and Ato Mustafa Kedir on October 17/2015 in Addis Ababa. 
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6.10. Concluding Remarks 
The chapter indicates that the customary court operates side by side with the state administrative 
systems. It further states that the local legal system has faced challenges from the state since the 
late 19th century, yet has survived due to some factors including the agency of actors. The 
interactions of state and non-state actors have changed based on the ideologies of the successive 
regimes. The chapter observes that state actors have developed an ambivalent position towards 
the local system, which is characterized by keeping their status in the community by tacitly 
lending support to the local custom and serving the political interests of the government. The 
empirical data presented in the chapter also indicate that the customary legal system is 
characterized not only by plurality but also, by intra-contestations among local legal actors. 
Moreover, the system has served as a tool for identity struggle. 
The ethnographic data demonstrate further that customary courts handle various cases and have 
become important tribunals at the grass roots level. The customary court judges make use of 
various ways to appeal to clients including by portraying their images at the expense of the state 
system. The empirical data further indicate that the interactions between customary and state 
court judges are characterized by cooperation and contestation. But the community resorts to 
customary courts cases due mainly to better legitimacy, closeness to the people, and economic 
and time factors. Moreover, even though the state tries to control every aspect of the social life 
and activities of customary court judges, the local state officials are more governed by their daily 
experiences than the estate principles on the one hand, and the local dispute settlers also use their 
local agency as instrument to continue the mediation services they are delivering to the 
community on the other. And hence, as they are very near to the local community, the customary 
courts are providing justice to the grassroots level more than other tribunals. The chapter also 
demonstrates that the customary system has faced existential threats not only from the 
centralized governments but also from Federalist Ethiopia. In addition, we can understand that 
local legal actors use their agencies to maintain their local positions and provide services. Even if 
the local systems have enjoyed the freedom to revive and operate at the grassroots level since the 
1990s, elders have developed the interest to form elders' council. This is an indication of the 
revival of traditional power among the Siltie. However, it is also a clear indication of power 
contestation between the state and non-state actors in the area which will become a potentially 
destabilizing factor in the future. 
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                      CHAPTER SEVEN 
7. LOCAL LEGAL ACTORS’ SELF-PERCEPTIONS, CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES AND 
LEGAL REALITIES: INTERACTIONS AND COMPETITION FOR LEGITIMACY 
7.1. Introduction  
This chapter explores first the self-perceptions and critical perspectives of local dispute settlers 
on other legal actors, and how the local legal actors depict themselves vi-a-vis the contending 
state actors in the area. It also looks into the interactions of local legal actors, and the duality of 
complementary as well as the competing nature of interaction among the various legal systems. 
Dispute settlers' self-descriptions and critical perspectives become an important legal reality to 
understand the lived experiences of actors in one hand, and the emerging legal hybridism among 
the Silties on the other. The chapter also presents various dispute cases ranging from minor 
marital disputes to homicide, the legal systems involved, legal actors' interpretations of their 
mediation services which also involve explanations about the concrete strategies they employ to 
handle disputes and the power relations among various legal systems. It also explores the 
different incidents the local community has passed through to appropriate the social 
transformation process that depicts the existence of social transformational processes from the 
grassroots level. The book argues that self-expressions of dispute settlers become significant 
indicator of legal regimes' interaction in the plural legal constellations. Local dispute settlers 
while presenting themselves as peace makers, they also compete for religious authority and 
social power by depicting religious figures and state actors as inefficient indicating the 
contending interactions among actors. This chapter argues further that local dispute settlers use 
disputes to ascertain local power, and negotiate with different actors including the state. It further 
claims that dispute settlers employ mediation services as one of the ways to maintain their local 
legal agency. It further argues that neo-traditional leaders portray their mediation services as 
truth and peace searching than as imposing norms. The chapter also argues that local dispute 
settlers develop a hybridized legal perception to settle disputes and hence employ more than one 
modes of dispute settlement. The chapter further argues that cross-referencing legal and social 
norms by actors have boosted the legal agency of local legal actors. It also pinpoints that legal 
hybridism has become the norm than the exception in the legal realities among the Silties.  
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The chapter finally argues that duality of cooperation and contestation characterize the 
interactions among the various legal actors. 
7.2. Self-Descriptions and Critical Perspectives of Dispute Settlers  
This sub-topic examines cases from local dispute settlers' perceptions and self-expressions 
(Ubink 2007, Oomen 2003) that portray themselves and their jobs as instruments for reinstating 
peace rather than sanctioning norms. It also shows the ways local dispute settlers present and 
criticize the other of in an attempt to build their legitimacy in the local setting. 
7.2.1. Case 1. Raga Hajji Awel's190 Self Expressions and Critical Perspectives: 
Competing for Religious Authority 
Raga Hajji Awel, 65, lives in Enseno Town, Mesqan Wereda, in Gurage Zone. Quite large 
number of Siltie people live also in Enseno town. Hajji Awel settles cases referred from Gurage, 
Siltie, neighbouring Halaba and Oromia areas. He speaks Amharic, Mareqo, Siltie and Gurage 
languages. He presides over various cases like family dispute, homicide, land dispute, and deaths 
related to car accidents. On average, Raga Awel handles 30-40 cases every week. The court 
session works every Sunday, which is a market day in Enseno Town. I have attended several 
sessions and observed how Hajji Awel handles dispute cases. Hajji Awel's court is an appellate 
court for some Magas working in Siltie, Mesqan as well as Mareqo areas. The court setting is 
arranged in a circular mode with a large crowd surrounding Hajji Awel. I observed that elders, 
youth, women and religious leaders, and followers of various faiths attend the Raga court. Raga 
Awel always seats in the middle encircled by the court attendants.  
The language of the court changes as per the clients' language. I have observed that Amharic, 
Siltie, Mesqan and Mareqo languages are used as a medium of communication in the customary 
court and this further strengthens Hajji Awel's mediation power in the court hearings vis-a-vis 
state or religious courts. The court summons in an open air under the acacia tree in the compound 
of Hajji Awel. There is a clear form of procedure in the court. Parties have to wait for their turns 
to talk. The court secretary writes down the clients' names according to their arrival time. Each 
disputant pays five Birr for the service. However, Hajji Awel did not have a cashier. Rather, one 
of the court attendees collected the money from the disputants, and another one replaced this 
person after finishing his case. Hajji Awel said that he is not interested in collecting the money. 
                                                     
190 Interview with Raga Hajji Awel, age 65, from 1-7 September 2015 in Enseno Town. 
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He further said that whenever he goes out to the community, he will get much respect from the 
people.  
He stated that he preferred the respect from the people than money. For him, it is the mediation 
services that bring social respect. He said the following about his job. 
I have inherited the Raga position from my father. I did not want to be 
Raga. However, it is Allah who has given me the power to work for truth, 
and reconcile disputants. My father was a respected elder and Raga in the 
community. If a member of your family does well, the position of 
elderliness will keep on with one of the members of the household. Thus, I 
have got it because Allah has chosen me to work for peace and truth. It is 
not my choice. It is the Almighty's choice. I have no power and capacity to 
resolve conflicts. It is Allah who has given me the authority to do so. As I 
am doing His work, seeking the truth that gives me the strength in every 
activity. I do not want any payment for my job. But it is the disputants that 
has fixed five birr payment for every case. They wanted even to increase 
the payment, yet i disagreed. That is why I did not assign anyone to collect 
money. The community prefers our court for the following reasons. 1. We 
are quicker than the state court. 2. We are nearer to the local community 
than the state court, considering the local cultivation and harvesting time, 
and we do not have repeated appointments apart from those complicated 
cases which involve Berche. In fact, these cases require patience and may 
take time 3.Ours is less costly than the state’s judiciary. 4. We are also 
more truthful than the state. I am also doing my work as per Shari'a 
requirements respecting other faiths' rights, for Berche does not segregate 
faiths. Berche treats all faiths under the way. Islam also preaches peace 
and so do I. My job entirely focuses on reinstituting harmony among the 
community. I am working for the community as entrusted to me by Allah. 
Our court is also working the whole time whenever the clients come to my 
court. The court, as you see, uses various languages based on the client's 
ethnic back ground, and ours is more flexible than the state court. My 
court is also preferable to other Ragas who mainly use the Amharic 
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language. My court receives cases that referred from the Ragas as a result 
of the local community's dissatisfaction with the verdicts or the ways other 
Ragas go to finish Berche. 
 
 
Figure 22 Raga Hajji Awel while considering domestic violence case that involves teeth breaking in Enseno Town Gurage 
Zone (June, 2015).  
Despite the fact that Hajji Awel depicts the state court as a failure, quite large number of dispute 
cases are settled by the state courts and people still refer their cases to the courts as well. Raga 
Awel also presents his court as more religious than the Sharia courts indicating he is competing 
for religious authority and wants to use the growing tendency of Islamization as a channel to 
attract more clients and build up his legitimacy. Additionally, even though Hajji Awel presents 
his court as the nearer institution to the community, people travel to his court from very far area.  
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I also observed that Hajji Awel has employed religious, cultural as well as state legal norms to 
settle disputes. Hajji Awel considers his services as entrusted by Allah (God), and Allah has 
given him responsibility to work for the community. This indicates he emphasizes on Allah or 
Islam vis-a-vis the religiously diversified nature of his clients. Nevertheless, Hajji Awel's special 
emphasis on religion (Islam) seems to arise due to his local power that crosses ethnic boundary 
and hence he develops the strategy of employing religious norm to handle dispute cases that are 
referred from Muslim Siltie, Gurage, and Mareqo people. Additionally, the Siltie's local norms 
are at the center when disputants become non-Siltie due to the fact that the Siltie's local norms 
are shared by neighboring communities. I have also observed that the court gives priority to 
women and elders. It is also noted that Hajji Awel mainly compares his activities or mediation 
services191 with those of the state and other customary court actors and the Sharia courts, 
indicating partly the presence of competition between the customary, the state courts, and the 
religious actors than others. Hajji Awel's linguistic competence during court hearings also boosts 
his social legitimacy and has influenced the forum shopping trends that have been witnessing not 
only among the state, the customary and the religious courts but also between the customary 
courts. The self-expressions and critical perspectives of Hajji Awel also depict the intra and inter-
legal systems contending relationships prevalent in the area. Moreover, Hajji Awel uses the 
biography of his father as one of the ways to legitimatize his local legal power and form of 
possessing knowledge too. His critical perspectives on other legal systems also indicates the 
power relations that characterizes the relations of legal systems in legally plural constellation. 
7.2.2. Case 2. Hajji Mohammed Sheik Kelli's192 Self Portray and Critical Perspectives: 
A Strategic Alliance 
I accompanied Hajji Mohammed in different local dispute settlement sessions. He has 
experiences in dispute resolution ranging from family disputes to homicide dispute cases. I have 
observed that many people invite Hajji Mohammed to intervene into their cases believing that he 
can impartially mediate disputants. He is a President of Siltie Zone Islamic Council. He has 
developed an amicable relationship with the state officials (I observed that he met with state 
                                                     
191 I use mediation service to indicate the services delivered by local dispute settlers to the community in which the 
dispute settlers gain respect and legitimacy in exchange. 
192 Interview with Hajji Mohammed Sheik Kelil, 64, a Maga and President of Siltie Zone Islamic Council on 16 
December 2015 Werabe. I accompanied Hajji Mohammed to different customary court sessions to observe how he 
settles disputes since August 2014 for more than two years.  
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officials several times and was invited to bless local holidays' meetings and celebrations by Zone 
officials). He has a sound knowledge of Siltie cultural norms as well as Islam. I have also 
observed that he did not accept any form of invitations before ending disputes to show that his 
decision is impartial as a strategy to develop social legitimacy. He made the following comment 
about himself.  
I have worked on Boneya clan elders' council dispute settlement, local 
elders' forum, and Siltie Zone Islamic Council. I am also a farmer. I have 
inherited the knowledge and skill to mediate disputes from my father, 
Sheik Kelil Weraqe. My father was a well-known elder in our Boneya 
and Wenejela clans. He passed away in 1985. I have begun to take part in 
customary court session since then. Allah has also given me the wisdom 
and strength to do so. I can handle grave crime cases like homicide, 
divorce, and disputes over land and car accident cases that involve death. 
I see cases usually on Sundays, for it is a rest day for most of our 
community.  
We elder settle many of the cases easily that the state courts find difficult 
to resolve. We take cases (e.g. marital cases) from the state courts. When 
we see that disputants' marriage is going to be terminated, we negotiate 
and take the case out from a court. You know some of our initiatives to 
mediate disputants. We also meet those judges who refuse our 
interventions. We become more robust and powerful to narrow the gap 
as we live in the community and we meet daily unlike the state court that 
only operates in specified schedules. We tell the disputants that even if 
the state court settles the case, the spirit of conflict will never end. Allah 
also loves those who forgive and choose peace than dispute. We, 
therefore, prevail over other courts even the Shari'a one. We elder are 
bothered by the alarming increase of conflicts among members of a 
household, between relatives, and so many family cases are coming to 
my court. Thus, our involvement as custodian of our culture and peace is 
a must. We use a contract paper to show the end of disputes, and we will 
submit it to the courts. I do not rest home until the case is referred to me. 
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I initiate the reconciliation myself. It is my duty to play a role for the 
peace of the community. As you know blood cases cannot end without 
our involvement. I cannot remember a blood case193 that has been 
resolved in my absence. Murder or blood cases that involve Berche are 
severe. This is because the dispute settlement requires patience and 
cautiousness. Prisons cannot end Berche. I employ the Siltie cultural 
ways, and Islamic teachings as well as some ideas from the state system 
to reconcile disputants. I, for instance, use gender equality teachings 
which I have got through training to deal with marital cases. I also tell 
the disputants that if they do not end cases here, they will face the state 
system.  
I also frequently say to the participants that Allah likes peace and 
forgiveness than retaliations to narrow the spirit of combat between 
disputants. I also quote various Quranic verses to substantiate my 
argument. However, I understand from my lived experience that most 
members of the community are scared of local values like Berche and 
Fero than Islamic and state punishments. The youth fear the state and 
Islamic values than the culture. Nevertheless, I cannot remember a 
session wherein I did not use local values and norms to settle disputes. I 
consider the conditions of the disputants and the orientations they have 
before delving into the cases. If disputants are more oriented to Islam, I 
will do so accordingly. This time, I have started considering cases in two 
places to be more accessible to clients. The first place usual court place 
is Agode Qebele, and I have also introduced a new location in Werabe so 
that my customers can bring cases in more accessible and easy ways. I 
consider cases in the contexts of Siltie culture to see cases flexibly from 
different perspectives. You see the state court fixes 40,000 ETB (Around 
1800 Euro) as compensation for murder's victim's family. However, our 
court will make the perpetrator pay between 15,000-20 000 ETB (900 
Euros) according to the type of the incident.  
                                                     
193 The Siltie name murder cases exchangeable with blood case. 
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For intentional murder, the maximum compensation is 50,000 ETB194 
(2000 Euro). We as elders do make the victim’s family understand that 
compensation will consume one's asset including life, for everything 
happens according to Allah's plan. We also try to make them understand 
that forfeiting the compensation is better than receiving it. This helps one 
prevent the adverse consequences of Berche. We associate compensation 
with Berche, for people who demand much money will be affected by 
bad Berche. I teach the community by use of examples. I lost my son by 
a car accident while he was herding cattle in 1992. I did not take 
compensation, for death by a car accident is not intentional. However, I 
got the results of the good Berche back in 1997 when my elder son who 
was a driver overturned a car. The car was destroyed, yet my son 
survived. I understand that forgiving drivers after a car accident can 
become insurance for the one who becomes a victim, and of course will 
work better for the one who forfeits the compensation. I always narrate 
various stories about Berche and failure to uphold elders' decision while 
at the court can inflict harm. Our court is appealing to the vulnerable, 
(e.g. women and people with disabilities). We are also more preferred 
than social courts in the Qebele. People went to social courts to settle 
minor disputes like marital disputes. However, these days, the 
acceptance of social courts is decreasing due to bribery, and partiality. I 
do not like an invitation to the parties before settling disputes. I perceive 
that this may help me decide impartially on cases. I have been assigned 
as president of Siltie Zone Islamic Affair since 2011. This position has 
affected my daily work as an elder. The community respects me mainly 
for my role as a dispute settler than for being a president. I understand 
that respect to elders and customary courts seem to have been declining. 
I believe this is because of two major reasons. To begin with, some 
elders are appointed by the officials. The true elders who can work for 
truth are left at home.  
                                                     
194 This is based on the exchange rate of 1 euro with 25 ETB dated June 2015. 
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Those who are politically loyal are controlling the stage, and are 
supported by the government. I believe that our elders are categorized 
into two: those who support their custom and loyal to the people and 
those with the state and reluctant to the culture. I understand that local 
officials tend to take side with the politics than with the Siltie culture. 
Even though elders often deal with most of the civil cases freely, 
political interference into elders' activities has this day become the main 
challenge to the existence of customary court. The second factor is that 
some elders are so corrupt they engage in bribes with disputants. We see 
now the growing number of elders who take money from disputants and 
decide accordingly. I fear that the Siltie culture and customary court is at 
the crossroad. I also believe that Shari'a courts are not standing on their 
feet. Since the government pays them, there is a wrong assumption that 
the Qadis may not work for the Muslims. Due to this and other 
perceptions the Qadis have lesser legitimacy in the eyes of the 
community. I see that women, youths, and elders have confidence in the 
customary court, for the customary courts are truth seekers. There is one 
thing that is perplexing to me these days: seeing our officials who speak 
our language and who are products of Siltie culture, but who do not have 
much concern about the revitalization of customary court and Siltie 
culture. I believe that Siltie customary court is the custodian of Siltie 
culture. Unfortunately, it has been forsaken. I recommend that the 
government officials should support the elders in accordance with the 
constitution“. 
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Figure 23 Hajji Mohammed Kelil at Hajji Awel's court presenting Maga's decision on car accident case that involved 
death (October 2014).  
Thus, one can understand from Hajji Mohammed's self-expression and critical perspectives that 
his criticism of the Qadis and some elders seem to emanate from less understanding of the 
agency of actors who can use their abilities to achieve their intentions in the presence of strong 
structures like the state. The lived experience of Hajji Mohammed presented above indicate also 
that he still remains impartial and serves the community even if he is a state appointed head of 
Zone Islamic affair and has relationship with the state actors. Thus, this can lead us to conclude 
working with the state is not necessarily a problem to get social legitimacy in the area. I also 
observed that elders settle quite a large number of civil cases freely and with some disagreements 
with public prosecutors, they also handle crime cases too. We can also understand that Hajji 
Mohammed considers marital, land, interfaith and homicide cases. He also underscores that he 
has got the legitimacy to see dispute cases from his family, religious teachings, clan as well as 
the state. 
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 His involvements are not restricted only to the local dispute settlement areas but have also been 
witnessed in the Zonal and regional affairs too. These multi-directional activities have broadened 
the leverages as well as the local power of Hajji Mohammed which in turn has contributed to the 
flow of clients to Hajji Mohammed's court and hence for forum shopping.  
Having a number of membership in different fields with serve local actors like Hajji Mohammed 
has to boost their local agency that also contributes to the rise of neo-traditional leadership in the 
area. Unlike other local actors, Hajji Mohammed has developed a delicate balance among the 
state, religious and customary legal systems. His self-expressions also indicate the demand of 
some Siltie elders to develop elders' council that can help them negotiate further with the state 
and other actors. Hajji Mohammed is not only critical of the state and the religious systems, but 
also of the customary legal practices in the area. He underlines that there is a growing trend of 
money based exchanges between the disputants and the local judges whereby disputant pays 
money for the judge to get his case settled, and this can easily lead to bribery and partiality in the 
customary court. The self-expression of Hajji Mohammed also indicates the complementarity 
and contentious relationships not only among the customary, the state and the religious legal 
systems but also in the intra-cultural legal system. We can also understand from the Hajji 
Mohammed's self-portrayal and critical perspectives that he is very cautious of keeping integrity 
as a means of getting legitimacy both from the state and the community. It also demonstrates the 
divided mentality he has towards the custom, Islam and the state. He also uses impartiality and 
working for the community as a strategy to boost his social acceptance which in turn positively 
affects disputants' choice of his court. Moreover, he maintains his reservations about the state in 
a very mild way while making the point that the Constitution needs to be respected, 
acknowledging that the 1995 constitution has empowered elders to take part in dispute settlement 
processes. This state of affair indicates how non-state actors use state law as a weapon to 
champion their rights on one hand, the emergence of “democracy from below” trends on the 
other.  
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7.2.3. Case 3. Azma Jabir Hussein's 195 Self-Descriptions and Critical Perspectives 
I traveled to Sesso Qebele, Lanfuro Wereda where a large number of people from the Abalcho 
clan gathered for dispute settlement session and discussion of the socio-economic activities of 
the area in October 2014. I also attended inter-clan and inter-ethnic gatherings, which are locally 
referred to as Gogot where various Siltie clans and neighboring Hallaba ethnic group took part 
on April 23, 2016, in Shefode Qebele, Lanfuro Wereda. In both gatherings, Azma Jabir served as 
the key leader and dispute settler, and he is highly respected in the community. Unlike most of 
the local dispute settlers, Azma Jabir has a big farm, a large number of cattle and a mule, a 
locally relevant transport system and a sign of high social status in the area. He has practiced a 
mechanized agriculture.  
Azma Jabir leads a clan called Abalcho, one of the prominent clans among the Siltie. His 
influence passes the boundary of Siltie zone and covers Hallaba and Mareqo areas. My 
respondents said that Abalcho clan led by Azma Jabir maintained peace and social order not only 
in the village, but also in the neighboring areas.  
I also observed that disputants invited Azma Jabir for reconciliation in different areas, especially 
Dalocha, Lanfuro and Sankura Weredas. I also observed that there are a clear structure and 
procedure that are used to regulate communication among disputants, dispute settlers, and court 
attendants. Disputants stand in the middle of a big circle formed by participants to present their 
cases in front of dispute settlers (See figure 23 below). There is also a man in charge of 
communicating the cases to the dispute settlers and the participants. The person is called locally 
as Was agache, means a person who is in charge of communication and keeping the security of 
the court by giving turns to disputants according to the time of the compilation of the cases ( See 
more above under section Clan Court /Yegicho Shengo).The court communicator is called 
„Qora“ among the Oromo (Mamo, 2006). 
After presenting disputants' cases, the communicator interprets the cases and throws the themes 
of the cases back to the participants in a more understandable and in a customary court context. 
Interrupting the presentation and talking without the permission of the communicator will be 
fined 50 birr (about 2 Euros).  
                                                     
195 Interview with Azma Jabir Hussein, 64, on 24 April 2015 in Mitto Town, Lanfuro Wereda. 
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The court is open for all to give their opinion and ideas about the cases. There are also nominee 
local mediators who are learned men and supposed to replace the chief justice in the future. They 
are also allowed to give their ideas on cases, and hence contribute to the final decisions. 
Nevertheless, it will be up to the main dispute settler, Azma Jabir, to give a final decision on any 
case brought to the court. I took much time with Azma Jabir to discuss his reflections on dispute 
settlement and the different self-presentations he accords to himself as well as how he perceives 
his role in society.  
“Our Abalcho clan council has been working since late 19th century. I 
have worked for a long time as dispute settler in the community. I 
traveled long distances to settle disputes and maintain peace and security 
among my community. I have been in mediation business since the 
1970s. My involvement in the conflict settlement process covers the 
areas inhabited by the Abalcho clan. Four Abalcho Council covers four 
Weredas in Siltie, namely Sankura, Hulbareg, Lanfuro, Dalocha, and 
Mareqo in Gurage zones and Hallaba Special Wereda. The clan has a 
judge in every Wereda, and I am leading all. Our court is involved in 
cases like homicide, marital and property as well as inter-ethnic and 
interfaith disputes. We also have excellent communication with the state 
courts. We adjudicate196 dispute cases using mainly local ways.  
Nevertheless, if a person is not abide by our decision, our clan council 
will collect money from members and pay for a legal representative to 
stand for in the state court for the disputant who was disserted by the 
other party in the customary court. We also exchange such dispute cases 
as marital, car accident, land disputes with the state courts. This clan 
council has passed through past regimes which suppressed it in different 
capacities, yet it has survived. This is mainly due to the justice and 
impartiality we have brought to the community. On the other hand, 
Abalcho clan council has also played a significant role in local 
                                                     
196 I used the word adjudicate here to refer that Abalcho clan sometimes uses force to settle cases and its role 
surpasses a mere negotiation in some instances. For instance, the clan can coerce a member or both disputants to 
accept the decision or face repercussions which involve boycotting from social life. 
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development. We have mobilized the community to take part in national 
and regional elections in 2005, 2010 and 2015 elections. We support 
EPRDF led government, for it has maintained our identity in the current 
federalism. The clan council is working based on the local values and 
norms. However, ours is better than the state court in maintaining peace 
and order in the community since we live near the people. 
 
 
Figure 24 An Abalcho clan court presided over by Azma Jabir while hearing dispute case in Sesso-Edeneba Qebele 
(January 2015). 
Abalcho clan council settles both crime and civil cases including grave 
crimes like homicide, snatching one's wife forcefully, and divorce cases. 
We work in different Weredas every fifteen days to preside over 
different kind of cases. These days, it seems that local officials have 
understood the roles of elders in the community.  
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Local administration often involves customary courts to settle with 
family disputes. Lanfuro Wereda Administration, for instance, has 
encouraged the Wereda first instance court to settle family dispute cases 
after they are examined by elders. This may be due to constitutional 
provision granting local institutions to deal with such civil cases and 
mostly to reduce the caseloads of the state courts.  
Some individuals refused to accept our decisions and took their cases to 
state courts. But when they failed to get their cases settled, these 
individuals brought their cases back to our court. I can tell you that this 
person197 who is now the secretary of our court took his case to the state 
system up to the Federal Cassation Court. He, however, failed to settle 
the case. Later, he brought back his case to our court. Finally, we 
intervened and settled his case. I am not paid for my services. However, I 
am happy with my services because of the support I enjoy from the 
community, as they often follow or accompany me wherever I am out in 
the surrounding. The community has prayed for my health. When I look 
at people surrounding me, I become more healthy and satisfied. People 
prefer to bring their cases to me for settlement, for I mediate impartially. 
I handle divorce cases and look at women's cases very seriously. I also 
ask advice from state court judges on some issues like women’s rights to 
get more understanding on current issues.“  
I observed198 that the Abalcho customary court's communication is formalized, and the court 
follows defined procedures in dealing with cases. This indicates the existence of political order 
                                                     
197 Interview with Ato Detemo, 45, who previously was unable to accept the decisions of Abalcho clan in the past 
took the land dispute case to the state court. Nevertheless, he informed me that he went to all levels of the state 
courts up to Federal Cassation Court to end the dispute. He failed to get justice due to „lack of fair decisions.“ Later, 
he brought the case back to the Abalcho court, and “received fair decisions.“ He later decided to serve the clan court 
as a secretary. He further recommends that South Sudan’s Conflict can be resolved with elders' involvement which 
is currently also recommended by the African Union to resolve South Sudan's crisis;-“ AU targets traditional leaders' 
involvement in restoring peace in South Sudan“ CC TV News on 30 November 2016 at 8:25. 
198 My observation on the inter-clan meeting at Abalcho court on January 4/2015 in Sesso Kebele, Lanfuro. 
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in the community (For more see under Clan courts' section). Azama Jabir describes his job as 
more peace searching and perceives himself as impartial contending not only the state system, 
but also other local actors. I also observed that unlike other local actors Azama Jabir is rich and 
his economic status contributes its share for the legitimacy he enjoys in the community. His 
influence also extends to the neighbouring Hallaba and Mareqo communities due to the 
existence of members of his clan in those areas. But Azma Jabir uses his clan power and the state 
system rather than the local values and norms as instruments for enforcing the clan's decisions. 
The existence of the clan's court for more than a century among the community foregrounds the 
hypobook put forwarded by Klute Embalo and Embalo (2011:255) that underlines „under the 
existence of violence, power alternatives to the state, if they are meant to last, have to figure out 
regular and enduring modes of conflict resolution, which substitute, parallel or articulate with the 
ones offered by the state“.  
Additionally, Azma Jabir's material means of production (his big farm, large number of cattle) 
and his links with the state system contributes also to get the legitimacy he enjoys in the 
community. Further, he performs his mediation services freely and can summon members of the 
clan in at least three Weredas without any notification to the state system. This may be partly due 
to the relative strength of the clan on one hand, and the dispute settler's strategic alliance to the 
state system on the other. 
The above three cases that have been extracted from dispute settlers' perceptions and self-
expressions suggest that traditional authorities often depict themselves as more peace searching 
and harmonious rather than state legal actors, for they accuse the state agents of imposing legal 
norms, and not reinstitute peace. It also demonstrates the social, and political power contestations 
among the three legal actors. In this regard, neo-traditional authorities appear to be looking for 
peace more than anything else. They also strongly link the activities of customary institutions to 
Islam by ascribing their local legal power as bestowed by Allah) to serve the community. They 
frequently said, „I am establishing harmony among the people because I have been given the 
power from Allah.“ They claim that the legitimacy of their authority comes from God (Allah). 
Since Islam has got a new context and significance among the Siltie people, dispute settlers try to 
link their mediation services to the ideas of Islam. Moreover, it is observed that Siltie elders are 
borrowing ideas from another mode of dispute settlement like the Sharia and the state apart from 
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Siltie culture indicating the emergence of a hybridized form of legal practices in the area. Hajji 
Awel and other local legal actors said that they had inherited the local legal actor position from 
their fathers, which indicates that their jobs have social legitimacy and foundations. However, 
seeing the new impetus Islam has got among the local community, Raga Awel, for instance, 
frequently said that God (Allah) gave him the power of reconciling disputants. He often said, „I 
have no power and capacity to resolve conflicts. It is Allah who empowered me to do so for I am 
doing His work, and seeking the truth is now behind me in every activity“. This indicates it is 
difficult to demarcate the religious from the customary as both are intertwined and 
interconnected each other. This state of affair enhances the local legal agency of actors. 
Local dispute settlers describe their mediation services as more restorative unlike state system 
that focuses on sanctioning and executing of norms. They have also tried to fortify their 
legitimacy from the state court's context as well. Siltie local dispute settlers said that the state 
court is less efficient and prone to bribery than the customary. Nevertheless, some informants 
accuse the customary court actors also of bribery and partiality. Authors like Anna Kristin (2016) 
dispute settlers' self-portrayal as „self-presentation“ which is dispute settlers' „impression 
management“ (Goffman 1959: 238). The cases further imply that modes of market exchange 
make its ways into the customary court as the relation between the disputants and dispute settlers 
seem to be monetized. Previously, the relation between disputants and dispute settlers seems to 
be characterized by generalized reciprocity rather than a balanced reciprocity (e.g redistribution 
and market exchange). Thus, people used to get things like dispute settlement done through 
generalized reciprocity than money which was normally excluded. Nevertheless, I observed that 
clients have started paying some money to dispute settlers for the mediation services. The cases 
and the various empirical data indicate also that heterogeneity of modes of dispute settlement 
seems to be a norm than an exception, for dispute settlers borrow and cross-reference ideas and 
norms from various legal systems to settle disputes in the area (Santos de Sousa, 2006; 
Cheeseman, 2016). The lived experiences of local dispute setters indicate that the state is not the 
only agent that monopolizes violence. Rather, it is part of the plural legal installation in the area. 
It can also be inferred that both contestation and collaboration characterize the power relations 
among legal actors. Additionally, the self-expressions of actors reveal that the protection of the 
society from violence, and maintaining the continuity of the mediation services over time have 
made non state actors secure reliability and legitimacy in the eyes of the society. 
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Moreover, local dispute settlers have used their legal agency to make themselves more appealing 
to clients and have developed more legitimacy and acceptance than the state legal actors. We can 
also understand that the legitimacy of local dispute actors varies from one actor to another on the 
basis of impartiality, fear of local values and norms which in turn affects the tendency forum 
shopping not only between different actors, but also among local dispute settlers. I can also argue 
that local dispute settlers develop a critical perspective as a strategy to compete for legitimacy 
and vie also for religious authority. Scholars also indicate that actors in different legal system 
criticize the other of in an attempt to maintain their power and positions. The following 
Tamanaha's excerpt also illustrates this fact. He states that 
“Existing normative systems-the people who believe in them, the 
people who hold positions in them, and the interests that benefit from 
them — will fight to maintain their power and positions. People and 
groups in social arenas with coexisting, conflicting normative systems 
will, in the pursuit of their objectives, play these competing systems 
against one another. Sometimes these clashes can be reconciled. 
Sometimes they can be ignored. Sometimes they operate in a 
complementary fashion. But very often they will remain in conflict, with 
serious social and political ramifications” (2008:409- 410).  
To sum, the local dispute settlers' self-descriptions and critical perspectives indicate 
how the normative systems including actors in the institutions interact and how these 
social actors employ various strategies to achieve their objectives including maintaining 
their power and legitimacy in the plural legal setting.  
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7.3. Legal Realities and Practices of Legal Systems: An Actor-Oriented Analysis  
Below, dispute cases that involved some actors from different legal regimes will be explained. 
The cases portray how cases traveled from one legal system to another and among actors within 
same legal system. Since the study explores the interactions of various legal systems and legal 
realities, the cases are not thematically selected. All dispute cases from homicide to marital are 
involved in the analysis so as to provide the legal world of the Siltie. 
7.3.1. Case I. Hajji Kedir's Murder Case199   
Murder date: May 4, 2014  
Place: Hulbareg Wereda, Agena village 
Victim: Hajji Kedir Seman /Husband/ age 65. 
  Fetiya Abrar, the second wife who was severely injured but survived the incident. 
Ete Jemila Abdela /wife, age 55 / the perpetrator  
Siltie Zone Public Prosecutor's file and informants indicated that 55 years old woman Ete Jemila 
Abdela beheaded her 65 years old husband Hajji Kedir Seman with an axe on May 4, 2014 while 
he was sleeping with his second wife named Fetiya Abrar in a village called Agena, in Hulbareg 
Wereda. 200It was reported that Hajji Kedir was murdered by Jemila /the victim's wife / 
intentionally since she thought that Jemila thought that her husband relinquished or abandoned 
her spending much of his time with Fetiya. The customary court dispute settlers also confirmed 
that Hajji Kedir was sleeping with his second wife when he was beheaded by his first wife, 
                                                     
199 (Interview with Sheik Muze Seid, Aman (Aba Fedlu), Dilebo Gebre, Hajji Nasir Siraj, 70, on September 12, 
2014; October, 18, 2014, December 10, 2015 , January 14, 2017 and my observations on the local community's 
protest on state justice system and my observations of the customary court sessions on December 2015 ) as well as 
widespread gossips in Werabe Town. The case script has also been supported by data collected from documents 
from the state court's verdict file number 156/06 resolution dated 20 August 2014, videos of both the court and the 
customary court sessions, observations of dispute settlement on customary court sessions in December 2015 in 
Datewezir Kebele.  
 
200 Ete Jamila's case has been considered as an expression of resistance to polygamy, on one hand and the 
tensions between the customary, the religious and state legal systems on the other.  
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Jemila. Jemila who became angry with her husband's frequent behavior thought that she was 
ignored by her husband. She said her husband „could not bring her firewood from the village to 
Werabe town,“ so she intended to kill both Fetiya and Hajji Kedir. Fetiya, who was hit by an axe 
several times, narrowly escaped death with severe injury. Taking this into consideration, the 
Siltie customary court considered the murder from the inception as an intentional 
killing/Agarsa/. 
Local community informants push cause of the incident about 30 years back. They explained that 
30 years ago a woman from the nearby village who was suspected of killing her husband hid at 
Hajji Kedir's house to escape from the police. Both Jemila and Hajji Kedir refused to expose and 
hand over the woman to the elders and hence played their role to cover the issue. The Siltie 
believe that if someone covers his crime like killing somebody including even animals, Berche 
will inflict harms on him/her up to seven generations. The Berche's repercussions could also 
affect those individuals who saw or heard about the incident and failed to report it to the elders. 
The Siltie believes that the blood of any living thing should be remunerated if someone kills 
somebody including animals. Moreover, my informants said that Ete Jemila is also suspected of 
murdering a little girl while she was a bride 35 years ago. 
 The local community could not get the evidence, and Hajji Kedir could not also expose this 
crime and made his wife resolve the dispute and end bad Berche. These two suspected murder 
cases strengthened the existence of bad Berche or Tiro /the climax of Berche/ to remain in the 
house of Hajji Kedir. My informants also explained that hiding of these two cases expressed 
themselves by bringing some dangers on both Jemila and Hajji Kedir twenty years ago. This 
time, Ete Jemila tried to kill Hajji Kedir with a sickle when Hajji Kedir wanted to marry a 
second wife. But elders were involved in the dispute, and they succeeded in reconciling the 
couple after persuading Hajji Awel to desist from taking a second wife. It is reported, however, 
that Hajji Kedir's family could not address Berche during this time. Thus, according to my 
informants, Berche tried to show Hajji Awel and his wife with various perilous consequences 
that could affect the life of a member of the family to socially inform them that they should have 
uncovered the hidden crimes.  
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Thus, the local community said that the power of Berche reached its zenith and had turned into 
Tiro201 that claimed the life of Hajji Awel and brought Jemila to life imprisonment ( See the 
court's decision in Appendix II). In the incident, as mentioned above, Hajji Kedir lost his life, 
and his second wife was severely wounded.  
Following this incident, Ete Jemila was imprisoned, and her father lineages (Abotgare) and 
mother lineages (Ummigare) left the village as required by the Siltie Serra norm. According to 
the Siltie norms, if any person kills someone either intentionally or not, he/she and his/her 
relatives should leave their residence area for some time. The duration of the time a person 
should leave the place as the local community calls it Keterat202 meaning a 'Cooling period' is 
determined by the intention of a perpetrator. If someone kills another person intentionally, the 
Keterat period will last from 2-3 years, and if not intentional (e.g.Sekebe, Sebebe, like car 
accident case) one or two months’ time is enough until the dispute settlement commences.  
                                                     
201 Tiro is the climax of Berche. When someone cannot end Berche, Tiro will be the next step. The power of Berche 
is active after it reaches Tiro level. 
202 Local dispute settlers will also order Keterat to impose an injunctive order to thwart the suspect from 
engaging in the daily activities like production, marketing, cultivating or entirely sanctioning social 
boycotting for the suspect to feel the pain of the accident. 
 
 
 
 
273 
 
 
Figure 25 An abandoned203 house after the son of the owner of the house killed his uncle's son Agode Qebele Siltie Wereda 
(September 2014).  
Since Jemila's case is considered an intentional murder /Agarsa/, elders strongly condemned it 
and did not show interest to initiate dispute settlement process for a while. Elders also mentioned 
that Jamila's case could be imitated by other women if not condemned in a strong term. Thus, 
they took much time to initiate the dispute settlement process. My key informants have singled 
out the category of disputants who had been involved in the case as a factor that complicated the 
dispute for settlement. There were three groups of opponents participating in the case. These are- 
Hajji Kedir's family (his father and mother lineages), Fetiya's families and clans as 
Yewede/victim group/, and Ete Jemila's sides who were locally called Yewedebuye (perpetrators). 
It is mentioned in the preceding chapters that the Siltie's concept of dispute or conflict is 
                                                     
203 The Siltie state that a person suspected of killing someone and his family members should leave the village 
including his residence until the dispute is settled. Abandoning the residence is intended to make the suspect and his 
families feel the pain as well as avoid possible retaliation from the victim's family members. It is also part of social 
boycott sanctioned by the customary court on the perpetrator.  
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communal based and conceived as a common scenario. Thus, I observed that elders were busy 
narrowing the gaps between groups after the police detained Jemila. Thus, the two legal systems 
were involved in the case since its early stage. The customary legal system was active in cooling 
down the spirit of tension between the groups by sanctioning Keterat time that could not allow 
anybody to approach the house of the deceased and resort to any form of retaliation. But it has 
been mentioned by some informants that the state legal system was slow in handling the case.  
The local community perceived that there was an attempt to release Jemila from jail due to the 
false evidence provided by their children who were suspected of manipulating the case. In 
resistance to the alleged state of impunity, the local community who were scared of Berche 
staged a demonstration to protest the state court's proceedings which they thought skewed to 
Jemila due to 'bribery’. The due process of law by the state court had appeared unsatisfactory to 
the local community, and hence the majority of Datewezir area residents including local state 
representatives like Qebele chairpersons came to Werabe to protest what they call „the derail of 
justice“ that was favoring the perpetrator rather than the victims.  
Democracy from Below and the Power of the Weak as Correctional Mechanism: The Rural 
Community's demonstration for Justice 
I observed that a significant number of people came from Datewezir and adjacent Qebeles to 
Werabe town to demonstrate against what they call „injustice in the state court“ on 25 August 
2014. Informants said that they demanded justice for the blood not only of Hajji Kedir but also to 
end Berche to the whole Qebele.  
According to my informants, the state court process was not handling the case properly. They 
believed that Hajji Kedir's sons who are wealthy businessmen in Addis Ababa bribed the state 
judges not to prosecute their mother properly and arranged the transfer of Jemila to Addis Ababa 
where they could facilitate the release of Jemila from jail with money. It was also said that the 
children of the victim prepared „a fake medical report that indicated Jemila had a psychiatric 
problem and hence she committed the crime with this ground.“ The local community's 
demonstration was a response to this „fraudulent move,“ and hence determined to get rid of bad 
Berche in the community. This is a clear indication that conflict among the local community is 
not conceived as merely an individual matter. Rather it is considered as a collective scenario 
which involves the whole society beyond a few people or families in dispute.  
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Thus, we can say that the community was scared of Berche and were bothered for their safety or 
wellbeing. I also observed that participants of the demonstration included elders, women, Qebele 
officials, and youth. They demanded truth and criticized what they called „the mismanagement 
of the state justice system as money bought the justice.“ The people went to Siltie Zone 
administration office and Zone Justice to ask interventions into the state court's proceedings. 
However, an informant from Zonal Justice Department204 said that it was her legal representative 
who brought a fake evidence to show „Ete Jemila has a medical problem.“ According to state 
officials, the Zone was against the legal representatives whose act would have an adverse impact 
on the rule of law in the area.  
Following this episode, Siltie Zone administration interfered in the case and ordered the Justice 
office to evaluate the ways the case was being handled and looked indirectly into how the case 
was pursued in the state court. After this incident, the general public also seemed involved into 
the case that was also waiting for the court's final verdict to see how the due process of law 
would go. Siltie Zone High Court finally found Jemila guilty of intentional murder and 
sentenced her to life imprisonment on 03 October 2014. Was this the end of the story? No, not at 
all. This may be the end of State's court involvement into the case, yet the dispute persisted 
between the families of Hajji Kedir, and his second wife, and Ete Jemila's clan. But one can say 
that this can also be considered as a good example to show a tension between the customary and 
state legal systems and hence the power relations they have in the community.  
The Roles of Sharia and Customary legal systems to address disputes in the collective 
scenarios: Instances of a hybridized Legal Practices 
Hajji Kedir's children who were suspected of influencing the state court's rulings to free their 
mother from prison, however, were forced to come from Addis Ababa to the customary court to 
initiate the dispute settlement process. It was mentioned that even if Jemila was imprisoned, the 
tensions between groups of disputants remained high. Moreover, it is believed among the Siltie 
that prisons cannot end Berche. Lawyer informants consider the involvement of customary 
court's in a conflict after it is settled by the state court as a double jeopardy. Nevertheless, from a 
Siltie culture perspective, there is no room for a perpetrator to purify him or herself from Berche 
by serving prison terms.  
                                                     
204 Interview with Ato Kedir Siraj/pseudo name/ on 14 January 2017 Werabe Town.  
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Hajji Kedir's children who were saddened by the loss of their father and their mother's 
imprisonment solicited elders from Werabe and Alicho Wereda several times to plead with them 
that they respected the culture and wanted to get rid of Berche. Based on this belief, the children 
said that they would not try to bribe the judges or look for mechanisms to get Jemila out of 
prison. The elders warned the children further that Berche would sustain and bring harms to them 
and the family up to seven generations if they tried to meddle with the local justice system to 
favor their mother.  
However, as a manifestation of their local power, the customary court dispute settlers warned 
that it was difficult to intervene in Jemila's case. Since the crime was intentional and it was a 
serious offense, elders were not first willing to initiate the process before the cooling period of 2-
3 years ends. The other main reason was due to the belief among the Siltie that Berche will visit 
the house of the elders if they did not respect the Siltie Serra norms which require them to settle 
Agarsa/intentional/ murder cases between 2-3 years’ time. However, considering the tension 
among disputing groups that involved the families of three households and in order to avert 
possible revenge, elders decided to start processing the dispute after one-year’s cooling time. On 
the other hand, despite the fact that the state court gave a verdict in the case, the case could not 
end there, for the goals of traditional modes of dispute settlement aim to settle disputes between 
groups rather than individuals. Thus, Abotgare and Ummigare, the father and mother lines 
respectively of the two groups gathered in Datewezir Qebele, Hulbareg Wereda a residence of 
the father of Jemila on May 3, 2015. 
It was thus her father who hosted the elders for a final settlement. I observed that elders set a 
boundary where the property of Jemila father existed as a conflict area which was not allowed 
for Hajji Kedir's lineages and representatives to cross until the final reconciliation started. The 
Siltie believe that a conflict zone is not permissible to cross before reconciliation commences to 
avoid possible retaliation from the victim’s family. It also prevents the impacts of Berche that 
can occur due to crossing the imaginary boundary that marks the victim's area of residence that 
covers the places where the victim's extended families live from the perpetrator's clan's residence 
areas. Thus, until the dispute is settled, no one can approach the perpetrator's family's village due 
to the Keterat period. It was mentioned that the main purpose of the gathering was to be purified 
from Berche between the relatives of the two groups. 
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All participants from both groups cried in the area on that day because they were quite emotional 
during the hearings. I observed that elders were very busy reciting Quranic verses that focus on 
forgiveness and the divine predetermination of any act and the power of Berche indicating that 
failure to cool down the tension will perpetuate even more severe danger among the family up to 
seven generations, especially if they did not accept the reconciliation process. These strategies 
help elders to calm down the tensions.  
It took more than half an hour to calm down tensions among members of the disputants. Thus, 
the elders frequently recited Quranic verses as a mechanism to persuade and calm down the 
conflicting spirit that had settled between the disputants. They said that it was Allah who decreed 
things to be the way they did. Furthermore, they also tried to link Berche with ideas in Islam 
saying, ''No blood will be unpaid; every misdeed has its fruits back“. This is a clear indication 
that the two systems, Islam and customary laws, selectively complement each other to resolve 
disputes. Finally, two women205 from both groups came out and sprinkled honey206 and milk207 
to the participants symbolizing the end of enmity and the inception of an era of peace between 
disputants. The hitherto disputant groups also sat and had lunch together which is also an 
indication of the onset of normalcy among member of the disputants. I also observed that the 
spirit of tension had changed to festivity after the reconciliation process. 
 
                                                     
205 Women are in charge of sprinkling the milk and honey as a figure rarely involve in disputes. They are chosen due 
to the nature of their personality as soft, and motherliness. They are perceived as queen of the society as they give 
birth to the king, the local leader and producer. The famous adage „Gered Geradint“, means a woman is a queen 
attests this fact.  
 
206 Milk symbolizes the end bitterness, and revenge and the restoration of good relationship, milk stand for the 
cooling of hatred spirit and the restoration of peaceful relation between the disputing parties. 
207  
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Figure 26 Elders from the various areas gathered at the house of the brother of Ete Jemila to end the homicide case in 
Datewezir Qebele on May 3, 2015 (Photo by the researcher). 
 
 
279 
 
 
Figure 27 Members of the disputant groups took part in a lunch ceremony after concluding the dispute settlement 
process, symbolizing an end of enmity (May 3, 2015).  
Since the disputant parties were already tied through marriage, there was no Gudda tying 
process. The family was tied via marriage and set up marital kinship. Elders decided that the case 
has been categorized as intentional murder for Jemila killed her husband with an ax while he was 
sleeping with his second wife. Thus, it has been singled out as a premeditated murder or Agarsa, 
and hence the families of Jemila paid 50, 000 ETB (2000 Euros) as compensation. The money 
was distributed between Hajji Kedir's clan, and mother clan. With this, the reconciliation process 
ended and a new era of peace started between disputant parties. One can understand from the 
above case that murder cases can be settled with the involvement of a number of legal systems. 
The customary legal system is mainly important to address collective disputes than individual 
one as illustrated in the argument script. Thus, the script clearly indicates the existence as well as 
the importance of legal pluralism for dispute settlement.  
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The case also illustrates how single inter-personal incident involves multiple category of 
disputants and the collective nature of inter-personal disputes. 
The case also indicates the roles of belief systems, more importantly Berche as a value 
potentially preventing conflict in the community. The case shows that dispute settlers' attribute 
the cause of disputes to the spiritual/ values (e.g.Berche) and employ the value as the customary 
courts' decision enforcing mechanism. It also indicates the existence of gender-related conflict 
where by women start to resist the prevailing men's dominated social structure. The case, 
however, shows the tendency of men to down play the main cause of the conflict (Polygyny), 
and try to show the case as unusual incident. 
 It also illustrates the involvement of politics in the judiciary system that can affect the 
legitimacy of the state legal system. The case also shows the complex nature of interaction as 
well as the interdependent natures of legal systems in the area. There is also porosity among the 
various legal systems as one legal system intervenes in resolving the conflict. It also shows the 
perceptions among the community that there is corruption in the state justice system that can 
undermine the fabrics of the society on the one hand and the legitimacy of the state judicial 
system on the other. The case also underpins the legitimacy of the customary system by the local 
community as it mainly regulates the day to day activities of the community than other legal 
regimes. 
7.3.2. Case 2. YeQeqenqegne case208: Murder Case 
Lubaba Abdo: suspect 
Indris Mussa: the victim 
According to informants, Ato Indris Mussa, 55, and a father of five children lost his life in the 
late 1980s. His death was controversial as elders could not sort out the perpetrator at that time 
                                                     
208 YeQeqenqegne implies a murder case that could not be resolved for an extended period due to the 
complex nature of the case, on one hand, and one or two of the disputants who could not confess about 
the cause of the incident or could not collaborate with elders to finish the case, on the other. It also 
implies a dispute case that could not be resolved for an extended period. Interview with customary court 
judges on 20 December 2015 at Enseno Town, Hajji Awel's court, and field observation on 28 December 
2015 local elders meeting in Agode Kebele. 
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beyond having his wife Ete Lubaba Abdo as a prime suspect. Elders tried to persuade her to 
confess committing the beating that to Ato Idris to death. But she denied committing the crime 
saying that he might have been attacked by his enemies in the village. Her relatives also 
defended her innocence saying that, „Lubaba reported that a number of individuals, whom she 
could not identify at that time, came home at night and had beaten Ato Indris badly.“ Indris died 
three days later due to the injuries he sustained. Nevertheless, Ato Indris's relatives blamed the 
woman as the main suspect behind the death of Ato Idris. 
In 1983, elders summoned the disputants and tried to reconcile victim's sides on one hand, and 
the suspect’s (the wife's side) on the other. However, the woman refused to confess that she was 
responsible for Ato Idris death. The woman side /Ummegae/ could also bring a result. Thus, 
elders resorted to the swearing ritual /Terte/ that involves a black she-goat209 (Tem Dena). Ete 
Lubaba also swore through Teme Dena that she did not kill her husband and did not know who 
did it. Then the elders decided to wait and see the outcome of the ordeal ritual. They said „Let us 
see the manifestation or a sign on whoever conceals the case. Let us see any sign in the 
perpetrator's house and how Berche can react on the perpetrator“. 
On the other hand, Indris's son named Mohammed210 who was a child in the 1980s when his 
father died and was working as a police officer in Siltie Zone. He said that he faced various 
calamities like arrest, accidents in his work, and failure in life. He attributed the challenges and 
hardships he encountered in his workplace with unpurified Berche, and some hidden problems in 
the family. Mohammed told me that he used local values and norms when he investigated crimes 
in his capacity as a police officer. Being a member of a community, he also believes that Berche 
can negatively influence one's life if not properly addressed. Thus, influenced by the gossip then 
circulating in the village, he began to press his mother what to uncover any thing hidden in the 
family that requires cleansing.  
According to the Siltie custom, if someone faces repeated calamities for reasons not directly 
associated with him or her acts, it can be attributed to some hidden misdoings by a member of 
                                                     
209 As mentioned before, Terte is one of the ways elders employ to investigate a suspect and end dispute. Tem 
Denna, which involves the slaughtering of a black goat and asking the suspect to cut the intestine while swearing, is 
swearing ritual with a black goat is considered as a final swear where a suspect can say „I did not do this crime. If I 
did and swear falsely, let my life become darkened and die.“ The suspect cuts the intestine that symbolizes cutting 
the continuity of one's family and generation. Black goat symbolizes dark life if someone swears falsely.  
210 Interview with Mohammed who worked as Investigative police in the past. I met him at Agode when local elders 
gathered for dispute settlement on 25 December 2015.  
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the family, alive or dead. Lubaba who was heartbroken by Mohammed's hopeless recurrent pleas 
and challenges, finally whispered to him in 2015 that she „committed the crime“. She informed 
him that Indris had beaten her several times, and he disturbed her life since he was highly drunk. 
It was due to this problem that she beaten him and he was died of the injury. She also went to her 
relatives and informed them that „she was responsible for the death of Indris 32 years ago. She 
said that further she has hidden the case for long for the fear that Ato Indris's clan would retaliate 
her by killing herself and member of her family „. She further said that „she was seeing the 
impacts of the case and that she is losing members of her family“. She said „she was afraid the 
calamity would continue and consume her children and members of the family including the 
whole clan“. Thus, she warned her relatives to end the murder case and stop the impacts of the 
Berche. 
Disputes in the Conflict: Intra-Lineage Disputes 
 Lubaba further requested members of her lineage (Ummegae) and her clan to contribute for the 
compensation. Her lineage who considered themselves forsaken for long by Lubaba, however, 
became reluctant to collect the payment and less interested in taking part in the dispute 
settlement. Their reluctance was related to a rumor in the community that before confessing the 
crime and resolving the murder case, Lubaba violated Siltie custom by marrying Ato Kedir, an 
uncle of Indris and gave birth to a child. Moreover, Ato Hussein, an elder brother of Indris, also 
prosecuted Ato Kedir in the family forum for marrying Lubaba by breaking the Siltie norm. 
According to Siltie custom, Ato Hussein is the right inheritor of Lubaba, his deceased brother’s 
wife.  
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Figure 28 Sheik Mohammed while undertaking a homicide case of Indris Agode Qebele, Silti Wereda (February 2015).  
After hearing the case, the family forum decided that Ato Kedir, who broke the local norm, 
should divorce Lubaba, and that Ato Hussein could marry Lubaba, the wife of his younger 
brother. Thus, Ato Kedir and Lubaba were forced to divorce, which led to Lubaba marrying Ato 
Hussein, the elder brother of Ato Indris.  
Clash of Group Interest: Lubaba's Desperate Journey to end the Dispute and her Ultimate 
Failure 
Due to the complex social relationship Lubaba that experienced with Indri's family, her relatives 
asked her that she should summon members of both Indri's and her lineages who could share her 
grief and raise the compensation money.  
Elders stressed also that Indris's relatives could no more become victims, for they had married 
her before ending the dispute. The elders recommended that Indri's relatives should sat together 
with Lubaba's relatives to end the case.  
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Her family members also considered Lubaba's act as a violation of the Siltie norm. Her relatives 
were not happy with Lubaba's engagement with Indris's family before the case resolved. 
Frustrated by the circumstances surrounding her, she refused to gather both groups and informed 
the Indri's families that her relatives could not contribute for compensation to the victim's 
families.  
Lubaba together with her son, Mohammed and with Indris's family started the dispute settlement 
process so as to end the case. They consulted with Raga Hajji Awel on how to proceed in this 
regard. It was also said that Indris's families bought a quarter hectare of land for 45,000 ETB 
(nearly 1700 Euro) from Lubaba to end the dispute. Informants from her clan stated that this was 
one of the means of weakening Lubaba and her children economically on the one hand, and un 
proper way of ending blood case and cleansing oneself from Berche on the other. Compensation 
should be contributed by members of one's clan. According to the Siltie custom, 2/3 of blood 
money should be collected from the perpetrator's father's clan and 1/3 from his/her mother's 
clan.211 This is because the father clan is always responsible for settling murder cases and 
household expenses as observed in patriarchal structure of the area.  
As mentioned earlier, Indris's family members who were supposed to sue Lubaba started the 
reconciliation process without the involvement of Lubaba's clan. After ending the case with 
Indris's family and her son, Lubaba passed away in early November 2015. Unlike the state court, 
the customary court never closes the case upon the death of the suspect. Faring the consequences 
of Berche, Lubaba's clan members went to Hajji Awel's court on 20 December 2015 to ask 
whether the dispute settlement process that was initiated by Indris's families has been concluded 
in line with Siltie custom and end Berche.  
                                                     
211 The Siltie's concept of justice considers not only the victim to present his case, but also the accused to look for 
truth and settle the dispute. If one of them, or both ignore examining the problem and get settled at least try to settle, 
all of them up to even seven generations suffer the consequences, and the problem lives with them for long. 
Abotgare should pay 2/3 of the blood compensation, while Ummigare 1/3. Power conflict is witnessed not only 
between actors in dispute settlement but also between opposing genders. Taken from Field diary on 15 September 
2014. 
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According to members of the Ummegae212, they went to Raga Hajji Awel to end Berche or Tiro 
in their family and stop the possible calamities that could happen due to the unresolved case. I 
observed213 that Lubaba's clan members presented the case to the Raga Awel stating that they 
feared the unsettled crime case could annihilate the whole clan if it is not resolved properly. 
They further asked whether the way Lubaba initiated the case end the dispute could be allowed 
by the Siltie custom. Hajji Awel advised them to go back to the village and inform members of 
Indris's family members that the ways Lubaba concluded the case) was not done properly since it 
contradicts with the Siltie custom. He ordered them that Lubaba's family that they should do it 
again by jointly raising the blood payment money with Ato Indris's lineages. The Raga further 
said that if Indris's family could not accept the verdict, the Ummegae (Lubaba's lineages) could 
end the Berche and the other side would face the calamity. Lubaba's family members said, „We 
have come to the court on our own to cleanse ourselves from Berche and Tiro.“ The group also 
said that those signs which the elders predicted 32 years ago were observed in the families of 
Indris rather than in the perpetrator's family/Ummegae/. They have counted the death of nine 
persons in car accidents attributed to Berche in the victim's family. Elders said that they were 
afraid because the problem would perpetuate itself if they did not addressed it properly. The 
Ummegae believes that they have become peaceful as a result of the neutrality of the group.  
Dispute between Lubaba's Members: Processing Disputes Breeds Disputes 
After hearing from Hajji Awel, the local dispute settlers summoned both groups to discuss how 
to end the case in Agode Qebele, Silti Wereda on December 30, 2015 when Lubaba's brother Ato 
Ibro Abdela told elders that she had secretly told him that she had killed Ato Indris. But Ato Ibro 
could not expose the case and chose to keep silent for a long time. Elders told Ibro that he should 
ask Raga to purify himself from Berche for hiding the case for a long time. I also observed214 
that Ato Indris’ sons had quarreled over the case. They were not clear about whether a thread's 
Gudda should be tied to the disputant families or not. Some of the elders said that for dispute 
cases that have not been resolved for a long time, a Gudda ritual is not considered a serious 
matter.  
                                                     
212 Interviewed on 20 December 2015 at Raga Awel's court, in Enseno town.  
213 I also escorted Lubaba's clan members when they went to Raga Awel's court to see how the case would go, and 
hear how the Raga could end old cases.  
214 I have attended the joint meeting of Ato Indris's and Lubaba's families in Agode on 30 December 2015. 
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Group Reconciliation between Lubaba and Indris's Lineages: Forum Shopping Between 
Local Dispute Settlers as a Manifestation of Local Social Power Contestation 
Others who were involved in initiating the settlement process after going to Hajji Awel court said 
that Gudda tying must be concluded to cool down the spirit of tensions between disputants. They 
also disagreed on whether it is possible to conclude Wurkefena215 ceremony now or not. 
Moreover, elders decided that Lubaba's clan members should collect money for blood and return 
the sold land from Indris's brothers. Local elders also stressed that Indris's family members 
would get calamity due to the land they bought from Lubaba who sold it to end the Berche. Thus, 
they warned that Indris's family members and Lubaba' relatives should purify themselves in 
returning the land so that Indris's children can have their own property to support themselves.  
Local elders (Magas) recommended both Indris's and Lubaba's lineages should go to another 
Raga for three reasons. First, the elders wanted to know whether Hajji Awel's verdict was 
acceptable to end the dispute. In this case, it was Hajji Awel who told Lubaba and Indris's family 
to end the dispute. As part of this process, elders wanted to know if Wurkefena should be 
concluded this time or not. Second, elders wanted further clarification on how one ends 
YeQegneqegne dispute. Third, they also wanted to know whether Magas should tie Gudda or not 
in the dispute settlement. Therefore, they recommended disputants to take the case to another 
Raga in Mareqo area, Gurage Zone or Raga Lalu in Silti Wereda. Both disputant groups thus 
selected neutral elders who took the case to Mareqo Raga on 04 January 2016. After taking the 
cases to Mareqo Raga and hearing his decisions, the neutral dispute settlers reported to the 
                                                     
215 Wurkefena is one of the rituals in the dispute settlement procedures that help dispute settlers calm tensions down 
between contending parties. The process can be initiated when a person who commits murder sends dispute settlers 
to the victim's family to commence dispute settlement to share grief and give some amount of money for mourning. 
It is also a process where a suspect shows a confirmation that he/she is behind a crime. Here, a neutral jury will also 
conduct a ritual process called YeKire Gudda, white thread tying process between the suspect and the victim family, 
symbolizing the onset of the first towards peace and reconciliation step that lays a foundation for lasting peace. It 
will also dictate that the victim's family will not prosecute a suspect in the state court, leaving the case for elders. I 
also observed that Ragas order the suspect to buy a middle sized cow for the victim’s family, and request the 
victim's family to return half of the price of the cow to the perpetrator. The Raga said that the cow is only for 
milking not for sale, and warned the family not to sell it. This is owing to two major reasons. First, he said that 
taking all money will bring Berche to the victim's family. Second, buying a cow with money collected from both 
groups can become a symbol of unity, and social solidarity, and also a cow that cannot be sold will symbolize unity 
with the disputants and unit them socially. The cow will also become a symbol of peace between disputants. 
 
 
287 
 
Magas that the Raga decided that no Wurkefena be conducted during the settlement process of 
YeQegneqegne dispute, for the dispute is not a recent phenomenon, and that the tension would 
cool off through passage of time.  
While rejecting Hajji Awel's earlier decision to conduct Wurkefena, the Mareqo Raga approved 
Hajji Awel's decision not to conclude Gudda. This is because Gudda is recommended to forge 
fictious kinship between disputants who do not have a family tie. In this case, there are family 
ties between disputing parties. Hearing the case from (Yegute Baliqes) neutral elders, Magas 
could not be convinced with the decisions not to conclude Gudda, and needed more clarifications 
about Wurkefena. Thus, they wanted to appeal in a customary Cassation court called 
YeFerezagegn Court. I accompanied local elders to the Cassation Court in Amber Qebele, near 
Butajira Town, Gurage Zone on 28 February 2016. I observed that a number of individuals from 
Siltie and Gurage, and Muslims and Christians attended the court hearing. Three old Ragas have 
deep knowledge about local dispute settlement presided over the court216 that served as 
customary judges for several years. I also observed that the three judges consulted each other 
before giving a verdict on a case. The cassation court dispute settlers used words like Maga to 
refer to Ragas like Hajji Awel considering the lower level customary court dispute settlers as the 
ones who did not attain the raga position. They referred to them as Magas, indicating the 
existence of power contestation in the intra-customary legal system. I also observed that court 
attendants have the right to ask clarifications in every aspect in the court. 
After presenting the dispute case in detail and the different procedures they had followed to end 
the case including the decisions of two Ragas, the Agode elders presented the following two 
questions to YeFerezagegn court. They asked a question on how Wurkefena could be concluded, 
and whether Gudda could be completed for a case unresolved for long? 
After hearing the report from the Magas, the cassation court ragas changed all decisions from 
the lower level courts and told the Magas that Wurkefena must be concluded. The YeFerezagegn 
ragas' decision to review the decisions of other Ragas is emanated from the normative ground 
that even if the case is not a recent phenomenon, the spirit of revenge was not removed from 
both disputant parties. Thus, they believed that Wurkefena could cool them down, and must be 
concluded with the following modifications. First, the Ragas said that Lubaba's family members 
                                                     
216 The three judges are Shewmolo Berta, 60; Andeyehun Issa, 80 and Mohammed Hassan, 45. 
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must give a big bull to Indris's elder son representing the victim. The bull symbolizes the 
strength of the father who could support the family for plaguing the farm.  
Second, they decided that a middle aged cow be given to the elder brother of Indris. Last, the 
judges said that mattress must also be given to a younger son of Indris. The cassation court 
judges further stated that Lubaba had betrayed Indris by killing him and denying the case for an 
extended period. This circumstance destroyed the social and marriage ties that had existed 
between the two, and hence no Gudda ritual process was conducted between them that could 
persist until now. They also said that Lubaba had vowed with black goat and had transferred the 
case to her children. They also stressed that the dispute case had carried a dangerous and 
revengeful spirit between disputant groups for an extended period. Thus, Gudda is a mandatory 
ritual process between the disputant groups. They also said that Lubaba's family members should 
facilitate the final dispute settlement process and contribute for compensation as indicated by the 
Siltie norm. With such a total reversal of decision by the cassation court, the Magas went back to 
Agode to gather members of Lubaba's family to start a reconciliation process. It is reported217 
that Lubaba's family collected 45,000 ETB (around 1,500Euro) and bought back the land from 
Indris's family and handed it over to Indris's children. They also collected compensation, and the 
final dispute settlement was conducted at the end of January 2017.  
The two cases indicate the complex nature of domestic violence that leads to a tragic end, 
claiming the life of the husbands. Both Hajji Kedir and Lubaba's cases indicate that violence is 
committed by women which is unusual in the area. One major factor may account for the 
emergence of this development. Some women in the study area face serious problem and abuses 
and mistreatments at home by their husbands.  
Due to the patriarchal social structure, however, they could not speak out the case. Additionally, 
due to the nature of the problem that was happened behind bars, the state system also could not 
address the issue. This problem leads them to take justice in their own hands. Although there was 
widespread gossip that pointed Ato Indris's death was linked with Lubaba, there was no formal 
investigation by police into the case for such long period of time, and the police could not 
uncover the crime. When there is no evidence beyond suspicion for a crime committed in the 
                                                     
217 Interview with Hajji Mohamed, a local elder who was involved with the case for long on 19 January 2017.  
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community, elders thus resort to powerful rituals and direct the dispute to the super natural 
power and wait for the „consequence“ indefinitely.  
In this regard, the case underlines that even those considered weaker in the community (e.g. 
women) can violate some of the most serious norms /values/ in the community. Lubaba, for 
instance, committed murder which is a serious crime in the community. She also hid the truth 
knowing that Berche could inflict serious outcome on her, and she also underwent an ordeal like 
swearing ritual. Thus, the case indicates that individuals' can use their agency can also take all 
risks for personal wellbeing (physical, emotional, and socio-economic), and revolt against social 
structure even at the expense of their safety. On the other hand, we can also understand that 
when such actor's agency is challenged by the emotional power of child-mother relations when 
Ete Lubaba could not bear her son's plea and finally confess the crime. The case shows that the 
agency of individuals can influence the social life of the community, and challenge the 
prevailing social structure. It illustrates the intra-system contestations in the customary legal 
system as well as the shopping forums and forums shopping trends, for elders employ dispute 
and dispute settlement forums to strengthen their power. 
7.3.3. Case 3: Interfaith Conflict: the Garore Arsema Church Land Dispute: tension 
between the Cross and the Crescent on Contested Land claim218  
Despite the fact that Islam is a dominant religion among the Siltie, few cases of interfaith 
disputes were recorded in the area. The 2012 contested land claim had got not only local, 
regional, and national attentions, but the case had also been extended to the global arena, since 
the dispute clip was posted on YouTube under the title“ Ethiopian Siltie Zone Christians Cry for 
Justice,“ making it visible to outside world. The conflict involved a local investor, Muslims, 
Christians and local cultural practices. 
 It appears that some Ethiopian Diasporas posted the clip with the aim of instigating more trouble 
or conflict in the area. Moreover, the news was spread across the world using social media by 
                                                     
218 Interview with members of the local community, Sheik Mohammed Kelil, Hajji Hamid Hassan on August 
29/2014; 16 November 2015, 23 January 2017 and Priest Awegechew on 27 January 2017 Werabe, and on 9 
February 2017 with Ato Darunga Desta, a local dispute settler who was head of Christian disputants in 2012 Inter -
faith dispute, YouTube Video uploaded on 30 December 2011 & EBC news and a paper that contains signatures of 
elders who took part in the reconciliation process on 07-08 March 2012. 
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Christians. Some media which are owned by Ethiopians abroad echoed that 70 years old church 
was in danger of being demolished by Muslims in Siltie Zone.219  
Local newspapers like „Addis Admas“ also wrote that the 70 years old Church was burnt by 
Muslims in Siltie Zone, which clearly indicates that unconfirmed news can become one of the 
factors for exacerbating disputes. 
Thus, without confirming the real cause of the case, global actors like Ethiopian Orthodox 
Christian Diasporas had used the Garore Church land dispute to indicate how „Radical Islam 
could destabilize“ the fabrics of society. It was observed that the Diasporas further aggravated 
the tensions for several times, yet elders' involvement calmed the tension down.  
According to local informants220, the Qoto Saint George church was built in the late 19th century 
following Menilik II expansion by Amhara settlers221. Others mentioned that the church was 
built in the 1930s222. Even if there are a small number of Orthodox Christians in the area, the 
Majority of Muslims lived peacefully with people of other religious denominations in Siltie area 
in general, and in Garore in particular. Local informants said that during the Italian occupation 
(1935-1941), the Italians attacked Christians for Muslims as a strategy to divide and rule the 
country. Moreover, the Amhara settlers are integrated with the local community, speak Siltie 
language, and the priests also use Siltie language not only in their everyday interaction, but also 
in teaching the gospel to their followers. 
Local communities have presented different versions about the disputed land. The root of the 
cause harks back to 1940s. Respondents from the Garore village mentioned that the Garore-Qoto 
area was the center of Silti Wereda during early periods of the Imperial regime (1931-1974). 
There is an open field down the Saint George Church that covers more than10 hectares of land. 
The residents of the then Qoto Town and neighboring areas used the land for different purposes. 
The local community mentioned that the people used the place for various purposes including for 
cattle grazing, for celebrations of Muslim Holidays and for annual Epiphany celebrations by 
Orthodox Christians. The area also served as a playing ground for local golf called Genisho. 
                                                     
219 Interview with an informant in Siltie zone who was involved in the dispute settlement process in November 2016 
(Anonymous). 
220 Interview with Priest Awegechew, head of Siltie zone Orthodox Church, Ato Demerew and Abegaz Darunga 
followers of Ethiopian Orthodox faith in the area on 27 January 2017 in Werabe Town.  
221 Interview with Priest Awegechew and Ato Kairedin Hussein on 14.February 2017  
222 Interview with Ato Jemal Kedir and Imam Hussein Adem on 26 January 2017 in Siltie wereda.  
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Also, it hosts graves of one of the Siltie well-known Sheiks and the last Siltie kingdom leaders 
who lost their lives during Menilik's expansions in the late 19th century. Parts of the area had 
also been given to a local investor who used it to manufacture rocks for building in 2011.  
Before the place was given to the investor, the local community also used the area as a local 
market. Thus, a number of actors wanted the space for different purposes, yet they used it 
peacefully for an extended period. My Christian informants, however, said that the area was used 
for religious and cultural purposes before the center of the Wereda moved to the present Qibet 
Town in 1947. Garore is 2 kilometers away from Qibet Town, the center of Silti Wereda. 
However, they argue that the Christians used some parts of the land for Epiphany celebration 
annually. After the downfall of the Imperial regime and the declaration of Land Reform Act 
under the banner of “Land to the Tiller” in 1975, the Church maintained some parts of the land 
for the celebration of Epiphany Holiday. Except for graveyards, the remaining land had been 
confiscated and registered in the Qebele land bank. It is also stated that following the downfall of 
the Derg regime in 1991, the land has been recorded by the Qebele land administration as public 
property. Hence, the land has been redistributed based on the needs of the local community. 
According to local informants who work in the local Qebele administration positions, the Church 
has got 2 hectares of land for religious purposes while 5 hectares of land had been given for 
Warrie and Liqa celebrations. It is also mentioned that 1/2 hectare of land has been reserved for a 
graveyard, and 10 meters of land has been left for local road services.223 Siltie zone 
Investment224 office had also given 2.8 hectares of the land to the investor that in turn led to an 
emergence of multiple claims in the land.  
Muslims resisted the state's intervention by viewing it as an encroachment into their belief and 
cultural practices. They said that the local community used the place for annual Islamic holidays' 
celebrations, grazing land for cattle as well as local golf playing. They stated that they adore the 
place as Sheik Abdulqasim and Tem Lezbo's graves are also found in the area. Sheik Abdulqasim 
is one of the well-known Siltie religious figures who resisted the expansion of Christian empire 
in the late 19th century. Christians also contested the move on the land claiming that they used 
parts of the land for annual Epiphany celebrations and resisted the local investor's move who was 
interested in the area for producing rocks.  
                                                     
223 Interview with Ato Darunga who worked in Garore Kebele on 9 February 2017.  
224 Interview with Ato Seid Seman, head of Siltie Zone Investment office on 1 February 2017 Werabe.  
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Christians also admitted that Muslims used the place for praying before 1947.225 They, however, 
said that local Christians understand that local Muslims revere the place due to the presence of 
the grave of Sheik Abdulqasim.  
They further explained that the area had been used afterwards for grazing. However, they said 
that Muslims did not use the space for Holidays celebrations since 1947. The Christians also 
resisted the state's move as violating their place of Epiphany for local development. As a result 
of these multiple claims, and potential disputes, Silti Wereda Administration tried to persuade the 
community by providing another area for praying without including the graveyard of the Sheik in 
the investment zone. Local Christians prosecuted the local investor whom they considered 
„encroaching their sacred space“ in the Wereda court and finally won the case in October 2011. 
Hence, the investor left the area for the Church226.  
Amidst this controversy, the Christians competing over the land constructed a small Church in an 
area that was used for Epiphany holiday. The Muslims protested the move. They stressed that the 
new church which was going to be built in less than half a kilometer from the old Saint George 
church was a „provocative action“ arguing that the existence of two churches close to one 
another, with a small number of followers of Orthodox Christians was an illegitimate action227. 
My Christian informant who was involved in the dispute settlement process said that the 
construction of the Church at a place that was reserved for Epiphany was emotional and 
illegitimate.228While the dispute between faiths started to flare up, Silti Wereda Administration 
requested followers of the faiths to restrain from the dispute, and hence the interfaith dispute was 
averted for a while.  
The Qebele administration, on the other hand, prosecuted those individuals who built the church, 
claiming their action was an illegal act. Following the Qebele decision, law enforcement agents 
demolished some parts of the new Church after four months of its construction in February 2012. 
The local police removed the corrugated iron of the church and left the wall. Following this 
action, some Silti Wereda Christians spread the news that they were prevented by Siltie Muslims 
from constructing the Church, and said to the believers also that Muslims illegally demolished 
                                                     
225 Interview with the head of local Christians mediators Ato Darunga Desta, and Priest Awegechew in January and 
February 2017.  
226 Interview with Ato Darunga on 9 February 2017. 
227 .“Interview with Ato Kemal Kedir, Ato Kemal Hussein and Ato Jemal Habib (Pseudo names) in December 2015. 
228 Ato Darunga Desta. 
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the Church. Moreover, a large crowd went to Southern Regional Government to challenge the 
action, and informed South Region Justice Office that Christians could not build a church in Silti 
Wereda due to the influence of Muslims. Informants said that after returning from South region, 
the crowd protested the action of demolishing the church in Kibet Town. In response to these 
acts, elementary and high school students from Kibet Town burnt down the remaining parts of 
the church in February 2012.Following this incident, the dispute was exacerbated, and some 
Christians, scared of the tension, abandoned the area for some time. Orthodox Christian priests 
and leader of the Christian mediators who took part in the dispute settlement said that Muslims 
were not responsible for the burning down of the church.229 The following is what they said 
regarding the dispute. 
"I condemned the Christians who built the Church emotionally at a place 
reserved for Epiphany. They should have understood that we have lived 
amicably with our Muslim brothers for an extended period. My sisters 
are married to Muslims. We are intermarried and lived peacefully. On 
the other hand, Muslim youths should not have burnt the wall of already 
demolished Church, for we were informed by the local administrators to 
demolish it. You know the wider Christian community did not 
understand what happened and simply said Muslims burned the Church. 
It was not a Christian-Muslim conflict. It was a wind of the time. There 
are some element of extremists both from Christians and Muslims who 
do not understand the coexistence of religions and want simply to air 
confusion and sow discord among believers. We have now settled 
everything, and are living together. The new church does not have a 
fence. It is Muslims who protect it. ,Muslims  have become a human 
shilds who save the church .We thank our Muslim co religious groups230: 
                                                     
229 Ato Darunga, Priest Awegechew and Sheik Mohammed Kelil, a local Christian woman whom I met in Garore 
area in December 2016. 
230 Interview with Priest Awegechew and Ato Darunga Desta on 25 January 2017 and 9 February 2017 in Werabe 
and Garore.  
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Local Christians have, however, developed their conspiracy theory saying that the local investor 
might have been the factor behind the burning of the Church.231 The state representatives tried to 
calm down the dispute by inviting elders to intervene in the matter.  
Following this incident, fifty elders from both faiths gathered and sought to resolve the matter. 
The next day southern region's justice and security office representatives came to the area. The 
officials discussed the incident with representatives of the two faiths. They requested elders how 
to end the dispute on the basis of local norm. Muslims demanded the case to be considered by 
elders, while Christians opted for the state to intervene. Finally, southern region's justice and 
security office agents persuaded representatives of both faiths to come to terms based on local 
values and norms and agreed that it would be better to leave the case for elders to allow the local 
elders to resolve the issue amicably and once and for all. Twenty elders from all parts of Siltie 
area were selected from both faiths equally to adjudicate the dispute. Below is what the elders 
and religious figures said. 
"The state officials gave us two days to search the suspects from both 
faiths, and hand them to the state. However, we urged that it is better 
to calm the case down rather than punishing the suspects. The 
officials recommended reducing the number of elders, and hence we 
selected five from each faith. We took the case and started to settle 
the dispute.232" 
The elders sorted out two major points to settle the case. These were: those individuals who have 
kindled the fire must be punished by elders in the customary court, and those who were 
responsible for constructing the church unlawfully would also be held accountable as well, and 
must be punished by the customary court. An elder who took part in the process said, „We avoid 
the state's punishment as elders want to reinstate peace rather than punishment that involves jail. 
Based on this agreement, Muslims identified seven individuals who were suspected to be behind 
the case, while representatives of Christians could not bring the suspects233, saying that the whole 
                                                     
231 Ato Darunga, and Priest Awegechew in January and February 2017. 
232 Interview with Hajji Hamid Hassan, head of Muslim elders, Darunga Desta, head of Christian dispute settlers, 
and Hajji Mohammed Kelil, head of Siltie Zone Islamic Affair, and Priest Awegechew, head of Siltie Orthodox 
Christians 
233 Interview with Sheik Mohammed Kelil. 
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Christians constructed the Church in their land, and hence all of them were responsible for 
that234.“ 
Finally, representatives of Muslims, Christians, state and local elders gathered in Qibet Town to 
end the dispute peacefully on 07 March 2012235 . They signed a deal that declared the end of the 
conflict over the land. Based on the agreement, elders condemned the illegal construction of the 
Church as well as the burning of the church by some youths. They have further agreed that the 
contested place should be reserved for Epiphany, and the Wereda Administration should give 
another area for the construction of the church. Finally, the Wereda Administration could not 
provide land for the church near the contested area, for peasants have already occupied all plots 
of land. Nevertheless, representatives of the local communities came up with the idea that the 
Wereda Administration could provide two hectares of land in another area for two peasants 
became voluntary to exchange the land for the church. Thus, the church had got two hectares of 
land near the contested area, and the Wereda Administration had exchanged the land with the 
peasants based on the agreement. Despite the fact that the dispute was concluded peacefully, 
some media continued to inflame the case as if „the Church was burnt by Muslims236„. But the 
Christian community constructed a church near the contested area and inaugurated the Church on 
May 14-15, 2016 in the presence of known Christian and Muslim leaders. 
To conclude, the case clearly indicates how the local case that traced its genesis in the early parts 
of the 1900s under the Imperial regime, unfolded itself after a century and became globalized. 
The dispute was also resolved through legal pluralism. It also indicates the failure of the state 
justice system to resolve the inter-faith dispute, the rejection of state's interventions by the local 
community as well as how the agency of local actors have played significant roles in maintaining 
law and order in the area. 
 
 
                                                     
234 Interview with Darunga Desta on 9 February 2017 in Garore. 
235 Taken from the agreement paper that contains the six agreed points and signatures of 20 individuals who 
participated in the conflict settlement process.  
236 Ethiopian Broadcasting Service,“Seifu Show,“ an independent Media on April 30, and May 7, 2016, at 9:25 pm, 
and leaflets distributed by unknown figures.  
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7.3.4. Case 4: Land Dispute Case- Agera Qebele, Silti Wereda 
Actor: Zemzem Ahmed Age: 65 versus Qebele Land Administration 
Weizero 237 Zemzem who lost her husband in 2009 left her area of residence in Gera Qebele, Silti 
Wereda to live with her son in neighboring Shele Washo Kultene Qebele in 2012.The Siltie 
practice a local form of old age center where an elder's son will protect his parents after they 
become old. Thus, Zemzem who became a widow and felt lonely decided to move to her son's 
house to stay in the company of her son's family. Following this step, she handed over her half a 
hectare land to Ato Hussien Shewmolo on the condition of sharing the produce without forfeiting 
the rights she has over the land.  
Zemzem inherited some parts of the land from her parents and gained some of it from bride 
wealth, paid to her by her husband when they were getting married. The Siltie practice three 
types of agricultural activities or local production system. These are, plowing one's land „Yegeg 
Deche Eresot,“ in which case the farmer plows his/her land by his oxen or by a combination of 
neighbors' oxen. Here, the farmer has full possession of the land and the produce. The second 
type of agricultural practice is called „Lederet Eresot“ Plowing for equal share/ whereby the 
farmer can contract the land out and sometimes the oxen for one season or more. Here, the 
farmer does not have land right and oxen, yet he will work over the land using the other party's 
land as well as oxen to share the produce with the person who has given him the resources for 
one season or for a long term. This can occur due to various factors including aging. It could also 
be because the man who gives the land may have much land for which he /she could not have 
enough time to work on. The third type of plowing is called „Kerab Tukesho,“ whereby the 
farmer has got the land, yet does not have oxen and hence will borrow oxen from others. This is 
done especially on Fridays as the community mainly takes rest on Friday. 
Thus, Weizero Zemzem's case falls into the second category for she was aged and saddened by 
the loss of her husband and could not plow the land by hiring workers. She decided to give it to 
Ato Hussein who could cultivate the land and share the produce with her. Following this 
agreement, Zemzem moved to the nearby Shele Washo Kultene Qebele where her son lives. After 
discussing with Weizero Zemzem, Ato Hussein planted Chat on half of the land, and the 
                                                     
237 Weizero is a local title mainly used by Amharic speaking communities to call a married woman. 
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remaining half was covered with other crops for one harvest season. Based on the agreement, 
Hussein shared half of his produce for only two seasons in 2013 and 2014 harvest time.  
Weizero Zemzem then changed her mind since she was not satisfied with the share she was 
getting from Hussein, and due to old age and health problems, she could not properly understand 
how Ato Hussein was managing the land. Thus, she did not want to rely on Ato Hussein 
anymore. And she wanted to hand the land over to her son mainly because of her age. Realizing 
that Zemzem was planning to take the land from him, Ato Hussein began contacting the Qebele 
land administration committee to arrange for him possibilities of transferring the land ownership 
certificate to himself by dispossessing Zemzem. He bribed the Qebele officials to provide him the 
certificate, and they agreed. According to Siltie Zone Good Governance and Appeal Office238, 
Silti Wereda is one of the Weredas with a high number of good governance problems on land 
related disputes. The Wereda has also owned a large number of public lands and has had the 
biggest population in the zone. Hussein had received the land ownership certificate by the end of 
2014. Following this incident, Zemzem requested the Qebele office to be involved in the case and 
bring her back the land but she failed.  
Involvement of Elders in the Issue 
As she became desperate over the ways the Qebele officials were handling the case, Zemzem 
took the case first to the Family forum, since Ato Hussein is her relative, and then to elders’ court 
to get her property back. The elders called Ato Hussein and tried to persuade him to accept 
Zemzem’s proposal and give her back the land so she could give it to her son who was taking 
care of her. He said that he was still abiding by the agreement and did not betray her. No formal 
contract paper was signed between the two parties that could dictate him to bring back the land. 
Rather, he would continue sharing the produce as usual. Frustrated by the course of events, 
Zemzem took the case to Silti Wereda Administration, Wereda Women Affairs, and rural land 
administration, yet she could not be successful as Hussein had already obtained a certificate of 
ownership of the land. Her sons were also involved in the case as they mobilized the local elders 
to intervene again in the case. Yet, as she did not have the land ownership certificate, Zemzem 
could not easily win the case.  
 
                                                     
238 Interview with Ato Mohammed Nur Rameto, ex-head of the Office on 10 January 2015 Werabe.  
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Involvement of State's Court 
Zemzem took the case to Silti Wereda First Instance Court in early 2015. The court ordered the 
police to bring the Qebele officials and Ato Hussein's evidence over the case. However, before 
that, the court asked both parties to reconsider it with the involvement of elders and the Qebele 
officials. Ato Hussein said to elders that he lent Zemzem 50,000 ETB (a little more than 2000 
Euro) as she wanted the money to send her daughter to Gulf States. Zemzem, however, said that 
she did not take money from Hussein, but agreed with him to cultivate the land on the condition 
that he shared the harvest with her. Elders tried to persuade both of them using the various 
swearing strategies, but all attempts failed. Finally, the elders and the Qebele officials wrote the 
customary court mediation result signed over it indicating the inability to reconcile disputants 
and sent to the Wereda court in March 2015. As the various ways of modes of dispute settlement 
strategies could not resolve the issue, and Ato Hussein had got the land ownership certificate, the 
litigation process could not end easily, and Zemzem was losing the land.  
Implications of the Case 
Some strong men can manipulate the Qebele administration as a weapon to take the rights of 
women. In this regard, what is supposed to protect the vulnerable people like senior women and 
minorities' rights worked against them. Moreover, women are still suffering a lot as they could 
not get protection either from the state apparatuses or the cultural mechanisms. The legal realities 
also indicate that the three courts exchange dispute cases. The case indicates, however, that some 
cases cannot be resolved easily. Moreover, beyond the involvement of the different actors and 
how the case has traveled through various legal systems, the case clearly indicates also how the 
local dispute settlement has been conducted in what Nader (1978) called the processual approach 
rather than rulemaking trends. The processual approach also underpins that the resolution of a 
dispute and the entire procedure and the process might change their nature in one single case, 
and how individuals use the system to their advantage or shop the forum to advance their 
interests. 
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7.3.5. Case 5. Jemila's Car Accident Case239 
Since I started field work in August 2014, car accident cases have dominated the news of 
Ethiopian Television, local radios, and local talks. Most of the dispute cases I have examined are 
related to death cases due to car accidents. Car accident cases have become an epidemic which 
claims lives of Ethiopian citizens, and the case has become a state agenda that has recently got 
serious attention by the government.  
Reports indicate that more than 3500-4000 deaths and 600 million destructions were reported in 
2015/2016 in the country (2007)240, while 28000 car accidents occurred in the first six months of 
2014/5 alone. It is also indicated that 4000-5000 lives are lost annually due to car accidents in the 
country241, while seven deaths are reported daily in the country242. Siltie zone has also seen a 
high number of car accident cases since August 2014-2016 in the period I stayed for field work 
in the area. 
Siltie Zone Roads Development and Transport Department report (2015/16)243 indicates that 
more than 115 car accident cases have been registered in different parts of Siltie with 40 deaths, 
and the accident rose to 91 with 32 deaths in the first eight months of 2016/17 Ethiopian fiscal 
year. The report further indicates that more than 3 million ETB (around 125,000 Euros) was lost 
due to the accident in the 2015/16 fiscal year. Improper drivers' training systems (85% of the 
accidents are due to poor driving244), poor roads, and local community's lack of enough 
awareness about traffic, among others, have been mentioned as factors contributing to the rise of 
car accidents both nationally and locally. To cite an example of car accidents in this zone, 18 
years old girl named Jemila lost her life as a result of a car accident on 26 August 2014 on the 
asphalt road between Hulbareg and Sankura Weredas. Following the incident, police arrested the 
driver, and elders initiated dispute settlement process.  
                                                     
239 Interview with Fedlu Mohammed, 39, Sheik Muze, Sheik Mohammed, Hajji Nassir, Abegaz Aregaw, head of 
Melga clan, and my observations during dispute settlement session on 15 September 2014, and 23 September 2015 
in Hulbareg Wereda. 
240 Ethiopian Television news Amharic program, a six months report from Ministry of Transport on 26 February, 15 
10:21 pm, and July 2015 8:06 PM news 
241 Taken from a report from Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn while presenting six months report to 
the House of People's Representatives on 12 January 2017 EBC News on 12 January 2017 at 8:10 pm.  
242 Addis Admas News Paper page 2 published on 4 February 2017  
243 Siltie Zone Transport and Roads Development Department Report on 3/March, 2017 Werabe. 
244 Addis Admas News Paper page 2 published on 4 February 2017 
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The driver was from Werabe area, and addressed in the customary court as a member of 
Datewezir clan, while the girl was from Melga clan in Hulbareg Wereda.  
The Siltie do not want to show the heterogeneity that is witnessed widely in the daily lives of the 
people. They apparently demonstrate that they are homogenous both culturally and religiously. 
Nevertheless, my observation from the daily life of the people indicates that there are local 
variations in the social life of the people including in the customary modes of dispute settlement. 
Elders including the owner of the car that killed the girl went to Hulbareg Wereda around 
Demeqe Qebele to bury the girl. It is believed that taking part in the burial ceremony is valued by 
the victim's family as one of the ways to show grief and concern to the bereaved family. This 
circumstance can also facilitate the initiation of dispute settlement process by elders. The owner 
of the car also gave 12000 Birr (500 Euro) for burial and mourning processes and attended the 
burial ceremony. It took three hours on foot from the main asphalt road to reach the village 
where the father of the dead girl lives. 
After the first meeting, an elder said that car accident cases should be adjudicated nearer to 
roads, so that road's Berche will be finished. Since then, elders began considering the case near 
the main asphalt road. I went with elders to see the onset of conciliation process on 15 September 
2014. This day, elders initiated the dispute settlement process and discussed how the 
perpetrator's family could share money that had been spent for mourning and other costs related 
to the accident. They also discussed Wurkefena including Gudda/White Tread/ tying process that 
temporarily can create a peaceful relationship between the parties involved in the event, and 
hence paving the way to the release of the driver who was under police custody. They agreed that 
the driver's family should bring the Wurkefena in the next seven days and handed it to the girl's 
family. I observed that elders requested the girl's family not to cooperate with the police so that 
the police could not provide evidence. The participants agreed further that the victim's family 
should communicate with the local administration to hide the address of witnesses’ Qebele. They 
also requested the girl's family to submit a letter to the police indicating the onset of dispute 
settlement and facilitate the ways the driver could be released from prison.  
Nevertheless, elders representing the victim's family said that the dispute resolution should be 
concluded based on Melga Serra rather than the grand Siltie Sera. The Siltie Serra prescribes that 
the perpetrator's family should give an average size cow, traditional cloth called locally Buluko, 
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traditional women's belt called Eto, and 40,000 ETB (around 1500 euro) during Wurkefena. This 
request created disagreement between elders who came from Werabe and Silti areas on one hand 
and those from Hulbareg, on the other. It took more than 4 hours to come to a consensus. The 
debate was all about local variations on the ways murder cases can be adjudicated. They were 
disputing over which items should be given to the victim's family during Wurkefena time. Elders 
from Melga clan area said that a middle sized cow should be paid during Wurkefena time, for the 
mother of the girl would drink the milk and get strength from the sorrow incident after losing her 
daughter. Elders from Datewezir clan, however, said that the cow should be given to the jury 
Temm Gudda245period when the dispute will be settled in the end. The Melga elders also stressed 
that the driver's family should give 40,000 Birr as a prerequisite to starting the conflict settlement 
and facilitating the release of the driver, while the Datewezir elders contested this proposition too 
indicating Berche as a guarantee. With this disagreement and stalemate, a neutral jury came up 
with the idea that narrowed the gap. He said that the case should be considered based on the 
norms of the area where the victims live stressing the right the Siltie Serra can give to the 
victims. However, he underscored that holding the money until the dispute settlement ends 
cannot resolve murder case as well as cleanse one from Berche. The elder stressed that Berche 
has more power than money to force a person to finish the dispute and the case, and it will track 
him if he retreats from the agreement. With these compromises, participants agreed to proceed 
with the conflict settlement process.  
I accompanied elders to the victim's family's house in Hulbareg Wereda to hand over the 
Wurkefena items on 23 September 2014. The driver who was released from prison on bail also 
went with us to accomplish Wurkefena that included Yekir-Gudda tying process. As part of 
Wurkefena rituals, the driver and the father of the girl sat together whereby the neutral jury asked 
them to bring the white thread from each party's clothes, and the parties brought the thread. The 
neutral jury/Yegute Baliqe/ spun the parts of thread to form one thread, symbolizing the 
beginning of a peaceful relationship and the unity of the disputants family. Finally, the person 
tied disputants' toes with the spun white thread and told them that a new era of kinship has 
started between the parties. 
                                                     
245 Temm Gudda is a black goat slaughtering ritual process when the representatives of the disputant groups will be 
tied by the intestine of the goat presided by the neutral jury. This ritual process symbolizes the end of feud and 
quarrel between or among groups ushered in the inception of a new fictitious relationship between the disputing 
parties. 
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 The neutral jury further stated, „You are now tied with a common thread to end revenge and 
avoid looking at one another with revengeful eyes and do not to seek the demise of one another 
including taking the case to the police. Now I am going to cut the thread, and anyone who breaks 
the oath will be cut like this.“ After passing this message, the person cut the thread into two and 
gave each part of the thread to the parties.  
Following this ritual, disputants went together to a tree which was selected by the girl's father as 
a tree that will not be used for wood or will not be cut forever by the family. It is believed that 
the tree will be a witness to the case. The neutral jury asked the father of the girl to dig a hole 
under the tree that symbolizes digging a grave for himself if he breaks the oath, and both asked 
to bury the thread symbolizing burying the foes, and dispute forever. Finally, the driver was 
asked to bring back the dust to the hole symbolizing burying himself if he breaks the bond and 
initiate conflict in the future. Elders said that anyone who believes that the other one has 
betrayed the agreement will come and tell to the tree which would avenge on behalf of the 
deserted. With this, the Wurkefena process ended, and participants enjoyed the feast prepared by 
the father of the girl. Mediators selected two elders one from each party to accompany the 
neutral jury to go to the Raga who would pass a verdict on the amount of blood money, and sort 
out ways on how the case would end with Temm Gudda. 
I understood, however, that the driver was arrested again by the police. This situation created a 
dispute between the driver's family and elders who could not stop the state intervention and the 
subsequent imprisonment of the culprit. The girl's family informed elders that the Wereda police 
transferred the case to the zone, and could not control the case. The Zone High Court kept on 
looking at the case, while the customary court was handling the case. Despite this, the customary 
court could not stop looking at the case. Members of the driver's family said that there is a 
double standard in the state court in handling the car accident cases, indicating the end of a car 
accident case in Hulbareg Wereda near the former place without even arresting the driver who 
killed a woman with a mini bus fifteen days after the Hulbareg incident. The driver's family 
members further said that they are not happy with the way and the manner both elders and state 
courts handled the case, for they paid money and invested energy thinking the customary court 
would conclude the case. Elders, on the other hand, were always confused as to why they could 
not resolve dispute cases, albeit constitutional entitlements, and hence could not protect the 
culprits from imprisonment.  
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With these complex relations elders have with disputants, Werabe High court found the driver 
guilty of negligence and sentenced him to eight months imprisonment. While the driver was in 
jail, the customary court kept on hearing the case, and the Raga at Embobo Qebele decided that 
the driver's family should pay 9900 ETB (nearly 450 Euro) as compensation to the girl's family. 
Finally, the disputants ended the case with Temm Gudda, and signed an agreement paper 
indicating the end of the dispute with the customary court, and submitted the paper to Siltie Zone 
High Court. The driver was released after finishing his eight months’ prison terms. However, 
members of the driver's family said that they ended Berche, though they suffered from a double 
standard in the state court. 
The case shows the natures of the interactions among the different legal systems. In this regard, 
local dispute settlers asked the disputants to withdraw their cases from the state legal system and 
subscribe to that of the Siltie Serra or the customary legal system. It has also indicated the 
legitimacy crisis the state and the customary legal regimes have met due to the bribery. The case 
has also shown that the state legal system has had different means of dealing with dispute cases 
like car accident, indicating the existence of double standard in the state justice system. 
7.3.6. Case 6: Bedria Bamud's Car Accident Case246 
Data collected from informants and sue paper indicate that Bedria was a mother of seven 
children. She lost her life while she was returning from the local market by a mini bus247 car 
accident on 12 September 2014 at 8:30 pm at a place known as Agode Qebele, Silti Wereda. The 
minibus was providing local transport service between Werabe and Butajira towns. After the 
incident, the driver of the car named Abdurrahman Mussa was sent to prison. Abdurrahman is an 
Oromo while his wife is Siltie. The owner of the car Hajji Awel Hussein and local elders went to 
Agode Qebele to attend the burial ceremony, and initiate dispute settlement process.  
                                                     
246 Interview with Ato Mussema Idris (Husband of the victim), Sheik Mohammed Sheik Kelil, Abdurrahman Mussa 
(the driver who was responsible for the accident), Ato Akmel Ahmedin, Siltie Zone High Court President and my 
observation of the customary court since the case happened on 12 October 2014 for five months (See also Appendix 
III). I attended Raga Awel's customary tribunal hearing where the driver represented by elders appealed to Maga's 
decisions on mourning expenses on 5 February 2015.The case has also been written based on Public Prosecutor's sue 
paper dated 18 March 2015 and Siltie Zone High Court decision file number 10598/07 dated 28 October 2015. 
247 This is a local transportation car that can carries 12 passengers. It becomes the main local transportation in Siltie 
and neighboring areas. 
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They informed the family of Bedria that the driver was responsible for the accident and they 
wanted the case to be resolved according to the Siltie culture. They also gave some money for 
mourning and other related costs for the husband.  
After two weeks, elders went back to the village to continue the dispute settlement process, and 
facilitate the release of the car and the driver from the prison. Elders both from the victim's 
family and the driver side agreed that the driver and the car should be released from jail to keep 
on the dispute settlement process. To this effect, they also agreed that the victim's family should 
not start the legal process to sue the driver in the state court, and local elders from the victim's 
side were also informed that they should persuade possible witnesses not to appear before the 
police fearing Berche. After this agreement, elders initiated the dispute settlement between the 
victim and the driver.  
According to elders, the disputants who were involved in the case were the driver, the victim's 
family and the owner of the car. It is believed among the Siltie that the car has got Berche and 
will continue to kill human beings if the proprietor could not end the Berche. The owner of the 
car also informed me that he believed that the Berche would follow and attack him if he could 
not share the expenses of the driver during the dispute settlement process. And hence, I observed 
that the owner of the car was paying the transportation costs of elders who went to Silti Wereda 
from Werabe to facilitate the release of the car and the driver as well as the transportation cost of 
going to elders' village. Finally, the driver was released from prison on bail, and the car was also 
released.  
Elders summoned the disputants again to keep on the dispute settlement process. This time, 
Mussema Idris, the husband of the deceased asked the driver and owner of the car to reimburse 
all the money he spent in the process. The local dispute settlers told Mussema that he should fear 
Allah as well as Berche and that he should stop calculating the expenses so as to avoid possible 
negative impacts of Berche on his life, which could occur due receiving unnecessarily big 
amount of money from the parties. Ato Mussema told elders that he spent more than 50,000 ETB 
(more than 2000 Euro). Elders, however, could not accept the request as it was highly inflated. 
And the Raga requested Mussema to calculate the money for reconsideration. Yet, Mussema 
could not change his stand. This situation created disagreement between elders and disputant 
parties.  
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Thus, elders wanted to take the case to an appellant court at Hajji Awel court. Abdurrahman and 
the owner of the car went to Hajji Awel’s court to appeal to the Maga's decision and ask how to 
end the case on 5 February 2015. Elders, disputant parties, and I also went to the court. 
Hajji Awel also said that the amount of money requested by Mussema seemed more than an 
average amount requested by other disputants with similar cases and warned him that the money 
will devour him and his family if he is not reconsidering it. The Raga also told Mussema that it 
would be better even to forfeit money related with murder cases so as not to fall under the 
dangerous impacts of Berche. Hajji Awel also decided that the driver and the owner of the car 
would pay 8674 ETB (360 Euro) as compensation to victim's family or Gumma. However, Hajji 
Awel warned Mussema that he should agree with elders when he took the money. Mussema told 
me that he could take all the money and ask the perpetrator to pay him the price of the donkey 
that was hurt by accident. It seemed that the tensions between the disputants could not be calmed 
down due to the less reconciliatory tone of Mussema who frequently said that he lost his wife, 
and took the responsibility of taking care of seven children including an infant.  
Views from the Judged 
While elders were processing the dispute in the customary court for six months, the public 
prosecutor initiated prosecution of the driver. Abdurrahman, who was a driver and perpetrator of 
the accident, told me that he did not believe elders have real power to implement their court's 
decision since they could not guarantee him from state's prosecution. Abdurrahman248also said 
that elders also are corrupted just like some judges in the state courts. He further said that the 
public prosecutor also demanded a bribe to drop the case. As he said, it would have been better 
to be sued and prosecuted by the state court from the onset than trusting the customary court, for 
it took six months to wind up the case in the customary court without implementing their 
decisions. Abdurrahman stated that the owner of the car and himself spent more than 45, 000 
ETB (around 1700 Euros) in the customary ways, yet he could not end the matter in the 
customary court. Therefore, he received a prosecution letter from the zonal court on 02 February 
2015 to appear at the court over the case. And hence, the customary system could not protect 
Abdurrahman from state's prosecution as well as prevent him from being prosecuted in the state 
court.  
                                                     
248 Interview with Abdurrahman on 5 February 2015, Werabe.  
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He stressed further that if he were sued instantly, he would have finished the sentence or 
imprisonment by then. Thus, finally, Siltie Zone High Court passed a resolution dated 28 
October 2015, file number 10598/07 that found Abdurrahman guilty of a negligence crime and 
sentenced him to two years imprisonment. After facing another crisis, Abdurrahman said that he 
faced double jeopardy from the case. He stated that he had been punished two times. First, he 
said he took the case to customary court, and invested 60,000 ETB (more than 2000 Euros) 
thinking that the case would be ended there. Second, he faced state court's decision, and fine as 
well. Abdurrahman, however, indicated that if the state court had handled the case, it would have 
been accomplished with 10000 Birr and a maximum of 8 months imprisonment.  
Abdurrahman's arrest created some instability in the justice department, Zone administration, 
and Siltie Zone High Court and questioned elders' power of enforcing their decisions in the area. 
This was because Abdurrahman's wife took her children to Siltie Zone administration to ask why 
Siltie culture could not end the case. She stated that Abdurrahman spent more than 60,000 ETB 
in the customary court, and impoverished the family without putting an end to the matter. She 
said further that the Zone administration should intervene in the case to help the family which 
could not survive without Abdurrahman. I also discussed with the President of Siltie Zone High 
court about the case and stressed that car accident cases are not intentional and the court 
recommended that the cases be transferred to customary courts for resolution. Moreover, the 
court initiated some form of discussion with the zone justice department to look at the roles of 
elders in resolving car accident cases and treat them accordingly. However, since Abdurrahman's 
case had already got a decision, it went out of control. But he stated that the court would try to 
lower the prison sentence by discussing with stakeholders like the jail office and justice 
department. Finally, the judicial department, Zone administration, and Zone High Court 
reconsidered the matter, and Abdurrahman was released from prison after serving eight months 
and ten days behind bars following the Ethiopian government’s official pardon for convicts on 
the Ethiopian New Year celebration on 11 September 2016.With this, Abdurrahman's dispute 
case was ended. The case indicates the existence of competition and complementarity between 
the different legal systems. It also shows the declining legitimacy of both the state and customary 
legal regimes, and that elders could not enforce their decisions. 
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7.3.7. Case 7: Motorbike Accident Case249 
‘' ...We are also Muslims, not Christians; it is Allah who gave us our culture, Islam is here from 
time immemorial with us, the Quran and the Hadith are with us too. It has co-existed peacefully 
among the community with our norms and values. We practice both our culture and religion. 
What is wrong with us these days? We cannot forsake one or the other or both. We have 
maintained a delicate balance between culture and religion for an extended period. What do the 
youth practice? Which version of Islam are they imposing on us..?“ (An elder who went to 
customary court to mediate a car accident case with the deceased person’s family). 
An old woman called Amina, who was in her 60s, was hit by motorbike driven by a government 
employee named Mohammed in Silti Wereda on August 18, 2014. After she had got a medical 
treatment for a month, Amina passed away due to the injury she sustained. Following her death, 
the relatives of Mohammed took the case to customary court and asked the victim's family to 
resolve the case in line with the Siltie norm. Nevertheless, the brother of the deceased woman 
called Kedir declined the involvement of elders in the case as he thought the cultural way of 
resolving the conflict would bring non-Islamic ways or bida’a. He considered the customary 
court's procedures as „jahil's“ or ignorance way, and it is only the Quran that can become a guide 
for his way than culture. He has also stressed that he has already forgiven the person.  
Kedir said further that the perpetrator did not kill the woman intentionally. He said it was 
predestined, as he executed the decision of Allah. Elders, however, had different positions on 
Kedir's stand. Even those elders who came from the culprit's side were divided over the situation, 
and hence some of them were persuaded and took side with Kedir. However, the majority of the 
elders stood for handling the case at customary court and hence insisted that Kedir persuade the 
whole family, especially the paternal lines/Abotgare/ to resolve the case according to the Islamic 
law250 and to confirm elders if Abotgare complied with his proposal. Nevertheless, Mohammed's 
family could not agree to end the case through Islamic law, for they said that Berche would not 
be ended if the whole family agreed to the procedure. Kedir could not also retreat from his stand. 
                                                     
249 Interview with Hajji Shewmolo Admama and Hajji Umar Daremulo on 27 September 2014 in Enseno Town. 
Interview with Hajji Shewmolo, 64, and Hajji Umar 47 in Enseno Town on 27 September 2014. 
250 The reason elders wanted Kedir to persuade the Abotgare was due to the fact it was the Abotgare that 
had influence and local power in handling the dispute, and hence elders would be convinced that the case 
would be resolved. Additionally, local elders have also a divided loyalty both to the custom and Islam.  
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Mohammed's representatives requested again if the victim's family believed that the murder case 
could be resolved with forgiveness as Islamic law recommends. Since they believed that 
Mohammed implemented Allah's plan, they were supposed to confirm them by inviting the 
Abotgare who could represent the group's interest. However, the Abotgare of the deceased 
insisted that the case be handled in a customary way contrary to Kedir's stand. Hence, both the 
victim's family and elders finally agreed to the fact that the case should be adjudicated in 
customary court. Following this decision, Kedir disassociates himself from the reconciliation 
process. Despite this, the customary court continued hearing the case, and elders concluded all 
procedures according to Siltie norm including Gudda tying process after more than two months’ 
time. Even if culture prevails over religion, elders will say that religion is challenging the 
existence of culture as the younger generation inclines towards Islam than culture. Most of the 
youths consider Gudda that involves tying the toes of disputants with white thread and later 
concluded with the slaughtering of black goats locally called Temm Gudda as innovation or 
„bida'a“ and hence non-Islamic. However, Gudda has been considered by the community as a 
central part of homicide cases that involve murder. 
7.4. Concluding Remarks 
In the chapter, I investigated local dispute settlers' self-perceptions and expressions that indicate 
how the roles dispute settlers' agency play an important role in maintaining social order and the 
interactions among various legal systems operating in the study area. Local dispute settlers also 
use tracing their ancestors' job as a mediator to create a continued legitimacy which helps them 
contest for more power in the plural legal constellation. It also seems that the three legal systems 
complement each other in resolving disputes, and at times, contend over cases. Furthermore, the 
various cases explained in the chapter also expound that the existence of polygamy among the 
local community as a marriage practice is now facing some challenges. Nevertheless, the chapter 
shows that marital dispute has become the major dispute in the area. The dissolution of a family 
following termination of marriages has influenced the condition of women, especially during 
property disputes. It has also been discussed that local dispute settlers employ plural legal 
systems to address disputes including interfaith disputes and homicide cases. The existence of 
plural legal regimes has provided various options for the local community to choose from.  
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The empirical data discussed in the chapter also indicate that there is competition not only 
between legal systems but also, among the various customary legal systems operating in the area. 
Moreover, the data showed that the people show little interest in resorting to state legal system 
for a number of reasons. In the first place, the Siltie believe that prison or state legal system's 
sanctioning does not end Berche, for Berche is a powerful concept of the right to life considered 
by the community as a cultural police that controls the existence of injustice among members of 
the community. Secondly, the local community believes that the state legal system is corrupted 
and could not give an appropriate decision, indicating a declining legitimacy of state legal 
system. Thirdly, the local community believes that the state system could not resolve group 
conflict and imply the less relevance the state legal systems have for settling collective disputes 
since conflict is widely considered communal rather than individual by the people. Fourth, it is 
believed that the state legal system could not normalize relations between the disputants, unlike 
the customary system that works to reintegrate the culprit into the society. Finally, the various 
dispute cases explained in the chapter indicate that the customary legal system's values and 
norms are more related to Islam rather than the state ones and hence contributed for the relatively 
greater legitimacy the customary systems enjoy among the people than the state legal system.  
The struggle between religious actors for more power to Shari'a courts seems a reflection of the 
demand of Muslim community for more religious right and an indication of the worsening 
relation between Muslims and the Ethiopian state in the last five or more years. 
It is also argued that local dispute settlers also shop the forums as they use some opportunities 
that involve customary court to accumulate power by playing off the dispute. That is, if they are 
not participating in the dispute itself, the dispute could not be resolved, and this can contribute to 
the theory of power and law. Finally, the chapter argues that demography and the religious 
census have become one of the grounds for the degree of legitimacy the customary legal system 
obtains in a pluralistic legal setting. 
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                         CHAPTER EIGHT 
8. STATE-SOCIETY RELATION AND PROCESSES OF IDENTITY FORMATION: AN 
OVERVIEW 
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter briefly explores the various historical episodes the Siltie have passed through in 
resisting state interference into the local people's life including state strategies to disintegrate the 
people in the late 19th century. In so doing, the chapter sheds light on the successive state’s’ 
failed attempts and strategies to compromise, disintegrate, and silence the Siltie’s quest for self-
determination and the century-old popular struggle that curbed such attempts beginning from the 
19th century. It has also made glimpses on the inter-ethnic conflict between the Gurage and the 
Siltie, and the various mechanisms employed by the state and non-state actors to resolve the 
dispute. The Siltie-Gurage identity conflict has once become a major issue in the ethnically 
federated Ethiopia. During this time, quite a good sections of the society ranging from students, 
the rural community, urban dwellers and of course the newly emerging Siltie elites and 
politicians took part in the struggle for Siltie identity. These public interests to assert their ethnic 
status have been manifested in various aspects of their life, including the traditional dispute 
settlement mechanisms. Thus, the chapter mainly focuses on the interactions between dispute 
resolution and identity construction and the various measures Siltie took to develop their identity 
manifestations since the 1990s.The chapter argues that recovery of local modes of dispute 
settlement have links with a revitalization of ethnic sentiments and identity formation processes 
Siltie has undergone since the 1990s, and this has led to the emergence of customary modes of 
dispute settlements as one of the many identity markers of the Siltie. It also argues that local 
actors use their agency to resist the Ethiopian state's interferences in local affairs. 
8.2. The Evolution of State-Siltie Relations: Interventions and Local Responses 
The Siltie interaction with the state had started in the 14th century when King Amdesion invaded 
ancestor of the Siltie land somewhere in the East (Bustorf, 2009; Braukämper, 2001; Kairedin, 
2012). However, a noticeable relationship that has brought significant socio-economic, as well as 
cultural changes has begun since the late 19th century.  
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This time, forces of Emperor Menilik II subjugated the Siltie land in 1889. Since then the Siltie 
area had become part of the Ethiopian state. The new governors introduced a complex system 
that combined „transplantation of Abyssinians and the cooptation of a subordinate indigenous 
elite“ (Markakis 2011:4). As a result of the incorporation, the Siltie's local governance system 
has been reduced to ritual than political power. Furthermore, the new rulers brought 
Gabbar/tenant, and Balabat /Malkagna251 system in the area. Under this system, the most fertile 
and productive lands of the Siltie were appropriated and distributed for soldiers or Malkagnas. 
The majority of the Siltie who were forced to live in their land as servants became tenants. The 
same situations prevailed in the following Imperial regime (1931-1974). During the Imperial 
period, homogenization of culture led by the Amharic language was strengthened, and other 
languages were outlawed officially (Markakis 2011:126).  
On the other hand, the ethno genesis of the Siltie indicates that parts of the soldiers of a medieval 
Muslim expansionist known as Imam Ahmed ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi (1506-43) also known as 
Ahmed Gragn/Left Handed/settled among the Siltie during his war with Ethiopia's Christian 
Highland Kingdom in the 1530s. The Imam's 'expansion to the north marked 'the Abyssinian 
psyche with an ever-sensitive scar, and an abiding distrust of Islam and Muslims’’ (ibid.: 33). 
This scenario has developed an 'Ahmed Gragn Syndrome' by the then Christian dominated 
Ethiopian state which has also implanted a seed that has worsened Siltie-state relations until 
now. The Siltie have become suspect number one whenever Islamic momentum arises, and the 
religion has been perceived as politically subversive in the country. 
Due to this factor, Muslims were marginalized in every aspect of life including the state 
apparatuses since late nineteenth century. Though the Siltie were near to the center (only less 
than 200 kilometers away from Addis Ababa), they were marginalized socially, culturally, 
economically and politically for more than a century. They had been divided into neighboring 
communities so as not to allow the unified Muslim communities to live in peace (Markakis, 
2011; Yalew, 2004; Kairedin, 2013). They even felt ignored during the first decades of post-
socialist Ethiopia (Dirk 1997, 2011). 
                                                     
251 The local people in the study area refer to those rulers who came after Menilik II’s expansion to administrate the 
area as Balabat or malkagna. 
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According to a key informant252, the Malkagnas and Balabats were the most powerful persons in 
the area during the Imperial regime. The administrative system before 1930 consisted of these 
structures as a district province, and empire. Hence, those governors who were appointed by the 
emperor monopolized all powers in their provinces. As scholars such as Bahru (1991) said, the 
coming into power of Hailesillasie I (r.1930 - 1974) aggravated the weakening of local systems 
in the country in general and among the Siltie in particular. In 1931, the emperor promulgated 
the first constitution. The new constitution further set up a statutory framework for the emperor. 
It gave him the unprecedented power in the state apparatus (Bahru 1991:140). 
Thus, with the approval of the first constitution in 1931, the seemingly dual exercise of the 
provisional governors and Balabats who were previously allowed to levy and collect taxes on 
land and other powers were abolished. The new rulers were fully appointed by the emperor 
(Abbera 1998:7). Therefore, such newly devised system allowed the emperor to have greater 
control over the local authority. Hailesillasie I placed this power under the central administration 
(Aadland 2002:29). As studies show, the process of centralization also continued in the Italian 
interlude period (1935-41). A new regional administration was devised in 1941 that brought 
twelve, and later fourteen, provinces (Teklai-Gezat) that were ruled by a governor-general. There 
were around 100 countries (Awraja), over 500 districts (Wereda), and several sub-districts 
(Mikitil Wereda) (Walelign 2005:91).  
Moreover, before the Italian occupation, Emperor Hailesillasie I divided the country into 32 
provinces (Gizat) that were directly organized under the central government. Each province was 
numbered, and the name of the governor of each region was designated by corresponding names 
of the Gezat. The provincial governors who governed the fiefs in the name of the emperor were 
alien appointees to the localities (Aklilu 2002:28).Thus, during that time administrative 
arrangements were formed at the expense of identity and local realities. The Siltie, following the 
enactment of Decree No. 1 of 1942 that divided the country into 12 administrative provinces 
(Awrajas) were placed under the province of Shoa. Shoa Teklay Ghizat also became answerable 
to the Ministry of Interior at the top level of a hierarchy.  
                                                     
252 Interview with Gerad Awel and Gerad Teka Werabe and Sankura Towns, taken from earlier field notes and 
updated afterward.  
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Based on this, the Siltie were further divided into Chebo and Gurage Awraja and the Kambata 
and Hadiyya Awraja (Aklilu 2008:28-29). Having been disintegrated into various administrative 
structures, the Siltie could not exercise their local system of governance in the area. The strong 
centralization policy of the Imperial regime could not allow the local system to function fully in 
the area. The Siltie were thus denied the right to self-rule and were only communicating with the 
center via Christian Gurages, and neighboring Kembata and Hadiyya peoples. This situation 
further worsened the state-Siltie relations. 
As Aklilu (2002:29) rightly said, "the local people had no direct influence in the administrative, 
political, and economic realms in their realities." Thus, the central government, its functionaries, 
and representatives enjoyed a considerable degree of political and socio-economic privileges in 
the area. The local people, however, were subjected to exploitative and oppressive structures. 
Despite that fact that the emperor introduced a revised constitution in 1955, nothing was changed 
for the local systems to revive in the area. Nevertheless, there was an attempt by provincial 
governors to install the local chiefs as Balabats in the political system.  
However, their functions were limited only to serve the central government than the local people. 
Furthermore, the criminal code of the 1930 and the proclamation of Administration of Justice of 
1942 of the Imperial Regime replaced the customary dispute settlement modes by the state court 
system in the country. It denied the legal recognition for those local institutions of law and 
authority. The Balabat was responsible for maintaining law and order, hearing disputes as well 
as administering traditional justice among others during the imperial period (1931-74) (Markakis 
2011:110).  
As respondents253 said, the customary courts were used by the majority of the rural people for 
resolving such conflicts as matrimonial cases, land disputes, theft and debt cases during the 
period. As they said, the state courts were employed to resolve infractions of state law such as 
failure to pay taxes properly, and to regulate public order. Thus, there had been aspects of legal 
pluralism even during the Imperial period.  
                                                     
253 Interview with Ato Kedir Lalega, Kemal Hussein and Abdi Mohamed on 22, 25, 30 April/2016 and taken from 
earlier field notes. They are Dalocha, Silti, Lanfuro Wereda officials respectively  
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Therefore, these facts indicate that the indigenous systems did not cease to function in practice 
among the society, and the local community resisted the central government’s keen interest to 
silence local modes of governance and customary courts using various strategies including 
everyday forms of resistances. 
One can also understand that the local systems did not completely vanish following the codes 
and proclamations of the central government. Rather, the customary court had been modifying 
itself to cope up with the changing socio-economic and political circumstances of the time. As 
paper money has become the principal currency from that time on, the customary court has 
adopted cash for compensation payment as blood price. Thus, customary fines have now been 
replaced by paying in cash rather than in kind. The local community resisted the attempt to 
implant the customary court using everyday forms of resistance (Scott, 1985) like refusal to take 
cases to the state court and to cooperate with the Balabats on local administration.  
FGD participants254 agreed that it was in the days of the Derg (1974-1991) that the pressure of 
the state was most acutely felt. An Ethiopian historian Bahru Zewdie (2002:25) stated that „the 
unprecedented control that the state was able to exercise over society through the peasant and 
neighborhood associations tended to stifle local initiative.“ Therefore, the Derg regime even 
more than before had become hostile to the existence and functions of the customary and 
religious laws (Alula and Getachew 2008:8). The customary court was forced to operate in a 
hidden way among the society. As a key informant255 said, the customary court was employed 
among the people to resolve some minor disputes such as family disputes, matrimonial and theft 
cases.  
As scholars further said, the establishment of a centralized court and police system since Menilik 
II period also diminished the power and applicability of the customary system of arbitration and 
maintenance of social order (Bahru 2002:25). The local system could not completely vanish from 
the area. The society employed it in one or another way to settle disputes among kin groups and 
to maintain the social order in the area.  
                                                     
254This is based on FGD that was conducted with eight informants on April 1/2012 on the annual Siltie History, 
culture and language Symposium in Werabe town & FGD that was carried out with such key informants as Ato 
Kaire Sule, Hajji Abdurrahman, Werkicho Yusuf, and Hajji Hussein Barsebo on April 22/2013 in earlier contact and 
updated later in Werabe Town.  
255 Interview with Gerad Awel on November 2/2013 in Werabe Town in earlier work.  
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Following the installation of Ethnic Federalism in post-1991 period in the country, the customary 
and religious laws have been undergoing a dynamic process of revitalization. Bahru Zewede, 
Ethiopian historian, said that the customary systems, far from disappearing completely, have 
managed to persist up to now in the country. Bahru (2002) further attributed the resurgence of 
the local system to the failure of the parliamentary democracy in the continent. 
 "… the failure of parliamentary democracy in Africa has forced a fresh 
look at traditional /pre-colonial systems of governance. It is argued that 
for the continent to emerge out from the vicious cycle of military 
dictatorship, and corrupt civilian regimes, it has to reexamine its 
traditional political systems, revitalize them and make them pertinent to 
the contemporary application" (Bahru 2002:17). 
Therefore, after the demise of the Derg, the EPRDF led government of Ethiopia has also drafted 
a constitution that gives room for the local systems to revive and play their roles for 
democratization process. Thus, in the post-1991 Ethiopia, the customary and religious systems 
are encouraged to revitalize and become part of the new order if they could not contradict with 
the FDRE constitution (Art.34/5/;78/5/).  
The constitution recognizes non-state laws to operate side by side with the state apparatus. It 
limits the full implementation of the system if it contradicts with the tenets of the constitution. 
For instance, non-state laws are entitled to deal with conflicts related to personal and family 
disputes. Nevertheless, resolutions of criminal cases are not to be handled by those traditional 
institutions. Furthermore, as mentioned above, Article 34 (5) of the F.D.R.E constitution (1995) 
stipulates that non- state institutions can prosecute dispute cases the parties agree to do so. 
Despite this, one can say that the post-1991 Ethiopia has been witnessing strong revitalization of 
the local systems that deal with every form of disputes in the area (See more in chapter five and 
six).  
Following the installation of the current ethnic federalism, the Siltie local systems have begun to 
revive in the area. My key informants256 present the case in the other way round. They said that 
although the local systems have been experiencing a process of revitalization in a major part of 
the country since 1991, the Siltie’s oppression had kept on in the federalist Ethiopia for a decade 
                                                     
256 Interview with the main informants who preferred anonymity in this case.  
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until 2001. They were denied self-determination for long since the people were associated by 
external actors with the Gurage.  
As mentioned above, the Siltie were disintegrated into three adjacent administrative structures, 
namely the Gurage, the Hadiyya, and the then Hallaba-Temabaro Zones. This incident 
prevented the Siltie from reviving and developing Siltie's customs in a more organized way, on 
the one hand and indicated the continuation of the deteriorated state-Siltie relationship, on the 
other. The Siltie had worsened interaction with the current situation from 1991 to 2001 as they 
were involved in an inter-ethnic conflict with the Gurage people. As FGD informants mentioned, 
it was only after 2001 that the Siltie have begun to administer themselves and revive the local 
institutions including the customary courts in the newly established Siltie zone.  
However, this is not also without pitfalls. According to informants257, the people cannot fully 
revive and employ the systems currently. This is because the zone officials seem to be not ready 
to see „a state within state“258 and cannot allow another system to function in the area. The other 
reason is due to reluctant nature of the younger generation to employ the customary courts 
because of the expansion of „modernization“ in the area. These developments have lessened the 
significance of the local systems in the area. Nevertheless, as I observed in various parts of the 
Siltie, the customary court and the local religious ones had played an important role in resolving 
various disputes including homicide cases and those hidden crimes for which enough evidence 
could not be provided for the state justice system to deal with them. 
Even though the state-Siltie relationship since 2001 can be characterized as a healthy one, the 
people's relation with the government seems to have worsened since 2011 when the government 
tried to impose its version of „moderate Islam“, Al-ahbash259 on Ethiopian Muslims. The Siltie 
have once again been suspected by the government as one of the factors behind Muslims' 
protests260in the country. In sum, the Siltie have undergone a contentious and amicable form of 
interactions with Ethiopian state at least since the incorporation of the area by the Ethiopian 
empire in the late 19th century. 
                                                     
257 Interview with anonymous informants.  
258 Interview with the ex-justice department head of the Zone who initiated the dialogue between elders and zone 
and supported elders' council, yet who was later informally discouraged by higher officials (February 2015 in 
Werabe Town).  
259 Al-Ahbash is a religious sect established by an Ethiopian Cleric Abdela Al-Harari in Lebanon (See More in the 
next sections). 
260 PM Hailemariam Desalegn’s speech in Werabe Town. 
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8.3. Dispute Settlement and Identity Formation: Duality of Cooperation and 
Contestation among legal Actors 
"We have asserted the right to self-determination, albeit late, in the Federalist 
Ethiopia. We paid every price to get recognized by the central government. As an 
independent ethnic group, we have our customary dispute settlement/Ye Siltie 
Serra/.We have been employing the system for long to resolve disputes including 
murder cases. We also know that the government has set up its judiciary systems 
up to the grassroots level. Alhamduli-Allah our Din/Islam/ also acknowledges 
our role as an elder to employ our culture. It even recognizes Berche. Ironically, 
the public prosecutor could not allow us to install an elder system to deal with 
murder cases. In fact, we cooperate with the state jurisdiction in those cases for 
which the police could not easily find evidence. The state has got prisons, yet we 
have got Berche that can keep on inflicting harms up to seven generations upon 
the disputing parties as well as upon the dispute settlers if not well addressed. 
Where is article 39 of the FDRE constitution? Why does the state not allow us to 
fully involve our elders in resolving disputes like our neighboring ethnic 
groups?” (Hajji Kemal Barsebo, 62, on 27 August 2014 in Silti Wereda). 
The above idea has been taken from an elder's reflections on the relation between the customary 
court and state institutions. I have learned from the field that most of the Siltie elders also share 
his idea. His description of the situation shows the inconsistency between the right the customary 
court enjoys in the Federal Ethiopia and the challenges they face on the ground whenever they 
resolve disputes including murder cases in the study area. It portrays not only the complimentary 
aspects of various legal systems but also the existence of power contestations among different 
legal systems in the area. From the above elder’s view and explanation, one can also understand 
that the Siltie's skepticism about the activities of the state persists until now. The elder's idea 
clearly indicates the existence of diversified legal systems among the Siltie that embraces the 
state, the customary and religious legal systems even if with varying arrangement of power. The 
elder’s reflection underscores the existence of both amicable and contentious relationship with 
the various legal regimes.  
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As mentioned in the preceding chapters, the state court's report acknowledges its failure to 
handle the various disputes without the active involvement of elders. The political interferences 
have further worsened the legitimacy of public institutions like the judiciary (Baker, 2013).The 
Shari'a courts also suffer a legitimacy crisis due to a number of internal and external factors 
(Mohammed Abdo, 2010) including political interferences. The introduction of developmental 
state economic model that further strengthens the power of central state vis-a -vis local power 
has further challenged the existence of legal pluralism in the area. And hence, the prospect of 
legal pluralism has become to be at the crossroads. 
8.4. Inter-Ethnic Dispute: The Re-making of an Ethnic Group  
The Siltie are an oral society and commence most of their conversations with proverbs. This is 
even true during the formal meetings like Zone councils and state court sessions. They are open 
to talking, yet often express their ideas idiomatically. They criticize the state whenever it seems 
necessary to them, but they do it cautiously as they still „fear“ the state. Nevertheless, they have 
their forms of resistance as Scott aptly puts it referring to how the weak resists the powerful in 
everyday life (Scott, 1985). The Siltie's interaction with the Ethiopian state, on the other hand, 
harks back to the late 19th century. Both friendship and enmity characterize the Siltie's 
interactions with the state. Their first encounters with Menilik II's Ethiopia at the end of the 19th 
century did not start in healthy ways because of the imperial state's disintegration of the Siltie 
land into neighboring people that had been precipitated by the fierce military resistance the Siltie 
showed towards the expanding forces of Menilik II. The state was since then perceived as an 
enemy, and it continues to have negative connotations among the Siltie until today. It is 
remarkable that the local community calls the state „Mengist,“ that is an „absolute power“ that 
can give and take everything that it wants from the people.  
In any case, it is not conceived as an institution in the (Western) common sense whereby the 
state is elected by the people and stands for the rights of people. It is likewise remarkable maybe 
also due to the problematic relationship between the Siltie and the state-which the Siltie managed 
to set up their administrative Zone only in 2001 that was a decade later than most of the ethnic 
groups in the ethnic federal Ethiopia. 
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8.4.1. The Genesis of the Siltie Identity Crisis and the Siltie-Gurage Inter-Ethnic 
Dispute: Extending Local Scenario to the National Case 
Even though the inter-ethnic dispute between the Siltie and the Gurage started in the early 1990s, 
its emergence could be traced back to the late 19th century. As mentioned in various sections of 
the book, it was at the end of the nineteenth century that the Siltie area had been incorporated 
into the Ethiopian state. Menilik II's expansion into the south and southwest of the country had 
culminated with the birth of a unified Ethiopia in the quarter of the 19th century. In his 
expansion to the south, Emperor Menilik II used two strategies to conquer and incorporate new 
territories effectively. These were peaceful submission and armed struggle (Bahru 2001:60-
61).The expansion of Shoa to the Siltie that had started in the 1870s had been concluded with the 
conquest of Siltie in 1889 (Dirk,2011).The Siltie formed an alliance called Gogot with 
neighboring people like Qabena, Sodo Gurages to fight Menilik's forces, yet became 
unsuccessful (Abdulfeta 2002:193). 
Following their incorporation, a new form of the legal system has been transplanted, and the 
Siltie land was disintegrated into neighboring areas. As a result, the quest for self-determination 
and central administration had started since then. The Menilik administration adopted a politico-
administrative system called Balabat or Malkagna and appointed Balabats to administer the area 
(Markakis 1974:67-68) indirectly. Denying self-rule of the Siltie had continued under the 
Imperial regime as well. The Siltie students had joined the Ethiopian Student Movemnts that 
became one of the factors that unseated Emperor Hailesillasie I in 1974 (Kairedin, 2012). The 
Siltie area had been included under Gurage, and the people in the urban area were called Gurage. 
Some sources indicate further that the Siltie identity politics was initiated since 1990s, and „does 
not have any historical precedence. Rather, it constitutes an emerging social and political 
processes of constructing a new ethnicity for the majority of Eastern Gurage-speaking 
population“(Zerihun 2015:7-8). Some written sources, however, indicate that the Siltie has got a 
different origin (Trimingham, 1965; 188; Shack 1966:16; Kairedin, 2012; Aklilu, 2000), and 
identity markers (Markakis, 1998).  
Additionally, studies that are based on empirical data indicate further that the Siltie-Gurage 
identity dispute had been a continuation of the past and the post 1990s identity struggle was a 
revivalism of an already existing ethnic group identity that „was suppressed under the wider 
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Gurage category“(Markakis, 1998; Aklilu, 2000; Braukämper, 2001; Abdulfeta, 2002; Vanguan, 
2003; Smith, 2013; Kairedin 2012; 2013). The empirical data also indicate that the Siltie did not 
categorize themselves with the Gurage and describe their history significantly different from 
other Gurage groupings. The Siltie disputed over categorization with Gurage and continued the 
struggle for identity during the Derg regime. 
The fall of Derg regime in Ethiopia coincided with the end of the cold war era, and the inception 
of a new world order that ushered in most of African countries a demand to institutional and 
structural reforms that aim at „the right to have a right“(Smith 2013:3). Smith further noted that 
groups that were left out of the political reforms aspired for greater access to the „goods“ of 
citizenship with an active interest to bring about an application of citizenship, popular 
participation, and accountability of leaders (ibid.). Smith further underpins that „citizenship has 
also become the kind of quality of life and development initiatives one could or should 
expect“(ibid.). 
After the demise of the Derg regime in 1991, Ethiopia has introduced a new policy called 
„Ethnic Federalism.“ Such policy has mainly based itself on a formal decentralization of local 
and regional administration along the ethnic, linguistic and historical criteria. This policy led to 
an ethnicization of public discourses filled with cultural revivalism and resulted in the 
strengthening of ethnic group identities. The Siltie who were categorized among the 
administrative Zones of Hadiyya, Gurage and the then Halaba-Kambata zones felt neglected 
both economically and politically under the post-Mengistu regime. Thus, the urban Siltie, youths, 
peasants as well as rural self-help organizations initiated an ethnic identity movement called the 
Siltie movement that lasted from 1991-2001. Its aim was to define their ethnicity and to develop 
the socio-economic lives of the society. According to Dirk, their first important political goal 
was „to assert their ethnic unity and to realize equality with neighboring ethnic groups by 
acquiring their „administrative Zone“ (Vaughan, 2003; Dirk, 2011:457; Smith, 2013, Kairedin, 
2013). 
The Siltie intensified their struggle, and the state took various measures including arrest and 
intimidation to silence the quest. The Federal and southern regional states provided different 
mechanisms including conferences to resolve the dispute. One of the major actions the 
government took was organizing a conference known historically as Butajira conference in 
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Butajira town. It was held from 30 July-1st August 1997 in which the representatives of the Siltie 
and the Gurage, contending parties, federal as well as regional government authorities took part 
in different capacities. The Siltie contested the mechanisms provided by the government that 
were against the constitution that stipulates that „the exercise of self-determination, including 
secession would be determined by a referendum of the concerned group and subsequent approval 
by federal and regional government bodies” (Article 39(4)). 
Studies indicate that „both local and regional authorities do not provide any argument or 
justification to how and why this procedure was not perused in the course of resolving the Siltie-
Gurage identity dispute“(Aklilu 2000:67). Aklilu (2000:67) also notes that representatives of the 
Siltie communities from different districts gathered in Butajira town to decide the status of the 
Siltie by referendum. The Siltie party, Siltie Peoples Democratic Unity Party (Henceforth 
SPDUP) had contested both the outcome and the entire process of the resolution and made a 
formal request to the House of Federation to resolve the question of Siltie as per Article 62 of the 
constitution. Representatives of Siltie elders and SPDUP had submitted a petition to the House of 
Federation to review the entire process and provide another mechanism to resolve the dispute on 
March 25, 1998, and November 7, 1991. The House referred the case to the Council of 
Constitutional Inquiry (CCI) committee to interpret the constitution as per Article 84(1), and 
come up with the resolution. Finally, the CCI indicated that the procedures taken by the southern 
regional government had violated the constitutional right of the Siltie. It was because of this 
problem that the results of the Butajira conference faced fierce resistance from the people. The 
CCI underlined further that the procedures and mechanisms used to resolve the inter-ethnic 
dispute were not carried out in the spirits of Article 39(5) of the Constitution that empowers the 
Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of the country to self-administration including secession. 
The Constitutional Inquiry Committee recommended that the identity question be resolved by the 
active involvement of the people who raised the quest. The House of Federation instructed the 
Southern regional state to facilitate a referendum to settle the identity dispute between the Siltie 
and the Gurage. 
With the failure of various strategies to end an inter-ethnic dispute between the Siltie and the 
Gurage, a popular referendum had come out as the only mechanism to resolve a decade-long 
identity struggle. Thus, the Southern regional state arranged a referendum on April 1, 2001, 
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when the majority of the Siltie took part and decided that the Siltie be an independent ethnic 
group. Such episode led to the regaining of ethnic and administrative independence of the Siltie, 
which they lost following the incorporation of Siltie land into Ethiopia under Menilik II forces in 
1889 (Yalew 2004:35; Dirk 2011: 457-458). Finally, in June 2001 Siltie Zone was formed. In the 
inter-ethnic dispute, both state and non-state actors had active involvement, and with this, the 
Siltie has got the status of ethnic identity and their administrative center in the Federalist 
Ethiopia. 
Following the establishment of the Siltie zone, the Siltie Zone has launched various projects 
aimed at developing the region and the identity markers of the people. As part of identity 
formation, Siltie Zone chose the following symbols and events as identity markers. The people 
have opted for a pink color as a marker of the Siltie symbolizing bright future to the newly born 
Zone. They have also invested huge money in the Siltie language studies and have decided that 
the Siltie language be the official working language of the Zone since 2017. However, more 
importantly, Islam has become one of the major identity markers of the Siltie. Another identity 
marker which is emerging among the Siltie is peace as an indication of the high value the Siltie 
accords to dispute settlement. The Siltie’s choice of peace and harmony indicates the importance 
or centrality of local dispute resolution among the people. Moreover, the categorizing of time 
itself is an indication that the Siltie determines to forge a new form of identity in the 
contemporary Ethiopia and give their interpretations of the time. All people categorize time 
based on past episodes they passed through. In contrast to recent Ethiopian history, when all 
Ethiopians consider 1991 as an inception of a new era, the Siltie have emphasized the period of 
the struggle to restore their identity and the date the referendum was reached, as well as the post 
zonal establishment periods as crucial periods in the categorization of time. As they struggled for 
their identity for a decade after 1991, 2001 has become an important starting point for the people 
as it heralded the establishment of Siltie zone.  
In short, the importance of local dispute settlement has strengthened since the 1990s due to the 
identity sentiments which in turn boost the legitimacy of local dispute settlers and the customary 
court. It is observed in different parts of the Siltie that both state and non-state actors consider the 
local modes of dispute settlement not only an important institution for dispute resolution but also 
an important identity marker that embodies the identity manifestation of the Siltie. 
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8.5. Concluding Remarks 
In sum, the chapter elucidates that the relation between the Siltie and the state is characterized by 
contentious and amicable interaction based on the orientations of the regimes to the local 
realities. The state-Siltie interaction that had worsened since the 1990s following the genesis of 
Silti-Gurage identity dispute finally culminated with a referendum that laid the foundation for the 
formation of Siltie Zone. The Siltie-Gurage identity dispute has marked the apogee of Siltie-state 
confrontation on the quest for self-rule that had started since the late 19th century. It was also a 
struggle waged for gaining an appropriate resource from the Federal arrangement. Even though 
the 1995 constitution ushered in a radical departure by introducing decentralization and 
constitutionally sanctioned pluralism, religious and customary actors are vying for more power 
and using their agency to appeal to the community.  
In sum, the chapter elucidates that the relation between the Siltie community and the state is 
characterized by contentious and amicable interaction based on the orientations of the regimes to 
the local realities. The state-Siltie interaction that had worsened since the 1990s following the 
genesis of Silti-Gurage identity dispute finally culminated with a referendum that to the 
formation of Siltie Zone. The Siltie-Gurage identity dispute has marked the apogee of Siltie-state 
confrontation on the quest for self-rule that had started since the late 19th century. It was also a 
struggle waged for gaining an appropriate resource from the Federal arrangement. Even though 
the 1995 constitution ushered in a radical departure by introducing decentralization and 
constitutionally sanctioned pluralism, religious and customary actors are vying for more power 
and using their agency to appeal to the community. The political interference in the state 
judiciary has negatively affected the legitimacy of the state legal system on the one hand and 
played a role for the non-state actors to boost their agency on the other.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
9. DYNAMICS OF PLURAL LEGAL CONSTELLATIONS: RETROSPECT AND 
PROSPECTS OF LEGAL PLURALISM IN FEDERALIST ETHIOPIA 
9.1. Introduction 
By extending the Siltie experiences to the legal history of Ethiopia, this chapter presents an 
overview of the historical trajectories the various legal systems have undergone in Ethiopia, and 
the changes and continuities the different legal systems have been witnessing in the Siltie area. 
The chapter examines the challenges the legal systems face and the various mechanisms dispute 
settlers employ to overcome both internal and external obstacles. More importantly, the chapter 
links the micro legal realities of the Siltie to the global situations and looks at the strength and 
limitations of the existing socio-legal and anthropological literature in conceptualizing the notion 
of legal pluralism, and hints the ways forward for future the socio-legal and anthropological 
scholarship. The literature and the empirical data presented in this book indicate that one size fits 
all approach of the positivists' conception of law has given the place for legal pluralism as a 
means of ending disputes both in the state and non-state scenarios. The chapter finally argues 
that socio-legal anthropological scholars need to rethink the concept of legal pluralism and bring 
legal hybridism into the discussion as an emerging legal sphere in contemporary socio-cultural 
setting. 
9.2. Genesis of Legal Pluralism: Processes of Legal Transplantation and Local 
Responses 
It is indicated in the preceding chapters that the state had introduced different mechanisms aimed 
at supplanting the customary system since the late 19th century. It took the local political and 
judicial authority away from the Siltie elders, functionaries and thereby restricting their influence 
in the social life. The central government, for instance, installed the state courts and Qebele 
institutions as an alternative forum of dispute settlement in the area. However, the state could not 
break down the traditional authority and customary court in its entirety. This is mainly because 
the local authority is primarily based on kinship which is governed by economic and political 
relationships (see also Benda-Beckmann 1981:138). Using their agency, local actors are involved 
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in various dispute cases including murder cases. The data presented in this book indicate that 
compared to the secular court, the local community has opted elders to end disputes.  
Elders use the customary court as a forum to settle disputes, and dispute settlement session has 
become a major field to generate power at the local level. The elders are thus at the forefront of 
the struggle for the resurrection of the customary dispute settlement institution due to three major 
reasons. First, the local dispute resolution has become the only forum that can provide them with 
the legal basis to take part in the dispute resolution processes. Second, the customary dispute 
settlement has also become an integral part of local identity. Third, the local dispute resolution 
has also served elders to generate local power and foster their local legitimacy vis a vis other 
contending legal systems. It is also observed that local legal actors resort to various local and 
Islamic belief systems such as religious precepts and state laws to appeal to clients and use them 
to compete with the state as well as religious courts. Local mediators also consider cases that are 
referred from different ethnic and religious groups. They handle interfaith and inter-ethnic 
disputes according to the belief and ethnic background of disputants.  
I observed that local dispute settlers mention the weaknesses of other legal systems to attract 
more clients. A good case in point was how Hajji Awel presented the state legal system's 
inefficiency to deliver justice to his clients (See more in chapter Seven Case I). Nevertheless, 
Hajji Awel borrowed some ideas from the state and religious legal systems to handle cases. This 
shows the flexibility and diversified ways customary court legal actors use to settle disputes on 
the one hand, and the contestation of power among different legal actors, on the other (Tamanaha 
2008:409-410). The incident shows the relevance of state and religious legal norms to carry out 
„legal activities of non-state legal actors“ (Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Keebet Benda-
Beckmann 2006:9) who have employed the norms in the local legal court proceedings. This 
scenario has also brought the possibility of forum shopping and self-image and presentations as 
one of the factors for attracting clients. 
One can also understand that local actors' perceptions of various legal systems are inconsistent 
with the prescribed and written ways each system depicts its laws. Rather, it seems that it is 
influenced by their understandings of what is equality, delivering Haq or truth and impartial 
justice and maintaining peace in the society. Hence, actors interpret the law according to what 
Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann call, “popular notion of common 
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sense law“ (2006:9) which the Siltie call Berche and Fero. Thus, even though the state has used 
the legal transplantation process as one of the instruments of state building process, and tried to 
supplant the customary courts, they have persisted to this day due mainly to the social legitimacy 
actors enjoy from the community. 
9.2.1. The Prospects of State and Non-State Modes of Dispute Settlement: Legal 
Pluralism at the Crossroads 
Unlike the case during the Imperial and Derg periods when the religious and customary laws had 
got little concessions in the constitutions (Alula and Getachew, 2008), the 1995 constitution 
represents a marked improvement and has given space to non-legal systems to settle private 
disputes. Legal pluralism has been constitutionally endorsed since 1995. Various religious 
practices have sprouted in Ethiopia following the introduction of freedom of expression and 
beliefs too. The post-socialist Ethiopia has also seen the reconfiguration of the Ethiopian state 
into a Federal structure which has further introduced the right to self-determination including 
establishing state courts by ethnic groups. Such a new system has thus introduced „the formal 
recognition of expressions of ethnic and religious identities and practices as the basis for 
democratic state-building,“ and ethnic-judicial orders have also got legitimacy by the 1995 
constitution (Zerihun 2013:148,149).  
The state's ambitions to control every aspect of life and the political interferences witnessed in 
the state legal systems (Baker, 2013) have overshadowed the various socio-economic and 
cultural achievements Ethiopia has registered since the 1990s on the one hand, and have 
negatively affected the legitimacy of the state judiciary, on the other. The limited political 
commitment and the introduction of the developmental state, as well as the state-religion conflict 
since 2011 have also become one of the challenges religious institutions including Shari'a courts 
face in the country. The shortages of qualified Qadi and declining legitimacy of the Shari’a 
courts, power contestations from customary court judges as well as criticism from the youth and 
the subsequent rise of youths' modes of dispute settlements can also be mentioned as some of the 
challenges the faith-based institutions face this time.  
The Sufi shrines and popular Islamic practices have faced criticisms from Islamic reformists 
(Østebø, 2008; Zerihun 2013:151) who have begun to consider the practices as innovations and 
illegitimate practices.  
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The local belief practices, however, continue to persist due partly to the new government's 
encouragement of „moderate Islam“ and the decline of the state judiciary's delivery of justice 
owing to a number of internal and external factors. The inefficiency of the Shari'a court itself 
contributes to the revival of the practice of local Islamic practices.  
This is an indication of power contestation with in intra-faith legal systems and among legal 
actors of the different legal systems. The customary legal system has faced challenges not only 
from the state but also from Islamic reformist movements. 
The findings of this study also indicate that against the dominant presence of Islam as a religion 
in the area, the Shari'a court could not earn more legitimacy than the state and customary courts 
in the eyes of the community due to internal and external factors261. A number of factors can be 
counted for the decline of the importance of the religious courts. First, my respondents said that 
they do not consider the Shari'a courts and Islamic council the real Islamic institutions since the 
courts perform their works as prescribed by the state that formed the institutions. They underline 
that the courts are not given rights to handle all disputes according to the teachings of the 
Shari’a. They are not happy on responsibilities the Shari'a courts are mandated by the 
constitution ( e.g. marriage contract). Some informants said that they could conclude marriage 
contracts at home without necessarily going to the Shari'a court since Islam gives the parties the 
right to do so on condition that the parties can fulfil the requirements. Second, informants do not 
believe that Qadis can understand the secular laws since it is important to see the jurisdiction and 
follow the procedural laws comparatively. The Qadi appointment procedure itself is not based on 
meritocracy, and hence Islamic knowledge is not considered seriously as a prerequisite for 
appointment to the Shari'a courts. Informants said that the religious leaders who are known by 
their disciples and have religious knowledge are at home since the state cannot easily manipulate 
them. Third, some Qadi informants posited that the tribunal is not operating at its full capacity. 
This is due, among other factors, to the limited constitutional rights accorded to the courts and 
the inefficiency and inability of Qadi rather than the Shari'a law. They underscore that if the 
Qadis were well educated in Shari'a law, they could easily understand that Shari'a gives much 
right and protects the rights of the Muslim community.  
                                                     
261 Interview with Ato Mustafa, an ex-judge, Sheik Kedir, Islamic council leader and Weizero Amina/Pseudo 
names/, Zone official and Qadis from Silti and Werabe areas in February and March 2015. 
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The Qadis do not believe that their verdicts are binding as the police mostly do not accept their 
orders to bring the culprit to the court.262 Additionally, some Qadis informants mentioned that 
Muslims themselves could not resort to the Shari'a court for dispute resolution due to their 
limited knowledge of Shari'a law. The second reason the Qadis mentioned is the influences of 
young, educated Salafis who mix religious knowledge with secular education and could not 
respect their institution.  
Fourth, the non-existence of translated Shari'a procedural and crime codes is one of the reasons 
Qadis mentioned that negatively affect the Shari'a court capacity to deliver justice. The Qadis 
state that the legal representatives of the accused advise their clients to go to the state court since 
they could not get translated Shari'a codes. 
Fifth, some informants said that though there are some competent Qadis in the Shari'a courts, 
most of the courts are not working properly due to the limited budget allocation by the 
government. The courts are not well equipped both materially and in the human resource and 
this, in turn, hinders the court's effectiveness to fully implement and deliver justice to the 
community (Appleby, 2008). I have also observed that except the Zone High Shari'a Court other 
Shari'a courts did not have computers and office equipment. My informants said that this is one 
of the strategies the state system employs to weaken the Shari'a courts. 
 Lastly, the emergence of young and educated Muslims who begin to replace the hitherto 
respected traditional Sheiks in delivering religious knowledge can also be mentioned one of the 
reasons that negatively affect religious courts. Exploiting the failure of the Shari'a courts and the 
state judiciary to deliver justice, Muslim-educated youths have capitalized their agency and 
appear as a viable dispute settlement option for the younger generation. Second, the existence of 
inefficient Qadi helps them also to generate support from the Muslim community. They consider 
the appointment procedure and state interferences into the religious affairs as a manifestation of 
the government's hypocrisy to Islam's revival.263 Art.34 and 78 of the 1995 constitution is quoted 
as a case show by Muslim youths to indicate the government's reluctance to practically 
empowering Islamic institutions. 
                                                     
262 Interview with Qadi Ahmed/pseudonym/ on August 23/8/2015, Werabe town. 
263 Islamic revivalism is a broad-based social and political movement directed toward internal renewal. It is a 
response to a widely felt melancholy that has left Muslim societies weak and unable to meet the modern world on 
their terms (Seid and Fun 2001:15).  
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Despite the challenges they face, both faith-based dispute settlers and customary court judges 
consolidate their legitimacy by manoeuvring the limited space they have got in the constitution 
and the failure of the state and judiciary. According to a report from the Siltie Zone High Court, 
thirty judges are working in nine First Instance and the Zonal High Courts.  
This number seems to be too small to the state court to be able to render justice for more than a 
million people in the Zone. Thus, these factors help customary court judges, local faith leaders, 
and young Muslims to strengthen their agency and concretize their legitimacy among the local 
community. This scenario boosts the legitimacy of actors of faith-based and customary courts vis 
a vis the state legal systems.  
The Qadis and the local community informants state also that the Siltie culture is strongly tied to 
Islam. Thus, they are happy whenever some crimes such as murder and theft that could have 
been punished with extremity by Shari'a law get settled in the customary court. One of the Qadis 
explained that he resolved a murder case using the Siltie values in the customary court. The state 
court judges and public prosecutors said that since elders only have constitutional rights to 
handle minor disputes than crimes, they are working in cooperation with customary court Ragas 
especially on civil matters. They said that the state courts mostly depend on customary courts for 
those crimes the police cannot prosecute due to lack of access to evidences.  
The attorneys also explained that the elders are always important agents in screening out suspects 
whenever a crime is committed at night and in the absence of witnesses. The legal reality among 
the Siltie indicates, however, that elders are involved in every form of dispute including 
homicides. The police, the state prosecutors, and social court actors mention that they employ 
Awchachign, a local form of investigative mechanism to screen out suspects. State agents said, 
however, that the court sometimes disagrees with local dispute settlers over crime cases the 
constitution does not empower customary and religious courts to prosecute. I observed that the 
public prosecutors sometimes did not suspend perusing a legal action on crime cases like murder 
and theft even if they know that elders have handled the case.  
I also observed that even if the state court resolved a homicide case, the perpetrator could not 
reintegrate into the community unless he/she summons elders to see the case again to enable 
him/her be cleared of Berche and Fero. Siltie Zone High Court President said that the tribunal is 
now in consultation with the justice department, the Zone officials and the police in an attempt to 
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reduce contestation over cases and enable the state court to reduce caseloads. The discussion also 
aims at developing a mechanism that can allow elders process murder case, especially car 
accidents, without the interference or support of the state system. Thus, the Siltie's experiences 
on legal pluralism is characterized by competition between intra-faith and inter legal systems. 
9.3. Rethinking the Concept of Legal Pluralism: More research in the Area 
The literature and the empirical dispute cases reviewed in this book indicate that one size fits all 
approach to the monolithic conception of law has given the place for legal pluralism as a means 
of ending disputes both in the state and non-state scenarios. Some literature (e.g., Moore, 1978; 
Tamanaha, 2010) underscore the fact that developed countries have also experienced one or 
another form of legal pluralism rather than being strictly regulated by the central legal system as 
perceived before. Although it is usual to hear the demand to revive national laws against the 
common laws and the re-emergence of nationalism sentiments right from North America to 
Europe, including the June 23, 2016 Brexit, multiple legal systems also govern countries in the 
developed world. This is due to the existence of national laws and common organization laws 
like EU law on the one hand, and the existence of migrants who are moving with their values and 
norms that demand recognition partly on the contrary. On top of all this, it is also indicated that 
contemporary legal systems of multinational states like Ethiopia and Mozambique (Santos de 
Sousa, 2006) are characterized by porosity that lacks a clear judicial boundary, indicating the 
little significance the notion of the Weberian nation state has in the African countries. Legal 
actors also take ideas and legal conceptions from different legal and social norms to prosecute 
cases indicating the emergence of legal hybridization and cross-fertilization in Africa 
(e.g.Gluckman, 1956; Santos de Sousa, 2000; Lewellen, 2003; Klute and Bellagamba, 2006; 
Berman, 2012; Santos de Santos, 2006; Cheesman, 2016) and possibly beyond. This cross-
referencing and the subsequent development of hybridized legal norms, in turn, enrich the legal 
perceptions of local actors which boost the legal agency of local legal actors.  
Based on the empirical data, it is observed that different actors have developed multiple 
allegiances to the plural legal systems operating in the area. In this regard, both mediators and 
disputants have developed multiple allegiances to the plural legal systems as an indication to the 
existence of forum shopping in the study area. State actors, for instance, are strongly interested in 
perpetuating the local custom by informally referring cases to the customary legal system as the 
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latter embodies the culture of the people on one hand, and plays a significant role in reducing the 
caseloads in the state courts, on the other. Moreover, the state legal actors have also borrowed 
local norms and values to consider cases on the basis of the dispute cases (e.g., family cases) 
referred to the courts. And hence, they informally rely on the customary legal systems.  
The customary court judges, on the other hand, have developed a good relation with the state 
legal systems for different reasons. First, the elders use the state legal system’s win-lose way of 
treating cases as a reason to convince the clients of how the customary court is better than the 
state since the customary court ends in a win-win result. Second, the local mediators also employ 
the state legal system as instrument to bring back the clients who defy their decisions to the court 
by verbally frightening disputants and in some instances playing a „role of prosecutor“ by 
providing cases and witnesses to the state courts. This state of affair helps the customary court 
legal actors to bring the culprits back to the customary court, and if not successful, use the case 
as a lesson for other cases. Third, in an attempt to resist the blame they face regarding human 
rights and gender issues that have little place in the customary court, local mediators borrow state 
legal norms to settle disputes. It is observed this time that women present their cases without 
Abotgare representative. In addition, Shari'a Qadis are strong supporters of the local custom 
since the customary court considers criminal cases that are not allowed for the Shari'a courts. 
Added to this, the Qadis can take part in the customary court as mediators. They also use the 
state legal system's procedural laws to settle cases in the religious courts.  
On the other hand, the clients of the courts or disputants have used the existence of plural legal 
system as an opportunity to resort to the court from which they expect a good result. On top of 
all this, disputants use state laws as a weapon to resist possible abuses in the customary court 
since the customary court is accused of abusing the right of minorities and is also influenced by 
bribery. They also rely on the customary court to bring the suspect on some cases like arson, 
crimes conducted during night time, theft and homicide cases on which the state legal system 
fails to get evidence. The people also resort to the Shari'a courts for marriage contract cases for 
which either the state or customary courts lack the authority to conclude based on the teachings 
of Islam. Thus, disputant actors have also influenced the interactions of legal systems in the area. 
In addition, the state agents want the existence of plural legal settings to show the results of 
Federalism the Ethiopian state introduced since 1995. Therefore, the interaction of legal systems 
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is characterized by cooperation on one hand, and contestation on the other. Due to the complex 
nature of the legal-reality of the Siltie, we can say that different actors have various interests in 
the existence of plural legal systems in the area. Therefore, this study points that future socio-
legal and anthropological researches should focus on this complex legal reality in contemporary 
societies to examine the possible factors behind the emergence of a complex and hybridized legal 
systems. The findings underpin that „legal systems or orders are not internally homogeneous or 
monolithic as the discourse suggests“ (Twinning 2010:483), and hence legal systems are 
characterized by internal plurality.  
The book also pays much attention to the descriptive aspects of legal systems, and contestations 
among legal actors in the area. On a descriptive level, it should take into account actors other 
than courts. Otherwise, it would lose, at least partially, its explanatory force. Given this scenario, 
the legal pluralist theory might be reconsidered by adding other elements into the framework 
(e.g.by taking the perceptions of local legal actors and disputant parties on legal pluralism). 
Added to this, socio-legal and legal anthropological literature should also give due attention to 
the empirical reality vis a vis ideological combats to better frame and develop the concept of 
legal pluralism. I also believe that Ethiopia's model of constitutionally sanctioned pluralism will 
provide some useful insights to grasp how complex the relationship between courts and political 
institutions in the multiethnic states are, and how legal pluralism and legal hybridism have 
become an empirical reality than myth. Finally, the ambiguous nature of constitutional 
provisions that could not provide clear legal recognition to the customary and religious 
institutions has influenced the Ethiopian legal system to grasp the potential roles non-state actors 
can pay in criminal and other legal areas. Despite this constitutional limits and barriers, non-state 
legal actors have involved in every case and the state legal system has informally relied on the 
customary and partly religious legal system to deal with some dispute cases. Thus, Ethiopia's 
constitutional provisions and its legal system should be revisited to harmonize the religious and 
customary legal regimes' roles for dispute settlement.  
To recapitulate, taking the perceptions of both state and non-state legal actors and further 
investigating how they deal with conflict cases, this book argues that not only are legal systems 
plural, but they are also becoming hybridized. And the findings presented in this book will also 
have contribution to understand how the local community uses various legal regimes to get best 
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out of prosecutions, 'Strategic Choices' (Tamanaha, 2008), and „ Forum Shopping“ Benda-
Beckmann, 1971; 1986 and 2006). Taking the growing nature of hybridized character of systems, 
this book argues that instead of debating whether there is legal pluralism or not in a given social 
setting or focusing on mapping out what type of complexity should be conceived as „legal 
pluralism”, or asking whether legal pluralism requires the existence of more than one legal order 
or whether there are various „legal mechanisms”(Benda-Beckmann, 2002), since legal pluralism 
is everywhere (Merry, 1989; Tamanaha, 2010), we need to rethink the notion of legal pluralism 
(G. Teubner,1992) and adopt legal hybridization as prospective agenda for socio-legal and 
anthropological inquiries. This is mainly because a growing number of research works indicate 
that the conventional differentiations of legal pluralism have recently been reshaped by the 
emergence of the most complex forms of legal pluralism. This type of complex legal system 
encompasses customary, religious, national and also global norms that have no clear boundaries 
amongst legal systems (Merry, 1989; Griffiths Anne 2002; Tamanaha, 2010; Santos de Sousa, 
2006; Klute and Bellagamba, 2006; Cheeseman, 2016). 
9.4. Concluding Remarks 
The chapter indicates that the political interference in the state judiciary has negatively affected 
the legitimacy of the state legal system on the one hand and played a role for the non-state actors 
to boost their agency on the other. The Siltie use plural legal systems as the major tool to settle 
cases, and as an instrument legal instrument to maintain local identity and power. There is also a 
power struggle between intra-faith dispute settlement which seems a generational conflict 
between classical Sufi Sheikhs and Salafi-oriented youths. The struggle between religious actors 
for more freedom to Shari'a courts seems a reflection of the demand of Muslim community for 
more religious freedom and an indication of the worsening relation between Muslims and the 
Ethiopian state in the last five or more years. Finally, the chapter argues that existing socio-legal 
anthropological studies should pay attention to the pluralism natures of intra-legal systems and 
legal hybridism as an emerging legal reality in both developing and developed countries.  
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CHAPTER TEN 
10. CONCLUSION 
This concluding chapter presents an overview of the book and a commentary on the state of the 
art. It also considers issues such as what substantive questions need to be addressed that have not 
yet received attention by socio-legal researchers so far. 
Based on the reviewed literature and empirical data presented in this book, I can conclude that 
different regimes starting from Menilik II to Hailesillasie and later the Derg failed to recognize 
customary and Shari'a laws, and suppressed the institutions at various levels in Ethiopia in 
general and among Siltie in particular. Despite these challenges from various regimes, the 
customary laws could not die out and continued to operate in hidden ways and resist the 
interventions by various regimes till now. The customary and religious legal systems have 
partially got resurgence following the installation of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia since 
1990s.The continued existence of non-state dispute settlement institutions, albeit there are 
various interventions and policy shifts in the country, enjoying legitimacy and durability of 
social orders indicate the non-state modes of dispute settlements' capacity to deal with the 
problem of violence. Close inspection of various laws enacted in the country since the 1950s 
indicates that the legal reforms aimed at constructing the state legal system with its monopoly 
over other laws. Hence, the constitutional sanctioning of customary and religious laws seems an 
unfinished project in the contemporary Ethiopia. Following the introduction of what the 
government calls „developmental democratic state“ since 2011 this state of affair has further 
worsened, for the model gives more power to the state and privileges a unified legal system than 
pluralism as an instrument to bring socio-economic development in the country. And hence, 
customary and religious laws cannot enjoy equal status even as the constitution gives some 
concessions to them. Nevertheless, one of the aspects of legal pluralism among the Siltie is that 
the customary and Shari'a courts are not functioning or operating based on constitutional 
stipulations. For instance, they consider criminal cases that are in principle not within their 
jurisdiction.  
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Hence, it is evident from the data that close inspection of legal pluralism among Silties also 
indicates that the customary laws handle cases more than what the 1995 constitution prescribes 
for them, and are playing a significant role in maintaining order.  
The reviewed cases and perceptions of dispute settlers also indicate that the state is encroaching 
on the judiciary in a number of ways including political interferences. On top of all that, it is 
observed that the customary and religious laws have been applied in day-to-day life more than 
the state laws. Nevertheless, dispute settlers have developed new forms of legal perceptions 
according to which there is no clear boundary between the legal systems. Legal actors take ideas 
and values from different jurisdictions to consider dispute cases specially, the state court judges' 
decisions regarding family cases also incorporate elements of customary laws, indicating the 
emergence of „a process of cross-fertilization or hybridization of legal norms „(Santos de 
Sousa2006:36) in the area. The interaction among legal systems is mutually reinforcing in that 
„rules in one system are shaped by and are shaping those in another“ (Griffiths 1998:134). 
It is also worth recalling that religious ideas and values are the most important factors the Siltie dispute 
settlers employ to potentially avoid conflict and to build peace in the local community. Popular Islamic 
practices including the Sheiks' shrines and Mawlids have revived since 1990s as places of social 
solidarity and centers of dispute settlements. However, it is clearly observed that there is a 
generational conflict between the traditional Meshayiks and the young, active and educated 
Imams. Sharia courts have also faced challenges from the constitution, the state actors, the state 
court judges, and the community. The Ragas and other traditional authorities have the traditional 
legitimacy to rule the customary and religious courts. The cases in this book indicate that these 
non-state actors act as standard setters in the area, and consider the mediation services they 
deliver as instruments of peace. Taking the roles customary law plays to regulate the interactions 
of members of the community, one can say that it has elements of law as non-state law 
(Gillissen, 1971). There are also instances of pluralism within the customary, state and Sharia 
laws; hence, they are characterized by „pluralism of pluralism“ (Tamanaha, 2010). It is explained 
in this book that western legal traditions are deeply rooted in the interpretation and application of 
written codes and decisions, while the customary laws such as that of the Siltie are not codified 
and are thus amenable to interpretations. The customary laws are also adaptable and flexible to 
changing circumstances since they are deeply rooted in oral traditions.  
 
 
336 
 
They also empower legitimate stakeholders of the conflict (the offender, the victim and their 
families) to control the dispute and come in to terms by avoiding revenges. 
Despite these advantages, there are inherent limitations in customary laws as far as they remain 
unwritten. One prominent example is that they could not guarantee protection of human rights 
and minorities' rights (Pimetel 2010:19) as the customary law is mainly framed with patriarchal 
mindset. Decisions are not predictable in the realm of customary courts, and there are no clear-
cut preambles for substantive rules. An elder can criticize another one for the fact that the latter 
is not good in procedural rules and in passing verdicts on the basis of Siltie strict traditions and 
norms. This is also an effective way to compete for power among contending elders. However, 
these days, it seems that those elders who have given due attention to Islamic ideas, rules, and 
traditions are getting prestige and recognition among the younger generation than those sticking 
to Siltie traditions. Accordingly, codification may be a necessary precursor to meaningful 
appellate review. Codification, however, has other costs to the system, and to the concept of 
legal pluralism, and should not be pursued without at least considering the compelling 
advantages of an oral legal tradition, which is flexible and highly adaptable when compared to 
written law. It is also noted that a number of elders have begun to collect bribe from one side and 
decide accordingly, indicating the development of bribery and monetizing the system rather than 
abiding by local values and norms. Exploiting the legal vacuum brought about by the legitimacy 
crisis of the state and religious legal systems, non-state legal actors, mainly customary court 
judges who use hybridized legal concepts to end disputes, maneuver and appeal to the 
community which in turn helps them boost their legal agencies. The analyzed empirical data also 
indicate that dispute settlers employ customary law as a restorative justice to bring the culprit 
back into societal life by normalizing the parties in dispute. However, the customary law violates 
the suspects' rights of presumption of innocence since the customary court considers the accused 
as the perpetrator by not considering him or her innocent before the final verdict, unlike the state 
and Shari'a courts. 
The dispute cases and the empirical data reviewed in this book indicate further that elders handle 
quite a large number of cases vis a vis other legal actors. It is, however, stated that state officials 
try to politicize their relations with the traditional authorities like local religious leaders mainly 
during the Siltie's identity struggle period between 1991 and 2001.  
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At the same time, some chiefs and other local dispute settlers demonstrate the tendency that they 
can strengthen their agency and authority by offering their allegiance to, and secure the 
endorsement of the ruling party. Here is a prime example of how legal pluralism has been 
exploited on all sides for political gains. In this regard, traditional authority is preserved 
nominally, but it is reinvented to reflect the interests of the modern state as the federal state 
exploits it for its interest than the local community since the ruling party is shoring up its 
political base at the grassroots level. In addition, it seems that elders and local religious leaders 
have their interests in perpetuating legal pluralism because it will help them gain legitimacy via 
the patriarchal relationships. In this way, the mediation processes will help local dispute settlers 
accumulate power and social leverages (Klute and Embalo, 2011). 
Thus, the recommended approach for Ethiopia should be driven by higher principles and 
purposes, and by the desire to avoid the exploitation of legal pluralism for purposes of 
oppression or political or personal gain as we are now witnessing more often. Accordingly, the 
linkages among legal systems should be established in a way that recognizes and respects the 
traditional culture and custom. This state of affair can limit the potential for such traditions to 
violate the fundamental human rights of women, ethnic or political minorities, or other persons 
or groups. It can also foster the establishment of the rule of law. The cases examined in this study 
indicate that dispute settlers use disputes as shopping fora for their political ends. Local dispute 
settlers are proud to be called everywhere to resolve conflicts and use it as an important channel 
to consolidate power dividends. Thus, power is contested in the local arena, and disputes serve as 
sources of local power for mediators. The Ragas’ decisions are considered as an arena that boosts 
the bargaining power of the elders. 
The executive-judicial relationship is not clearly demarcated at the grassroots level even if 
outlined candidly in the 1995 constitution. Taking Siltie's case as an example, it seems that 
Ethiopia's experience on legal pluralism does not emanate from the normative commitment to the 
existence of legal pluralism. Rather, the legal reality in contemporary Ethiopia can be explained 
as a temporary accommodation in the process of legal re-centralization. The book argues that the 
type of pluralism the type of pluralism witnessed in Ethiopia can be explained as ''superior state 
approach to legal pluralism'' (Pimetel, 2010).  
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The approach is characterized by the existence of a „power centric system“(Bohannan 1965:39), 
whereby the constitution recognizes the validity and existence of the non-state institution, yet the 
state legal system supersedes the religious and customary laws in various ways. In this regard, 
the constitutions recognize the validity of the customary law and customary courts non-state 
institution but, the superiority of the state institutions is often assumed, and hence the state 
institutions always trump the non-state legal ones. Finally, I argue that Siltie customary law 
serves as one of the identity markers of the Siltie people. It is thus not only the law of the state 
that constructs meaning but religious law, local normative orders, and customary law can also 
generate their version of identity (Griffiths Anne 2002:310). The book finally argues that the 
recent recovery of local modes of dispute settlement is linked to the revitalization of ethnic 
sentiments and identity formation processes the Siltie have been undergoing since the 1990s 
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Lists of Key Informants 
No. Name Age Wereda Status Remarks 
1 Girazmach Hussein Bussera 68 Dalocha clan leader He was nominated as 
leader of Siltie elders' 
council 
2 Gerad Awel Ahmed 65 Silti Mauta Leader, and 
known informant in the 
area who died in 
August 2014 
Died in August 2014 
3 Hajji Awel Hassan 69 Enseno Town, 
Gurage Zone 
a Raga who presides 
over dispute cases on 
Sunday  
 
4 Ato Kaire Sule 49 Lanfuro 
Wereda 
an important informant 
on Siltie history and 
customary system 
 
5 Hajji Mifta Siraj 62 Werabe Siltie Zone Sharia 
High Court Judge 
 
6 Abdulwaris Redi 49 Werabe An elder and Siltie 
Musician 
 
7 Ato Akmel Ahmedin   Werabe Siltie Zone High Court 
President 
He is very 
cooperative to give 
information on the 
status of state courts 
and their interactions 
with the customary 
and religious courts 
8 Ato Nesre Issa 39 Werabe Ex-Siltie Zone High 
Court judge, and now a 
religious affairs high 
expert in the Zone. 
 
9 Hajji Mohammed Sheik 
Kelil 
64 Silti 
Werda,Werabe 
Siltie Zone Islamic 
Affair President, and 
customary court judge 
 
10 Azma Jabir Hussein 73 Lanfuro 
Wereda 
Abalcho clan leader 
and customary court 
judge 
 
11 Gerad KedirTeka 65 Sankura Dispute settler  
12 Hajji Arga Nurya 67 Hulbareg Head of Melga 
community and in 
important customary 
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court judge in 
Hulbareg area 
13 Ato Dilebo Gebre 62 Alicho Wuriro An important 
customary court judge, 
and has developed 
good relation with the 
state 
 
14 Sheik Abdurrahman 
Shewajjo 
60 Dalocha local dispute settler 
and member of Zone 
council 
 
15 Sheik Muze Seid 60 Worabe religious leader and 
dispute settler 
 
16 Hajji Temam Imam Surur 68 Alicho-Wuriro local dispute settler  
17 Ato Detemo Desalegn 51 Lanfuro 
Wereda 
elder and secretary of 
Abalcho clan court 
 
18 Hajji WerkichoYesuf 82 Hulbareg local dispute settler  
19 Ato Nuri Teremo 78 Silti local dispute settler  
20 Abdurezak Said 39 Werabe ex-judge in the state 
court and now a legal 
representative/Attorney 
 
21 Ato Bahru Jemal 38 Worabe key informant on 
religious dynamisms in 
the area  
 
22 Rukia Kedir 40 Silti female key informant  
23 Hajji Kemal Barsebo 62 Silti Elder  
24 Ato Mohammed Hussein 44 Silti he is also well known 
informant about the 
history and local 
system of the people 
 
25 Hajji Nuriye Hamdino 63 Alicho Wuriro 
wereda 
he has rich knowledge 
about the local system 
of the Siltie 
 
26 Gerad Kedir Ahmed 70 Silti clan Leader  
27 Rewda Abdella 38 Dalocha female key informant  
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28 Rukia Kemal 36 Hulbareg female key informant  
29 Ato Mohammed Ahmed  38 Werabe zonal police staff  
3o Ato Hamid Azma Hassan 55 Silti local dispute settler  
32 Ato Jemal Adem  46 Addis Ababa businessman  
33 Ato Kedir Lalega, 35 Dalocha wereda official  
34 Ato Mustafa Kedir 
 
52 Werabe ex-state court judge, 
and public prosecutor 
 
35  Engineer Temam Zeyine 
 
48 Werabe local investor and has 
good knowledge on 
customary law 
 
36 Hajji Nasir Mohammed 72 Mierab Azernet local dispute settler  
37 Hajji Keresema 69 Lanfuro clan leader and dispute 
settler 
 
38 Ato Alewi Nuri 50 Werabe a former head of Zone 
security department  
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39 Weizero Aysha Balengo 45 Alicho-Wuriro a women group leader 
at local level 
administration in 
development leagues 
Alicho Wuriro 
 
 
40 Ato Mohammed Yesuf 45 Werabe former zone official  
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  Appendix I. Primary Sources 
Recorded and Transcribed Interviews in chronological orders264 
2 April 2012     Focus Group discussion with Ato Dilebo Gebre, Ato Kairedin Azma Hussein,   
                Hajji Abdurrahman Shewajjo, Hajji Hussein Barsebo in Werabe Town. 
 
23 July, 2014     Interview with Raga Kedir court and the court attendants in Dalocha  
   Town. I observed at the court that women took part while presenting their  
        cases. I also understand that women are shy in the state court and passed  
   the case to legal representatives than talking themselves. 
29 August 2014    Interview with members of the local community, Sheik Mohammed Kelil,  
                Hajji Hamid Hassan about the Arsema Church land dispute in Werabe Town. 
31 August 2014   Interview and observation at Werabe Maga court that was hearing death  
   case due to a car accident in Werabe Town. He was puzzled by the  
        interference of the zone public prosecutor who applauded the driver while  
         elders were dealing with the case. Most of the time elders are allowed to  
   settle car accident cases as the crime cases are not considered as   
   intentional. 
12 September 2014   Interview with Sheik Muze Seid, Ato Dilebo Gebre on Jemila' murder  
                   case in Werabe Town. 
26 September 2014   Observation and interview at Magas' court while considering car accident  
                   case in Werabe Town.  
18 October 2014      Ato Dilebo Gebre, Hajji Mohammed Sheik Kelil in Werabe Town 
4 January 2015.       Interview with Azma Jabir and field observation of inter-clan meeting in  
                Sesso Qebele, Lanfuro Wereda. 
Recorded Dispute Settlement Sessions265 
                                                     
264 This part contains those interviews and observations that have been collected and transcribed for the purpose of 
the research result in this dissertation. I collected and transcribed the empirical data from Siltie and Amharic 
languages with the help of my field assistant Jamal Mohammed. The interview also contained field data from my 
earlier works since 2012, and later modified during my stay in the field. 
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14 September 2014     Video record of an abandoned and thorny fenced house after the son of 
    the owner of the house killed his ankle's son Agode Qebele Siltie Wereda  
15 September 2014    video and audio record about Wurkefena process for car accident case,  
                     Hulbareg Wereda 
21 September 2014   Video s and audio tape recordings of the Wurkefena process aimed to  
                   settle car accident case that claimed the life of 11 years child in Werabe. 
5 October 2014     video and audio recordings of Hajji Awel's court where Hajji Mohammed  
                 Kelil presenting Maga's decision on car accident case that involved death. 
4 January 2015     my observation on inter clan Abalcho court sessions on January Seso  
                Qebele, Lanfuro. 
 
8 February 2015    Audio and video recordings of the customary court where Sheik  
                 Mohammed while involved in the settlement of homicide case led to the 
                death of Indris in Agode Qebele, Silti Wereda 
 
5 February 2015   Video and audio recorded scripts at Hajji Awel's court I observed how  
                disputants like Ato Mussema Idris (Husband of the victim), local elder such  
                as Sheik Mohammed Sheik Kelil, Abdurrahman Mussa (the driver who was   
                responsible for the accident) interacted each other and with Raga Awel. 
 
10 December 2015  Videos of the customary court sessions, observations of dispute settlement  
                   at Datewezir Qebele(Jemila's case).  
20 December 2015  My observation on the local community's protest on state justice  
                 system (Jemila's case) and my observations of the customary court sessions  
                  as well as gossips in Werabe Town .  
24 April 2015      Video and audio recording Interview with Azma Jabir Hussein, 64, in Mitto  
                 Town, Lanfuro Wereda. 
May 3, 2015        Video recordings of the customary court where elders from the various area  
                  gathered in the house of the brother of Ete Jemila to end the  
                                                                                                                                                                           
265 This part contains video and tape recordings of the customary and religious courts as well as relevant data from 
Ethiopian and China Televisions from August 2014 to February 2017. 
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                  homicide case in Datewezir Qebele , Hulbareg Wereda. 
7 June 2015        Video and audio recordings of dispute settlement session at Raga Awel  
                  court while settling domestic violence case , Enseno Town.  
23 September 2015  Video recordings of customary court session in Hulbareg Wereda 
10 January 2015    Interview with Ato Mohammed nur Rameto , ex-head of the Office on the  
                 interactions between state and non-state actors, specially about cases  
                 referred to Good Governance and Appeal office 
5 April 2015       Interview with Hajji Temam Surur and observation of Alicho-Wuriro court.  
                  
24 April 2015      Interview with Azma Jabir Hussein, 64, in Mitto Town 
26 April 2015      FGD Interview with elders. 
  
16 June 2015    Interview with customary court judges and observation of Magas while  
               hearing murder case at Burda level Alicho-Wuriro Wereda.  
20 June 2015    Interview with Ato Mohammed Yusuf, a former head of Siltie zone culture,  
              tourism and communication department, Werabe Town . 
26 June 2015    Weizero Aysha Balengo, a woman local leader at local level administration in  
               Women's development leagues Alicho Wuriro. 
July 25 2015    Interview with Shiek Ahmed Kelil, Hajji Kedir Abdela, Imam Hussein Kedir  
               and Ato Bahredin Adem who were key figures in their communities in various  
              Weredas.  
 
1- 7 September 2015  Interview with Raga Hajji Awel, age 65, in Enseno Town. I attended the     
                   court session several times to observe how cases are settled.  
                  I also followed dispute cases from Agode Qebele Maga to Hajji  
                  Awel's appellate court several times to observe how cases are settled in a  
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                  more concrete ways. 
16 November 2015  Interview with Priest Awegechew, head of Orthodox Christians in Siltie 
Zone 
10 December 2015    Interview with Sheik Muze Seid, Aman (Aba Fedlu), Dilebo Gebre, Hajji  
                    Nasir Siraj, 70. 
16 December 2015  Interview with Hajji Mohammed Sheik Kelil, 64, a Maga and President  
                  of Siltie Zone Islamic Council on 16 December 2015 Werabe. I  
                  accompanied Hajji Mohammed to different customary court sessions to  
                 observe how he settles disputes since August 2014 for more than two years.  
 
20 December 2015   Interview with customary court judge on in Enseno Town, Hajji Awel's  
                  court, and field observation of the court's session. 
25 December 2015   Raga Lalu's Customary Court Session in Udasa Qebele Silti Wereda  
 
26 December 2015  Engineer Temam a Siltie local investor and known for his cultural  
                 knowledge specially about lowland Siltie Werabe. 
28 December 2015  Interview with disputants and Hajji Mohammed Kelil at local elders   
                 meeting in Agode Qebele. 
30 December 2015  Interviews with Ato Alewi Nuri and other state representatives while  
                 discussing with various individuals about the significances of elders for the  
                  justice sector Werabe town . 
7 January 2016     Interview with Ato Akmel Ahmedin, Siltie Zone High court President in 
                  Werabe Town. 
25 October 2016   Interview with Ato Bahru Jamal, a lecturer/anonymous name) Mirab Azernet  
                area. 
11 December 2016   ,Interview with Ato Ahmed, Zone official and has worked with elders on  
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                    local security and dispute issues for a long period of time, Werabe  
01 January 2017      Interview with Hajji Mohamed, a local elder who was involved with  
                   Church land dispute.  
27 January 2017     Interview with Priest Awegechew about the Church land dispute case  
                  (Interview held in Werabe). 
1 February 2017     Interview with Ato Seid Seman, head of Siltie Zone Investment office on                       
                  (Interview held in Werabe). 
9 February 2017    Interview with Ato Darunga Desta, a local dispute settler who was the  
                  head of Christian disputants in 2012 Inter -faith dispute on.(Interview held  
                  in at Garore ) And field observation of the disputed land. 
Recorded Tape and Television programs 
30 December 2011 YouTube video Uploaded on Dec 30, 2011 „Ethiopian Silte Zone 
Christians cry for Justice“, accessed 11 April, 2017. 
07-08 March 2012  Ethiopian Television News on the disputed church land case  
20 February 2015 Ethiopian Television news Amharic program, a six months’ report 
from the Ministry of Transport at 10:21 pm, and 8:06 pm news 
30 April 2016 ”Seifu Show”, EBS TV. Advertizing the Arsema church 
inauguration  
7 May 2016           „Seifu Show“, EBS TV at 9:25 pm (Church inauguration addressing the  
                         burnt church in Siltie)  
 
30 November 2016    China Television News (CC TV) on the African Union's recommendation  
                        of elders to resolve South Sudan's crisis;-“ AU targets traditional leaders'   
                        involvement in restoring peace in South Sudan“ at 8:25. 
O1 January 2017       EBC News on Peace and Development Center:-Peace and Development  
                   Center has been set up by the government. It has mentioned that elders  
                  and religious figures are important figures to tackle conflicts and bring  
                  lasting peace in the country. Elders and religious leaders gathered at the  
                  center on 2 January, 2017 at the center to discuss the roles of elders and  
                   religious leader for local and national peace as well as development. It is  
                  said that the major reason behind the peaceful existence of Ethiopians is  
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                 the roles of elders and religious leaders who have been playing a crucial role  
                  to keep social order at the grassroots level (at 8:15) 
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       Appendix II State court and Sharia court Resolutions 
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Appendix 2.1. Siltie Zone Public Prosecutor's law suit on Hajji Kedir's Murder case 
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Hajji Kedir's case continued... 
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Continued... 
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Appendix 2.2. Siltie Zone High court decision on Hajji Kedir's case 
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Appendix 2.3.Public Prosecutors lawsuit on Bedria's Car accident Case 
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Appendix 2.4 Siltie Zone High Court Decision on Bedria's case. 
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Appendix 2.5. Elders' contract paper submitted to Siltie Zone High court.  
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 Miscellaneous 
29th August 2014-April, 29, 2016  Field Diaries  
Since August 2014 to February 2017 S-Mobile Notes  
 
Appendix 2.6. Shari'a court's decision on Divorce Case 
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Glossary of Local Terms 
Abotgare/Habotgare 
Agga 
Ato 
Abotweld 
a man's side lineages or Patrilineal Assembly (Siltie) 
 type of marriage where a girl chooses her would be husband (Siltie) 
mr (Amharic) 
kins (Siltie) 
Azma a title given to local leaders (Siltie) 
Baliqenet elderness (Siltie) 
Berche the local notion of justice (Siltie) 
Biter marriage (Siltie) 
Dagna head of clan court leader/in some instance chief (Siltie) 
Debo traditional collaborative system for economic activity (Siltie, also 
common across several Ethiopian cultures) 
Debub south (Amharic) 
Dem literally 'blood', meaning murder (Siltie) 
Deret half (Siltie) 
Derg literally 'committee’; from ‘Provisional Military Administrative 
Committee’, used of the regime of 1974-1991 
Enset Enset Ventricosum (a staple food in most parts of Southern Ethiopia) 
Ete a title given to Siltie queen 
Gerad local leader and customary judge (Siltie, Somali, Hadiyya, Mareqo) 
Gicho clan (Siltie) 
Got the smallest state administrative level below Qebele (Amharic)  
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Gragn 'left handed', used of Ahmed ibn Ibrahim-al-Ghazi (1506-43). 
Gumma/Blood money) compensation paid to families or lineages of victims of crimes, blood 
wealth, or blood money after murder (Siltie, Oromo). 
Gudda Eggedot a rite disputant parties conclude after the end of dispute settlement, 
especially on those disputes that involve murder cases (Siltie). 
Girazmach commander of the gate’; imperial politico-military title (Amharic). 
Herrat reconciliation or mediation involving a third party (Siltie). 
Iddir a self-help funeral association (Siltie, Amharic). 
Imam a religious leader (Siltie). 
Qebele originally small geographical unit; widely used after nationalization of 
land to denote area of a peasant/urban dweller’s association during 
Derg; also used of administrative council/committee of area unit 
currently in Ethiopia. 
Kilil Regional State, federated units since 1995. 
Maga Customary First Instance Court dispute settlers (Siltie). 
Malkañña/Naftagna local governor, owner of land and person to whom a tenant owes 
tribute (Amharic). 
Mulli a witness/witnesses in the customary court (Siltie). 
  
Murra a household leader, specially members of households in a village that 
are related in blood have one Murra, usually an elder man who 
represents them in clan meeting and customary court sessions (Siltie). 
Negus king (Amharic) 
Nikah permanent marriage (Arabic, Siltie). 
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Olla a neighbor both individually and communally who meet daily and 
involved in dispute settlement process in the village (Siltie). 
Raga local legal expert (Siltie). 
Serra traditional law (Siltie, Oromo, Sidama, Halaba, Kembata). 
Tembekessa terror (Siltie). 
Teshinenenote dispute or disagreement (Siltie). 
Ummigare a woman's lineages or matrilineal assembly (Siltie). 
Waqf endowment in the name of Islam (Arabic) 
Wegeret peace (Siltie) 
Wereda district, administrative subdivision (Amharic) 
Yebadewold a person from my country or place of birth, and sometimes used to call 
a person from same country Ethiopia (Siltie). 
Yedem/Summera 
Merka 
homicide case (Siltie). 
Yedambus serra 
 
 
Yemelga serra 
part of local dispute settlement system whereby dispute settlers 
nominate a body of 8-12 individuals to bring an accused person to 
customary court session if he/she does not agree with the decisions of 
elders (widely used in the highland Siltie). 
local dispute settlement ( widely used in Melga clan areas). 
Yeqebre serra funeral association involved in minor dispute settlement processes 
(Siltie). 
YeSiltie serra the customary law of the Siltie people 
Zenna conflict that involves word and physical combat (Siltie) 
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